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This thesis traces the connections between ethnicity, hierarchy, and punishment 
on a Ugandan periphery. Focusing on an area known as Bugungu in the lowland 
northern-western littoral of Bunyoro, this study explores a colonial optic that 
ordered ethnic subjects not only horizontally and spatially through division and 
agglomeration, but also vertically by ascribing places in a civilisational hierarchy. 
This study advances the concept of ethno-civilisationalism to encapsulate this 
mode of thought and practice. Adopted by the British partly as a matter of 
expedience and economy, this approach offered opportunities for colonial 
subjects to assert or advance their own rank, drawing on their own prior versions 
of inter-ethnic hierarchy. Shifting the focus from the violence of classification to 
violence as classification, this thesis posits that ethnic difference and hierarchy 
was primarily inscribed in colonial Africa through what is here termed 
‘collectivising punishment’ – punishment of, or calibrated for, particular 
collectives on the basis of stereotypes. Colonialism constituted a project of 
discipline and rank as well as one of divide and rule. Based on archival and oral 
sources, this thesis looks to the peripheries of a colonial territory where the British 
at times outsourced the business of empire – including punishment – to what they 
saw as ‘more civilised’ African ethnic sub-colonials, instead of adopting Indirect 
Rule. The thesis traces the evolution, contestation, and internalisation of these 
ideas and practices within states and society over a period of 130 years, spanning 
the pre-colonial and post-colonial eras. 
  
 




A NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY vi 
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii 
DEDICATION x 
INTRODUCTION: Different strokes for different folks 2 
Historiographies 4 
Agro-pastoralism or barbarism?: ethno-civilisational hierarchies and 
stereotypes in africa 4 
Bunyoro and ethnicity 14 
Classificatory violence: punishment and ethnic hierarchy in colonial africa 18 
Other Karamojas: violence and exceptionalism in Uganda 23 
Methods and sources 27 
Thesis structure 32 
CHAPTER ONE: Hierarchies, civilisations, and collectivities between the 
plateau and the plains, c.1860 37 
Degrees of Nyoro-ness: ethno-civilisational discourses and alterity 38 
Ecological ethnicities, hierarchies and stereotypes between the plateau and 
the littoral 44 
Ethnonymic practices and political subjectivities in Bugungu 48 
Civilisational nexus and intercalary: contested hierarchies 57 
Conclusion 62 
CHAPTER TWO: Conquest and retribution: between the Mukama and the 
mujungu, c.1870-c.1899 63 
Antecedents of occupation: traders, slavers and governors from the north
 64 
‘Fort Magungo’: the politics of Turco-Egyptian occupation on the Northern 
Albertine frontier 69 
Rebellion and retribution post-occupation, 1880-1894 76 
 
No man’s land: collective punishment, between the British and Kabaleega, 
1894-1899 82 
Conclusion 93 
CHAPTER THREE: Savage punishment: disease, difference, and 
displacement, c. 1899-c.1921 95 
Proper and improper tribes 95 
Discipline and disease control 107 
‘The Bagungu location’: administration, missionisation, and identification 
in exile 123 
‘The Bagungu question’: indiscipline, insecurity, and evasion, 1909-1919 128 
The politics of reclamation, 1918-1922 134 
Conclusion 137 
CHAPTER FOUR: Civilisation and its discontents: rewilding Bugungu, c. 
1922-c.1938 138 
Civilisation, nature, and punishment in Bugungu, c.1922-c.1930 139 
Preserving wild Africa: Bugungu and the national park threat, 1930-1934 150 
Preserving wild Africans: scales of justice and civilisation in Bugungu, c. 
1930-1935 163 
Wilderness saved: reincorporation and dehumanisation, 1934-1938 169 
Conclusion 181 
CHAPTER FIVE: Domination, difference and deflection on the capitalist 
frontier, c.1938-c.1952 182 
Accumulation, infiltration, and degradation, 1938-c.1946 183 
Developmental images, ironies, and interventions in post-war 192 
Reforming subjects: discipline and deflection, 1948-1949 204 
Licensing violence: Congo kidemu, 1950-1951 210 
Disorder resumes, c.1951-c.1952 217 
Conclusion 220 
CHAPTER SIX: Between ‘darkness’ and ‘light’: extinction, extortion and 
excess in late colonial Bugungu, c.1952-1961 221 
‘[T]he consequences of their misbehaviour’: c.1952-1954 222 
Reformers, readers, and rumours, 1954-1955 228 
Reconciliation, revolution and reversion, mid-1955 to c.1957 243 
 
‘We Bagungu are eating each other like grasshoppers’: moral ethnicity in 
Bugungu in the mid-to-late 1950s 251 
Ethno-civilisational competition and rank, 1958-c.1961 259 
Conclusion 267 
CHAPTER SEVEN: Corporate hierarchy: the business of ethno-
civilisationalism in Bugungu, c. 1961-1970 268 
The road to a higher level, 1962-1965 269 
Corporate hierarchies and takeovers in ‘wild’ Bugungu, 1965-1968 280 
Downturn, disorder, and division, 1968-1970 288 
Conclusion 294 
CHAPTER EIGHT: Colonial spectres: decline and crisis, c.1971 to c.1991 295 
Localisation and destabilisation, 1971-1974 295 
Redefining Bugungu, 1974-1979 303 
Amin’s shadow, 1979-1985 315 








Figure 1: ‘Location of Murchison Falls Conservation Complex’ (2001). 35 
Figure 2: Planned petroleum infrastructure in Buliisa District today. 36 
Figure 3: ‘Map of the routes in eastern Africa between Zanzibar, the Great Lakes 
and the Nile explored and Surveyed by Captain J.H. Speke 1857-1863’ (1863). 50 
Figure 4: ‘Rough hand sketch by Colonel C.G. Gordon’, 1879. 70 
Figure 5: ‘68. Wanyoro- Mädchen’. 74 
Figure 6: 72. ‘71 Magungo-Mädchen' and ’72. Magungo-Neger’. 74 
Figure 7: ‘61.Dschafalu-Neger’. 75 
Figure 8: ‘Movements in Unyoro 1893-94’. 84 
Figure 9: ‘Loading up the ferry-boat at Pajao’. 89 
Figure 10: ‘The infant Ajaka, the youngest chief in Unyoro’. 92 
Figure 11: ‘Skeleton map showing the present sub-divisions of the Unyoro District’ 
(1901). 97 
Figure 12: Map showing the boundaries of Uganda, the Congo Free State and the 
Lado Enclave. 105 
Figure 13: David Bruce, ‘Koba, Lake Albert’ (1903). 105 
Figure 14: ‘Map of Western Unyoro’ (1901). 107 
Figure 15: ‘Chief Jemusi-Miti-Kago, H.R.H., Mr. Leakey, at Butiaba’. 117 
Figure 16: Untitled map regarding saza chieftainships (c. 1910-1916). 119 
Figure 17: ‘Plan to illustrate game reserves under Game Regulations 1906 and by 
Proclamation Published in the Official Gazette of 1st September 1909’. 122 
Figure 18: ‘Map to show the boundaries of Bunyoro Game Reserve’ (1910). 122 
Figure 19: Untitled map from Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission (c.1912-1913).
 133 
Figure 20: Untitled map showing concession areas under negotiation (1920). 136 
Figure 21: ‘Map of Uganda Protectorate showing the areas proclaimed in the 
Sleeping Sickness Ordinance, 1928’ (cropped by present author). 140 
Figure 22: C.R.S. Pitman, ‘Bangungu (sic) porters and a dead hippopotamus’ (n.d. 
but c. 1926). 143 
Figure 23: Untitled map showing oil concessions (1926). 147 
Figure 24: 'Hydro-electric investigation of the Victoria Nile' (1935). 160 
 ii 
Figure 25: ‘S.W.S. “Lugard” anchored below the falls’ (c.1936). 174 
Figure 26: The Kenyan and Uganda Railways and Harbours, ‘The Murchison Falls 
Uganda’ (1938). 177 
Figure 27: Untitled map of boundary change (1938). 180 
Figure 28: B.G. Kinloch, 'Hauling a seine net at Buliisa' (n.d. but c. 1950). 185 
Figure 29: B.G. Kinloch, ‘The late Mr. L. St. C. Bartholomew, Fisheries Officer, 
Lake Albert’ (n.d. but c. 1950). 205 
Figure 30: The south-western boundary between Murchison Falls National Park 
and the Bugungu Elephant and Hippopotamus Sanctuary (1952). 226 
Figure 31: B.G. Kinloch, ‘The “new look” in fishing canoes – Kabalega-built boat 
specially designed for use with an outboard motor’. 251 
Figure 32: Y.B. Bigirwa (far left, sitting), Y.G. Tundulu (left, standing), (1964). 272 
Figure 33: Y.B. Bigirwa (sitting, second from left) as best man for a Hoima groom 
(1965).  273 
Figure 34: Dugout canoes seized by UNP (c. 1961). 277 
Figure 35: Wanzala with a UN ILO advisor outside the Bugungu Ltd’s 
headquarters in Wanseko (1967). 285 










ADC  Assistant District Commissioner 
AEIC  African & European Investment Co. Ltd 
BaCA  Bagungu Community Association 
BOSA  Bugungu (or Bagungu) Outside Students Association 
BUA  Bugungu (or Bagungu) United Association 
CHA  Controlled Hunting Area 
CMS  Church Missionary Society 
CS  Chief Secretary 
DC  District Commissioner (‘District Collector’ before 1912). 
DP  Democratic Party 
DCWND District Commissioner West Nile District 
KUR&H Kenya and Uganda Railways & Harbours 
MFNP  Murchison Falls National Park 
NiP  Nile Province 
NP  Northern Province 
Sokimo Société Minière de	Kilo-Moto 
SPFE  Society for the Preservation of the (Wild) Fauna of the Empire 
PC  Provincial Commissioner (Sub-Commissioner before 1912) 
PCNP  Provincial Commissioner for Northern Province 
UNILO United Nations International Labour Organisation 
UNP  Uganda National Parks 
UPC  Uganda People’s Congress 




ARGD  Annual Report of the Game Department 
ARGFD Annual Report of the Game & Fisheries Department 
ARPC  Annual report of the Provincial Commissioners 
AMSR  Annual Medical and Sanitary Report 
AMWF  The African Missions of the White Fathers 
BdSGI  Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana 
BdSdGdE Bulletin de la Société de géographie d'Égypte 
BTSGKC Bulletin trimestriel de la Société khédiviale de géographie du Caire 
CMI  Church Missionary Intelligencer 
CSHS  Comparative Studies in Society and History 
EPCA  Emin Pasha in Central Africa 
GJ  The Geographical Journal 
IJAHS  International Journal of African Historical Studies 
JAH  Journal of African History 
JEAS  Journal of Eastern African Studies 
JICH  Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
JRAI  Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
JSPWFE  Journal for the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the 
Empire  
MN  Mengo Notes 
PGM  Petermann’s Geographische Mitteilungen 
 iv 
PRGS  Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 
PRSE  Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 
RSSCRS Reports of the Sleeping Sickness Commission of the Royal Society 
RATUNP Reports and Accounts of the Trustees of Uganda National Parks  
SNR  Sudan Notes and Records 
SPFEJ  Society for Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire Journal 
UCR  Uganda Church Review 
UJ  Uganda Journal 
 
ARCHIVES 
AA  Archives Africaines  
A.G.M.Afr. Archivio Generale dei Missionari d'Africa  
AIMO  Affaires Indigenes & Main d'Oeuvre 
BL  British Library 
BPA   British Petroleum Archive  
BTB2  Bujenje Touring Book Vol. 2 
BTB3  Bujenje Touring Books Vol. 3 
CKP  Cosmas Kato Papers 
CRL  Cadbury Research Library  
CRLs  Centre for Research Libraries 
CS  Chief Secretary 
CUA  Church of Uganda Archives 
CUL  Cambridge University Library 
EISP  Edward I. Steinhart Papers 
GDA  Gulu District Archives 
HAD  Hoima District Archives 
HIA  Hoover Institution Archives 
HWCEAP The Humphrey Winterton Collection of East African Photographs 
IWMA  Imperial War Museum Archives  
JWP  Justin Willis Papers 
JMP  John Mills Papers 
JWP  Justin Willis Papers 
KDA  Kabarole District Archive 
LSA  Linnean Society Archive 
LSHTMA  London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Archives  
MDA  Masindi District Archives 
MJHLAS Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies 
MULAS Makerere University Library Africana Section 
NUA  Northwestern University Archives 
NHMA  Natural History Museum Archives 
ONHMA  Oxford Natural History Museum Archives 
OP  Office of the President 
PP  Parliamentary Papers 
Prov  Provincial Papers 
QENPA Queen Elizabeth National Park Archive 
RAA  Rubaga Archdiocese Archives  
RAC  Rockefeller Archive Center 
RAI  Royal Anthropological Institute 
RAMC  Royal Army Medical Corps archives 
RBF  Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
RCMSA Royal Commonwealth Society Archives 
 v 
RGS  Royal Geographical Society 
RHL  Rhodes House Library 
RWP  Roger Wheater Papers 
SecTop Secretariat Topical  
SDP  Shane Doyle Papers 
SHLA  Senate House Library Archives 
SOAS  School of Oriental and African Studies 
TCDA  Trinity College Dublin Archives 
UCLA  University of California, Los Angeles. 
UFFD  Unyoro Field Force Diary 
UNA  Uganda National Archives 
UNILOA United Nations International Labour Organization Archives,  
  Geneva 
UKNA  National Archives, UK 




































A NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY 
In the Great Lakes Bantu languages most commonly used in western Uganda, /l/ 
and /r/ are allophones from a phonological perspective. But in some cases 
speakers use the linguanymic prefix Ru- instead of Lu- or vice versa, partly as a 
means of reinforcing the distinctiveness of linguistic identities. In upland 
Bunyoro, the /r/ prevails in this regard, hence Runyoro; in Bugungu, the /l/ 
prevails, hence Lugungu. 
In both these languages one Nyoro is a Munyoro, two or more are Banyoro. In the 
interest of simplicity, I omit these prefixes except in the name of the country itself, 
Bunyoro. For the same reason initial vowel are omitted throughout; thus I write, 
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‘a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for 
training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them 
capable of a higher civilization’.1 
‘Punishments are usually heavier in primitive areas such as this 
where they are needed’.2 
‘The true Banyoro (…) were people like the Bagahya from those 
sides and not from Bugungu here (…). At kikonko (at the escarpment) 
going those ends those are the ones called the Banyoro, Bagahya. So 
for us in Bugungu here, for us we are Bagungu but in Bunyoro (…) 
That is how I understand it’.3 
 ‘[T]hey thought [us] (…) primitive, arrogant, undisciplined people. I 
don’t think they had very kind words [to say] about Bagungu’.4 
 ‘The Bagungu are extremely progressive people in every walk of 
life imaginable (…). They have advanced in education and trade (…) 
Intermarriage with several Nilotic tribes (…) has resulted in giving 
the people an appearance and general physical structure which is 
quite different from that which could be referred to as standard 
Banyoro (…)’.5 
                                                        
1 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 2nd ed. (London, 
1861), p. 329.  
2 18/12/42, BTB2. 
3 Int. Gungu 21a 
4 Int. Gungu 4c. 
5 Edward Kakongoro, ‘Kibiro Salt’, unpublished BA dissertation (Makerere 
College East Africa, 1968), p. 25 
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INTRODUCTION: Different strokes for different 
folks 
Colonial rule involved putting people in their places in terms of imagined ‘tribal 
territories’ and in their place in terms of positions on an imagined scale of 
civilisation. This thesis traces the evolution of putative hierarchies of inter-ethnic 
superiority and inferiority over the course of 130 years in part of what is today 
Uganda. Spanning the pre-colonial to the post-colonial eras, this study centres on 
the people known as Gungu in a marginal area known to most for most of this 
period as ‘Bugungu’, though it is known as Buliisa District to the current Ugandan 
government. In the nineteenth century this lowland littoral constituted the 
western section of the northern borderlands of the historical Great Lakes kingdom 
of Bunyoro. Known also as ‘Magungo’ by Lwo-speakers of the region, it was a zone 
where predominantly Bantu-speaking Bunyoro met the smaller, predominantly 
Lwo-speaking, ritually subordinate polities of Lake Albert and the upper Albert 
Nile valley. Since British colonial conquest and rule (1894-1962) Bugungu has also 
constituted the edge of Uganda, sharing its Lake Albert lacustrine frontier – within 
the Albertine Rift Valley – with what was to be the Belgian Congo in roughly the 
same period.  
Racial and colonial thinking under British rule relied on the notion of a 
civilizational hierarchy, not only of races but also of ethnic groups. As racial as it 
was ethnic, as racialising as it was ethnicising, vertical relations were bound up 
with ethnic stereotypes, in a mode of thought that is herein termed ‘ethno-
civilisationalism’. This mode of thought offered colonial rulers a way to order and 
categorise as well as the potential to employ ‘superior’ groups to govern ‘inferior’. 
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But it also offered opportunities to colonial subjects to assert or advance their own 
rank in this hierarchy, drawing often on their own prior versions of ethno-
civilisational hierarchy. By focusing on these vertical inter-ethnic relations and 
not only on the horizontal ordering of ‘tribes’, the thesis offers a new approach to 
the nature and effects of colonial Indirect Rule and to the longer history of 
ethnicity.   
These contested assignments and ascriptions, involving both colonisers and 
colonised, were the work of ethnic stereotyping but also punishment. As such, this 
study shifts the historiography of ethnicity’s focus from the violence of 
classification to violence as classification. At the periphery, it was punishment that 
did considerable ethnological work, often in the shadows of the tribal categories of 
colonial census schedules. What Connor Cavanagh calls the ‘civilizing violence’  of 
colonialism was also classificatory and collectivising.6  Collectivising punishment 
produced and reproduced collectivities and difference – and the content and 
boundaries of ethnic identification – through acts of collective punishment but 
also individual punishment calibrated for particular collectivities according to 
their putative positions in ethno-civilizational hierarchies. In this way, colonies 
functioned ‘according to a set of changing rules and hierarchies that orders social 
kinds’, to quote Ann Laura Stoler: it was about sorting ‘those eligible for 
recruitment, for subsidized or forced resettlement, for extreme deprivation or 
privilege, prioritized residence or confinement’.7 This thesis argues that these 
gradations of degradation were expressed most clearly through the outsourcing of 
                                                        
6 Connor J. Cavanagh, ‘Anthropos into humanitas: Civilizing violence, scientific 
forestry, and the ‘Dorobo question’ in eastern Africa', Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 35, no. 4 (2017), pp. 694-713. 
7 Ann Laura Stoler, ‘Colony’ in J.M. Bernstein, Adi Ophir, and Ann Laura Stoler 
(eds.), Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon (New York, 2018), pp. 45-58. 
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power at the colonial peripheries and interstices. The classic exposition of indirect 
rule entailed use of ‘customary’ forms of authority within a society; but in the case 
of Bugungu, power was delegated to Africans who were explicitly chosen because 
they were not considered part of the same ethnic group, but were understood as 
‘more civilized’ in a framing that was both ethnic and racializing.  
This thesis uses these concepts of ethno-civilisationalism and classificatory 
violence to help draw connecting lines between several episodes in Bugungu’s 
history. This study illuminates the enduring, consequential nature of 
collectivizing punishment which, though not without pre-colonial precursors, 
featured most meaningfully as tools of colonial governance beginning with a 
foundational event – a case of state-enforced mass population removal in 1909.  
The thesis traces the ways these ideas and practices came to be internalised and 
adopted by vigilante non-state actors as part of post-colonial politics, culminating 
explosively in September 1991 in the fishing villages on the shoreline of Bugungu 
in an episode of violent collective expulsion. With echoes and inversions of 1909, 
this event constituted a reaction to political insubordination rhetorically rendered 
as criminality.  
Historiographies 
Agro-pastoralism or barbarism?: ethno-civilisational hierarchies 
and stereotypes in africa 
This thesis intervenes in a literature on the relationship between hierarchy and 
ethnicity in African history. Horizontal cleavages remain the primary 
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preoccupation of Africanists, as anthropologist Jemima Pierre observes.8  Scholars 
tend to promulgate an image of colonial ordering of African ‘ethnic’ subjects along 
horizontal, spatial lines, beneath the racial hierarchy of European, over African.9 
Since the 1980s many Africanist historians became absorbed by processes of 
division and agglomeration as debates intensified over the provenance of ethnic 
formation.10 Earlier contentions about the ‘colonial invention of tribalism’ gave 
way to a degree of consensus that pre-colonial processes of inclusion and 
exclusion placed important limits on the projects of invention.11 But the place of 
vertical relations bound up with ethnic stereotypes in these processes of 
identification is rarely addressed explicitly.12 
While there is some consensus that ethnicity was not simply a colonial creation, 
through much of the literature runs the assumption that related stereotypes and 
hierarchies were products of the ‘unequal opportunities for social mobility’ in that 
                                                        
8 Jemima Pierre, ‘Structure, project, process: anthropology, colonialism, and race 
in Africa’, Journal of Anthropological Sciences 96 (2018), pp. 213-219 (215). 
9 A.J. Christopher, ‘‘Divide and Rule’: The Impress of British Separation Policies’, 
Area 20, no. 3 (1988), pp. 233–240; Mahmood Mamdani, Define and rule: native as 
political identity (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2012); Julie MacArthur, ‘Decolonizing 
Sovereignty: States of Exception along the Kenya-Somali Frontier’, American 
Historical Review 124, no. 1 (2019), pp. 108-143 (120). 
10 For some early examples from this now vast literature, see Terence Ranger, 
‘Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The Invention of Ethnicity in 
Zimbabwe’, in Leroy Vail (ed.), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London, 
1989), pp. 118-150; J.D.Y. Peel, ‘The Cultural Work of Yoruba Ethnogenesis’, in E. 
Tonkin, Maryon Macdonald, and Malcolm Chapman (eds.), History and Ethnicity 
(London, 1989), pp. 198–215.  
11 Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-traditionalism and the limits of invention in British colonial 
Africa’, JAH 44 (2003), pp. 3-27; Paul Nugent, ‘Putting the History Back into 
Ethnicity: Enslavement, Religion, and Cultural Brokerage in the Construction of 
Mandinka/Jola and Ewe/Agotime Identities in West Africa, c. 1650 – 1930’, CSSH 
50, no. 4 (2008), pp. 920-948. 
12 Africanist anthropologists have occasionally been attentive to contemporary 
practices, however. See Peter Geschiere, ‘Regional Shifts—Marginal Gains and 
Ethnic Stereotypes’, African Studies Review 50, no. 2 (2007), pp. 43-56; Julien Brachet 
and Judith Scheele, ‘Remoteness is power: disconnection as a relation in northern 
Chad’, Social Anthropology 27, no. 2 (2019), pp. 156–171.  
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era.13  It is clear that stereotypes were produced by people through their 
differential claims to modernity, and access to the resources of the state, the 
church, and capitalist economic accumulation under colonialism.14 Tribal 
stereotypes were of course much in use among white military recruiters, 
missionaries, colonial administrators and capitalist employers and the Africans 
they enlisted.15 But Africanist historians have made very little attempt to examine, 
in particular, the ways pre-colonial stereotypes and related notions of hierarchy 
and civilization carried over and interacted with colonial ideas.  
Stereotypes are a form of oral knowledge that reflect a human tendency towards 
cognitive economy; they are ‘not the products of individual pathology but of 
cognitive regularities and shared culture’.16  Laden with moral and political 
                                                        
13 Crawford Young, ‘Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity’, 
Daedalus 3, no. 2 (1982), pp. 71-98 (76). 
14 On more general interactions between stereotyping and claims to modernity, see 
Jocelyn	Alexander	and JoAnn	McGregor, ‘Modernity and ethnicity in a frontier 
society: understanding difference in Northwestern Zimbabwe’, JSAS 23, no.2 (1997), 
pp. 187-201; Pius S. Nyambara, ‘Madheruka and Shangwe: Ethnic Identities and 
the Culture of Modernity in Gokwe, Northwestern Zimbabwe, 1963-79’, JAH 43, no. 
2 (2002), pp. 287-306.  The notion of stereotyping and hierarchy is largely implicit 
in Aidan Stonehouse, ‘The Bakooki in Buganda: identity and assimilation on the 
peripheries of a Ugandan kingdom’, JEAS, 6, no. 3 (2012), pp. 527-543. He notes that 
momentum for Ganda-isation of the Kooki from the margins of Buganda was 
generated by the Kooki desire to acquire ‘perceived modernity, innovation and 
prestige through becoming Baganda, even if, simultaneously, the integral 
concerns of the centre prohibited the realisation in actuality of Bakooki desires’. 
15 On martial stereotypes, see Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, ‘‘Damnosa Hereditas’: 
Ethnic ranking and the martial races imperative in Africa’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 
3, no. 4 (1980), pp. 393-414; Timothy H. Parsons, ‘“Wakamba Warriors Are Soldiers 
of the Queen”: The Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial Race, 1890-1970’, 
Ethnohistory 46, no. 4 (1999), pp. 671-701; Risto Marjomaa, ‘The Martial Spirit: Yao 
Soldiers in British Service in Nyasaland (Malawi), 1895-1939’, JAH 44, no. 3 (2003), 
pp. 413-432; Timothy J. Stapleton, ‘Martial Identities in Colonial Nigeria (c. 1900–
1960)’, Journal of African Military History 3 (2019), pp. 1–32.  On occupational 
stereotyping, see Brian Siegel, ‘The “Wild” and “Lazy”	Lamba: Ethnic Stereotypes 
on the Central African Copperbelt’, in L. Vail (ed.) The Creation of Tribalism in 
Southern Africa (London, 1989), pp. 350-371 (355). 
16 Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman and Peter Stamatov, ‘Ethnicity as Cognition’, 
Theory and Society 33, no. 1 (2004), pp. 31-64. See also Hal B. Levine, ‘Reconstructing 
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judgements and expectations, stereotypes are part of ethnic thought – an element 
of the shared knowledge and practice of everyday social actors, who are constantly 
redefining the bounds, status, and meaning of categories. Contrary to certain 
assumptions, there is no reason to think that they were any more salient in local 
discourse during the colonial period than they were before or after, as Felicitas 
Becker observes.17 Working on the Central African Copperbelt in the 1950s, J.C. 
Mitchell hypothesised that in the ‘considerable prestige’ attached to certain ethnic 
categories had its foundations in pre-colonial stereotypes and attendant 
hierarchies – ‘the glory of their military forbears’.18  
Stereotypes play an essential part in structuring the ‘proto-racism’ of ethnic 
hierarchies.19 Such ideas have been developed in a strand of the Africanist 
literature which explores the idea of racialisation and its role in particular cases of 
inter-communal violence in Africa. Scholars focusing on the West African Sahel 
and Indian Ocean coast where the Arab world met the African have increasingly 
argued that racial	thought should be viewed as part of the same spectrum as that 
of ethnicity, within a historically-specific, negotiable, ‘shifting field of discourse’.20 
In Jonathon Glassman’s work on Zanzibar, he discerns this ‘general set of 
assumptions that humankind is divided among constituent categories, each of 
                                                        
Ethnicity’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 5, no. 2 (1999), pp. 165-
180. 
17 Felicitas Becker, ‘Vernacular Ethnic Stereotypes: Their Persistence and Change 
in Southeast Tanzania, ca. 1890-2003’, in Alexander Keese (ed.), Ethnicity and the 
Long-term Perspective: The African Experience (Oxford, 2010), pp. 93-121 (102). 
18 J.C. Mitchell, The Kalela Dance, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 27 (Manchester, 
1956), pp. 26-27  
19 Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton, NJ, 
2004), p. 1. 
20 Jonathon Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in 
Colonial Zanzibar (Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2011), pp. 10-11. 
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which is distinguished by inherited traits and characteristics’. 21 Ideas of hierarchy 
constituted a key element among the racial meanings by which ethnic distinctions 
were transmogrified. Keeping these as separate domains risks, sociologist Loïc 
Wacquant argues, ‘the near-total exclusion of the study of racial(ized) practices, 
beliefs, and institutions among subordinate categories’.22   
Glassman resists the contention that racial thought represented a colonial 
imposition. He invokes literatures from the 1960s to the early 1980s which 
reflected significant Africanist interest in stratification – particularly in relation to 
certain infamous cases of inter-communal conflict.23  Many scholars observed 
widespread locally-embedded, dynamic ideas of difference and hierarchy.24 Social 
evolutionism and related discourses could be subtly and insidiously grafted onto 
extant local idioms of civilization and barbarism – ‘African ways of expressing 
                                                        
21 Jonathon Glassman, ‘Slower Than a Massacre: The Multiple Sources of Racial 
Thought in Colonial Africa’,	The American Historical Review 109, no. 3, (2004) pp. 
720–754; Bruce Hall, A History of Race in Muslim West Africa, 1600–1960 (Cambridge, 
2011). 
22 Loïc Wacquant, ‘For an Analytic of Racial Domination’, Political Power and Social 
Theory 11 (1997), pp. 221–234 (25-26). See also Ramón Grosfoguel, ‘Race and 
ethnicity or racialized ethnicities?: Identities within global coloniality’, Ethnicities 4 
(2004), pp. 315-336. 
23 Arthur	Tuden	and Leonard	Plotnicov (eds.), Social Stratification in Africa (New 
York, 1970); Martin R. Doornbos, ‘Kumanyana and Rwenzururu: Two Responses 
to Ethnic Inequality’, in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (eds.), Protest and 
Power in Black Africa (New York, 1970), pp. 1088-36; Ali Mazrui, ‘Ethnic 
Stratification and the Military-Agrarian Complex: The Uganda Case’, in Nathan 
Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge, 
Mass, 1975), pp. 420-452; M. Catharine Newbury, ‘Colonialism, Ethnicity, and Rural 
Political Protest: Rwanda and Zanzibar in Comparative Perspective’, Comparative 
Politics 15, no. 3 (1983), pp. 253-280. 
24 Michael G. Kenny,  ‘Mirror in the Forest: The Dorobo Hunter-Gatherers as an 
Image of the Other’, Africa 51, no. 1 (1981), pp. 477-495; Igor Kopytoff, ‘The 
Internal	African Frontier: The Making of African Political Culture’, in Igor 
Kopytoff (ed.), The African frontier:	the reproduction of traditional African societies 
(Bloomington, IN, 1987), pp. 3-81; David Newbury, ‘Bunyabungo: The Western 
Frontier in Rwanda, c. 1750-1850’, in Igor Kopytoff (ed.), The African frontier, pp. 164-
192; John L. Comaroff, ‘Of totemism and ethnicity: Consciousness, practice and the 
signs of inequality’, Ethnos 52, nos. 3-4 (1987), pp. 301-323. 
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identity, of creating hierarchies of superiority and inferiority’, as Terence Ranger 
puts it.25 Ethno-civilizational thinking was a particularly salient aspect of 
precolonial Ganda ideology in relation to their neighbours. John Tosh writes of 
the Ganda sense of ‘racial superiority’ to ‘those who lacked centralised political 
institutions’. 26 ‘The peoples beyond Lake Kyoga were Bakedi, uncivilized naked 
savages, Soga were quasi-slaves, but the Nyoro were regarded with particular 
malice’, writes Shane Doyle. Nyoro became a synonym for ‘stupidity and 
backwardness’, he explains; such stereotypes conditioned acts of violence ‘[w]ars 
against Bunyoro did not follow normal rules’.27  These earlier ethno-civilizational 
discourses were particularly pronounced in regard to relatively centralised state 
systems such as those of the Great Lakes of eastern Africa where ‘[a]ncient motifs 
(…) attributed civilizing processes to exogenous intruders’. More recent 
believer/non-believer dichotomies emanating from Islamic Middle East and North 
Africa thus ‘lay like palimpsests on a substrate of earlier ideas’.28 Exclusion and the 
expression of unease through ethnic stereotyping had a long history of its own’, 
asserts Richard Waller, ‘as did attempts to resist it’.29 Acts of designation and 
stereotyping of certain collectivities by ethnic outsiders often precede ethnic self-
designation. For John Comaroff, ethnic identification ‘entails the complementary 
                                                        
25 T.O. Ranger, ‘Race and Tribe in Southern Africa: European Ideas and African 
Acceptance’, in R.J. Ross (ed.), Racism and Colonialism: Essays on Ideology and Social 
Structure (Hague, 1982), pp. 121-142 (122). 
26 John Andrew Tosh, ‘Political authority among the Langi of northern Uganda, 
circa 1800-1939’, unpublished PhD thesis (London, 1973), p. 231. 
27 Shane Doyle, ‘Immigrants and indigenes: the Lost Counties Dispute and the 
evolution of ethnic identity in colonial Buganda’, JEAS 3, no. 2 (2009), pp. 284-302 
(288-289).  
28 Jonathon Glassman, ‘Ethnicity and Race in African Thought’, in William H. 
Worger, Charles Ambler, and Nwando Achebe (eds.), A Companion to African 
History (Hoboken, NJ, 2018), pp. 200-223 (215). 
29 Richard Waller, ‘Ethnicity and Identity’, in John Parker and Richard Reid (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History (Oxford, 2013), pp. 94-113 (105). 
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assertion of the collective self and the negation of the collective other’; it may ‘call 
into question shared humanity’, ‘on putative cultural or “civilizational” grounds’.30 
 This thesis brings these ideas more explicitly into dialogue with the 
preoccupations of a literature concerning ‘ecological ethnicities’.31 Among this 
substrate of civilizational, proto-racial discourses lay a stronger, older dimension. 
Building on the insights of Frederick Barth, via Steven Feierman, historians of 
Africa have noted the ways that societies – and perceptions thereof – are shaped 
by the ways livelihoods are adapted to environmental niches – e.g. rivers, lakes, 
hills, mountains, plains.32 Environmental dichotomies were a pervasive feature in 
                                                        
30 John L. Comaroff, ‘Of totemism and ethnicity: Consciousness, practice and the 
signs of inequality’, Ethnos 52, nos. 3-4 (1987), pp. 301-323. 
31 The term has been adopted by historian John Lonsdale in a recent series of 
publications: ‘Ethnic patriotism and markets in African history’, in Hiroyuki Hino, 
Arnim Langer, John Lonsdale, and Frances Stewart (eds.), Ethnic Diversity and 
Economic Instability in Africa: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 19–
55; and ‘Kenya’s four ages of ethnicity’, in Hino et al (eds.), From Divided Pasts to 
Cohesive Futures: Reflections on Africa (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 15-68. 
32 Steven Feierman, The Shambaa kingdom : a history (Madison, 1974), p. 18; Michael 
G. Kenny, ‘Mirror in the Forest: the Dorobo hunter-gatherers as an image of the 
other’, Africa 51, no. 1 (1981), pp. 477-495; Thomas Spear, ‘Introduction’, in T. Spear 
and R. Waller (eds.), Being Maasai: ethnicity and identity in East Africa (Athens, 1993), 
pp. 1-18; Nancy J. Jacobs, ‘Environment, Production and Social Difference in the 
Kalahari Thornveld, c1750-1830’, JSAS 25, no. 3 (1999), pp. 347-373; David S. 
Newbury, ‘Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties’, 
IJAHS 34, no. 2 (2001), pp. 255-314 (pp. 259-266); William Beinart and Joann 
McGregor, ‘Introduction’, in W. Beinart and J. McGregor (eds.), Social history and 
African environments (Oxford, 2003), pp. 1-24 (p. 4); Michael Sheridan, ‘Tanzanian 
Ritual Perimetrics and African Landscapes: The Case of Dracaena’, IJAHS 41, no. 3 
(2008), pp. 491-521 (p. 493). Work on relations with littoral environments have been 
fewer and further between: Richard Roberts, ‘Fishing for the state: the political 
economy of the Middle Niger Valley’, in Donald Crummey & C.C. Stewart (eds.), 
Modes of Production in Africa: the Precolonial Era  (London, 1981), pp.175-203 (196); 
Michelle Wagner, ‘Environment, community and history: “Nature in the mind”’, 
in Gregory Maddox et al., Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History 
of Tanzania (London, 1996), pp. 175-199; David Schoenbrun, ‘Ethnic Formation with 
Other-Than-Human Beings: Island Shrine Practice in Uganda’s Long Eighteenth 
Century’, History in Africa 45 (2018), pp. 397–443 (399); David L. Schoenbrun and 
Jennifer L. Johnson ‘Introduction: Ethnic Formation with Other-Than-Human 
Beings’, History in Africa 45 (2018), pp. 307–345. 
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collective categorisations across pre-colonial Africa. But these ‘natural referents 
were often infused with complex social meaning which transcended the obvious 
topographical features’, Richard Waller maintains.33   
Ethno-civilisational thought in regard to livelihoods was central to pre-colonial 
regional webs of economic and political relations. ‘A people’s adaptation to its 
environment was its civilization’, argues John Iliffe.34 ‘[I]t is conceivable that the 
marks of a distinctive way of life were more important for a person’s ethnic 
identification than their language’, notes Felicitas Becker; at any rate these marks 
were salient within regional ‘pecking orders’.35 Pastoralists tended to look down on 
agricultural work while farmers saw cultivation as civilizational work.36 But 
regional consensus on the relationship between ethnicity and ‘class standing’ 
relied on both pastoralists and farmers stigmatising livelihoods based on hunting 
and gathering as backward or morally ambiguous. Great Lakes forest peoples, for 
instance, occupied ‘the bottom rung on the ethnic ladder’.37 ‘African explanations 
of social and racial characteristics’, observes William Beinart, ‘may have 
something in common with older traditions of European environmental 
determinism’.38  
                                                        
33 Richard Waller, ‘Ecology, migration, and expansion in East Africa’, African 
Affairs 84, no. 336 (1985), pp. 347-370 (p. 349). 
34 John Iliffe, A modern history of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979),  pp. 9-11. 
35 Felicitas Becker, ‘Vernacular Ethnic Stereotypes: Their Persistence and Change 
in Southeast Tanzania, ca. 1890-2003’, in Alexander Keese (ed.), Ethnicity and the 
Long-term Perspective: The African Experience (Oxford, 2010), pp. 93-121 (102). 
36 John Lonsdale, ‘Soil, Work, Civilisation, and Citizenship in Kenya’, JEAS 2, no. 2 
(2008), pp. 305-314. 
37 David Schoenbrun, ‘African Pasts for African Futures in a time of Radical 
Environmental Change: Notes on History and Policy in Africa's Reconstruction’, in 
Robert Launay (ed.), PAS Working Paper Number 17 (Evanston, Illinois, 2009), p. 25. 
38 William Beinart, ‘African history and environmental history’, African Affairs 99 
(2000), pp. 269-302 (229-230). 
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Discourses of civilisation and barbarism were to develop with violent 
consequences between Great Lakes communities in what had been pre-colonial 
state systems with relatively interspersed populations, such as the Hutu and Tutsi 
in Rwanda, and the Iru and Hima in neighbouring the kingdom of Nkore. But 
ethno-civilisational ideas were also intensely expressed where these eco-
ethnological taxonomies and hierarchies articulated with the core-periphery 
dynamics.39 Seeking to provincialise the agro-pastoral plateau where most of the 
Great Lakes’ centralised political authorities were found, this thesis explores the 
place of fishing on the margins of Bunyoro, demonstrating that it was not just in 
European imaginations that riverine regions were rendered ‘treacherous places’ – 
‘unruly and unpredictable’ zones ‘where both subjecthood and loyalty were in 
doubt’.40  As such, this thesis constitutes an act of reinsertion – putting the 
lacustrine in the interlacustrine  historiography – which various scholars have 
demanded.41 This study emphasises the historical significance of the consumption 
of fish, in particular; its status as a marker of cultural difference in the western 
interlacustrine region is perhaps masked by the gradual disappearance of the 
dietary taboo since the mid-twentieth century, and its different status within the 
                                                        
39 The ecological element is hinted at in Carolyn Hamilton and John Wright, ‘The 
Making of the AmaLala: Ethnicity, Ideology and Relations of Subordination in a 
Precolonial Context’, South African Historical Journal 22, no 1 (1990), pp. 3-23 (18-19). 
40 Lauren Benton, A Search for	Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European 
Empires,	1400–1900 (Cambridge, 2014), p. 103 
41 Joan Vincent, Teso in transformation: the political economy of peasant and class in 
Eastern Africa (Berkeley, 1982),  p. 20;  Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Scott Straus, The 
Great Lakes of Africa: Two thousand years of history (New York, 2003),  p. 45; Charles 
Asowa-Okwe, ‘Precolonial fishing industry in Lake Kyoga’, Makerere Historical 
Journal 4, no. 1 (1988), pp. 25-50; Charles Asowa-Okwe, ‘The pre-colonial social 
formation among the Bakenhe fishing community of Lake Kyoga region of 
Uganda, 1800-1894’, unpublished MS (Kampala, 1996); and Charles Asowa-Okwe, 
Capital and conditions of fisher-labourers of Lakes Kyoga and Victoria canoe fisheries 
(Kampala, 1989). See also Efuraimu Rwumva Kamuhangire, ‘The Pre-Colonial 
History of the Salt Lakes Region of South Western Uganda, c. 1000-1900 AD’, 
(Makerere University, 1993).  
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neighbouring Great Lakes kingdom of Buganda – Bunyoro’s in many ways 
anomalous ancient rival that was to dominate colonial Uganda and its 
historiography. 
This thesis argues that certain stereotypes demonstrated considerable stability 
that belied simultaneous subtle – and not-so-subtle – shifts in social, political, and 
economic relations between the ascribers and the ascribed. As such, this study 
builds on the insights of the Indianist scholarship concerning the pre-colonial 
stereotypes that provided moorings – the ‘cultural purchase’ – for the colonial 
designation of ‘criminal tribes’. ‘Relatively simple ideas, which can absorb shifts of 
emphasis and different shades of meaning, while still retaining a familiar shape, 
are the best—the most resilient—stereotypes’, posits Anastasia Piliavsky.42 This 
thesis focuses on how the stereotypes in regard to Bugungu shifted to 
accommodate the encounter with colonial modernity. Attendant hierarchies were, 
however, contested and transformed amid the vicissitudes of the temporally and 
spatially uneven penetration of the state, capitalism, and Christianity. These 
transformations in fortune and status were sometimes dramatic, engendering 
dissonance, ambiguities, and inversions between collective images and places in 
imagined scales of status and civilisation, with explosive consequences.  
But ethno-civilisationalism is not just about othering; it is fundamentally a matter 
of these same social, economic, and political changes influenced self-stereotyping. 
As such, ethno-civilisationalism can be seen to form a conceptual connection 
between what John Lonsdale terms ‘moral ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’. For 
Lonsdale, moral ethnicity is the internal dimension of ethnicity: it is an intra-
                                                        
42 Anastasia Piliavsky, ‘The “Criminal Tribe” in India before the British’, CSSH 57, 
no. 2 (2015), pp. 323–354. 
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communal arena for ongoing moral arguments over civility in regard to wealth, 
age and gender.  Political tribalism, on the other hand, is the external dimension: 
an arena of inter-communal competition over the resources of the state and the 
market. People made judgements over civilisational superiority and inferiority 
both within and between communities. Ethno-civilisationalism represents the 
threshold between the inner and outer ‘architectures’ of community; changes to 
the character of one, impacted the other.43 
Bunyoro and ethnicity 
By exploring the relationships between violence and ideas of civilizational 
hierarchy, this thesis addresses an unspoken tension in regard to the question of 
ethnicity in Bunyoro. Both popular representations and the dominant strand of the 
relatively small body of extant scholarship on pre-colonial Bunyoro has 
promulgated – if only implicitly in some instances – the assumption of 
correspondence between Nyoro polity and Nyoro ethnicity.44 Ever since 
anthropologist John Beattie’s research in the late 1950s, scholars of Bunyoro have 
remained oddly wedded to this notion of static isomorphism, casting the Nyoro 
state first encountered by Europeans in 1862 as the ethnically homogenous husk of 
a once expansive multi-ethnic Kitara empire.45 In this view, the different pre-
                                                        
43 John Lonsdale, ‘Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism’, in P. Kaarsholm and J. 
Hultin (eds.), Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to 
the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (Roskilde,1994), pp. 131-150. 
44 J.H.M. Beattie, The Nyoro State (Oxford, 1971),  pp. 13, 255; Edward I. Steinhart, 
Conflict and Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda, 1890-1907 (Princeton, 
NJ, 1977), p.19-20, 175-176; 	D. A.	Low,	Fabrication	of Empire: The British and 
the	Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902 (Cambridge, 2009); Joel D Barkan, 'Bunyoro', in J. 
D. Barkan (ed.), Uganda district government and politics, 1947-1967 (Madison, 1977), 
pp. 150-177 (151).  
45 For example, see Shane D. Doyle ‘From Kitara to the Lost Counties: Genealogy, 
Land and Legitimacy in the Kingdom of Bunyoro, Western Uganda’, Social 
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colonial sub-units of Bunyoro that lived on as colonial era counties and sub-
counties ‘had no special significance’.46 On the rare occasions a slightly more 
diverse and spatially varied picture is briefly acknowledged, it is seemingly – and 
rather inexplicably – consigned to pre-colonial past.47 But the scholarship has not 
engaged with the kingdom’s internal politics of ethnicity. The only scholar to have 
undertaken extensive analysis of colonial Bunyoro, Shane Doyle, lays analytical 
emphasis on class, gender, and generation – axes of struggle deeply entangled with 
that of ethnicity – identifying key fault-lines between chief and peasant in the early 
colonial period, and between the former and literate modernizing ‘new men’ in the 
late colonial period.48 Attempts by political scientists to reconcile this literature 
with the complex picture perceptible on the ground today result in the sublimation 
or subordination of ideas of internal difference to a ‘sub-ethnic’ level, a term that 
                                                        
Identities 12, no. 4, (2006), pp. 457-470; Richard J. Reid, ‘Past and presentism: The 
“precolonial” and the foreshortening of African history’, JAH 52, no. 2 (2011), pp. 
135-55 (p. 149); Richard J. Reid, A History of Modern Uganda (Cambridge, 2017), p. 291;  
Elliott Green, ‘Explaining African ethnic diversity’, International Political Science 
Review 34, no. 3 (2013), pp. 235-253 (p. 246); Adrian Hastings, The construction of 
nationhood: ethnicity, religion and nationalism (Cambridge, 1997),  pp. 149, 157.  
Crawford M. Young, The African colonial state in comparative perspective (London, 
1994),  pp. 149, 234; Susan J. Hall, ‘The beginnings of Nyoro nationalism and the 
writers who articulated it during the early colonial period’, unpublished PhD 
dissertation (Columbia University, NY, 1984); Crawford Young, ‘Ethnicity and the 
Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa’, in Paul Brass (ed.), Ethnic Groups and 
the State (London, 1985), pp. 57-93 (75-76).  
46 Joel D Barkan, ‘Bunyoro’, in J. D. Barkan (ed.), Uganda district government and 
politics, 1947-1967 (Madison, 1977), pp. 150-177. 
47 At most, some admit a limited degree of cultural difference at the north-eastern 
peripheries where it is most conspicuous:  the Jo-Palwo (known pejoratively as 
BaChope), who are anomalous Lwo-speakers whose area of settlement featured 
consequentially in histories of nineteenth-century Bunyoro. For scholarship on 
the pre-colonial history of the Palwo, see Adebowale I.	Adefuye, ‘Political History 
of the	Palwo	, 1400-1911’, unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Ibadan, 
1973). 
48 Shane D. Doyle, Crisis & Decline in Bunyoro:	Population & Environment in Western 
Uganda 1860-1955 (Oxford, 2006). 
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manages to lack indigenous equivalents, and sound both ambiguous and mildly 
demeaning.49 
There are various reasons for the literature’s failure to engage with this topic. 
Little research has been undertaken on, or from the perspective of, the northern 
and lacustrine margins of Bunyoro. Research on Bunyoro has tended to strongly 
mirror the foci of early colonial official interest wherein ‘the capital had become 
magnified (…) as to somewhat obscure the rest of the District’.50  For one of the 
earliest European missionary chroniclers of the region, the ‘hauts-plateaux’ of 
Bunyoro’s core was the only zone deemed worthy of comment.51  Professional 
anthropologists several decades later were still exhibiting a strong preference for 
studying ‘the unambiguous heartland of a society’ rather than what could be 
called its ‘uncertain peripheries’, or the ‘middle ground’.52 This tendency to avoid  
difficult, intercalary, suspended spaces was exemplified by the anthropologist 
Beattie, whose entire oeuvre was based almost entirely on fieldwork conducted in 
just two localities in the same south-central county of Bugahya over nineteen 
months in 1951-1953.53 Nyoro elites from the plateau have since the late colonial 
period promoted an external image of ethnic homogeneity concerning Bunyoro’s 
                                                        
49 Roger Southall, Parties and politics in Bunyoro (Kampala, 1972), p. 35; Anders 
Sjog̈ren ‘Battles over boundaries: the politics of territory, identity and authority in 
three Ugandan regions’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 33, no. 2 (2015), pp. 
268-284 (277). 
50 Wilson to Johnston, 6 September 1900, UNA, A12/1. 
51 J.	Gorju,	Entre le Victoria, l'Albert et l'Edouard (Rennes, 1920), p. 19. 
52 Kopytoff, ‘The Internal’, p. 5; David S. Newbury, The land beyond the mists: essays 
on identity and authority in precolonial Congo and Rwanda (Athens, GA, 2009), p. 3. 
For older exhortations to explore such zones, see Aidan W. Southall, ‘Cross 
cultural meanings and multilingualism’, in W. H. Whiteley (ed.), Language Use and 
Social Change (London, 1971), pp. 376-396 (376). 
53 J.H.M. Beattie,	Understanding an African Kingdom: Bunyoro (New York, 1965), pp. 
13-14. 
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indigenous population – one that bears a passing resemblance to that which 
dominates in regard to Buganda.54  
Dominant narratives of Bunyoro’s history have also tended to preclude discussion 
of ethnic hierarchies within Bunyoro. Part of the literature has tended to 
preoccupy itself more with vertical ordering of Nyoro society in three social strata: 
the ruling Biito clan at the top; below them the cattle-herding Huma clans; and at 
the bottom the agriculturalist Iru commoners.55 But even this had faded, according 
to the historiography, by the advent of colonial administration.  The Nyoro elites 
cast their community, and were themselves cast by others, as colonial-era victims 
of the cultural imperialism and the hauteur of negative stereotyping, not 
perpetrators and ascribers. The scholarship overwhelmingly presented the people 
of Bunyoro as the oppressed, suffering not only at the hands of their self-
interested leaders, but also at the hands of both Buganda, and the British.56  
This thesis concerns power relations and hierarchy, but seeks to move beyond 
static representations in order to explore the historicity of ethnicity in Bunyoro. As 
such, the study engages with a scholarly undercurrent which has resisted the 
temptation to flatten understanding of the complexities of belonging in Bunyoro 
past and present. The most thoughtful and lucid consideration within this less 
influential – and largely unpublished – strand of the literature is represented by 
                                                        
54 See Nakanyike B. Musisi, ‘Morality as Identity: the Missionary Moral Agenda in 
Buganda, 1877–1945’, Journal of Religious History 23, no. 1 (1999), pp. 51-74. 
55 For a piece on stratification that reflected its time’s historiographical 
preoccupation with the emergence of state structures in relation to mode of 
production debate, see also Melvin L. Perlman, ‘The traditional systems of 
stratification among the Ganda and the Nyoro of Uganda’, in A. Tuden and L. 
Plotnicov (eds.), Social stratification in Africa (New York, 1970), pp. 125-61. 
56 Derek R. Peterson, ‘Violence and Political Advocacy in the Lost 
Counties,	Western Uganda’, IJAHS 48, no. 1 (2015), pp. 51-72. 
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the brief intervention of anthropologist Simon Charsley, who conducted research 
on Bunyoro’s north-eastern peripheries in the mid-1960s. Charsley contended that 
all of Bunyoro’s indigenous population were ‘politically Nyoro, i.e. subjects of the 
Mukama’, but only some were ‘the Nyoro proper’, who were ‘not (…) an 
assimilating tribe’; they were the ‘bearers of the language and culture of the 
political and geographical centres of the former empire’. To Charsley, Bunyoro 
represented the remnant of that ‘culturally diverse’ ‘multi-tribal empire’ but one 
whose component parts still culturally demonstrated ‘very considerable 
differences’ in spite of the continuing ‘cultural domination of the Nyoro proper’.57 
This thesis takes up Charlsey’s interests, exploring the changing nature of the 
‘improper’ peripheries’ engagements with the core’s ideas of civilisational 
propriety and hierarchy. 
Classificatory violence: punishment and ethnic hierarchy in 
colonial africa 
That violence and hierarchy lay at the heart of the ‘civilising mission’. Violence 
‘constituted colonial difference’, as it was through these corporeal practices that 
colonisers ‘governed the colonized en masse’.58 ‘The purpose and duty of the 
                                                        
57 S. R. Charsley, ‘The Formation of Ethnic Groups’ in Abner Cohen (ed.), Urban 
ethnicity (London, 1974) pp. 337-368 (366-368); S. R. Charsley, ‘Patterns of social 
organization in an area of mixed immigration in Uganda’, unpublished PhD 
dissertation (University of Manchester, 1969), pp. 34-37. For slightly more muddled 
but similar accounts, see Renee Tantala, ‘The Early History of Kitara in Western 
Uganda: process models of political and religious change’, unpublished PhD 
dissertation (University of Wisconsin, WI, 1989), pp. 79, 95-96, 98; Godfrey N. 
Uzoigwe, ‘Updating the History of Uganda’ Tarikh 3, no. 2 (1969), pp. 1-4 (2); 
Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, ‘Kabalega and the Making of a New Kitara’, Tarikh 3, no. 2 
(1969), pp. 5-21; Godrey N. Uzoigwe, ‘Precolonial Markets in Bunyoro-Kitara’, CSSH 
14, no. 4 (1972), pp. 422-455 (452); N. Bazaara, ‘Agrarian Politics, Crisis and 
Reformism in Ugands, 1962-1996’, unpublished PhD dissertation (Queen's 
University, 1997), pp. 259, 267-268. 
58 Anupama Rao and Steven Pierce, ‘Discipline and the other body: Correction, 
Corporeality, and Colonial Rule’, Interventions 3, no. 2 (2001), pp. 159-168 (164). See 
also Kim A. Wagner, ‘Savage Warfare: Violence and the Rule of Colonial 
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liberal imperialist was to raise colonized people up the ladder of civilization and 
train them to rule themselves’, observes Elizabeth Kolsky. ‘The notion of colonial 
tutelage provided an implicit justification for the exercise of colonial violence’.59 
But such violence was not distributed evenly. That ‘[c]olonial regimes punished 
different people differently’ has been recognised in the Africanist scholarship.60 A 
rich literature has developed about the place of draconian punitive strategies – 
from capital and corporal punishment to exile and deportation – in the colonial 
period.  This historiography has often focused heavily on white settler colonies, 
such as Kenya, where ‘the subject of law and order looms larger (…) than in any 
other British colonial possession in Africa’.61 Brutal punishment was ‘central to 
establishing the racial hierarchy of settler society’.62 It inscribed and maintained 
‘the boundaries of colonial authority and African subjectivity’.63  
But Africans were not punished as an undifferentiated mass under colonial rule. 
Among Africans, different collectivities were believed to exhibit different 
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collective shortcomings; ‘colonial institutions often put more stress on the 
maladjustment of the collectivity than of the individual’.64 Tending to be ‘defined 
in ethnic terms’, these collectivities ‘were said to possess distinctive psychologies 
and bodies’.65 The same Victorian racial taxonomic modes of thought entailed in 
the notion of ‘martial races’, gave rise to their ‘the dark obverse’: the belligerently 
insubordinate whose challenges to authority were treated not as politics but as 
crimes.66 The severity and techniques of punishment were dictated and justified 
by constructions – often less formalised – of ‘primitive’, ‘uncivilised’ communities. 
The idea of racial hierarchy was inherent to ethnic differentiation. There was 
something fine-grained about the function of violence, as ‘an index of the 
humanity of the colonized’.67 Africans of certain collectivities needed more 
‘civilizing’ than others, so colonial thinking went. It was a matter of gradation, and 
degradation.  To produce a more subordinate attitude required a violence that was 
not only civilizing, it was classificatory. It reinforced, revalorised, established and 
maintained ethnic hierarchies and boundaries. 
Similar to other aspects of communal governance, the discriminatory ethnological 
punishment regime in British Africa was influenced to some degree by India, 
though it remained unsystematic and unformalized by comparison. In India ‘the 
administrative collectivization of punishment’, reached its apotheosis in the 
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Criminal Tribes Act.68 The Act gave the colonial government the power to gazette 
‘any tribe, gang or class of persons, or parts thereof as “criminal tribes”’. 
Individuals belonging to ‘criminal tribes’ whether implicated in criminal activity 
or not, faced special, excessive measures of punishment, surveillance, and 
sequestration.69 British Africa lacked legally designated ‘criminal tribes’. But 
punishment did ethnological work, albeit inconsistent and haphazard. This 
classificatory dimension was most apparent when collective punishment was 
employed as there was a need to establish a criteria ‘by which a punishable 
collectivity could be defined’. 70 This inherent definitional imperative was clearly 
stated in the Collective Punishment Ordinance, enacted throughout much of 
British Africa from about 1909.71 Inspiring far more infamous pieces of British 
imperial legislation outside of Africa, this formal legal codification of collective 
punishment  gave officials the power to ‘impose fines on all or any inhabitants of 
any village or district, or members of any tribe, sub-tribe or community’. 72 Even 
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established practice of quasi-martial law’ – it stood as ‘one of the bleakest, most 
direct incorporations of the use of force into legal form imaginable’, enshrining in 
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when colonial agents dispensed punishments to the individual, they calibrated 
these acts to the particular collective to which that individual was deemed to 
belong – collectives corresponding to ‘different degrees of social evolution’.73 
Individual punishment was in this way collective. Whether administered to the 
individual or the collective, this was thus collectivising punishment. The measures 
considered necessary to remedy these collective shortcomings were tailored for 
the members of that collectivity.  
The force of the inscription was partly a matter of the identification of the 
inscriber. On the margins of colonial Uganda, as elsewhere, British officials at 
times imported African chiefs – ‘native aliens’ – deemed sufficiently advanced to 
act as apostles of civilisation. The case of Bugungu demonstrates that the ‘sub-
imperialism’ that Andrew Roberts has identified in Uganda was not limited to the 
work of Ganda colonial agents, and outlasted the early colonial period. 74 Far from 
the fetishised, ideologised doctrines of Indirect Rule, this practice was at times an 
improvisation, at times an imitation of pre-colonial arrangements, but always a 
reinforcement of ideas of ethno-civilisational hierarchies. As Moses Ochonu has 
argued, such arrangements disrupted the dichotomy of coloniser/colonised. 
                                                        
law ‘several features deeply inimical to even a minimalist commitment to a 
normative idea of the rule of law’. The CP Ordinance demonstrated a 
commitment to ‘not only immunizing itself from review, in a metastasization of 
the typical declaration of immunity that might be passed in the wake of a period of 
martial law, but also severing the link between individual action and punishment’. 
73 Steven Pierce, ‘Punishment and the political body: flogging and colonialism in 
Northern Nigeria’, Interventions 3, no. 2 (2001), pp. 206-221. 
74 Andrew D. Roberts, ‘The sub-imperialism of the Baganda’, JAH 3, no. 3 (1962), pp. 
435-50. 
 23 
Collectivising punishments were often meted out by the ethnic Other – what 
Ochonu calls the ‘proxy colonial’ – at the other end of the cane. 75 
As such, this thesis advances a fresh understanding of the notion of classificatory 
violence. The term ‘classificatory violence’ usually denotes a symbolic, 
Bourdieusian sense: within social domains the taken-for-granted – ‘doxic’ – vision 
of division imposed by the powerful, does violence to subordinate peoples’ self-
understandings through misrepresentation. Classifications always entail such 
processes of exclusion.76 Drawing on Derrida, Ernest Laclau posits that ‘[i]dentity's 
constitution is always based on excluding something and	establishing a violent 
hierarchy between the two resultant poles’.77 Reconfiguring Laclau’s formulation, 
this thesis looks at the way punishment inscribed hierarchies of ethno-
civilisationalism – classificatory violence of a different sort.  
Other Karamojas: violence and exceptionalism in Uganda 
Colonial violence in Uganda after the conquest era is very rarely discussed in the 
historiography. It is well established that the colonial conquest, and the decade or 
two that followed involved great violence in Uganda.78 But it is also increasingly 
clear from other countries that accommodations between local potentates and 
officials, and improvements in bringing individual offenders to court, did not 
signal the end of harsh and arbitrary rule.  Colonial violence tended to become not 
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less common but less spectacular, more quotidian and routinised.79 Some colonies, 
such as Kenya, have received far more attention than others from in this regard.  
As manifested in the continued use of the Collective Punishment Ordinance in 
Kenya in the inter-war years, post-conquest penality was often heavy- and high-
handed. It was to powerfully shape the character of post-war ‘state of emergency’ 
tactics, counterinsurgency efforts, and anti-cattle raiding measures which would, 
in turn, have profound impact on the character of the post-colonial inheritor 
state.80   
Persistent use of collectivising mode of punishments and invocation of ethno-
civilisational hierarchies and attendant stereotypes in colonial Uganda tends to be 
seen as something that only remerged in the late colonial period, and even then 
only in the country’s north-eastern pastoralist region of Karamoja. The uneven 
texture, and militarised nature, of colonial state power found particular 
expression in the Special Regions (Karamoja) Ordinance (No. 40 of 1958). Enabling 
the government to, among other things, confiscate cattle as a form of collective 
punishment for cattle raiding, this law made the Uganda statute books resemble 
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‘the Soviet Criminal Procedure Code’, one of western Uganda’s African 
representatives, Grace Ibingira, argued in a heated Legislative Council debate on 
the eve of independence.81 One of his fellow members, Constantine B. Katiti, 
observed that the British did not contemplate such laws in the criminal hotspots of 
Kampala; the colonial government reserved collective punishment for the 
‘primitive’ people, they had ‘left backward’.82 ‘This is not a colony like Kenya’, he 
reminded his overlords, ‘it is a Protectorate and the British Government are 
obliged (…) to render services here on friendly terms of protection’.83   
But the current thesis shows that in practice such distinctions often meant little to 
the British. Karamoja was only the most notorious, extreme case, among various 
exceptions. Both inside and outside Karamoja, the nature of colonial state power 
varied immensely across time and space in its political, ideological, and 
imaginative forms. As John Comaroff argues, drawing on both Foucault and 
Cooper, this power was rarely purely ‘arterial’ or ‘capillary’.84 In some places 
closer to the ideological and geographical centres of colonial governance, a less 
erratic, more systematic engagement developed between state and the colonised. 
The unseen infiltration through the disciplinary technologies occurred to a certain 
extent; the assumption of power became less questioned. Peasant consciousness 
underwent ‘colonisation’ as John Comaroff puts it, drawing on Gramsci and 
Fanon. But this political rationality’s attempts to order to control and manage 
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individual bodies and construct subjects had particularly obvious limits in some 
places.  As Comaroff points out, disciplinary processes ‘were not a function of the 
state alone. Or even primarily’. 85 It was only particularly manifest where some key 
elements were present: Christian missions, introduction of individual rights of 
property ownership, and mobilisation into the capitalist sector as migrant 
workers. The arterial nature of colonial power was particularly palpable, by 
contrast, in the many graduated, indeterminate spaces and ambiguous zones of 
legal exclusions and circumscribed and partially suspended rights. The sorts of 
‘technologies of rule’ characteristic of ‘imperial formations’, Stoler argues, ‘thrive 
on the production of exceptions and their uneven and changing proliferation’.86  
This thesis examines an example of this through the Sleeping Sickness Area 
which the British declared in Bugungu in the early twentieth-century, before 
transforming it into a Game Reserve.  
This thesis pushes against the public image of restraint upon which the Uganda 
administration increasingly prided itself, and to which Africans sought to appeal. 
It was was precisely because of this image of moderation that collectivising 
punishments very quickly devolved into oblique, ad hoc, concealed, and 
sometimes extra-judicial practice.87 Uganda administration was keen to avoid the 
paperwork, noise, and friction involving London and local judiciaries and 
administrations that were involved in legalist approaches such as the Collective 
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Punishment Ordinance.  Uganda pioneered that ordinance but very quickly 
ceased to use it; instead, the collectivising punitive mode sometimes appeared 
under other guises – as part of, for example, disease control measures, which the 
Colonial Office found less controversial than other ordinances. Over the course of 
the colonial period, as metropolitan mores changed, far cheaper, and more 
discreet, but no less cruel and discriminatory strategies evolved, entailing the 
targeted, transactional withdrawal of services, resources, and protections – using 
abandonment, neglect, and, sometimes, exposure to mortal threats as a means of 
extorting compliance. 
Methods and sources 
This thesis relies heavily on documentary sources. This project was possible 
because Bugungu generated a disproportionate documentary record for a place 
that appears so marginal. About two hundred square miles in area, its population 
numbered less than 10,000 for the entire colonial period, reaching about 20,000 in 
1970. It has for at least two centuries been remote from the region’s main political 
and ideological centres; under colonialism its population embraced Christianity 
and literacy relatively late and only lightly. But it was subject to an extraordinary 
range of political, moral, and commercial visions and projects since at least the 
nineteenth century: from the Turco-Egyptian trading system, to sleeping sickness 
displacement and reclamation in 1909-1930s under early British rule, to fisheries 
and wildlife conservation interventions since the 1930s. 
The official archival record of Bugungu – distributed between London, Kampala, 
Masindi and Hoima – suffers from its relative paucity at all levels of government. 
The official record of colonial Uganda (1894-1962) is not what it is for other 
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countries. On the front of many file folders, bureaucrats had made references to 
the tantalising titles of other folders, which were today often nowhere to be found. 
These absences owe something to loss or destruction of archival materials during 
the main years of violent conflict and administrative breakdown from the 1970s. 
For example, many papers relating to Murchison Falls National Park held at the 
parastatal Uganda National Parks’ headquarters in Paraa were destroyed during 
armed conflict in the 1980s. But other files were lost owing to the constraints and 
contingencies of bureaucratic practice predating the 1970s. Most material relating 
to the years prior to the 1950s had been culled or lost from the provincial archives 
during the 1960s. Some files were casualties of vast, systematic, wilful colonial 
erasure or concealment on the eve of Uganda’s independence from Britain.88 
Under President Idi Amin’s regime, the archives were under no immediate threat 
– although they were increasingly inaccessible and disordered. Government 
archives covering the post-independence years are even more scanty. 
Government archives were supplemented with a variety of other documentary 
sources from the pre-colonial period to the 1990s, drawn from dozens of separate 
repositories, including tin-trunk archives. Often yielding only the most piecemeal, 
fragmentary relevant traces, sometimes not, these included newspaper and 
magazine articles, diaries, journals, ethnographic manuscripts, travelogues, 
meeting minutes, constitutions, letters, corporate filings, from archives of Catholic 
and Anglican missionaries, to personal archives of administrators, medics, game 
and park wardens and rangers, and anthropologists.  
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The nature all documentary sources pose certain challenges. For the first eighty 
years of the period under study, this is a written record from which African voices 
are largely absent. It was the product of European men. These diaries, reports, and 
correspondence accounts – even those replete with discussions of ethnic 
difference, hierarchies, and stereotypes – tell us more about the preoccupations of 
Europeans than it does the Africans. But colonial archives are not without value as 
historical sources. Missionaries', administrators' and other observers' interests and 
biases varied and their views can be read together to obtain a more complete view. 
This material is rendered valuable if its use adheres to the fundamental precepts 
concerning the analysis of evidence in regard to context, silences, intended 
audiences. The observations of Europeans sometimes prove to be extremely 
revealing, even if not for the reasons originally intended. 
Bugungu’s African literati made up for lost time from the 1950s on. The 
newspapers with which they engaged as readers and writers are an important part 
of the source base for certain chapters of this dissertation. This research drew on 
the expatriate-owned Uganda Argus into which African voices and news start to 
creep in the 1930s, but also vernacular newspapers that appeared post-war. In 
1950s Bunyoro the two main newspapers were Mwebingwa (‘the one to run to for 
help’), which was owned by the White Fathers Roman Catholic Mission, and 
Mugambizi (‘the preacher’), owned by a handful of Protestant African elites. 
Mwebingwa and Mugambizi are useful sources because they were perhaps even 
more about views than news.  These titles are helpful for the reconstruction of 
chronologies and events, but also for illuminating the debates and discussions 
central to the moral and political panics of the period. Until the 1990s, Bugungu’s 
intellectuals were not compelled by the cerebral business of constructing 
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orthographies, grammars, dictionaries, and origin stories. It is 1950s newspapers – 
in a ‘foreign’ African language, Runyoro – that played the most central role in 
conjuring the Gungu community and shaping its concerns. It was primarily in 
order to be at least partly able to read these newspapers at first hand that I 
underwent six months of language training in Runyoro. Perhaps the most 
important contribution this project makes to the evidentiary basis for Uganda’s 
history is by drawing attention to the value of these peripheral vernacular 
newspapers. The significance of newspapers as either a source or subject for the 
historiography of post-war Uganda, especially beyond Buganda, has not been 
recognised. 
These sources present different limitations. African writers were almost entirely 
men; men with a particular type of education; men drawn, in Bugungu’s case, 
from one particular ethnic group. But as one Africanist has convincingly argued, 
written culture was not just the purview of the elite: for the benefit of non-readers, 
literate individuals ‘read aloud, translated, summarized, and amended’.89 
Documents constitute much of the evidentiary base for this thesis; but it is 
necessary to move beyond the images perpetuated by literate elite men. To 
understand the micro-processes by which difference, hierarchy, and self is 
continuously fashioned, it is necessary to tap into vernacular quotidian discourse 
and social practice.  I relied heavily on interview work in communities in northern 
Bunyoro to generate insights into the ways people talk, interact with one another, 
and narrate their own life histories and the history of their family and community. 
My rudimentary understanding of Runyoro (and even more rudimentary 
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understanding of Lwo), enabled me to perform basic checks, and to appreciate the 
power of idiom, the significance of the particular lexical, dialectal and linguistic 
choices people make in certain circumstances, and the shared words between 
different languages, all of which can themselves be makers and markers of 
identity, as well as shedding light on deeper historical connections between 
linguistic communities. 
Oral testimonies were gathered from dozens of people mainly between February 
2014 and July 2015, and in September 2017, in Buliisa, Kigorobya-Kitana, Masindi, 
Hoima and Kampala.90 Interviews were conducted largely in the mother tongue of 
informants (either Lugungu or Lwo) through university-educated interpreters. 
These semi-structured, informal, personal interviews normally lasted one to two 
hours, and took place in private, at informants’ homes, or in quiet spots at local 
guesthouses. In some cases responses were elicited through the use of archival 
material and songs, but often just names of people and villages. These testimonies 
were recorded electronically and then transcribed before being translated in 
English by university graduates with qualifications in linguistics. The informants 
were not randomly selected. I tended to be directed to those widely reputed to be 
key sources of oral knowledge or memories of local history and traditions or more 
specialist topics. Perhaps half of the people I spoke to had no more than a few 
years of primary-level education. My informants included both men and women, 
drawn from different areas, clans, and ethnic groups. I revisited certain 
individuals who had proved particularly forthcoming and/or insightful. These 
interviews were anonymised as they contain content of a politically sensitive 
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nature at a time when relationships between communities and with the state are 
particularly fraught.  
These sources also have their advantages and limitations. Oral histories also 
contain elisions, obfuscations, and silences. Responses to questions were 
influenced to a certain extent by the concerns of the present: people who saw 
themselves as Gungu, and wished to cement both their political domination of the 
area, and their place in the national political order, to the detriment of other 
groups. Such people saw foreign researchers as powerful potential advocates for 
their interests. Certain culturally imposed constraints operate on the use of the 
past for contemporary purposes, however.91 Oral sources' limitations can be 
mitigated to a certain extent by reading them iteratively with documentary 
sources and other oral accounts of those with opposing interests. In Bugungu, I 
spoke to people from different ethnic groups, patrilineal clans, and parts of 
Buliisa. 
Thesis structure 
The chapters of this thesis are organised chronologically. The first two chapters 
deal with the forty years prior to the inception of formal colonial rule: Chapter 
One considers ethno-ecological hierarchical and taxonomic thought in the 
relationship between the north-western lowlands and the plateau core in 
Bunyoro, c. 1860; Chapter Two proceeds to position Bugungu on the frontline of 
competing new imperialisms from the 1860s to the 1890s, and its consequences for 
core-periphery relations, and the ideas and hierarchies that underpinned them.  
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Chapters Three to Seven consider the colonial and early post-colonial periods. 
Chapter Three explores the stereotypes and hierarchies that crystallised in the 
initial encounter between the colonial administration and Bugungu, and that 
shaped the punitive strategies, masked by disease control rhetoric, adopted by the 
state. The chapter investigates the complex effects of collective displacement and 
exile for local ideas about difference and territoriality that would contribute to a 
campaign for reclamation of part of Bugungu in 1922. 
Chapter Four details the punitive collectivising consequences of the colonial 
state’s struggles with the conditions of the 1922 reclamation. It analyses the 
revalorisation of the ‘wild’ that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s through ideologies 
of wildlife preservation and indirect rule, and reveals the ways these competing, 
dehumanising inter-war reactions against ‘Western civilisation’ bedeviled the 
spatial segregation of nature and culture in Bugungu. 
Chapter Five explores the consequences of the intrusion of capitalist production 
in the Bugungu fishing industry between the late 1930s and early 1950s. It traces 
the ways local actors experienced and appropriated the collectivising punitive 
interventions, and degrading discourses, of the early post-war colonial state to 
reclaim control of lucrative littoral resources from outsiders.  
Chapter Six details the early-to-mid 1950s emergence of a literate elite in Bugungu 
in an era of rapidly developing political opportunities associated with the 
democratisation of local government in Bunyoro.  It explores the tensions between 
these elites’ rejection and internalisation of the degrading ethno-civilisational 
ideas at a time of rapid social change and an intensifying culture of collectivising 
punishment. 
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Chapter Seven concerns the attempt to reorder core-periphery ethno-
civilisational hierarchies and stereotypes in the 1960s. In particular, it investigates 
the role played by capitalist corporations, namely Bugungu Ltd, in these inter- and 
intra-communal contestations and inversions.  
Chapter Eight, echoing Chapter Five, details the localist rechanneling and 
refocusing of ethno-civilisational ambitions during the destruction and disorder of 
Idi Amin’s rule and its aftermath. It analyses the ways state retreat, the dispersal of 
institutional power, and the experience of dramatic political and economic 
reversal provided the conditions for a shocking purge in 1991, as local actors 
internalised and assumed the brute collectivising power of the state in order to 





Figure 1: ‘Location of Murchison Falls Conservation Complex’ (2001).92 
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Figure 2: Planned petroleum infrastructure in Buliisa District today. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Hierarchies, civilisations, and 
collectivities between the plateau and the plains, 
c.1860 
‘[Ku-]Gungūza, v. i. go off by oneself, be independent, rebellious’.93 
‘[The Gungu ethnonym] came (…) from these Banyoro: the kings were just going 
there to collect some taxes (…) and they [the Gungu] would go hiding, so they 
called them “these Bagungu, they are not following us!”’.94 
Scholarship on pre-colonial Bunyoro has tended to present a relatively simple, 
homogenous image in certain regards: from the relationship between collective 
identifications, culture, and polity, to the culture of politics. Society has been 
presented as highly differentiated in vertical terms; the dominant political 
concepts, it has been argued, were respect for hierarchical structures and 
acceptance of the authority of rulers. But these accounts present Nyoro society in 
undifferentiated spatial and horizontal terms. While scholars have noted the 
limited ability of the Nyoro state to make its power felt at the periphery, they have 
been less attentive to the ways the centre and the periphery conceived of each 
other in ethno-civilisational terms.95 Focusing on the north-western borderland 
littoral of Bunyoro, this chapter complicates these visions by considering the 
ethno-civilisational discourses produced at the nexus of vertical and horizontal 
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axes of difference. It explores the relationship between ethnic categories, 
environmental ideas, and political subjectivities in the early 1860s when the first 
Europeans travelers arrived.  
Degrees of Nyoro-ness: ethno-civilisational discourses and 
alterity 
The earliest, and most influential, ethnological image of Bunyoro produced in 
European travelogues was one of a rather homogenous remnant – the remaining 
piece of Kitara, the vast multi-ethnic ‘empire’ which had disintegrated unknown 
centuries before. Based on his visit in the early 1860s, British traveller John 
Hanning Speke promulgated the notion of ‘Wanyoro’ ‘tribe’, who spoke ‘Kinyoro’ 
in a country called ‘Unyoro’ on the eastern shore of Lake Mwitanzige.96 Most of 
the European visitors who followed him to the area did not question this picture.97 
For one thing, even the most meticulous and scholarly among them continued 
using the Swahili toponymic (U-), ethnonymic (Wa-) and linguanymic (Ki-) 
prefixes, rather than those of local interlacustrine languages. Some travellers 
noted that the ‘Wachopi’ (i.e. Cope or Palwo) in the far north-east of Bunyoro were 
‘distinct in their type’, and spoke a language ‘different to the southern and central 
portions of the district’.98  But this detail was only rendered salient owing to the 
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on-going Palwo rebellion against Kamurasi, the mukama (pl. bakama) or ruler of 
Bunyoro. Otherwise, early observers maintained, difference within Bunyoro was 
not ordered horizontally or spatially, it was ordered vertically. Reflecting these 
Europeans’ own obsessions with status and rank, what preoccupied them were the 
hierarchical social distinctions between Iru agriculturalist commoners and their 
apparent superiors, the Huma pastoralists, who were both ruled over by the 
originally foreign Biito dynasty.99   
What the observers did say about Bunyoro’s margins calls into question this view 
of a culturally homogenous society ordered on lines of status and rank. While 
Iru/Huma distinctions may have been pronounced at the plateau core of Bunyoro, 
the ‘operative units’ with regards to both self-ascription and external 
identification tended to be rather different.100 Folk ethno-taxonomies 
corresponded at least in part to the saza (pl. masaza)- the territorial political unit of 
the kingdom - or sometimes to a cluster of such masaza. The noun ihanga (pl. 
mahanga) meant both ‘people’ and ‘country’; difference in Bunyoro was 
spatialised.  The visitors better acquainted with Bunyoro’s peripheries noted that 
‘the population of the kingdom’ was a ‘mixture’ of ‘scattered tribes’, such as 
‘Magaya [Gahya], Wahuma [Huma], Shefahi [Palwo], Magungo [Gungu], and 
Wanyoro [Nyoro]’.101 Sixty years later, the missionary-ethnographer John Roscoe 
noted that these sorts of ‘independent tribes composed of loosely connected clans’ 
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had been incorporated and subordinated into political structures by Huma 
invaders in the past, but were still very much a feature of the socio-cultural 
landscape owing to differences ‘both in type and language’, and the fact that they 
were ‘not nomadic’ and therefore ‘rarely moved out of their own districts’.102 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Nyoro category was a matter of political 
allegiance. Originally used derisively by their ancient rivals Buganda to the south, 
according to Roscoe, the term Nyoro meant ‘freed’, and referred to the elevation in 
status of Iru who ‘showed ability and rendered special service to the king’.103 The 
Nyoro category was inextricably bound up with state authority and patronage. 
The label had come to be assimilated locally to mean ‘great chief, lord, master.’104 
But if Nyoro allegiance had become an ethnic self-identification, it had only 
become so among the people of the masaza of the state’s plateau core – where 
early European visitors spent the most time. Touching the river Kafu, the masaza 
of Bugangaizi, Buga[h]ya, and Busindi alone were widely considered to be home 
to the ‘Banyoro boonyini’, which can be translated as ‘true Banyoro’ or ‘Banyoro 
proper’.105 In this plateau zone localised, alternative categories of belonging, 
namely Gangaizi, Gahya, and Sindi, carried less social, cultural, political meaning 
than those corresponding to other masaza.106 At Bunyoro’s cultural and political 
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heartlands, communities conceived in terms of kinship known to most people 
locally as nganda (sg. luganda), and widely translated as ‘clans’, were believed to 
have been dispersed and attenuated by a centralising Nyoro state in the 
eighteenth century.107  
It was on the plateau that the foundations of the Nyoro state were strongest.  
Several generations of bakama had been buried there.108 Although the Nyoro state 
was not based on a fixed capital, the itinerant royal courts from which mid-to-late 
nineteenth-century bakama ruled tended to move between sites in these counties; 
only when war with Buganda threatened, did they move further – retreating to 
Buruli on the Nile at the mid-eastern fringe of Bunyoro. Buga[h]ya saza, was 
widely considered to be the ‘favourite district’ of the majority of the bakama.109  
The conditions were relatively wet and cool, and the soils – lateritised red clay 
loams – were fertile;110 the vegetation is composed of light, deciduous forest wet 
savannah grassland, dominated by elephant grass (Pennisetum Purpureum).111 On 
the plateau, the Nyoro state enjoyed relatively low tribute collection costs; chiefs 
expropriated a proportion of surplus production in terms of grain, beer, and 
labour in the form of tribute.  
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The plateau was home to central Nyoro cultural conceptions.  The mukama’s 
power in part rested on his role as an intermediary between his people and the 
supernatural forces of the Cwezi-Kubandwa religion. This role was 
institutionalised in ceremonies that took place on the plateau at the Nyoro state’s 
itinerant capital during the New Moon. Rituals were performed for the collective 
well-being and fertility of the land and people. Through these rituals the mukama 
was also believed to be able to control the rain. The mukama, through his 
patronage, had also to some degree co-opted the power of practitioners of 
mbandwa – possessory spirits which had power over disease and individual health 
and fertility. The most important of these spirits were known as the Cwezi, who 
were believed by many to have been historical personalities: the ancient ruling 
dynasty. The bakama sought to legitimise their authority by represent the ruling 
Biito dynasty as the inheritors of the power of the Cwezi. and this seems to have 
been at least partly responsible for sustaining the state’s power for centuries. 112  
This religion was at its most compelling on the plateau, which was littered with 
Cwezi shrines. The bakama attempted to validate these sites as ‘symbols of Nyoro 
ethnic identity’ and the legitimacy of Biito authority.113 
The people of the heartlands considered their culture to be Nyoro culture, and to 
be superior. A few decades earlier before its loss through the secession of Tooro, a 
key saza at the cultural core of the Nyoro state was Mwenge, which functioned as a 
finishing school where noble sons polished their manners (makune) and 
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language.114 It appears that Bugahya was seen in a similar light. One early visitor 
seems to have been informed that the Gahya tongue was the ‘authoritative’ and 
‘most elegant’ form of Runyoro.115 People from the central plateau saw themselves 
as bearers of a higher culture; civilisation or kwegesebwa was a matter of tutelage; 
it shared a root with a verb meaning 'to learn something that could be taught'. 
The more a population was seen to diverge from these cultural and political 
norms, the more likely it was to be perceived pejoratively by the uplanders as not 
‘true’ Nyoro or perhaps even not Nyoro at all. Hierarchical, ethno-civilisational 
discourses were much in evidence. The Runyoro language term connoting 
inferior, barbarian status was owamahanga or munya’ihanga which meant literally 
something to the effect of ‘of the tribe’ or ‘tribesman’, but also simply ‘foreigner’.116 
Distant peoples were widely reputed to be ‘those who eat people’ (balyabantu), or 
sorcerers (barogo).117  On the plateau these ideas were perhaps particularly crucial 
to the self-image of certain people in central Bunyoro.  There were gradations of 
status even on the plateau, with some clans considered more lowly; for those 
clans, the ideas of ethnic status and exclusivity that asserted superiority over 
people on Bunyoro’s margins may have been especially important. 
The primary constitutive Other of the people of these tablelands were to be found 
in what they called ‘the land of	wild dogs’ (Mhwahwa) – Bunyoro’s ancient rival 
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state of Buganda.118 But the other end of Bunyoro was home to internal others, who, 
like the Ganda, were bound up with the establishment of Nyoro-Gahya self-
identity. Somewhat less Nyoro than the people of the plateau were the small 
populations of Bunyoro’s narrow littoral middle-fringes: the Kibiro and the Kobya 
(or Tonya) on the lake to the west; 119 the Ruuli on the river to the east.120 But the 
sites of the most questionable ‘Nyoro-ness’ were the northern margins, among the 
so-called ‘Gungu’ of Bugungu and the ‘Cope’ (Palwo) of Kibanda and Kihukya 
masaza. The Gungu and Cope ethnonyms were used with greater frequency and 
geographically denotive clarity and consistency than ‘Gahya’.  
Ecological ethnicities, hierarchies and stereotypes between 
the plateau and the littoral 
Different relationships to the environment were an importance element of these 
categories and hierarchies of political belonging. Everyday ethnic chauvinism 
most commonly related to livelihoods and food. That could operate in terms of the 
pastoralist-agriculturalist divide that was salient in the central plateau: one early 
colonial anthropologist later noted that the Iru were ‘despised’ by the Huma ‘not 
because of their poverty, but because of their mode of life’ –  their ‘living by a rude 
cultivation of the soil’.121 But there was another mode of life that even the 
agriculturalists tended to scorn. One of the region’s other natural dichotomies 
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counterposed the Gahya-Nyoro ‘people of the hills’ – bantu b’ensozi – and the 
Gungu of the lowlands. The consumption of fish seems to have been the most 
significant marker of difference. On the plateau, dietary restrictions had 
developed around fish, which was seen as a marker of low status. One visitor 
observed fishermen selling their ‘(so-called) fresh and dried fish’ at a market on 
the plateau’,122 he also commented that outside the ‘lake districts’ people tended to 
‘entirely avoid and despise it’.123   
In Bugungu, livelihoods were seen differently. Within Bugungu, the division of 
labour was more heavily gendered, and cultivation, along with the majority of 
domestic duties, are said to have been carried out by women.124 The domain of 
men lay elsewhere: they were ‘passionate fishers and hunters’, and ‘very fond of 
all kinds of game and fish’, an early visitor noted.125 The bow and arrow occupied a 
central place in lowland society , in contrast to upland Bunyoro.126 But to a quite 
strikingly unusual degree, the lake and river were at the centre of the productive 
environment for most men in Bugungu. While in Runyoro and related 
interlacustrine languages the word for earth, soil or land was itaka, in the Bantu 
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languages of Bugungu the same word meant ‘lake’.127 Local aquatic vocabularies, 
taxonomies and technologies were highly developed.128 Most of the major 
settlements in Bugungu were located along the shoreline and the river to the 
falls.129 It was not only fish that came from these waterbodies. Hippopotamus was 
hunted with a spear adapted by means of a rope and a float made of the ambatch 
tree.  And, in times of hardship, people could take to foraging for aquatic herbs, or 
burning the papyrus in order to transform islands in the river into fertile – but 
rather precarious – floating farmland (nswaa).130 
The significance of this lifestyle was also reflected in religious practice. 
Lowlanders sought mastery over this harsh environment by appeasing the spirits 
responsible for rain, fertility, fish, safe passage on the waters of the lake and rivers, 
and successful hunting and, especially, fishing. ‘[A]mong the people who are 
dependent on a particular craft for a livelihood, their religion extends to it, and 
not beyond’, one early colonial missionary later noted. The fisherfolk on the lake 
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‘will do nothing to offend the spirit, for fear of misfortune in their fishing’, he 
continued.131  But there was marked eclecticism of religious practice in Bugungu. 
Cwezi-Kubandwa was present to a certain extent.132 The family-level worship of 
ancestor spirits (mizimu) at man-made ancestor shrines – structures known as 
kibbila in Bugungu – was more prominent on the littoral than on the plateau of 
Bunyoro.133 In Bugungu this practice was known as kudya (to regurgitate food for) 
or kusala (to cut/sacrifice). 
Other forms of religious belief and practice involving hidden nodes of creative 
power were pre-eminent in Bugungu. The most significant, institutionalised form 
of ritual practice was kulegeza (to pray/sacrifice) or kulaamansi (to worship the 
earth), focused on propitiating deities known as bihala (sg. kihala). Some types of 
offerings – often of beads – were made on a quotidian basis to the lake and river,134 
where certain areas and times were forbidden to fish in due to ritual 
prohibitions.135  But the most important rites were performed periodically by the 
clan’s hereditary nature priest, the mulegezi, after gathering offerings from the 
inhabitants of the area. The bihala of the earth/nature (nsi) were propitiated by 
each priest at their clan’s shrine – called a mpuluma, which was situated under a 
specific, physically imposing tree at the edges of the clan’s area, where 
supernatural snakes appeared. Though most clans shared their one or more 
deities with one or more other clans, each clan had their individual mpuluma. 
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Some deities associated with the lake and river demanded major sacrifices in or 
near the water, entailing multiple groups, possibly led by the priests of certain 
supposedly ‘first-comer’ clans.136 
The shrines in the borderland of northern Bunyoro with the widest constituencies 
were associated with sites of extraordinary natural phenomena associated with 
the dramatic topography and geomorphology of the Northern Albertine Rift 
Valley.  Perhaps the premier shrine in the wider region area was one located at the 
north-eastern limit of Bugungu at the waterfall at Pajao. The place and the male 
deity worshipped there was known as ‘Muswa’ (or ‘Buswa’) – son of ‘Nyambogo’. 
Samuel Baker had named this feature of the landscape ‘Murchison Falls’ during 
his 1864 rash of symbolic appropriation (which also involved renaming Lake 
Mwitanzige as ‘Lake Albert’) but in his diary in 1872 he noted that ‘the ‘native 
name’ for it was ‘Mōosŏoār’.137  The people of the plateau showed little knowledge 
or interest in this spectacular waterfall. Their distantiated, depersonalised 
relationship with it was reflected in their name for it, kihirro kya bifuha, which can 
be roughly translated as ‘the sound of the snorting’.138 
Ethnonymic practices and political subjectivities in Bugungu 
Relationships to the environment and state authority intertwined; differences in 
ecological ethnicity and civic virtue were imbricated with political alterity.  
Bunyoro’s component parts were incorporated into the body politic in different 
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ways and to different degrees. For generations Bugungu had been nominally 
ruled, like the other masaza of Bunyoro, by princes from the Biito clan. Below 
them, in the hierarchy of state authority were certain individuals and lineages who 
were Nyoro-ised at least in the sense that they were tied to the state through a 
politics of personal loyalty, as recipients of the mukama’s patronage bestowed in 
the form of low-level hereditary territorial chieftainships, retainerships, and 
membership of a special group called the bajwara kondo, the ‘crown-wearers’.139 
But brief references made in the travelogues and diaries of travellers suggest that 
Bugungu, like ‘Chopi’ (Cope) to its east, was claimed by the bakama, but 
considered somehow separate. During his time in Bunyoro, information Speke 
received led him to describe ‘[B]Ugungu’ as a ‘dependency of Kamurasi’. The 
explorer applied the same ‘dependency’ category to ‘Ganyi’ – today considered 
Acholi – north-east of the Victoria Nile which he considered to be outside 
‘[B]Unyoro’.140 On the map that accompanied Speke’s travelogue, ‘Ugungu’ 
appears within the boundaries of Unyoro; however, unlike any other parts of 
Bunyoro, the area was labelled, as if to imply a difference in status. In a table in 
Baker’s diary, similarly, Mukama Kamurasi’s northernmost territories ‘Ugungu’ 
and ‘Chopi’ are neatly delimited as though separate categories to ‘Unyoro’.141   
 
                                                        
139 Nyakatura,	Anatomy, pp. 181-185.  
140 Speke, Journal, p. 467 (514). For the reference to ‘Ganyi’, see p. 242.  
141 Samuel Baker, Diary entry for 14 March 1864, RGSA, SWBP/1-4. 
 50 
 
Figure 3: ‘Map of the routes in eastern Africa between Zanzibar, the Great Lakes and the Nile 
explored and Surveyed by Captain J.H. Speke 1857-1863’ (1863).142 
Bunyoro’s northern littoral was a politically liminal zone – on the edge of 
Bunyoro, but not fully part of it. The Nyoro state’s interest in it tended to fluctuate. 
Much depended on the volume and type of trade that was being conducted at the 
north-western extremity of Bugungu in this period. Like centres across the water, 
it served as a commercial centre where goods from the lowlands and surrounding 
uplands were traded. Baker was informed in 1864 that in the years prior to his 
arrival Magungo had been ‘a town of considerable importance’. He heard that 
cowrie shells and brass coil bracelets had been regularly brought from Zanzibar, 
via Karagwe far to the south-west, to be traded for ivory and prepared skins at this 
commercial centre. But the traders no longer came owing to an incident involving 
a ‘disagreement with the people’, in which ‘some men were killed’.143  
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The Nyoro state generally rested rather lightly on Bugungu: expecting little from, 
and offering even less, to its people.  This arrangement was partly necessitated by 
the physical environment. The escarpment marked a dramatic change in the 
physical characteristics of the landscape, and the possibilities for agriculture. Like 
many people in Bunyoro, the residents of Bugungu still practiced shifting 
cultivation; the lowlands contained some more sympathetic micro-environments 
– such as near the intermittent watercourses and perennial rivers like the Waija 
(or Waiga) and Sambiye where vegetation cover thickened, and in the belt of 
slightly more elevated and fertile, stable soils in the east, where there was slightly 
more rain. Women cultivated the staples sweet potato (Batatas edulis), finger millet 
(Eleusine coracana) and durrah (a variety of sorghum) along with a variety of nuts 
and herbs. But it was hard to command tribute on the north-western periphery.  
Famine was a constant threat. 144  Its semi-arid shoreline and plains are among the 
lowest-lying and hottest parts of Uganda.145 It lies in rainshadow and often 
experiences prolonged periods of drought.  
But the Nyoro state also demanded little simply because it did not have the power 
to demand more. Lacking Buganda’s infrastructure, like many other precolonial 
African cases, state power weakened closer to borders in Bunyoro. Bugungu was 
wedged between obstacles. The hippopotamuses, crocodiles, windstorms, and 
extensive papyrus islands of the Lake Albert and the Victoria Nile made Bugungu 
a difficult place to reach by water from the south. Traveling by land from the same 
direction, a challenge was presented by the vast expanse of riverine tropical high 
forests like Budongo, punctuated by imposing hills including Gisi and 
                                                        
144 Owen to Colvile 31 January 1894, PP C.7708; Shane Doyle Interviews nos. 25 and 
26, SDP;  Schweinfurth (ed.), EPCA, pp. 17-19, 80. 
145 Uganda Government, Atlas of Uganda (2nd ed. edn.; Kampala, 1967),  p. 16. 
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Nyabuzaana the top of the escarpment.  Below it the rainy season meant raging 
rivers, like the Waiga (Waija) and Waisoke, which run on an east-west axis from 
the elevated grounds just above the escarpment, descend the rift scarps and 
traverse the plains of the rift valley floor, before draining into the lake. The same 
geomorphology and topographic features, combined with shoreline woods, 
gullies, and ravines made it easy for people to hide or seek refuge.146 People in 
Bugungu could vote with their canoes if obligations on them became overly 
burdensome.  Fishers ‘called Magango’ who ‘come from near the lake’ were 
encountered by early European visitor as far along the upper Albert Nile as Pacora 
near Pakwac.147  
The Nyoro state did not tolerate open rebellion, but signs of it were difficult to 
discern in Bugungu. Strong centrifugal forces operated in Bunyoro. Since the 
reign of Mukama Kyebambe III Nyamutukura (c. 1786–1835) the Cope area was a 
near constant source of concern for the Nyoro state. Royal rebel movements led by 
Kacope in Kihukya saza and Isagara Katiritiri in Kibanda were backed by a section 
of a local population  with whom they were associated through upbringing and 
maternal line. 148 In the second quarter of the nineteenth century Bugungu had 
also been seen by ambitious Biito princes as fertile ground in which to raise 
rebellions. A rebellion in Bugungu was planned by the saza chief, Biito prince 
Karasuma Bugondo bwa Musuga; but he was outmanoeuvred and killed. Before 
                                                        
146 Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, p. 315; Owen to Colvile, 31 January 1894, PP C.7708; 
Schweinfurth (ed.), EPCA, pp. 15, 19, 140. See also Thruston and Thruston, African 
incidents,  p. 145.  
147 William H. Chippindall, ‘Journey beyond the Cataracts of the Upper Nile 
Towards the Albert Nyanza’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London 
20, no. 1 (1875), pp. 67-69 (p. 68).  
148 Speke, Journal, p. 532 (2 October 1862); G. Casati, Ten years in equatoria (London, 
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the passing of Nyamukutura’s successor Nyabongo II Mugenyi in 1848, a second 
attempt to defy the mukama occurred in Bugungu when Mugenyi appointed his 
son Kamurasi to rule there. The late rebel Kacope’s son Mpuhuka launched a 
rebellion in Bugungu.149   
The attitude of the people of Bugungu to both royal rebels and rulers was highly 
ambivalent.  Oral tradition suggests that some of the inhabitants of Bugungu did 
rise against the Nyoro state, but not behind Mpuhuka. As Kamurasi’s forces were 
unable to reach Mpuhuka on his island redoubt, some of the people of Bugungu 
were raided in this rebel’s stead. It was this action that caused them to ‘rise’, only 
to see their insurrection crushed by Kamurasi’s mercenaries from Lango.150  
Bugungu soon became largely peripheral to the activities of Mpuhuka and the 
other the royal rebels.  Mpuhuka based himself in Kihukya and the late Isagara’s 
son Ruyonga in Kibanda. But the influence of both was dramatically restricted 
from about 1860, as their forces were routed and their property seized in the battle 
of Kokoitwa.151 Their forces and they were subsequently forced to flee north of the 
river from their redoubts on small island amid the rapids on the Victoria Nile, a 
few days east of Murchison Falls. The people of Bugungu did not seem to want to 
take sides in these royal rivalries. 
But in many respects Bugungu’s ties to the Nyoro state were more tenuous than 
those of the Cope masaza to the east. Though strained by rebellion in this period, 
the relationship between the Palwo, on one hand, and the Nyoro ruling dynasty 
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on the other, was conceived in terms of kinship, rooted in a shared deep past. 
These connections were still manifested in the persistence of the Lwo mpako 
praise names in Bunyoro, and in the sites of ritual and historical significance to the 
Biito dynasty scattered around north-eastern Bunyoro.152 Until the a few 
generations previously, this special historical connection had been acknowledged 
through a privileged role in the bukama, beyond the usual personal ties.153 The 
Palwo had been symbolically connected to the polity through a tradition of 
providing the ‘queen mothers’, who wielded considerable authority and 
patronage. 154 Efforts to increase the ideological hold of the bakama over the 
lowlands seems to have at times involved tapping into the power of the shrines, 
like that of Muswa at Pajao: the Nyoro state also appears to have, provided a 
sacrificial black bull, and even attended, periodic ceremonies for the deity there.155  
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But for the people of Bugungu, there was generally not the political or cultural 
symbolism or connection to mitigate their social and geographical marginality.  
One possible sign of, and reason for, the lack of centralising state penetration in 
Bugungu was the persistence of particular patterns of social organisation. Agnatic 
lineages remained localised in Bugungu to a degree that was less typical above the 
Bunyoro escarpment, where a son ‘goes anywhere’.156 One early visitor reportedly 
interacted with a ‘small tribe’ near ‘Magungo Mellisa’ (Buliisa in Bugungu) known 
as the ‘Wahinda’ (likely what is now known as the Kindwa clan). He learnt that 
they ‘spoke their own language, which differed from that spoken in the 
neighborhood’, and had ‘migrated from the north-east’. 157 The people of Bugungu 
were ‘luganda people’; the names of many localities, like Bukindwa, were derived 
from the name of the nganda (clan) that still dominated.158  The senior man of the 
clan, or muhandu wa luganda, often maintained political prominence in terms of 
arbitration, punishment, and the land matters. Often these men served as chiefs 
below the rank of the saza.159  
On an everyday basis, the nganda were far more relevant forms of self-
identification than more encompassing categories such as Gungu, but the latter 
and certain other local collective identifications were heavily freighted with socio-
political meaning. These categories were bound up with putative differences in 
assumptions about authority, hierarchy and politics.  Some of these sorts of 
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categories had at least begun as generic and sometimes abusive social categories 
applied to certain clusters of peoples by outsiders. Though the meanings invested 
in these categories were to some extent malleable, some of the elements of this 
discourse – particularly stereotypes – were rather resilient and the labels 
themselves remained relatively stable.  The ethnotoponymic ‘Gungu’ was 
connected to the verb kugunguza in Runyoro, which has been translated as ‘to go 
off by oneself, be independent, rebellious’.160 This disdain associated with this 
category above the plateau was reciprocated. The people of Bugungu seem to have 
seen themselves in contradistinction with the people they lumped together under 
the ‘Ga[h]ya’ category. That term carried a strong stigma as it connoted servility 
and slavishness; it was derived from a Lugungu verb kugaya, meaning ‘to treat 
without respect’.161 Emerging in relation to each other, these ethnic labels served 
as indices of political subjectivity. 
Socio-cultural distance and difference had long been considered an 
unremarkable, and even useful fact of life. Bugungu was seen as a reservoir of men 
for the mukama’s military. That is the way one of the most famous men from 
Bugungu, Wamara wa (son of) Mbunya, came to prominence, before being ‘exiled’ 
for becoming an ‘undisciplined’ ‘rebel’.162 An early colonial missionary noted that 
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the ‘men from Bugungu’ had been the mukama’s ‘tribe of executioners’,163  
possessing attributes that made them ideal warriors as one informant put it. This 
reputation as ‘dangerous’ sorts owed something to their prowess as spearmen and 
archers, but also their social distance. Their tendency to lack cumbersome ties of 
kinship and obligation on the plateau rendered the men of Bugungu useful to the 
mukama in terms of internal security and coercion.164 
Civilisational nexus and intercalary: contested hierarchies 
While populations from outside who settled on the plateau were quite readily 
assimilated,165 little concerted effort had been made to spread Nyoro-Gahya 
culture to the peripheries. The Nyoro state, by contrast with Buganda, had lacked 
the capacity and the will to do this cultural work. Certain aspects of upland 
culture had spread to the north-western periphery through migration and chiefly 
tutelage. But on the whole, cultural distance remained and was maintained. 
Members of certain lineages incorporated into Nyoro state institutions appear to 
have internalised the cultural chauvinism of the plateau; they acquired and did 
not wear lightly the ‘superior’ Nyoro-Gahya ways, including the lingua franca of 
authority, Runyoro-Rugahya. These ways were markers of elite status, and 
functioned in the same way as prestige goods. The Lugungu tongue that 
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dominated in Bugungu was not just any old ‘dialect’, contrary to the ethno-
linguistic taxonomies of certain European visitors.166  
Bugungu was liminal culturally as well as politically and bore the imprints of 
various, more active civilising projects. Over the course of its kaleidoscopic 
history, Bugungu had drawn in culturally diverse peoples from different 
directions. Most of the inhabitants of Bugungu spoke a language later classified as 
‘Bantu’. Some of the cultural traits of these people bore the imprint of the plateau 
society from which certain clans claimed origin.167 Deep roots in and connections 
to the less centralised societies south-west of the lake were also perceptible in 
various forms.  It is claimed through migration traditions of certain clans, but it is 
also suggested through the existence of many lexical items that are shared with 
Rwamba and Rukonzo, but not Runyoro-Rutooro, and the distinctive yodelling 
style of song was akin to the Twa forest people.168 But lowland culture also bore 
the unmistakeable marks of the civilisational endeavours of Nilotic Lwo-
speakers.169 Forms of the latter’s religious practice, such as worship at nature 
shrines, were ubiquitous, as were the lexical items relating to them: for example, -
legeza (to sacrifice), -laama (to pray), and -bbila (shrine).170 The names and sites of 
worship of the deities themselves – e.g. Muswa at Pajao – were also shared.171 Even 
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the coherence of clan settlement patterns to some extent reflected the influence of 
Nilotic societies characterised by large-scale extended lineages.172  
This influence was hardly surprising. It was clear that the littoral cosmopolitanism 
which had created these cultures persisted. Different areas in this wider 
borderland area were associated with, and generally populated by, different 
groups in which the use of a certain language would predominate. But the 
followings of influential men were diverse. Polyglot settlements straddled the 
narrow waterways that separated ecologically similar zones, and individuals and 
small groups moved between them.173 The small Nilotic Lwo-speaking polities of 
the upper Albert Nile Valley and on the western shore of Lake Albert fell within 
the Nyoro sphere of influence and dependence politically. Though the mukama 
did not appoint their rulers, they were ritually subordinate to him, posing no 
threat to the Nyoro state in and of themselves. There is no evidence of Kamurasi 
sending armed forces north of Bugungu. In the early 1860s these polities often 
sought to navigate politically between the mukama and his royal enemies in 
northern Bunyoro. Tellingly, rebellious soldiers from Bugungu like Wamara were 
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exiled across the water, but slaves were only captured from beyond it by Nyoro 
rulers. 174  
But the people of these Lwo-speaking areas were culturally influential in spite of 
their political subordination. In the highly populated hills inland to the north-
west of Lake Albert, the people of the Alur heartland polity of Okoro were 
regionally renowned for their ‘proselytising culture’. Over the course of centuries, 
various other peoples had undergone the process of ‘Alur-isation’, as Alur princes 
had struck out on their own away from, but maintaining a degree of ritual 
subordination to Okoro, while establishing local ritual supremacy in 
neighbouring areas. This phenomenon was particularly apparent among the 
neighbouring less-centralised Lendu and Okebo societies to the west and south 
west. By contrast, owing partly to their proximity and links to the Nyoro state, the 
littoral area was almost entirely independent of Okoro’s influence but revealed 
the consequences of its civilisational ambitions, and provided the medium 
through which its civilisers could move to Bugungu. The powerful political 
influence of the projects of Nilotic Lwo-speaking civilisers from the north were 
perceptible on the Nyoro plateau, but the cultural manifestations were far more 
obvious in Bugungu. 
There was no simple ethnic hierarchy between peoples in Bugungu. Lwo-speaking 
ritual specialists seem to have enjoyed some prestige. One researcher in the 1960s 
heard from an old man that before the colonial era, ‘[t]he Alur people (…) gave 
                                                        
174 Emin Bey, ‘Journal einer Reise von Mruli nach der Hauptstadt Unyoro’s, mit 
Bemerkungen uber Land und Leute’, PGM 25 (1879), pp. 220-224, 396-397; Mehmet 
Emin, Die tagebücher von dr. Emin Pascha Vol. 3 (Hamburg, 1922), p. 417 (16 
November 1887); Schweinfurth (ed.), EPCA, p. 154. 18, 72, 97.  See Mehmet Emin, Die 
tagebücher von dr. Emin Pascha Vol.2 (Hamburg, 1919), pp. 284-285 (6 October 1877).  
 61 
magic to the Bagungu. They rubbed the spears and hooks with herbs, and recited 
magic words’. 175 A certain cultural hauteur was demonstrated by certain Lwo-
speaking interlopers in their use of the derogatory, derisive term loduuni (sg. 
maduuni), meaning ‘small, round people’ in reference to the Bantu-speakers of 
Bunyoro.176   
But the stigma of slavery was attached to people from across the water. Most of the 
traffic into Bugungu related to the institution of slavery, which was important for 
the local labour supplies, as was often the case in the vicinity of trading centres. 
Oral sources attest to trade in both female and male Lendu and Alur slaves from 
the other side of the lake captured or purchased through the exchange of 
commodities, or pawned by their kin as security, or granted as compensation for 
offences.177  The nature of the arrival of people from outside was indicated by the 
names of some of the nganda: Hambwa, meaning ‘kidnapped’; Gwera was from the 
verb meaning to ‘capture, enslave, force someone to have sex’. While 
incorporating and defining authority over women across the lake was now – and 
had probably always been – achieved through marriage, it seems male clients and 
slaves from across the lake were important additions to the family’s labour supply, 
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but were ultimately assimilated into the locally dominant culture. Such was the 
‘moral degradation’ associated with slavery that memory of its role in the history 
of certain lineages’ arrivals in Bugungu was suppressed.178 
Conclusion 
Nyoro rulers generally showed little interest in Bugungu in the early 1860s. 
Demonstrations of great force were rare. The Nyoro state was unable and 
unwilling to project its power consistently over these amorphous margins. For 
Bunyoro’s core population on the plateau, Bugungu was a space of alterity and 
degradation in regard to livelihoods, environment, language, and politics. But the 
putative civilisational hierarchies and stereotypes that structured upland ethnic 
thought were not accepted meekly in the lowlands, and loyalty to the Nyoro state 
was more questionable the more one moved away from the centralised core. In 
the absence of cultural and political integration with the Nyoro state it constituted 
a refuge for the rebellious, the desperate and the outcast, and, even if the locally 
dominant ways of being were lumped together as ‘Gungu’ by outsiders, remained 
heterogeneous and ambiguous, and determinedly plural in their spirituality, 
livelihoods as well as sense of self. This area represented one of what Igor 
Kopytoff termed ‘ethnically ambiguous marginal societies’ presenting ‘a 
mishmash of regional cultural traits’.179 Bugungu represented the meeting point of 
different civilising, proselytising projects, which interacted and imbricated, 
defying cultural homogenisation and political control.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Conquest and retribution: 
between the Mukama and the mujungu, c.1870-c.1899 
Deep-rooted discourses concerning inferiority and superiority, barbarism and 
civilisation found fresh salience as successive new political actors staked claims in 
Bugungu from the late 1860s to the late 1890s. New forces transformed the 
lowlands into part of a distinct political sphere – a space between more ambitious 
but over-stretched imperial projects, rather than merely at the edges of a rather 
indifferent one, as had previously been the case. This period in eastern Africa is 
generally seen as one of disruption and destruction – a characterisation that 
certainly holds true in the case of Bugungu. But prevailing analyses of the period, 
emphasising external intrusions and the consequent rise and fall of Bunyoro as 
regional hegemon, have tended to flatten the complexity of local peoples’ 
engagements.180 Older political, ideological and material bases, and ethno-
civilisationalist biases – rather than just powerful leaders – facilitated the entry of 
these new foreign powers, and later functioned to perpetuate a cycle of retributive 
violence in Bugungu long after it ceased elsewhere.  
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Antecedents of occupation: traders, slavers and governors 
from the north 
From the early 1860s, traders and slavers from far to the north wrought 
devastation in Bunyoro, particularly the areas south-east and north-east of 
Bugungu. Known as ‘Khartoumers’, after the city of the Turco-Egyptian empire 
from which their force emanated, many of these people were in the employ of a 
trading company called Aqaad. This firm operated a network of lightly fortified 
trading posts, or zaribas. From a post at Patiko, dozens of kilometres to the north of 
the borderlands, the firm had expanded its operations into Bunyoro, with 
considerable violence.181 It was owing to the nature of these early encounters that 
the British explorer Samuel Baker – another foreigner arriving in Bunyoro from 
the north – was received with apprehensiveness by Mukama Kamurasi in 1864. 
Aqaad and other companies increasingly complemented their quest for ivory with 
slave-taking. Bugungu was not untouched by such raiding, but its impact was far 
greater in Cope masaza, especially far to the east on the river around the Pawiir, 
where the Khartoumers maintained a small slave zariba. Nyoro rulers and 
pretenders recognised the potential utility of these men and their firepower. In 
1869-1871, Khartoumers in the employ of Aqaad involved themselves on both sides 
of the succession war through which Kabaleega, a son of Kamurasi, came to 
power.182 
As governor of the new Equatoria province of the expansionist Turco-Egyptian 
empire, Samuel Baker intervened in this situation in 1872. He had been 
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commissioned to establish Turco-Egyptian rule – under the rhetorical guise of a 
humanitarian anti-slaving mission – in the equatorial lakes region of central-
eastern Africa by the ruler of Egypt, the Khedive Ismail. But Baker’s intrusion was 
resisted in Bunyoro. His maladroit and brusque efforts to convince Kabaleega to 
submit resulted in violence at Masindi in May 1872, forcing Baker to beat a hasty 
retreat north-east from the Bunyoro plateau. At Pawiir he rather ineffectually 
declared Kabaleega’s rival Ruyonga king of Bunyoro, stationing Turco-Egyptian 
forces with him. With additional assistance from mercenaries from Lango, 
Ruyonga appears to have won some early victories against Kabaleega after Baker’s 
departure for Egypt a few months into 1873. Baker also sent a detachment of 
irregulars to Bugungu.183 
Bugungu held special significance for the fundamentally riverine Turco-Egyptian 
imperial operation. This littoral zone featured particularly prominently in Baker’s 
short-lived visions of a Turco-Egyptian Bunyoro in 1872-1873. During Baker’s visit 
in 1864 he had encountered the once-thriving commercial hub at a locality he 
believed to be called ‘Magungo’ or ‘Magungu’, located at Bugungu’s northwestern 
tip, where the Victoria Nile meets Lake Albert. Baker imagined Magungo as 
Bunyoro’s ‘principal station’– a trading post for transhipment of ivory from 
Bunyoro and adjacent territories, to extant stations in Sudan - diverting trade from 
the Zanzibar route. A station at Magungo would enable easy exploration of the 
lake, which at the time he believed stretched much further south, and directly 
connected with Lake Tanganyika. It would also play a part in the projected 
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advance to Buganda.184 But there seems to have been little official enthusiasm or 
further support from Khartoum for the incorporation of Bunyoro. A year elapsed 
between the end of Baker’s service and the arrival of his successor Charles Gordon 
in Khartoum in 1874. If it occurred at all, the occupation of Magungo by Turco-
Egyptian forces under Baker’s governorship was only fleeting. To Gordon’s 
envoys, visiting en route to Buganda in 1874-1875, Ruyonga in Cope cut a forlorn 
figure, having been abandoned by most of his followers. In Baker’s view, Ruyonga 
was ‘not properly supported’ by the Turco-Egyptian troops.185  
Gordon gradually revived and developed Baker’s plans for Bunyoro. He 
reinforced the post at Pawiir, and by October 1875 had developed plans for a chain 
of military stations which would secure Turco-Egyptian personnel and 
communications and assert territorial dominance.186 In Gordon's plan, Magungo 
was to be the terminus of the riverine transportation along the Albert Nile from 
Dufile; from there, transport would be overland – circumventing Murchison and 
Karuma falls via several inland posts  before traveling via the Nile to Lake Victoria 
from Pawir.187  Coloured by Baker’s enduring and extreme public animosity 
towards Kabaleega, Gordon developed plans to depose him as Mukama and 
install one of the royal pretenders in his stead.188 To Gordon’s envoy Linant in 
early 1875, Ruyonga was no longer a suitable substitute. Politically and militarily 
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he appeared something of a spent force.  By contrast, Linant was impressed by a 
royal rebel called Mupina, who he encountered fresh from a highly successful raid 
on Kabaleega’s supporters.189 Mupina was the brother of Kamurasi’s enemy 
Mpuhuka, who had passed away in around 1870.190 He had taken charge to the 
west of Ruyonga; Linant reported that Mupina’s ‘power extends as far as the 
mouth of Lake Albert’.191 
But this was something of a half-truth. To the east of the proposed Fort Magungo, 
Mupina had some influence as a result of alliances he had cultivated with certain 
caravans.192 But similar alliances had brought Kabaleega to power, and enabled 
him to consolidate and extend his authority. He excelled in this gatekeeping role 
with foreign traders. By exercising a royal prerogative over guns and ivory 
Kabaleega became less reliant on internal revenues in the form of tribute, and 
therefore less beholden to his people and over-mighty subjects. At the same time, 
through innovations in the forms of a standing army and military chiefship, the 
increasingly authoritarian Kabaleega was more able to extract such taxes by 
coercion.193   
Though Ruyonga and the Turco-Egyptians were consolidating control in the 
north-eastern borderlands at this time, Kabaleega still held influence in Bugungu 
and the wider north-western borderlands. After establishing another riverine fort 
at ‘Mruli’ (Buruli) upriver of Pawiir, Gordon in early 1876 sent Italians Romolo 
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Gessi and Carlo Piaggia, accompanied by two officers and twenty regular troops, 
to make the first passage of the Albert Nile from Dufile to Magungo, where they 
were to deliver munitions and stores required for the new station.194 By that time, 
even in Koc (‘Wadelai’/‘Wod Lei’), far to the north of Bugungu along the Albert 
Nile, the powerful ruler there was  ‘vassal’ to Kabaleega, according to Gessi; every 
couple of months the chief sent Kabaleega ‘all the ivory he collected’ – an 
undertaking involving ‘two or three hundred bearers’ each time.195    
On their arrival on the Victoria Nile in late March, Gessi’s attempts to reach the 
site of the proposed fort were hampered by the presence of ‘a party of disbanded 
soldiers’ of Kabaleega. Faced with hostility along much of the Victoria Nile, Gessi 
was obliged to sail almost as far along the Victoria Nile as Murchison Falls – closer 
to Mupina’s headquarters – in order to find a chief who had accepted the 
authority of the Turco-Egyptian government. Only through this chief was Gessi 
able to pass on orders to the local commander Wat-el-Mek to secure the area.196 
Gordon was forced to concede that Kabaleega was a ‘very powerful Sheikh’,197 and 
scaled down his ambitions accordingly, hoping that the potentate would ‘come to 
terms and accept [to remain with] half of his kingdom’ with Ruyonga and Mupina 
occupying the other two quarters.198 
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‘Fort Magungo’: the politics of Turco-Egyptian occupation on 
the Northern Albertine frontier 
The nature and extent of the influence the Turco-Egyptian administration went 
on to achieve is difficult to gauge. Some lowlanders no doubt felt compelled to 
distance themselves politically and physically from this foreign power. The local 
inhabitants had various sound historical reasons to object to these foreign forces; 
many of the Turco-Egyptian ‘soldiers’ had worked for Aqaad’s slavers. Moreover, 
some people from Bugungu remained firmly allied with the Nyoro ruling dynasty. 
Among these men was Rukaara Mwanga Kanagwa of the Cwa clan, who was a 
chief in the south-eastern hinterlands of Bugungu. Kanagwa, or his father, had 
been made a mujwara kondo.199  The lines of Gordon’s ‘rough’ cartographic 
representation of the territorial extent of the encompassing administrative unit 
suggested authority stretching almost to the core of Bunyoro; the true extent was 
certainly more modest. 
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Figure 4: ‘Rough hand sketch by Colonel C.G. Gordon’, 1879.200 
But the inhabitants of the lowlands did not simply experience the occupation as 
victims.  The Turco-Egyptian presence brought not only disruption and 
destruction, but also opportunity for the building of local power and influence. On 
the peripheries of the area over which the Turco-Egyptians asserted territorial 
dominance it was possible, at least at times, for certain big men to adopt an 
explicitly neutral ‘independent’ position. But most of the Turco-Egyptian local 
connections were less ambiguous; the Turco-Egyptian government secured a 
foothold in the lowlands primarily by supporting Kabaleega’s defiant rival 
kinsmen and their followers. Through its military power and its patronage 
resources, Fort Magungo bolstered the nearest pretender Mupina – to the point 
that he was considered by one of Gordon’s men to be ‘chief of the whole of the 
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Magungo and Shifalu [Palwo] districts, as well as ruler of a part of the Lango 
country’.201  
But the Turco-Egyptian administration also built alliances with less well-known 
men – local big men and their followers – by affording them protection of the 
imperial power. Certain commoners had reason to embrace rather than simply 
acquiesce to the alien intruders. One such individual was Wamara, a military 
leader from Bugungu who had been exiled by Kamurasi.202 Wamara was not the 
only person with historical grievances against the ruling Nyoro dynasty and 
recognised the potential advantages of collaborating with the Turco-Egyptian 
project. Acting as Wamara’s ‘most trusted and confidential adviser’, was one Kiiza 
Kakungulu whose father had been killed by Kabaleega.203   
The allegiance of others was won through demonstrations of Turco-Egyptian 
magnanimity, power, and commodities. Chiefs formerly in the service of 
Kabaleega in Bugungu were spared execution at Mupina’s hands due to the 
intervention of Gordon’s men.  After Gessi returned to Magungo in early-to-mid 
April 1876 and hoisted the Egyptian flag at the zariba by the lake in a ceremony 
marked by ‘the firing of guns and the holding of court to pay homage to the Flag’. 
Gessi reported to Gordon that around the fort itself, the annexation of the 
lowlands in April 1876, had been ‘made in the presence of native inhabitants (…) 
without the slightest resistance’. 204 After some initial mistrust, some were won 
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over by ‘gifts of clothing, swords, and bottles of wine’ and were ‘very happy and at 
ease’.205 On a visit to Magungo in mid-1876, Gordon described the local people as 
‘quiet and well-disposed to us’ and witnessed various previously hostile elements 
submitting to the Turco-Egyptian government.206 A year later, Gordon’s envoy, 
the German Mehmet Emin, reported that ‘many negroes are now subjects of the 
station’, as its ‘territory has increased’.207 Bugungu’s relationship with the Turco-
Egyptian administration was given space to develop in part because relations 
between the latter and Kabaleega were peaceful for a short period between 1877 
and 1878.  Emin achieved this rapprochement through careful diplomacy: he spent 
over a month as an envoy at Kabaleega’s court and agreed to pay an annual grant 
in gifts or money, and to terminate Turco-Egyptian support for Mupina and 
Ruyonga.208  
The geographical focus of the Turco-Egyptian administration in Bugungu around 
this time shifted slightly, bringing new communities within the orbit of the station. 
As Gordon had long planned, the administration moved the station upriver to the 
east between 1877 and 1878, as it had been being washed away and had become 
‘damp and unhealthy’.209 The second iteration of the fort was established several 
miles further up the Victoria Nile on a hill above one of the few suitable landing 
stages.210  In its second iteration, the station consisted of a ‘clean and well-built 
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town’, according to one passing missionary.211 The area of this second fort became 
known locally as ‘Khartoum’.212  
Fort Magungo in both iterations represented something of a social and 
commercial hub for the ‘friendly’ villages. Troops received poultry and ivory from 
local people in exchange for yellow copper, beads, and white shells. 213 Villages 
provided the Turco-Egyptian forces with water and porters, and even 
interpreters.214 The Khedive’s men at times clearly held sway among, and offered 
protection to, the lowlanders for some distance beyond the perimeter of the 
station.215 Europeans had sustained interactions with certain lowlanders.  Emin 
recorded some of their fables and migration traditions, later published in a 
German magazine.216 A visiting Austrian, Richard Buchta, in early 1879 captured 
certain individuals on camera, labelling these photographs with the ethnonym 
‘Magungo’, as opposed to the ‘Wanyoro’ and ‘Dschafalu’ (Palwo) he encountered 
elsewhere. 
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Figure 5: ‘68. Wanyoro- Mädchen’.217 
 
Figure 6: 72. ‘71 Magungo-Mädchen' and ’72. Magungo-Neger’.218 
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Figure 7: ‘61.Dschafalu-Neger’.219 
Kabaleega was merely biding his time and he was soon vindicated in this decision. 
In early 1879 Gordon, by now Governor General, decided that the cost of the 
stations was insupportable and the vision of expansion unattainable. 220 Khedival 
insolvency had been increasingly accompanied by local insecurity. The Turco-
Egyptian government had failed to cut ties with the rebel princes, much to 
Kabaleega’s dissatisfaction. Emin’s casual reference to a raid on Fort Magungu by 
Kabaleega’s soldiers around October 1879, suggests that these were routine 
occurrences by that time, as do measures to bolster the station’s defences. 221  The 
fort was protected by a strong earthwork fortification, a moat ten feet in depth, a 
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field-gun and two rocket-tubes, along with sentries and a chain of outposts. Such 
measures were necessary as the area was ‘coveted’ by Kabaleega, as Felkin put 
it.222 The garrison generated local hostility by growing increasingly unruly; they 
were wont to overstep at stations remote from control of the governors, 
increasingly ill-supplied with trade goods, and located in areas poorly endowed 
with grain for requisitions. Aside from the ‘dirt’ and ‘disorder’, Emin learnt of 
‘great irregularities’ at Fort Magungo. The garrison had launched raids above the 
escarpment against some of Kabaleega’s people, and the station commander had 
attacked a ‘friendly village’ near the fort, shooting four women and one man. 223 
The Governor of Equatoria, Emin, after some delay, finally carried out the 
evacuation of Magungo and the other stations in the borderlands in November 
1879. 
Rebellion and retribution post-occupation, 1880-1894 
Regardless of the tenor of its conclusion, the flirtation between Bugungu and the 
Turco-Egyptian imperial project had deepened Nyoro state and society’s sense of 
the former’s marginality and menace. The events of the years that followed the 
1879 withdrawal of the Turco-Egyptian garrisons shed further light on the 
changing nature of the relationship between the lowlands and the Nyoro state. 
Kabaleega immediately re-asserted his claim over Bugungu at the end of 1879. 
Within a couple of weeks of the Turco-Egyptian withdrawal, the Nyoro 
potentate’s troops had taken control of the abandoned Fort Magungu.224 This 
station became a focal point in the struggle for Bugungu both for its strategic 
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position and, possibly, for its symbolism. ‘[M]assacres of friendlies’ occurred 
across the borderlands the Turco-Egyptian government had abandoned.225 
Fearing the prospect of being brought to reckoning by Kabaleega, locals such as 
chief Wamara and his multi-ethnic, polyglot following fled across the water to 
Panyigoro on the Albert Nile.226  
But this was only the beginning of Bugungu’s troubles, as the lowlands had not 
been abandoned for good. Successive phases of re-encroachment and 
retrenchment by the Turco-Egyptian project spurred further violence and 
displacement. Bugungu did not cease to be a space of princely insurgence and 
Turco-Egyptian interest and influence. Wamara was to remain at least loosely 
allied to the Equatoria project from his position on the Albert Nile for about eight 
years. Governors-general who succeeded Gordon after 1880 largely ignored 
Equatoria. But Emin took the opportunity to re-establish a presence, albeit rather 
slight, in the form of two stations east of Bugungu on the Victoria Nile which were 
maintained until April 1884, when he was forced to concentrate his forces in the 
wake of the Mahdist rising in Sudan. Warfare in the lowlands resumed, only now 
with the royal renegades – Mupina, and Ruyonga’s heir Kamissoa (or Kamuswa) – 
also fighting each other. Emin heard reports that owing to the violence, his old 
route from the Fort Magungo to the inland plateau Fort Kikoroto had been 
‘completely abandoned by residents and become a great forest’.227 Mupina’s power 
was somewhat diminished in the absence of Turco-Egyptian patronage and 
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protection. 228 But his men remained a threat very near the lake, where they 
reportedly launched a successful attack on Kabaleega’s men in October 1885.229 
Mupina maintained communications with Emin, whose troops remained nearby. 
As long as these rebel princes survived, they remained a beacon for malcontents, 
outcasts and the disaffected, and gave Kabaleega cause for concern. 
Maintaining ties with the littoral borderlands remained essential for Emin owing 
to the riverine nature of the Turco-Egyptian empire. With communication 
northward along the Nile cut off from mid-1885 to 1886, Emin turned to Lake 
Albert for a southward route. Building upon extant relationships, Emin came to 
rely heavily on the littoral chiefdoms across the water from the lowlands. Using 
the two steamers at his disposal Emin founded one station near the village of 
Mahagi, on the north-western lakeshore; two further south, on the western shore; 
and one down the Albert Nile at Wadelai. For a short time Emin and Kabaleega 
turned to one another after a four-year lapse in communication. Embroiled in a 
war against Buganda’s new ruler, Kabaleega had little choice but to tolerate 
Emin’s moves. Following an invitation from Kabaleega six months earlier, Emin’s 
Italian assistant Casati was welcomed in central Bunyoro as a representative in 
June 1886. But relations rapidly soured. 
The matter of control of Bugungu, and the northern borderlands more broadly, 
came to a head in 1887-1888.  After Mupina passed away in early 1887, Kabaleega 
attempted to assert his authority up to and beyond the Victoria Nile, anxious to 
eliminate the threat of Emin. Operating from the (second) abandoned fort and on 
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the north bank nearby in a locality known as Kinyamwesi, one of Kabaleega’s 
military leaders called Rukaara sought to mobilise people to attack the remaining 
Turco-Egyptian forts. He cast around for support in March 1887, targeting Emin’s 
chiefly allies in the Albert Nile Valley including the exiled Wamara – and the 
neighbours of the increasingly oppressive garrison to the north at Patiko.230 
Kabaleega’s forces also launched attacks to the east in April 1887 on the Victoria 
Nile against the people of Mupina’s son, Kacope Okwir Kamurasi, who had 
assumed the royal rebel mantle.231 
The riparian lowlands bore the brunt of Emin’s mid-May 1887 reaction to this 
encroachment. On hearing that Kabaleega planned an assault on the remaining 
Turco-Egyptian forces to the north. Emin despatched two steamers, including the 
108-ton Khedive to the old station of Magungo to ‘cleanse’ the south bank of the 
‘lying scum’. Supported by the forces of the rebel princes, the Turco-Egyptian 
assault reportedly killed ‘some natives’ and the barasura in the vicinity of the 
landing site at Kyonga, drove out Rukaara and razed his village, and destroyed five 
vessels nearby before moving closer to Murchison Falls where they exchanged fire 
with one of Kabaleega’s large new boats which was attempting to cross to the 
north bank.232 Repelled by the combined forces of Emin and the dissident princes, 
Kabaleega set out to end the latter’s resistance, through ‘definite occupation of the 
countries on the Victoria Nile’.233  
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The Nyoro state eventually took control of Bugungu with a ferocity indicative of 
the ever-intensifying distrust and contempt with which Kabaleega had come to 
view this peripheral zone, especially since the Turco-Egyptian occupation. All the 
while sending ‘the usual professions of friendship’ to Emin, the Mukama 
tightened his grip on the borderlands. Some of those loyal to Emin were executed 
or imprisoned;234 others switched allegiance in the absence of consistent material 
Turco-Egyptian backing. Those who failed to join hands with the Mukama were 
shown no mercy by the ‘great concourse of negroes’ who assembled under Rukara 
at the abandoned Fort Magungo in July 1887. Over the rest of the year these men 
defeated and killed the royal rebels, and ‘devastated’ Bugungu and Cope, forcing 
many to flee across the water.235 Emin had continued to receive tribute from 
‘people from Magungo’ even as late as November 1887.236 But Bugungu had been 
firmly reincorporated, and heavily militarised by the Nyoro state by mid-January 
1888, when Casati, banished by the Mukama, barely escaped through the lowlands 
with his life. 237 As was the case in Cope, some rebels were executed, some were 
conscripted into Kabaleega’s professional army, known as the barusura, and others 
forcefully relocated to central district of Bugahya.238  
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The violence intensified the usual flows of people across the waterways, throwing 
into sharp relief the diversity of the different component parts of northern 
Bunyoro’s borderlands. Lwo-speakers from the vicinity of Fort Patiko, took refuge 
on the south bank of the Victoria Nile. A ‘strong colony of Shooli’ (Acholi) had 
established itself in a locality known as Padiri near the abandoned fort Magungo 
under Rukaara’s authority in a bid to escape the ‘oppressions and sufferings’ of 
the Turco-Egyptian garrison. Other groups had taken refuge elsewhere on the 
plains and further south along the shoreline after fleeing Mahagi across the lake.  
Casati encountered in Bugungu ‘a village of Lur and Lendu’, including one man 
who had previously served as an interpreter for the late commander of Fort 
Magungu.239  
The devastation was compounded in mid-1888 when the Turco-Egyptian forces 
themselves turned against Bugungu. At this time Emin felt intense pressure, 
hearing rumours circulating that Rukaara was recruiting for an offensive against 
his severely diminished strongholds to the north. Even his own soldiers on the 
lakeshore and along the Albert Nile agitated against him, concerned by the 
implications of Stanley’s relief expedition, which arrived in April 1888.240 After 
Emin launched an indiscriminate attack on Kibiro the next month partly in 
retribution for Casati’s treatment, in July one of his commanders sacked and 
destroyed ‘all the villages on the coast of Magungo’, including the headquarters of 
both Rukaara and Wamara, and captured several prisoners.241 Emin’s vengeful 
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violence was to be the final significant event in the Northern Albertine 
borderlands before the Turco-Egyptian empire’s permanent departure. 
No man’s land: collective punishment, between the British 
and Kabaleega, 1894-1899 
Bugungu’s reincorporation by Kabaleega’s Nyoro state proved ephemeral. Within 
just a few years of the final retreat of the Turco-Egyptian empire, Kabaleega’s 
expansionism encountered that of the British. British interests initially took the 
form of the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC), which had been 
granted a charter by the British government to develop trade in the region. The 
Company’s intrusion into the Great Lakes was led by the indomitable Frederick 
Lugard, already fiercely antipathetic toward Kabaleega, owing partly to the biases 
of accounts heard in Buganda, which he had recently convinced to submit to 
British overrule.  Lugard came to Bunyoro unauthorised. Aiming to enlist the 
troops formerly in the service of Emin, he found himself in battle against 
Kabaleega’s forces in 1891 in Bunyoro’s recently reconquered southwesternmost 
territories. Emerging victorious, Lugard proceeded to restore Tooro’s 
independence from Kabaleega and install an exiled prince as the Mukama. Lugard 
established several large Sudanese garrisons in southern Bunyoro to defend his 
client polity against Kabaleega. 
The British government stepped in to take over in 1893 from an IBEAC 
bankrupted by Lugard’s military adventures. Driven entirely by political and 
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military expedience, the new Acting Commissioner of Uganda, Henry Colvile, did 
not change tack. He saw Bunyoro as an intractable threat to British ambitions in 
the region, and the means by which to alleviate increasing politico-religious 
tensions between factions within Buganda, where Britain had declared a 
protectorate. Colvile launched an expedition – comprising of more than 14,000 
Ganda soldiers – against Kabaleega in late 1893, and by early January 1894 the 
imperial forces had overrun the Nyoro capital Mparo in Bugahya and seized the 
lucrative Kibiro salt mine on the lakeshore. Colvile had annexed the masaza in the 
historical plateau Nyoro heartlands south of the River Kafu to Buganda. For the 
purpose of crushing the resistance of Kabaleega, who had been forced to take 
refuge in Budongo Forest, Colvile resolved to cut Bunyoro in half by constructing 
a chain of fortified posts from Kibiro on the lake to Buruli on River Kafu.  
The riparian borderlands became part of the battleground between the British 
imperial army to the south, seeking to incorporate Bugungu within a now-
conquered and colonised Bunyoro, and the guerrilla forces of Kabaleega’s exiled 
Nyoro court, forced from Bunyoro’s central plateau. Bugungu’s divided and 
ambiguous political loyalties were clear from the outset. The Bugungu lowlands 
momentarily became the key locus of conflict in this warzone. Fearing Kabaleega 
would source food in Bugungu, Colvile on 20 January attempted to extend British 
control north from Kibiro. He dispatched the ‘Magungo Column’ under Brevet 
Major Rodric Owen and Captain Thruston with a land force comprising of over 
220 Sudanese and Swahili soldiers, 60 Lendu porters and 10 ‘Wanyoro’ to ‘make a 
demonstration’ that would drive Kabaleega out of Bugungu.  The advance along 
the lakeshore track forced Kabaleega to flee south-east into Budongo Forest.242 But 
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in time-honoured fashion, many of Bugungu’s inhabitants opted to take refuge 
across the water. British seizures of supplies and livestock perpetuated this 
displacement. Some forces loyal to Kabaleega were still active in Bugungu. About 
a thousand men under chief ‘Makika’ reportedly attacked the column as it neared 
the Victoria Nile on 23 January; but to the east the ‘large force’ who attacked their 
camp near Fort Magungu on the Victoria Nile on 26 January was operating under 
another chief who, according to prisoners captured during the skirmish, had come 
‘one day’s march’ – most likely from the south-eastern parts of Bugungu.243  On 
the south-western littoral margins of Bugungu, people under the chief ‘Karamoyo’ 
hid themselves and their cattle from the British on islands offshore. 244  
 
Figure 8: ‘Movements in Unyoro 1893-94’. 
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Underestimating the logistical challenges, Colvile envisaged the resurrection of 
the abandoned Fort Magungu. From there the column was under orders to travel 
– ferried and accompanied by a steel boat bearing a maxim gun and piloted by 
another British soldier Purkiss – to the Albert Nile, in order to reconnoitre for 
signs of an expedition dispatched by the Congo Free State. The column was under 
instructions to proceed to Wadelai to locate and recruit any remnants of Emin’s 
former Turco-Egyptian forces – lest they ally with the Mahdists further north – 
before garrisoning them at Fort Magungo. But these ambitions were not to be 
realised. After the attack on the 26 January, Owen had moved the column to take 
up a very brief residence in the fort, where he estimated a garrison of 50-100 men 
could be supported.245 However, the column could not cross the river to advance 
north to recruit any of Emin’s former troops; Purkiss’ steel boat had not found a 
way through the sudd in the delta in order to ferry them across the Victoria Nile. 
The column waited a couple of days at Fort Magungo before aborting its 
mission.246  
For a time, the British maintained their aspirations to reoccupy Bugungu.247  But 
anxieties about encroachment of European imperial rivals into the north-western 
borderlands of Bunyoro were soon assuaged. A series of treaties were signed with 
chiefs, and garrisons established, on the Albert Nile and the western shore of the 
lake in February to May 1894. Fort Magungu would only very temporarily feature 
in the story of the British conquest of Bunyoro. The officer in charge of Bunyoro, 
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Arthur B. Thruston, waited there for about a week in about April 1894 en route to 
Hoima from the north-west shore of the lake Mahagi, where he had found and 
recruited 10,000 of Emin’s abandoned Sudanese, who needed to be ferried from 
the north to the south bank of the Victoria Nile. But Thruston came away hardly 
convinced of the fort’s merits – it was nothing ‘except a ditch’, he reported. Bed-
bound with malaria at the time, Thruston considered Bugungu ‘very unhealthy’. 
248 
Bugungu remained beyond effective British influence, but became increasingly 
marginal to the emerging arenas of conflict. Already by April 1894, Kabaleega had 
moved far to the east and north-east at Buruli. He was forced towards the end of 
the year to begin guerilla warfare, as his supporters failed to hold onto or regain 
parts of central Bunyoro.249  Only the people of Butyabwa closest to the 
escarpment to the south-west had submitted to the British in by mid-1894. They 
were raided from the direction of Bugungu a month later.250 Kabaleega was 
reportedly keeping his cattle in Bugungu in August 1894, according to intelligence 
received by the British;251 but the action had moved elsewhere. 
At the same time, certain people from Bugungu were helping the British in their 
pursuit of Kabaleega outside the lowlands. The exiled old rebel Wamara of 
Bugungu, and many of his followers, including his consiglieri the ‘shrewd old 
man’ Kiiza, ‘joined the English cause from the outset’. These men made sure they 
were known to the British as erstwhile allies of Emin, and steadfast enemies and 
oppressed victims of the old order. The British reported that Wamara had been 
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exiled under Kamurasi and was still ‘bitterly hated’ by Kabaleega, who had killed 
Kiiza’s father. 252 A mutually beneficial relationship developed between the British 
and Wamara – ‘the most influential and powerful chief in [B]Unyoro’. Wamara 
had provided contingents of irregulars of as much as 100 men for key battles, like 
the daring November 1894 assault on Machudi in north-east which had nearly 
resulted in Kabaleega’s capture. 253 Wamara and his deputies came to act as 
intermediaries, providing advice on the human and physical terrain, as they had 
done for Emin.254 For such deeds, they were rewarded in the form of loot from 
expeditions and, more unusually, monthly payment for their services.255  But it was 
clear that Wamara eyed the chieftainship of Bugungu above all else. Without 
elaborating, Thruston informed the commissioner in late 1894 that Wamara, ‘by 
right of birth should be Chief of Magungo’.256 Wamara and Kiiza – in 
acknowledgement of their having ‘rendered great services’ –  were in line for the 
leadership of Bugungu, but would not dare to return there until Kabaleega was 
defeated once and for all.257  
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Bugungu was clearly seen by Kabaleega as a British vulnerability. 258 In Wamara’s 
place, in mid-1896, a new collaborator called Rwabudongo had been put in charge 
of Bugungu.259 But he was also given Kibero and Bugoma masaza, and 
Rwabudongo only nominally controlled Bugungu, where he had placed his son. 
At any rate, Wamara, among others, accused Rwabudongo – formerly one of the 
principal barusura leaders – of still aiding Kabaleega. Faced with formidable 
British strength in the east around Buruli, Kabaleega’s men seem to have been 
extending their operations further and further west. In April 1896, the commander 
in Bunyoro William Pulteney requested that the forts be moved up the Nile to 
Bugungu to stop Kabaleega’s men raiding across the water.260  But the situation 
continued into September. Officials observed that peoples close to the river in 
northern Bunyoro were placed in the ‘unpleasant predicament’, of facing reprisals 
from both Kabaleega and the British for helping the other.261 As the British plans 
to establish a more permanent physical presence had come to light, Kabaleega 
had ordered the destruction of all the crops in northern Bunyoro, forcing people 
to come to his side of the Nile.262 
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Figure 9: ‘Loading up the ferry-boat at Pajao’.263 
The British tried to secure Bugungu in the last few months of 1896, extending the 
military frontier northward from the Kibiro-Mruli line to the Victoria Nile, a few 
months after the British government declared that the Uganda Protectorate had 
been extended to include districts to the west of Buganda, and also Bunyoro to the 
north-west. In early October 1896 Ternan initiated the construction of a fort at 
Pawir in the north-east of Bunyoro and established Ruyonga’s successor, 
Rejumba, as chief between there and Buruli to the east. Ternan proceeded 
westward the next month and selected Mugema for the saza from Pawiir to Pajao. 
He selected Pajao as site for a fort in order to monitor the ferry crossing, and from 
which the entire Bugungu riverbank upriver could be patrolled.264 From Pajao, the 
British were able to react with great speed when word reached them that 
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Kabaleega’s men were in Bugungu preparing to attack forts to the south. An 
expedition to Bugungu in November killed many of the Mukama’s men, and 
captured forty more including a chief called ‘Kabega’, along with two of the 
Mukama’s daughters, and two very large dugout canoes.265  
With local fear of Kabaleega’s reprisals beginning to subside, people started to 
return to Bugungu and submit to the British.266 By February 1897 the British had 
even convinced the ‘real chief’, Wamara, to accept the chiefship of Bugungu, and 
to return there with his followers.267 Wamara’s change of heart was probably in 
part because Kabaleega’s end seemed to be in sight; but perhaps he also sensed 
that further political advancement beckoned. The matter of the system of 
administration remained unresolved. At first it seemed that the British would 
place one of Kabaleega’s sons on the throne under one or more regents, in 
preference to incorporating Bunyoro into Buganda.268 But another radically 
different form of administration was being considered for a time in late 1896 into 
1897 by the British officer in charge of Bunyoro. Ternan advanced his opinion that 
it was preferable for Bunyoro to be governed as several separate political units 
through the ‘local chiefs’ that he had just appointed. 269   Certain chiefs – and 
others waiting in the wings like Wamara – were no doubt keen to capitalise, 
should this proposal gain traction.270  
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But Wamara died just a few months later, at the end of May 1897. At around the 
same time so did these nascent, alternative political visions.  Wamara’s death – 
apparently by poisoning – also suggested to the population that the British could 
not protect them from the Mukama’s terrifying, enduring reach. In vindication of 
Wamara’s earlier concerns, under Kabaleega’s orders he was poisoned by one of 
his own sub-chiefs. When the accused resisted arrest he was killed along with 
twenty of his followers by the British. But the effect of this show of force was not as 
salutary as the British hoped. Many local people – indeed the victim himself as the 
poison took hold – believed this to be death by mahano or Kabaleega’s ‘witchcraft’. 
Soon after Wamara’s death, Thruston composed a lengthy memorandum arguing 
for the restoration of Kabaleega’s lineage on the Nyoro throne. The ‘respect of the 
people is for royal blood’, he opined; ‘they do not trouble themselves with 
questions of legitimacy’.271 In March 1898, when false rumours of Kabaleega’s 
death spread through Bunyoro, it was decided to proclaim as Mukama one of his 
sons in order to maintain ‘good government and good-will’.272  
Bugungu was the place from which the earliest collaborators with the British were 
drawn, but also where the residual threat of Kabaleega was felt for longest. The 
lowlands became ‘very disorganised’ in the months following Wamara’s death at 
the end of May 1897, Thruston had reported; in accordance with the ‘national 
custom’, he appointed Wamara’s nephew ‘Msoga’, as regent during the minority 
of Wamara’s eldest son, the ‘small boy’ Ajaka (see figure).273 But Msoga was 
himself ‘only a lad’, and one so unsettled by the threat posed by Kabaleega that he 
sought refuge in ‘drink and debauchery’.  The British recalled him to Masindi for 
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supervision, leaving Wamara’s old deputy, Kiiza to oversee Bugungu from his base 
at Padiri in the north-east.274 Kiiza maintained the Bugungu chiefship by 
upholding the Wamara faction’s historical reputation with the military 
administration for being Kabaleega’s most committed adversaries.275 
 
Figure 10: ‘The infant Ajaka, the youngest chief in Unyoro’.276  
But even the wily political veteran Kiiza found it difficult to dispel the threat of 
Kabaleega.  From late 1897 to May 1899, Bugungu faced frequent raids. After 
crossing to the south bank, barusura leader Ireta and his followers had started 
targeting southern and south-eastern Bugungu. In April 1898, once Kabaleega had 
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joined hands with the uprising by Sudanese mutineers and Mwanga’s Ganda 
Muslims, the British sent three columns north to hunt down Ireta’s guerrillas.277 
But he evaded capture in the forests of Budongo and Pabidi. Ireta’s influence in 
Bugungu was still ‘far-reaching’ even in March 1899. The officer in charge of 
Bunyoro noted that the inhabitants of Bugungu were said to be ‘all in Ireta’s 
service’ owing to fear of having women captured and ransomed for food; the 
British commander even proposed establishing a post in Kitoro near the 
escarpment east of Butyabwa in the hope Ireta could be caught while out in the 
open.278 The insecurity forced people to rely even more heavily on fish, and to 
hide their cultivation precariously on the floating papyrus islands.279 Only in May 
1899 did Ireta surrender, just over a month after Kabaleega’s defeat and capture.  
Conclusion 
For a quarter of a century Bugungu found itself at the frontline of competing, 
interacting, and multiplying political projects led by royal pretenders, local 
entrepreneurs, Kabaleega, and foreign imperial powers. Lowlanders navigated the 
demands and opportunities as best they could. Some in Bugungu had rallied 
behind Kabaleega, but throughout this period there were notable exceptions 
which rendered salient old ethnocivilisational  stereotypes, reinforcing the 
distrust and disdain that had long defined the relationship between Bugungu and 
centralised state authority. The unprecedented intrusion and imposition of 
overlapping regimes of authority was marked by extreme violence and coercion – 
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often in the form of collective punishment. These legacies were to powerfully 
shape the contours of the imperial administration, and patterns of local response, 
that developed in Bugungu in the early twentieth century, shaping Anglo-Nyoro 
stereotypes of Gungu, and thereby structuring emerging conceptions of ethno-
civilisational hierarchy.
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CHAPTER THREE: Savage punishment: disease, 
difference, and displacement, c. 1899-c.1921 
The historiography of early colonial Bunyoro has been preoccupied by a political 
expression of Nyoro ethnicity: the Nyangire protest movement led in 1907 by local 
chiefs on the plateau in reaction to Ganda political and cultural sub-
imperialism.280 But different challenges confronted the British and the Nyoro elite 
in Bugungu as they sought to transform this politically interstitial space of alterity 
in-between political systems to one unambiguously within the shrunken husk of 
colonial Bunyoro. In this encounter, the colonial state absorbed and amplified 
certain older ethno-civilisational stereotypes, adopting a spatial strategy for 
economic, political, and disease control that entailed classificatory violence – a 
monumental act of collectivising punishment that was at once differential and 
differentiating..281  
Proper and improper tribes 
The British soldier-administrators who introduced military rule in Bunyoro at the 
close of the nineteenth century did not concern themselves to any meaningful 
extent with the composition of what remained of Bunyoro.  During the war the 
British tended to categorise the people of the country simply as either ‘friendly 
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Wanyoro’ or (unfriendly) ‘Wanyoro’; now they were just ‘Wanyoro’. Those on the 
plateau at the centre of the colonial district did not dispute this assessment. A 
colonial medic based at the fort at Pajao noted a ‘different race’ who ‘call 
themselves “Falua,” [Palwo] and differ from the Wanyoro in every respect’.282 But 
he did not venture any further away from Pajao into Bugungu, it seems.  No 
Europeans spent more than a day or two in the area. Bugungu was part of a littoral 
zone that was considered by Europeans to represent a ‘black strip in the health 
map of Uganda’.283 Certain parts of Bugungu, including its north-eastern limits at 
Pajao, were deemed particularly ‘poisonous’ and ‘wretched’. 284  The fort, far from 
any settled area, was soon abandoned. 
These men felt little need to uncover political structures and socio-cultural 
affinities as justification for their delineation of Bunyoro as an administrative unit. 
The northern fringes, once sites of intense military interest, were increasingly 
relegated to obscurity in the official mind. In Bugungu the hardship endured as 
the rains failed in 1899, leading to famine. In that December the first missionary to 
visit the plains for two decades noted that the famine had forced the withdrawal of 
the Church Missionary Society’s African teachers from Pajao, and was driving 
Bugungu’s inhabitants to migrate south along the shoreline.285  
But over the first few years of the 1900s, the civilian administration that took 
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charge began to devote slightly more attention to the anatomy of a newly ‘pacified’ 
district. On the basis of information provided by influential African informants, 
certain missionaries and administrators began to move beyond the taken-for-
granted, simple notion of a Nyoro ‘race’ or ‘tribe’. Instead, they saw a Bunyoro 
comprising of ‘several distinct tribes’ ‘belonging to different parts’, ‘differing 
completely from each other’, and only ‘nominally united under one king’.286  As 
part of a broader process of ethno-territorial ordering and mapping that extended 
throughout and beyond the Protectorate, early administrators came to understand 
Bunyoro’s several administrative sub-divisions as corresponding with what they 
termed ‘tribal territories’.287 
 
Figure 11: ‘Skeleton map showing the present sub-divisions of the Unyoro District’ (1901).288 
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Establishing colonial administration did not only involve mapping horizontal 
relations of difference. Under the influence of late Victorian social theories of 
evolutionary historicism and ‘racial science’ grafted onto ethno- and state-centric 
local ideas, early colonial officials exhibited a powerful interest in putative 
hierarchies of civilisation between the ‘tribes’ they thought comprised the 
colonised population. In the view of Johnston, the ‘big black Bantu Negro race’, for 
example, had been ‘tempered in varying degrees of intermixture’ with the 
superior ‘Hamitic negroid races from the northern half of Africa’; some tribes 
were, therefore, more ‘degraded’ – and disposable – than others in terms of 
temporal measures of linguistic, physical, social, and political development.289 As 
such certain groups were more ‘proper’ than others, particularly in regard to 
attitudes towards centralised authority.  
Some maintained that one could be less or more Nyoro.  Such notions found 
expression in regard to some of the people of the plateau in the European use of 
phrases such as ‘pure Banyoro’, ‘Banyoro proper’, or, as one Masindi-based 
missionary put it, ‘pukka Banyoro’ as opposed to ‘buffer tribes’.290 Muddled, partly 
tautological statements about ‘tribes’ and ethnonyms emerged when Europeans 
tried to impose a static, neat taxonomy: ‘the Banyoro are divided into clans or 
tribes’, including the ‘the Banyoro in Bugahya and Busindi, Baroori in Kisuga 
[Buruli]’, ‘Bagungu in Bugungu’ and ‘Bachopi [or Jo-Palwo] in Pawera, Kibanda 
                                                        
289 Harry H. Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate (London, 1902), pp. 566-567, 591-592. 
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and Kiwukya’.  For Europeans, part of the confusion lay in the fact that some of 
the chiefly lineages even on the periphery were culturally Nyoro-ised, and it also 
seemed that although these ‘distinct tribes’ were ‘too diverse in character to 
effectively unite in any cause’, there were no ‘inter-tribal feuds’ between them.’ 291  
The categories that generated the most official interest were those applying to the 
people of northern Bunyoro. Those widely known as Gungu were deemed different 
to the people of the tablelands, but in a manner less easily grasped than that 
which separated the latter from the Lwo-speaking Palwo  of the north-east. The 
first official to take charge of Bunyoro as District Collector, George Wilson, was 
immediately struck in Bugungu by the ‘essentially tropical’ nature of the 
vegetation, similar to ‘the country on the mainland opposite Mombasa’.292 The 
population were as different as the environment, he came to learn. Chiefs from 
central Bunyoro told Wilson ‘the Bagungu’ were ‘entirely alien’ and their language 
‘akin to that of no other tribe known in their vicinity’.293  Early African missionary 
visitors noted that the people of Bugungu found Runyoro ‘difficult’.294 
Administrators who followed in Wilson’s footsteps confirmed that this was a 
‘peculiar’, ‘somewhat distinct’ ‘tribe’ in that it ‘differs in many particulars from the 
tribes surrounding it’ to the degree that it ‘well merits examination by an 
anthropologist’.295  
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Two different ways of seeing their difference were to emerge. For some the Gungu 
were a remnant. Before leaving Uganda in 1902, Special Commissioner Harry 
Johnston had noted, in the huge ethnological compendium he published that 
same year, that the language spoken in Bugungu ‘differ[ed] widely from the Nyoro 
tongue’.296 He speculated on its relationship with other languages: ‘probably it is a 
dialect of’ or ‘closely allied’ to ‘Luhuku’ – a ‘very ancient’ and unusual tongue 
spoken west of the Semliki River near the southern extremity of Lake Albert.297 
Others saw this population as a hybrid, with the source of contamination lying to 
the north along the western shore: they had ‘assimilated themselves with the 
Lendus’, with whom they remained in ‘close communication’.298   
Either of these theories concerning Bugungu’s alterity could be invoked in order 
to make sense of the area’s socio-political relationship with Bunyoro. Officials 
reported that there was possibly a historically fraught, estranged relationship with 
the Nyoro state. Perhaps trying to ingratiate the area with the new regime, local 
informants in Bugungu told officials that they were victims of the ‘great animosity’ 
of Kabaleega, who blamed them ‘for Baker’s and Casati’s entrance into 
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[B]Unyoro’.299 There were further clues in a magical migration tradition involving 
‘the waters [of Lake Albert] opening and leaving a passage’.  Revealing a particular 
attitude to those above the the escarpment and a particular sense of geography, 
the story explained that ‘[t]he bulk of their tribe’ had in this way ‘escaped 
oppression in [B]Unyoro’.300 
But what were once ethnological curiosities or encouraging signs in the official 
mind, were soon rendered worrying indications of a tendency towards defiance. 
The salience of the Gungu category in Anglo-Nyoro discourse reflected growing 
practical concerns. Problems had started to become clear after Collector Wilson 
had replaced the Bugungu saza chief, Kiiza, in 1901 while reorganising the 
administration along the lines of the Buganda system. In dropping Kiiza, the 
colonial administration signalled that they no longer deemed enduring animus 
towards Kabaleega to be sufficient qualification for chieftainship; appointments 
were heavily influenced by CMS opinion. Kiiza suffered demotion. In his place, 
the British appointed Sirasi Tibansamba, a Busoga-born Anglican who had been 
brought to Bunyoro ‘as a child’ and raised in the Nyoro court. Tibansamba and his 
Ganda deputy very soon faced considerable opposition in Bugungu. Wilson’s 
replacement as District Collector reported ‘the Bagungu’ to be a ‘somewhat 
different’, or ‘somewhat distinct’ people who were ‘difficult to manage and 
disinclined to listen to or obey their Chief’.301   
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Ethnic categories informed official understandings of these administrative 
difficulties.  ‘With their own chief Kiiza there was little or no trouble’, British 
official Stephen Bagge reported hearing from a senior chief in Hoima. Problems 
started ‘only since a stranger has been put over them’. Tibansamba was not a 
‘stranger’ for having been born in Busoga rather than Bunyoro, believed Bagge; 
rather, he was a stranger for not being ‘a native of Magungu’. A young local rival 
called Mwanga, a sub-chief born of Bugungu, was waiting in the wings.  Like that 
of late Wamara, Mwanga’s lineage claimed to be rulers of Bugungu ‘by hereditary 
right’. The Collector Bagge reported that Mwanga was the son of the ‘the former 
chief of Bugungu by descent’.302 Calls for Tibansamba’s removal were in reality 
not merely a response to his outsider status. Tibansamba and one of his sub-chiefs 
had displeased the Anglo-Nyoro establishment above the escarpment by 
converting to Catholicism in 1902.303 The Anglican missionaries’ star pupil, 
Andereya Bisereko Duhaga, installed as mukama the same year, supported the 
claim of the baptised Anglican Erenesti Mwanga, whose family had received 
missionaries as far back as 1899.304 Tibansamba’s local unpopularity also stemmed 
partly from abuse of office; complaints regarding his seizure of peoples’ property 
led to an inquiry in May-June 1903 by Collector Stanley Tomkins.  Tibansamba 
and his deputy were found guilty of embezzlement and deposed. 305  
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But local hostility towards these chiefs was a response to authorised exactions, not 
to embezzlement. Previously the British had struggled to convince chiefs to even 
attempt to implement any government directives in areas such as Bugungu. Senior 
chiefs in Masindi contemptuously explained that such efforts were futile as the 
people of the ‘outlying country’ were ‘“such washenzi” (a Swahili term with 
meaning akin to ‘barbarians’). The barbarians demonstrated ‘slackness in 
obedience to orders’.306 Wilson had replaced many chiefs, including Kiiza, in order 
to remedy this situation. But many people in Bugungu were unprepared to accept 
these burdens introduced by the alien regime, regardless of the origins of the 
chiefs who mediated them. Tibansamba and some of his sub-chiefs – both from 
Bugungu and those from elsewhere – explained that the accusations levelled 
against him were merely a mask to distract the administration from the fact that 
people were ‘emigrating to avoid hut tax’.307  
The tenuous nature of sovereignty on the plains meant that the inhabitants could 
play off different regulatory regimes. Bugungu shared highly porous lacustrine 
and riparian boundaries to the west and north-west respectively with the Belgian 
Congo and Lado Enclave, a barely administered area on the west bank of the 
Albert Nile which was part of King Leopold’s Congo Free State; to the north, over 
the intra-territorial boundary on the Victoria Nile, lay the lightly administered 
Koba District within the Uganda Protectorate’s Nile Province. When ‘100 Alurs’ 
had arrived in Bugungu around the turn of 1901, as part of a ‘considerable’ wider 
influx, the British were apt to frame such movement in terms of the moral 
geography of imperial rule: the group were reported to have moved ‘on account of 
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bad treatment’ in Belgian territory.308 But when traffic flowed the other way, 
concerns about ‘tribal territories’ were invoked amid alarm over taxes and 
labour.309 The British were increasingly also worried about movements within the 
protectorate to the Nile Province. In one case, a sub-chief and about 300 of his 
followers had opted out of Bugungu this way.310 Inhabitants of the littoral zone, 
like border people everywhere, both flouted and appropriated the sovereign logics 
of sedentarism, map-making and borders.311 
These early colonial movements, like those of the pre-colonial era, depended on, 
and were determined by, political and social ties which were temporally deep and 
transcended ethnic boundaries.312 Across the border at the foot of the escarpment 
at Mahagi, the chief Otwikende, was referred to by the Belgians as ‘sultan of the 
Bagongo’. Though his subjects were largely Alur, his father was a Bantu-speaker 
from across the lake.313 Alur settlements, with roots of varying historical depths, 
were common throughout the northern half of Bunyoro, and had only become 
more common around the advent of colonial rule. 314 
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Figure 12: Map showing the boundaries of Uganda, the Congo Free State and the Lado Enclave.315 
 
Figure 13: David Bruce, ‘Koba, Lake Albert’ (1903).316 
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The situation did not improve under Tibansamba’s replacement, the ‘weak youth’ 
Mwanga from Bugungu. In May 1904 a visit from the mukama Duhaga and 
Wilson - now Sub-Commissioner of Western Province - occasioned a public 
meeting which ‘the Bagungu’ attended ‘in large numbers’. Wilson delivered news 
that he was introducing measures to regulate labour demanded by chiefs – news 
that had ‘created such enthusiasm’ at such meetings elsewhere in Bunyoro. But 
this announcement had a ‘much more moderate effect’ in Bugungu. The 
‘embarrassing want of feeling’, Wilson discovered, stemmed from ‘the fact that 
they had not hitherto regarded with much respect exactions of labour made by the 
chiefs’. ‘The Bagungu have a reputation for insolent disregard of any authority’, 
Wilson explained to the Commissioner.317 Six months later, it was apparent that 
disregard could turn to open defiance. It was noted in October 1904 by the 
Collector that ‘non-tax-payers in this part of ‘[B]Unyoro exceed very considerably 
the number of payers’.318 Sub-chiefs complained to a touring colonial 
administrator a couple of months later that on one occasion while attempting to 
collect taxes, in one village the inhabitants ‘turned out armed with spears, bows 
and arrows and drove them off’.319   
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Figure 14: ‘Map of Western Unyoro’ (1901).320 
Discipline and disease control 
In the British imagination of Bugungu, ideas of environmental and demographic 
crisis intertwined with a sense of moral and political panic in these years.321  It was 
African health that now rapidly came into view. The key concern for public health 
across Uganda in the first decade of colonial rule was sleeping sickness or Human 
trypanosomiasis (or ‘mangoota’, as it was known locally), which had been first 
identified in the south of the protectorate in 1901.  Carried by tsetse flies, the 
disease killed about 300,000 people on and around Lake Victoria in this period.  
The British had first become aware of suspected cases of sleeping sickness in 
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Bugungu in about August 1904.  Officials were alerted by the chief Mwanga that 
inhabitants of Bugungu were ‘dying in large numbers from an unknown 
disease’.322   
In November 1904, the assistant collector and medical officer toured Bugungu, and 
reported that sleeping sickness was prevalent in northern Bunyoro, warning that 
the disease may have spread as far north as Nimule near the border with Sudan.323 
At ‘Mwanga's shamba’ in the angle between the Weiga River and its tributary the 
Izolya, the medical officer collected 18 suspected cases who were inspected in 
Hoima.324 On the basis of a subsequent tour in the December, E.D.W. Greig of the 
Royal Society’s Sleeping Sickness Commission soon reported that the disease was 
present on the Victoria Nile, at Buligi and Pajao on the south-bank and Kimori on 
the north, and as far down the Albert Nile as Wadelai. Greig believed that ‘the 
chief infection is South of the Victoria Nile’; the disease had not so far reached 
Nimule, but he cautioned that there was ‘evidence that it is advancing Northwards 
in the fly belt’.325 The news of the disease’s presence on the Albert Nile in Uganda 
generated panic among certain senior officials. Wilson, now as Acting 
Commissioner, sent a telegram London warning of the ‘grave’ implications. 
Wilson was concerned not only about its possible impacts on British interests 
down the Nile, beyond Uganda, but also, and more immediately, the ‘political’ 
consequences in parts of the Uganda Protectorate that lacked the ‘passivity or 
resignation of the Baganda’. Recent experiences in Bugungu made him 
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particularly anxious that the disease might ‘dislocate’ the ‘administrative 
machinery’ in ‘areas such as Unyoro and the Nile’.326 
But the medical panic was largely misplaced. In December 1904, the medical 
officer in charge of extended sleeping sickness investigations, Aubrey Hodges, was 
dispatched to northern Bunyoro by the Principal Medical Officer. In a lengthy 
report written on the basis of several weeks' safari along and to the east of 
Masindi-Pajao cart road, Hodges confirmed the focal point of the outbreak in 
Bugungu, at Mwanga’s headquarters along the Waiga river. He estimated that the 
number of deaths amounted to ‘several hundreds’. But the investigation did not 
yield significant data as ‘the natives, who have had little to do with Europeans’, 
‘were found to be extremely shy and suspicious’.327 But as the PMO pointed out, 
Wilson’s ‘melodramatic telegram’ about the spectre of sleeping sickness in 
Bunyoro had, generated an ‘unwonted amount of excitement’. ‘There have been a 
few cases’, he conceded, ‘but so far as I can make out from the investigations (…) it 
is as yet not very extensive or serious’. The PMO stated with ‘practical certainty’, 
that elsewhere ‘sleeping sickness was not present in epidemic form’.328 
Further details confirmed that this outbreak did not warrant dramatic 
intervention.  E.B. Adams, who toured Bugungu in September 1905, confirmed 
that the epidemic was localised in a group of about a dozen villages situated on 
and between these the Waija and Izolya rivers, with the location of Mwanga's 
headquarters, right in their midst. Infection was with Trypanosoma gambiense, and 
the vector, Glossina palpalis, was observed to be abundant. The mortality rate was 
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severe with at least 200 deaths on the lower Waija river attributable to sleeping 
sickness over the previous few months.329 But this death-rate paled into 
insignificance when compared to what had happened on Lake Victoria. No 
G.palpalis were found north-west of the lowlands in some of the areas most prone 
to tax evasion, along the seven miles of Victoria Nile flanking the delta into Lake 
Albert, or along the lakeshore as far as the river Weiga.330  
The Sleeping Sickness panic had to a large extent passed by the turn of 1906. But 
political disorder and insubordination reigned. The collector on tour heard that 
the people of Bugungu were ‘encouraged in their attitude’ by the people across the 
river who called them ‘slaves of the Wazungu’ for bowing to the taxation demands 
of the whites. Among the main offenders were the inhabitants of the village of 
Buliisa where the people ‘openly said that they were quite ready to migrate (…) if 
pressed’. The lowlands itself remained a place of refuge for some, such as those of 
sub-chief Okello’s sizeable ‘Aluru village’ of Kakoora in eastern-central.331  But the 
outflux continued. Refusing to pay taxes, 700 people had crossed the Victoria Nile 
to Koba District. The ‘instigator of the movement’ was their chief, who preferred 
to accept the less onerous demands of Koba’s Lwo-speaking chief, Omach.332  
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Bugungu was source of frustration for early colonial officials because its 
inhabitants were ‘very unwilling to pay’ tax, despite being a ‘wealthy people’.333 Its 
population’s recovery in this regard since about 1900 had been quite remarkable. 
Some elephant-ravaged neighbouring areas relied ‘to a great extent’ on supplies 
from the cultivable hinterland areas of eastern Bugungu, which was considered to 
be ‘rich in food’ and ‘much better’ in this regard than those immediately to the 
east and south. There was also a booming trade in fish sought by ‘tribes across the 
river’.334 Within the space of a few years, touring officials viewed Bugungu’s 
population as denser and wealthier than in ‘any other part of the district’.335 Most 
people possessed flocks of goats and sheep.  The inhabitants of the area were 
reported to be ‘well-rounded in figure’, and, compared with the ‘rather ragged and 
scraggy’ people of southern Bunyoro ‘altogether wear a more contented and 
prosperous look’. ‘The women’, Wilson opined, ‘can quite well be described as 
buxom’.336   
The colonial state came to see Bugungu as wealthy, but both fiscally barren and 
ungovernable; its overmighty population of inveterate tax evaders appeared 
largely impervious to domestication. This area, that for Deputy Commissioner 
Wilson constituted ‘“undisciplined” [B]Unyoro’, represented an intractable 
problem going into 1906.337  Disciplinary measures were in order. Entebbe had 
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been shaken by the murder of a colonial official in Ankole District in May 1905 by 
people previously deemed docile.338 Bugungu and neighbouring Cope were, by 
contrast, ‘about the wildest in the settled portions of the Protectorate’ according to 
the outgoing Commissioner.339 The new Commissioner – renamed Governor – 
Henry Hesketh Bell, arrived in Uganda in May 1906, to read an annual report from 
the District Collector that slammed Bugungu as ‘not sufficiently under control; or 
accustomed to British rule’.340 The first step taken by senior officials to remedy 
these issues was relatively minor. The first to suffer was Mwanga, but only 
through a loss of status: he was demoted as Bugungu was downgraded to a sub-
county (gombolola) of Bujenje saza above the escarpment under the strong hand of 
Jemusi Miti, an energetic and entrepreneurial Ganda chief.   
But a far greater – though more oblique – punitive consequence awaited the 
whole population of Bugungu.  Bell’s administration adopted a legislative agenda 
that aimed to reduce reliance on costly and counterproductive military patrols. 
Bell formalised and institutionalised a suite of allied practices through resort to 
legalism. Among those with laws that contained potential for dealing with areas 
like Bugungu was the Collective Punishment Ordinance (CPO), which first began 
to be discussed in late 1906. It gave officials in Uganda the power to ‘impose fines 
on all or any inhabitants of any village or district, or members of any tribe, sub-
tribe or community’. The CPO in Uganda was developed by protectorate judge, 
Morris Carter, and was primarily aimed at the ‘primitive conditions’ of the 
residents of the eastern parts of the protectorate (which were, like Bugungu, under 
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the sub-colonial rule of Ganda chiefs and missionaries). But it was to be applied 
across the protectorate. The ordinance was in part designed to avoid the 
‘distasteful’ prospect of having to keep declaring ‘disturbed districts’ which ‘might 
lead the public at home and elsewhere to think that the Protectorate generally was 
in a disturbed state’.341 
Uganda’s CPO was the earliest of its kind in British Africa. Carter had found 
inspiration in the form of certain collective responsibility features of the Burma 
Village Act. This was not unusual: the punitive regime in Uganda was powerfully 
shaped by the Indian Penal Code and the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, 
beginning with their application in 1902. In India, collective punishment, and 
related notions of collective criminality, had featured since the 1830s after the 
establishment of the East India Company.342 It had been formalised in the 
Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, as Victorian metropolitan concerns regarding 
recidivism transmuted within the ‘ethnographic state’.343 The Burma ordinance 
took the ‘village’ as the unit of collective responsibility. In Uganda, the CPO gave 
officials far more definitional flexibility, and was without clear parallel in the 
British empire in its overt, specific intent, and territory-wide application; the 
Colonial Office’s William Bottomley had ‘not been able to trace any colonial 
ordinance which this draft may be compared’. Bell’s request for permission to 
enact the ordinance had met with some resistance in London in 1908, as Bottomley 
feared it represented ‘a retrograde step’.344 
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But the CPO was likely to fail to meet the administration’s perceived needs in 
regard to Bugungu. This area was judged to be inconvenient partly owing to its 
geography – even beyond its provision of ample possibilities for the evasion of 
colonial authority. The area was considered by European visitors to lack cash crop 
potential, rendering it of little immediate value to the administration.345 It was also 
confirmed to be insalubrious in regard to European bodies, and administrators 
and missionaries alike complained of Bugungu’s relatively remote and 
inaccessible position; its northern extremity could take a few days to reach from 
Hoima, and the route was ‘impracticable’ in the wet season.346  The administration 
really needed to both discipline and evacuate Bugungu. But the CPO did not 
permit mass removals. Inspiration could be taken, to a degree, from some of Bell’s 
other legal initiatives, such as the Removal of the Undesirable Natives Ordinance, 
the Deportation Ordinance, and Outlying Districts Ordinance.  
Useful elements were to be combined within another law: the Sleeping Sickness 
Ordinance. In Bunyoro, as Doyle posits, colonial medicine was used as ‘an agent of 
social control and political advantage’.347 The idea of compulsory mass 
resettlement was publicly floated by Hodges as a disease control measure in his 
half-yearly report in mid-1906.348 The sleeping sickness outbreak provided 
proximate rhetorical justification for administrative intervention, as it did in many 
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parts of eastern and central Africa at this time.349 But the vengeful, tutelary 
element of this spectacular undertaking was scarcely better concealed than the 
small-scale relocations that underpinned the pre-colonial forced relocations 
effected by the Mukama. It was to serve a disciplinary, civilising function. Hodges 
suggested the people of Bugungu were themselves to blame for the infection as 
they were prone to ‘frequent and indiscriminate and probably as yet 
uncontrollable crossing and recrossing of the river’. He held the opinion that 
‘removal’ was the ‘only course remaining open’ as the population were ‘backward 
and full of suspicion’ and ‘[could not] be depended on to do anything at all for 
themselves’.350 By refusing to conform to the colonial state’s sedentarist regulatory 
project, the lowlanders were seen to have forfeited their claim to inhabit Bugungu.  
Bell himself encountered Bugungu en route to northern Uganda in August 1906; 
he confirmed that, ‘the natives there were very primitive’.351  
Mass removal was to be carried out once a suitable resettlement area was 
identified and certain other, even more pressing matters handled. In 1907 the 
government embarked on evacuating the human population from the fatal fly 
belts around Lake Victoria to parts of the interior free from fly, in conjunction 
with a system of segregation camps on the lakeshore and the islands, in which 
people could volunteer to be treated.352 Colonial officials in Bunyoro were also 
preoccupied in 1907 with other political developments, notably the campaign of 
widespread anti-Ganda defiance known as ‘Nyangire’.Reaching its climax in April 
1907, this took its name from the phrase ‘nyangire abaganda’, meaning ‘I have 
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refused the Baganda’, and led to the arrest and deportation of about 50 chiefs – 
mainly Catholics – from Bunyoro.353 
The irony was that Nyangire – the central moment of political protest in early 
colonial Bunyoro – demonstrated that the inhabitants of the lowlands had begun 
to express their submission to the colonial state. The cry ‘Bunyoro for the 
Banyoro’, as it was rendered in military intelligence reports on Nyangire, seems to 
have resonated far less beyond the plateau. 354 Southern and central Bunyoro – 
‘usually the orderly part [of the district]’ – were mobilising against the Ganda 
chiefs, while ‘Magungou [sic] has actually forwarded supplies, during this 
agitation, to their chief Jemusi [Miti] and his retinue in Hoima’.355  In Bugungu 
only one individual, a long-serving sub-chief, was arrested in connection with the 
protest. 356 The uprising ultimately convinced the British to begin phasing out 
Ganda personnel in the chiefly hierarchy. But Miti held on for more than a 
decade. There were even suggestions in the same military intelligence reports on 
Nyangire that ‘the Bagungu’ might have potential in the colonial army – potential 
to transmogrify from an ‘undisciplined tribe’ into their moral and political 
antithesis: ‘martial’ races.357  
Ultimately, in the minds of British officials and Bunyoro’s senior chiefs, the 
collective reputation of the ‘Mugungu’ proved more difficult to shed, however.358 
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The signs of some willingness to recognise the authority of Miti during Nyangire 
were dismissed by senior officials as aberrations – it was simply a ‘peculiar fact’.359 
The removals were to be carried out even though the mortality rate in Bunyoro 
had peaked in 1908. The administration decided it would resettle the entire 
population in an uncultivated area above the escarpment at Kitana, mid-way 
along the road from Butiaba to Hoima, where they could be more easily surveilled 





Figure 15: ‘Chief Jemusi-Miti-Kago, H.R.H., Mr. Leakey, at Butiaba’.360  
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Officials found that initial requests for the population to relocate were flatly 
refused by the people of Bugungu at around the turn of 1909.361  The DC, T. Grant, 
sent both the mukama and chief Miti to cajole and coerce in March 1909. Some of 
the population, largely those occupying the inland portions more firmly under the 
control of Miti’s subordinate Mwanga, acquiesced. But thousands of people, 
especially those living around the riparian northern extremity of Bugungu, 
actively resisted. Some hid in the papyrus and bush, but many others fled in 
canoes to adjacent lowland littoral zones. When Grant came to Bugungu to 
monitor the evacuation exercise, he was informed that 556 taxpayers had gone 
north to Koba District, and 200 west to Belgian Congolese territory near Mahagi 
Port. An unknown number of others had sought refuge either to the east in the 
Cope masaza, or in the Lado Enclave. ‘If these numbers are correct’, Grant 
reported to Entebbe concerning the runaway taxpayers, ‘they would represent a 
total number of men women and children of about 3000; more than half of the 
estimated population’.362  
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Figure 16: Untitled map regarding saza chieftainships (c. 1910-1916).363 
The administration had not been sufficiently prepared for relocating this 
notoriously evasive population. To reassert its authority, Grant wished to 
demonstrate uncompromising power to locate and relocate. He licensed Miti to 
destroy or seize huts, food supplies, gardens and canoes in order to deter return.364 
Grant also ordered Miti to have his sub-chiefs pursue those who had absconded or 
remained, and to dispense ‘exemplary punishments’. ‘Any Bagungu found there 
should have their sheep and goats confiscated’, he recommended. The owners of 
the canoes that ferried them, and the chief who harboured them, should also be 
‘severely punished’. Assisted by Koba’s Assistant District Commssioner P.T. 
Hannington, and the Belgian Chef de Secteur at Mahagi, Miti’s sub-chiefs took 
about a thousand people, along with their livestock, to Kitana over the remaining 
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months of 1909. 365 The chief of the Gungu colony in Koba District, Wandera and 
his many followers, were forced to move to Kitana in December 1909. Appointed a 
year earlier, Wandera appears to have been particularly keen to hold on to his 
new, elevated position; and had repeatedly ignored instructions to relocate. 366  
The character of displacement of the people of Bugungu contrasted considerably 
with that of the other part of the Bunyoro that was to experience compulsory 
depopulation in early 1912. Among the Palwo of Cope area, it was not the whole 
population who were affected by disease and displacement. It was largely the 
people of Kihukya saza, directly adjacent to Bugungu. Moreover, after the chaos of 
1909, Entebbe chose to take a less confrontational approach in Kihukya. It would 
take almost two years of discussions and deliberations before the government 
issued the instructions to the inhabitants about relocation. People were given a 
choice over locations, so were more willing to move. Different people within this 
population moved to different locations from among the variety officially made 
available to them. As a consequence, the minority who had survived the disease 
left with little or no resistance, many settling outside Bunyoro District in the 
vicinity of the road leading north to Gulu in Nile Province, where they were to 
assimilate with peoples with whom there were already deep cultural and social 
ties.367  
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The authorities opportunistically gave the space cleared of people – newly 
classified as a ‘Sleeping Sickness Infected Area’ – over to another purpose. Above 
the escarpment the Budonga Game Reserve, a much smaller area covering about 
500 square miles of the eponymous forest, had been first established by 
Commissioner Johnston in 1899. For several years, subsequent administrations 
had resisted demands made for expanded reserves and tighter game regulations 
from the London-based Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of Empire 
(SPWFE), a patrician body of big game hunters which had been formed in 1903. 
But after the evacuation of Bugungu, Acting Governor Stanley Tompkins 
recognised that redefining the boundaries of the Budongo Game Reserve 
accordingly might satisfy not only the SPWFE, but also, with regards to Budonga 
Forest, the commercial interests whose rubber concessions were experiencing 
‘very considerable damage’ due to elephants.368 In April 1910, he suggested 
substituting Bugungu County for the forest – a move almost tantamount to a 
complete relocation of the Budongo Game Reserve. Once the Cope masaza were 
evacuated, the boundaries were modified so as to extend the reserve into this area. 
The new boundaries of the renamed Bunyoro Game Reserve were declared in 
December 1910. Bugungu’s people had been removed; their land had been given 
over to wild animals. 
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Figure 17: ‘Plan to illustrate game reserves under Game Regulations 1906 and by Proclamation 
Published in the Official Gazette of 1st September 1909’.369 
 
Figure 18: ‘Map to show the boundaries of Bunyoro Game Reserve’ (1910).370 
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‘The Bagungu location’: administration, missionisation, and 
identification in exile 
Exile and displacement had radical socio-cultural consequences for those subject 
to it. But the pattern that obtained in Kitana-Kigorobya was quite different to that 
elsewhere on the mangoota-ravaged peripheries of the historical kingdoms of the 
Uganda Protectorate. In Bunyoro’s southern, more compact neighbour Buganda  
‘sub-ethnicities’ or ‘sub-identities’ were suppressed by Ganda elites, or displaced 
by newly acquired religious identities, owing to the sectarian delineation of county 
chieftainships.371 Certain hitherto politically and culturally distinct peoples 
‘became Ganda’ after their colonial incorporation into Buganda as they were 
drawn into its orbit by missionary education and by the manifold opportunities 
for material gain, prestige and social advancement in the economic and political 
core of protectorate.372 But on the north-western peripheries of the colonial 
backwater Bunyoro an alternative dynamic unfolded. 
In certain ways, Anglo-Nyoro attitudes towards and intentions for the exiles were 
extremely conservative, but radical in effect.373 Though now under a Nyoro-Gahya 
saza chief in Bugahya County, dislocated from their ‘tribal territory’ by the very 
state that had insisted on such a notion, the exiles were in many ways treated as a 
though they were still in Bugungu. The exiles now occupied an area known 
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officially as ‘the Bagungu Location’. The name was important in itself. The people 
moved were settled together, as a ‘group’ called the Bagungu, in a way that gave a 
new significance to the ethnonym for them in their lives and interactions with 
authority. At the Location they remained under the immediate authority of the 
Gungu ‘hereditary ruler’ Mwanga, who remained as sub-county chief, bearing the 
title kaijongolo, until 1918. The longevity of his tenure was unusual in a colonial 
district where chiefs’ positions were intensely insecure.374 It was rendered all the 
more remarkable by the fact that Mwanga’s claims to ‘traditional’ chiefly authority 
were somewhat spurious in nature, and his administrative failings and personal 
indebtedness ‘caused great trouble’.375 He had also further displeased Bunyoro’s 
Anglican establishment in 1913 by becoming a Muslim. Going by the name 
‘Kassim’, this ‘Mugungu’ was consequently a ‘bête noir of the chiefs’, an ADC 
noted.376 His own chiefs openly challenged him; he was thought to have ‘little 
authority’ over them.377 But Mwanga-Kassim held on largely because the idea of a 
hereditary Gungu chieftaincy had become became embedded within official 
discourse. 
Mwanga-Kassim’s remarkably durable chiefship provided the embodiment of an 
increasingly primary notion of difference.  His extended period in office also 
served to naturalise the idea that the people of Bugungu – unlike those elsewhere 
in Bunyoro – needed to be under the authority of one of ‘their own’. In this 
interwar period, senior chiefs were more important politically and symbolically 
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than they were before or after. Though Mukama Duhaga, who reigned from 1902 
to 1924, sat atop the pyramid of local authority, he constituted a poor source of 
patronage and weak symbol of identity. Unlike the protectorate’s other historical 
kingdoms, Bunyoro had not been permitted to sign an agreement guaranteeing its 
ruler certain rights and powers; Duhaga had ceased to play any role in public 
rituals of well-being, and was overshadowed by other men, like Miti.378 The 
communal gaze was therefore drawn to ostensibly lower levels of authority, like 
the one occupied by Mwanga-Kassim. 
At Kitana-Kigorobya the exiles were brought into slightly closer contact with 
Christianity and Runyoro literacy. For benefactors back home, one Anglican 
missionary painted a rather hopeful picture of what was progressing in and 
around the ‘very nice church’ which had been built by the exiles in their first full 
year on the plateau. She reported that ‘the teacher had his hands full’, but ‘most of 
them understand Lunyoro fairly well and are most keen on learning to read’.379 
Some individuals and families enthusiastically orientated themselves towards the 
culture and the new opportunities associated with Bunyoro’s core. Perhaps the 
most committed was Zakayo K. Kwamya, who relocated and became a pastor at 
Masindi, adopting Nyoro-Gahya ways of the plateau while cutting himself off 
from his Gungu past.380 
But few stayed committed. Contact was still rather tenuous; the attraction 
remained limited.  Kwamya was rather exceptional. It was more common – 
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though still extremely rare – to see men pursue literacy but not likeness through 
the acquisition of Runyoro in these years. An early Anglican convert called Yosiya 
K. Wairindi was baptised in Hoima at the age of 22 in 1912, and went on to work as 
a clerk, but remained a key figure in the exiled community.381  Little in the way of 
foundations for Christianity had been established in Bugungu before the 
evacuation. Even after almost a decade in exile, one Catholic missionary observed 
that there were serious ‘obstacles’ even for the ‘preservation’ of an extremely small 
group of adherents. The old were ‘superstitious’ to ‘the highest degree’, the 
women were ‘crazy about dancing’, and – in a Rabelaisian allusion to both alcohol 
consumption and local divination practices – ‘everyone loved the dive bouteille’.382 
Christianity was not a route to integration into a collective Nyoro identity that 
offered them advantages.  
One key obstacle to evangelisation was the lack of familiarity with the written 
vernacular language used by the CMS. Missionaries noted that the exiles ‘speak 
their own language’.383  But Lugungu did not receive canonisation-via-codification 
by missionaries like Toro District’s minority Lukonzo language in the 1910s. Even 
the Nyoro-Gahya elite did not think that the bible was really in Runyoro. Many of 
the Nyoro-Gahya Christian elite joined hands with their neighbours in Tooro to 
overturn the CMS’s policy that they must all make do with a Luganda Old 
Testament. But they maintained that the ‘Runyoro’ New Testament, translated by 
a Tooro-based CMS linguist, was actually ‘Lutoro’. ‘[T]he Banyoro in Hoima do 
not like the books’, because some of the words in New Testament were ‘said to be 
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obscene in the Lunyoro language spoken in Hoima’, reported one missionary.384 
To the exiles, the vehicular language the CMS codified was both alien to them and 
distinct to the actual language of the uplands. Cultural reproduction and 
homogenisation continued in the shadows of Nyoro culture.  
The nature of the arrangement at Kitana-Kigorobya insulated and isolated the 
exiles collectively. The fact that a large tract of uncultivated ground was one 
granted by the state obviated the need for the exiles to develop social ties outside 
of the location on the Nyoro-Gahya plateau in order to secure access to land. It 
decreased the opportunities for interactions via the waterways with speakers of 
the region’s non-Bantu languages. In a complementary, simultaneous process, the 
rupture of relocation stimulated a renegotiation, broadening and circumscription 
of frames of action by attenuating clan-level authority linked to fixed shrines and 
place-specific knowledges.   
The population’s concentration and their location away from the lake on what 
was to them, to quote one missionary, ‘the outskirts of a foreign country’ provided 
exceptional cause and opportunity for extended, common self-reflection, and 
action.385 Referred to using the local common noun kidemu, their displacement and 
exile was a story of epochal rupture, rather than continuity, even against a 
backdrop of conquest and disease. The exiles endured considerable hardship in 
their new environment in the mid-to-late 1910s, owing to the introduction of 
forced labour, food requisitions, chronic insecurity over land tenure, catastrophic 
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famines, and rinderpest epidemics.386 It discouraged many exiles from putting 
down roots – both literally and figuratively.  
‘The Bagungu question’: indiscipline, insecurity, and evasion, 
1909-1919 
The people of the Bagungu Location refused to suffer meekly, however.  
Insubordination continued in pronounced fashion in exile. They were ‘still very 
wild’, explained one Catholic White Father, a couple of years after the move.387 
Game and sleeping sickness ordinances were flouted spectacularly, bringing large 
parts of the community into conflict with their chief. In one episode in 1913-1914, 35 
men were arrested by Mwanga-Kassim out of a 100-strong group who killed some 
fifty head of game after they breached the quarantined area around the Waki 
River in the vicinity of Butyabwa.  In response, the chief was subjected to multiple 
acts of arson.388   
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Certain figures made known their desire to return to Bugungu. The Acting 
Governor Tomkins in 1910 expressed the belief that the evacuated area would 
offer ‘little attraction, if any’.389 But this presumption had proved misguided. 
Demands for return were spearheaded by certain ambitious men, aiming to 
capitalise on Mwanga’s unpopularity in order to extend their political authority 
and wealth. Among them was a charismatic parish chief called Yubu or Job (from 
the Old Testament book of the same name) Katongole. Though he hailed from a 
rather insignificant clan, Katongole had become influential among the exiles as 
Mwanga’s authority weakened. The people of the Location came to know him as 
‘Kyamukatuka’ – a nickname derived from the verb kukatuka, meaning ‘to stride 
purposefully and quickly’. Katongole conjured a community and a homeland for 
whom he claimed the authority to speak. Using the key symbol of political 
authority in the Great Lakes, the drum, he summoned the exiles for meetings, and 
attempted to enjoin them to support his crusade by publicly articulating his 
visionary dreams of Bugungu’s future prosperity.390 Katongole was well known to 
Anglican missionaries and colonial officials; one of his sons, Eliphaz Gahwera, 
attended the CMS’ school in Hoima for the sons of chiefs, and later, in 1922, was to 
become the first person from Bugungu to progress to the famous King’s College 
Budo in Buganda.391   
Men like Kyamukatuka petitioned the colonial authorities citing ‘promises’ 
supposedly made to them in 1909. While on tour in June 1913, the DC received 
‘anxious enquiries’. ‘[T]hey appear to be under the impression that the Medical 
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Officer (Dr Van Someren) at the time (…) told them that they could return after 
five years’. Such assurances may well have been made. In early 1909, the sleeping 
sickness commission’s David Bruce, had made similar statements to the people of 
Lake Victoria’s Buvuma islands.392 But the veracity of these past assurances was 
dismissed by the provincial commissioner. He thought it ‘unlikely’ that said 
official would have ‘given them any hopes of returning within a given number of 
years’.393  Under the Bell-era sleeping sickness control policy of ‘concentration’, 
the restriction of populations to fly-free areas was considered a permanent 
measure. 
Increasingly indignant, many of the exiles returned regardless. The battles of 1909 
only represented the first engagements in a protracted struggle. Never before had 
population removal been attempted in this area on anywhere near this scale, or 
with this suddenness and force; the British had mustered considerable resources 
in their efforts to present their power as irresistible. But the people of Bugungu 
remained unconvinced of the colonial state’s power to maintain such outlay. 
Sleeping sickness inspectors in 1912 noted evidence on the shorelines that 
Bugungu was no longer uninhabited.394 In early 1913 there were ‘rumours of 
exodus’ from Kitana-Kigorobya of ‘numbers of Bagungu’ to the narrow littoral 
lowlands of Lake Albert in Congo, Koba, and the southern section of the Lado 
Enclave which had been transferred to the Sudan administration in June 1910 on 
Leopold’s death (but was to remain unadministered until it became Uganda’s 
West Nile District in a territory exchange on 1 April 1914).395 Some evictees 
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absconded to where friends and family – often former inhabitants of Bugungu 
who had escaped the dragnet – resided outside the reach of the British.  In Lado, 
‘large numbers of Bagungu’ inhabited the Panyamur flats under a Lwo-speaking 
chief called Wambidi and, closer to the Mayongo River where the boundary with 
the Belgian Congo lay, his uncle Okello. 
While some settled and assimilated, communication by means of canoe between 
dispersed littoral settlements had surreptitiously continued, ‘uninterrupted’ by 
the sleeping sickness control measures, officials noted. 110 canoes were reportedly 
kept at Butyabwa (Butiaba) where, in ‘the two mile restricted area’ were to be 
found natives of nearly every tribe in Uganda, under a headman from Buleega 
across the water, but ‘the local natives’ were ‘chiefly Bagungu’. Across the Victoria 
Nile from Bugungu, the clandestine Koba District settlement was home to 25 
canoes and functioned as both the ‘connecting link’ between these dispersed 
settlements as the main base from which to launch illicit forays. According to 
security reports from 1913, there was a ‘Bagungu village’ of 30 huts ‘among the 
local Nilotic Aluru’ from which men reportedly made journeys overland on a near 
daily basis to fish in the shallows of the Victoria Nile.396 
Beyond the risk of infection, these settlements and movements were perceived by 
the colonial administration to pose other sorts of threats to their authorities. The 
Koba ‘Bagungu village’ was once more under Wandera who, determined to 
reclaim the semi-autonomous political space he had had carved out for himself, 
had not been kept in the upland area for long.   Wandera constituted a challenge 
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to both Mwanga’s and the mukama’s authority. But these renegade populations 
also concerned colonial officials reeling from the Lamogi Rebellion of 1912 which 
had been triggered by disarmament policies in north-western Gulu District. The 
British were increasingly concerned that the ‘excellent canoemanship’ of the 
Bugungu people was ‘in great demand by smugglers’ who had developed a cross-
border network of gun-running centring on the lightly administered west bank of 
the upper Albert Nile in Lado.397  
In 1913-1917 the administration unsuccessfully attempted to resolve these issues. 
The Sleeping Sickness Ordinance of 1913, included Koba within the newly 
gazetted ‘Nile Infected Area’. This measure provided a convenient basis from 
which to shut down this network and confine all ‘the Bagungu’ to Kitana-
Kigorobya. But an administration constrained by the demands of the Great War 
found it difficult to enforce this ordinance. In April 1916, the DCs of Bunyoro and 
West Nile co-operated in the removal of some ‘620 Bagungu’ from Koba to 
Kitana.398 But a few years later people were still returning to the Victoria Nile 
estuary.399 The Bunyoro administration’s attempts to rein in those across the 
Albert Nile and Lake Albert proved even more unsuccessful, as they generated 
inter- and intra-territorial debates about where exactly ‘the Bagungu’ belonged. 
The mukama’s claims on, and efforts to relocate, part of ‘the Bagungu’ of the West 
Nile Panyamur flats population caused friction in 1917 between chiefs and were 
rejected ‘emphatically’ by the new West Nile DC, Arthur E. Weatherhead, who 
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had already offered this group the chance to move back to Bunyoro.400  In 
addition, the ‘Bagungu question’ – regarding part of the population under Chief 
Atwikende’s ‘Bagungu settlement’ at Mahagi – had become the ‘source of the 
greatest trouble’ between West Nile and Belgian Congo. All these problems were 
owing, Weatherhead maintained, to the fact that the ‘Bagungu do not belong 
exclusively to east of Lake Albert and River Nile, but were as any tradition goes, 
settled both West and East’.401  
 
Figure 19: Untitled map from Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission (c.1912-1913).402 
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The politics of reclamation, 1918-1922 
The practical challenges of keeping Bugungu closed, and demands for it to be 
reopened would have perhaps led to nothing had official thinking not changed on 
various counts around the end of World War One. The colonial administration, 
particularly after Robert Coryndon’s arrival as governor in 1918, had begun to 
seriously reconsider the future of the all the Protectorate’s Sleeping Sickness 
Infected Areas. The concentration policy had come under intense scrutiny during 
the hardships endured over the course of the war, but the war itself took away 
manpower required for investigations. No longer content to abandon these 
potentially productive areas, Coryndon’s administration adopted a strategy of 
controlled human resettlement – combining reclamation and concentration, to be 
overseen by American entomologist William Fiske. This fresh approach was 
underpinned by new scientific opinion that the fly could only exist precariously or 
sparsely in territory densely inhabited and developed by human populations 
taking active measures to maintain clearings.403  
Reclamation also reflected a shift in economic thinking with regards to Africans. 
Coryndon’s foremost concern was economic development; the protectorate’s 
reliance on an imperial grant-in-aid had only ceased immediately prior to his 
arrival. In the wake of the post-war slump which virtually wiped out the already 
limited presence of European plantation agriculture, the governor increasingly 
came to believe that Uganda’s economic future lay in African hands. Peasant 
production of cotton, which accounted for 90 per cent of the country’s export 
                                                        
403 W.F. Fiske, ‘Report of Entomologist’, 31 January 1920, UNA, A46/206. 
 135 
trade in 1920, was central to this vision.404 But this administration had also come to 
realise the fishing industry’s potential.405 Re-opening of the Bugungu fishery was 
expected to ‘increase the material property’ of the population, as one 
administrator put it.406 A sport-fishing enthusiast who had obtained a record catch 
on Lake Albert in 1920, 407 Coryndon was no doubt encouraged by news that a 
profitable fishery using modern gear was beginning to develop on the south-
eastern shore of the lake in the Belgian Congo, developed by a Portuguese Goan 
called Antonio Coutinho in response to demand from the gold mining complex at 
Kilo-Moto. Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (Sokimo), the firm that ran the 
mine, had introduced fish to workers’ rations in 1919.408  
Reopening the eastern littoral of Lake Albert to settlement might also serve the 
interests of more capital-intensive speculative investments from the colonial 
metropole. Africans had long been aware of what would turn out to be oil seeps 
and emissions of gas in the rift.409 Attracted by these signs, on the eve of the war, 
Nairobi-based Old Etonian William Brittlebank had been granted a five-mile-wide 
concession covering the whole of Lake Albert eastern shoreline by the 
administration of Governor Frederick Jackson.410 But Brittlebank had been 
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unsuccessful in interesting investors in funding oil exploration at this time.411 
Following a war that had proven the demand for petroleum products, and enticed 
by the director of Uganda’s new Geological Department early survey reports, 
various companies including the large Anglo-Persian Oil Company circled 
Brittlebank’s concession, while others areas fancied an area almost immediately to 
the east, taking in part of Bugungu.412 
 
Figure 20: Untitled map showing concession areas under negotiation (1920). 413 
Rumours circulated in the Bagungu Location in early 1919 about the possibility 
that the exiles might be ‘called back to their country of origin’.414 They turned out 
to be true. The administration’s designs for reclamation focused initially, in 1920, 
on the Ssese islands of Lake Victoria. By October 1921, the government had 
decided that it would re-open part of Lake Albert’s shoreline in early 1922.  
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Conclusion 
This audacious, sudden display of coercive state power in 1909 did not overawe 
the populace into docility. But classificatory violence, masquerading as disease 
control, was to have various profound, unintended collectivising consequences for 
the political subjectivities of the few thousand who experienced it. Previous 
exceptional and exemplary large-scale violence at the hands of state authorities, 
such as the Nyoro chiefs of Kabaleega’s era, had been experienced unevenly, as it 
was determined by a politics of loyalty. In contrast, the experience of forced 
displacement was shared; it inscribed putative ethno-civilisational hierarchies 
through violence, shaping a collective sense of self that had previously been of 
little direct political, social, and affective relevance, serving as a foundational 
episode of tribal deracination. Kidemu was imprinted on the political imagination 
among the exiles at the same time as it effaced the diverse claims of other African 
peoples who had occupied and shaped the plains before 1909. Like other acts of 
colonial violence, it was to have ‘lasting effects on the way people perceived and 
dealt with the state’.415 As subsequent decades were to attest, acts of collectivising 
punishment were never fully shelved by colonial officials and their agents  as an 
instruments in the creation and consolidation of the state authority in Bugungu.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Civilisation and its discontents: 
rewilding Bugungu, c. 1922-c.1938 
The return to Bugungu permitted by the colonial authorities in early 1922 was not 
quite what Katongole claimed to have foreseen in his dreams. The returnees 
quickly found themselves caught between competing conservative impulses 
within an empire reeling from the destruction of the First World War. Colonial 
states turned to spatial segregation to protect the human and animal populations 
from both each other and the caustic potential of ‘Western civilisation’.416 This 
post-lapsarian moment witnessed, on one hand, the rise of both the nature 
preservation movement, spearheaded by metropolitan aristocrats and eco-tourist 
settler capital, and, on the other, indirect rule discourses valorising ‘tradition’ and 
‘noble savagery’. 417  Among colonial officials, the valences of ethno-civilisational 
stereotyping underwent resignification and the nature of classificatory violence 
changed. This chapter explores the messy compromises through which the 
colonial state attempted to reconcile these ideas, interests and competing 
economic arguments related to European consumption and African production.  
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Civilisation, nature, and punishment in Bugungu, c.1922-
c.1930 
The ‘second Bugungu’ differed from that of old in significant ways. For one, there 
was the matter of administrative status: ambitious families like Katongole’s were 
to be disappointed by the lack of new chiefly offices entailed in reclamation. 
Bugungu remained a sub-county of Bujenje – the saaza chiefship which was to 
remain in the hands of Miti until 1930. Soon after Mwanga had passed away in 
Kitana-Kigorobya, his sub-county-level role as ‘chief of the Bagungu’ was 
transferred back to Bugungu and taken up by Mwanga’s heir, Mukukuusa, in 
1922.418   
The habitable size of Bugungu was much reduced, moreover. Returnees were only 
allowed to inhabit what was officially known as the ‘Bugungu Exempted Area’ – a 
short, five-mile-deep strip of the lakeshore plains (coterminous, maybe not 
entirely coincidentally, with the Bugungu section of Brittlebank’s oil concession). 
Down the middle of this narrow strip ran the road from Ndandamire near the 
lowlands’ north-western tip to within one mile of the Waiga River. The area to the 
east of the road but within the Exempted Area was open only for cultivation. On 
the basis of a brief October 1921 investigation, Senior Medical Officer for Sleeping 
Sickness G.D.H. Carpenter believed that the land surrounding this area needed to 
be avoided due to the risk certain tsetse-infested rivers still posed with regards to 
sleeping sickness.419  The areas immediately to the Exempted Area’s south, east 
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and, across the river north into Gulu District, remained a ‘Sleeping Sickness 
Infected Area’, known locally as karantini, from the English ‘quarantine’.  
 
Figure 21: ‘Map of Uganda Protectorate showing the areas proclaimed in the Sleeping Sickness 
Ordinance, 1928’ (cropped by present author).420 
Bugungu Exempted Area remained part of the Bunyoro Game Reserve, however. 
Uganda’s Governor Coryndon did not view the game reserves as sacrosanct; he 
maintained that ‘legitimate settlement’ and ‘industrial development cannot be 
prohibited or restricted (…) in order to preserve the game’. He resisted the creation 
of further game reserves, arguing that the whole of the Bunyoro district in effect 
functioned like an ‘inviolable’ reserve owing to the huge quantities of wild game 
that lived their ‘unmolested’ lives ‘from birth to natural death’.421 But where actual 
reserves had already been established, such as in the case of Bunyoro Game 
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Reserve, he did not abolish them. The governor was a keen hunter, and a 
committed member of SPFE, whose full opprobrium he was not prepared to risk. 
Coryndon’s administration did not agonise over the conditions of Bugungu’s 
reopening. The administration was aware of the dramatic increase in animals that 
had occurred over the previous 13 years.422 It was reputed to be home to ‘some of 
the largest tuskers in Africa’.423 But nature and culture presumably simply had to 
co-exist in the Exempted Area.  The line between them, in the official mind, was 
less clear in regard to the ‘wild’ Gungu than it was for other peoples. This 
dehumanising, romanticising view of people like the Gungu owed much to the 
fact that they were not really cultivators per se; they were ‘a tribe of impoverished 
fishermen’, with a ‘wholesome respect’ for the hippopotamus, ‘as having hunted 
them, ‘knew their capabilities’. The Gungu also possessed a similar ‘respect’  for 
the elephant.424 Pre-colonial notions of ethno-civilisational hierarchies linked to 
regard to livelihoods interacted with and reinforced colonial scales of human 
kind. The respect putatively demonstrated by the people of Bugungu towards the 
dangerous animals was not reciprocated.425 
The years that followed witnessed a closing of the narrow window of opportunity 
that had enabled the exiles to regain a foothold in the plains. The matter of 
human-wildlife conflict in such areas increasingly detained officialdom. Game 
reserves took on new meaning across the region over the 1920s, as the principle of 
separating human and animal populations became established as the way to 
                                                        
422 G.D.H. Carpenter, diary entries for 29 October & 31 October 1921, LSHTM. 
423 G. Archer to S. of S., ‘Suggested programme’, 19 August 1924, UKNA, CO 536/132. 
424 Pitman to Chief Secretary, ‘Game Report’, 7 May 1926, UNA, A46/2587.  
425 Int. Gungu 15a; Koosya Bahoire, ‘Kuruga mu Kidemu Bwozo Bubaagiirye’, n.d. 
but 2000s, KBP. 
 142 
preserve wildlife. Recommendations for revision of game laws, game control, and 
the role and location of game reserves were put forward from 1922 to 1924 by two 
official committees and a report during Archer’s administration.426  The colonial 
government consequently maintained the need to strictly partition the 
protectorate into ‘elephant and non-elephant areas’, i.e. game reserves and 
cultivated areas respectively. The reserves would function as ‘closed districts’, 
where neither access nor hunting was permitted.427 These spaces would contain 
the elephant herds that had been driven away from human habitation by hunters 
employed in elephant control. 
The existence of the Bugungu Exempted Area in the Bunyoro Game Reserve did 
not fit this new paradigm. Officials were divided about how best to make nature 
and society spatially distinct; some fantasised about drastic action. Geoffrey 
Archer, the hunter-naturalist who served as governor from 1922 to 1925, contended 
that the government could not ‘take upon itself the protection of all scattered 
crops in the remoter areas of outlying districts’ such as the ‘waste places in 
Bunyoro’. He asserted, somewhat euphemistically, that the inhabitants of such 
‘should be induced to move to the settled and closely cultivated districts’ (emphasis 
added) where they could be ‘given protection’ and brought ‘under better 
administrative control’.428  
Archer’s position on the Bugungu settlement and his dispositions were shared by 
the men who came to dominate the Game Department established in 1925. The 
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Game Warden Charles R.S. Pitman, who had served as an officer in the Indian 
Army before coming to Kenya’s Trans-Nzoia to grow maize in 1921, was fairly 
typical in this regard. Pitman had acquainted himself with the ‘the Bagungu’ when 
some of them accompanied him on his first tour of the reserve in 1926. He believed 
these people were clearly trespassing and feared the hitherto limited repopulation 
of Bugungu Exempted Area was only ‘the thin end of the wedge and may lead to 
the demand for further reclamation in the Game Reserve’.429 After the 1925 arrival 
of Governor William Gowers, another keen hunter-naturalist who was also an 
SPFE member, the government converted Sleeping Sickness Areas into game 
reserves in several locations in the south-west of the protectorate. Bugungu 
represented an anomaly.  
 
Figure 22: C.R.S. Pitman, ‘Bangungu (sic) porters and a dead hippopotamus’ (n.d. but c. 1926).430 
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While game preservationists were resistant to the idea of reclamation, 
administrators were not keen to embark on another episode of ‘induced’ 
resettlement.431 A flurry of overwhelming force would involve great expense, 
which would be looked on with grave disfavour by Entebbe and London, 
especially as this costly and protracted business had already been undertaken in 
1909. A second episode of coerced removal – violent or otherwise – so soon after 
the creation of the Exempted Area would jeopardise the increasingly stable and 
productive collaboration between African elites and European officials and 
unofficials that was developing in Bunyoro by the mid-1920s.432 While an image of 
the Gungu as primitive and undisciplined persisted, those at the Exempted Area 
under Mukukuusa were at least staying in place. 
In the early 1920s, European assessments of the ethno-civilisational standing and 
potential of Bunyoro as a whole were changing.433  Bunyoro’s peoples and their 
cultures generated greater European interest, respect and sympathy. Wartime 
service of a few Nyoro men as porters had burnished the reputation of Bunyoro as 
a whole.434 Administrators and missionaries were staying longer in Bunyoro and 
touring more frequently.435 The new generation of administrators asserted 
mastery of their domain and rights to membership of an élite administrative cadre 
by developing esoteric vernacular knowledges, including command of a language 
and ethnological insight.  ADC Lancelot Harry Cuthbert Rayne, who spent most of 
his twenties in Bunyoro, had by his death in 1919 become ‘the only Government 
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official who could speak the language’.436 Catholic missionaries like Omer 
Beaudoin, and protestants such as the CMS’s Harry Bowers continued to 
contribute to this official rehabilitation 437 A new era had dawned in 1924 with the 
enthronement of Mukama Tito Winyi and with Hoima’s restoration as the 
district’s administrative capital in an effort to provide impetus to the economy of 
the Nyoro-Gahya heartlands of Bugahya. 
In this context, inertia over the matter of Bugungu Exempted Area set in. The 
problem had been made even more intractable by scientific support for further 
reclamation. After a couple of years in which no fresh cases of sleeping sickness 
were identified, in 1927-1928 Carpenter began to argue that boundary of the 
Sleeping Sickness Area (as it was known from 1928) ‘requires redefining as it 
includes much country that could now be safely opened for habitation’.438 But the 
manpower required for such an undertaking was not forthcoming. In the late 
1920s there were years when Carpenter did not visit Bugungu at all. The 
administration did not meet his requests for the administration to recruit a 
Sleeping Sickness administrative supervisor for the Lake Albert area.439   
Growing claims were made by exiles and returnees for further reclamation and 
the downsizing of the game reserve. Pitman’s concerns in this regard had proved 
well founded. According to one count of the Exempted Area in 1928, 1285 people – 
only about a third of those who had been at Bagungu Location – had now 
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returned to Bugungu.440  Some preferred life above the escarpment; this was 
perhaps especially the case among the younger generation, who knew no other 
world, and women who performed most of the agricultural labour. But many men 
and women who had spent an earlier part of their life in Bugungu desperately 
wanted to return, once other parts of Bugungu were reopened for settlement. 
Many returnees knew that individual and collective well-being in this hostile 
environment required strength in numbers. 441 
Inertia was perpetuated by new sources of uncertainty. A proposed dam on the 
Albert Nile threatened to raise the level of the lake by several metres, causing 
massive disruption and upheaval to settlements. The project originated in the 
mid-1920s from within the Egyptian government whose studies of the Upper Nile 
Basin had suggested Pakwach as a likely location.442 Official interest in the area’s 
petroleum potential had also revived under Governor Gowers. The earlier oil rush 
had ultimately petered out as capital for such a risky venture proved difficult to 
attract in the early 1920s. But the economic climate had changed, and government 
geologists had identified further oil seeps in the Northern Albertine Rift, including 
one on the Victoria Nile below Murchison Falls.443 The government sought and 
found a highly capitalised, proven firm willing to consider this unproven oil 
frontier. Negotiations began in 1926 with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s 
wholly-owned subsidiary, the D’Arcy Exploration Corporation, and were to 
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continue into 1931, when international oil prices plummeted.444  But a company 
geologist who had visited Bugungu in 1928 believed that the lowlands held 
promise for oil-bearing geological structures.445 Gowers hoped that private 
investment would be forthcoming if the Colonial Development Fund covered the 
initial costs of the ‘proving the potential oil-field’.446 
 
Figure 23: Untitled map showing oil concessions (1926).447 
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This impasse over the Exempted Area was becoming increasingly untenable on 
the ground from the late 1920s. The Game Department maintained a policy of 
withholding protection from those who were audacious enough to live in places 
where protection was most required: remote places where elephants were 
plentiful – especially within or near game reserves. Demonstrating total ignorance 
of the pre-1909 history of Bugungu, Pitman averred that ‘in instances where the 
native population has encroached or has been settled on traditional elephant 
grazing grounds, little protection can be afforded’.448 In effect, this passivity on the 
part of the Game Department served as a form of collective punishment for those 
who lived where the colonial state would rather they did not. Human-wildlife 
conflict had intensified owing to the 1926 Game Ordinance’s restrictions on 
African hunting. Elsewhere in the protectorate, to the SPFE’s dismay, thousands 
of elephants per year were being shot by the Game Department in protection of 
African settlements.449 But in Bugungu local complaints about being ‘constantly 
raided by elephants’ had little effect, despite the fact that the elephant population 
had ‘increased enormously’. Very occasional ‘special tours’ by Game Department 
personnel were all this remote settlement received. No hunting was permitted in 
the game reserve either with or without a licence.450 
But conservationists soon found a way to resist downsizing the game reserve, and 
to threaten the very limited extant African settlement in the form of the Bugungu 
Exempted Area. The game reserve began to pay for itself, by attracting visitors to 
the spectacular Murchison Falls and its surroundings. This site had been a key 
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element in the imperial iconography of Uganda for almost 65 years – ever since 
Baker’s proto-colonial acts of inscription. But for several decades, none of those 
who followed Baker were preoccupied by its preservation and protection. On the 
contrary, many were convinced that the falls should be exploited for hydro-
electric power as a basis for local industry, and possibly a railway line running 
from the south of the protectorate to either Ndandamire, Pajao, or Butiaba.451  But 
industrial plans had not materialised, and the ways in which certain influential 
Europeans perceived this landscape had transformed over two decades during 
which barely anybody had seen it. Between the wars was a time of great anxiety 
about the self-destructive tendencies of industrial capitalist society, and the 
coming of age of ecology – a science enthralled by the idea of pristine 
ecosystems.452 The Victoria Nile up to Murchison Falls represented, in Pitman’s 
eyes, ‘one of the finest spectacles of wild unspoilt Africa which yet remains.’453 A 
wider social constituency for wildlife preservation was developing alongside new 
forms of consumption associated with glamour and status.  
The authorities developed the idea of selling steamboat trips to East Africa’s white 
populations and to a growing, well-heeled class of international tourists – 
particularly Americans – seeking to shoot wildlife with a camera rather than rifle. 
Trips would be run by Kenya and Uganda Railways & Harbours (KUR&H), the 
inter-governmental corporation which had taken over the running of 
transportation services along the lake and the Masindi-Butiaba road earlier in the 
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1920s.454  The only channel by which river steamers could enter the Victoria Nile 
through the papyrus from Lake Albert was reopened in 1928. In order to prevent 
‘promiscuous shooting on the part of sightseers’ the existing game reserve was 
extended north across the river and into Gulu District Sleeping Sickness Area for 
a distance of ten to fifteen miles, creating an almost quadrilateral-shaped 
‘Bunyoro and Gulu Game Reserve’.455  In 1929 KUR&H began running fortnightly 
passenger trips from Butiaba to Pajao as tourists started to arrive.456  Scheduled 
trips ran around the first few months of the year when more elephants frequented 
the riverbanks. Much of the initial marketing buzz had been generated by the 
royal safari of the dashing Prince of Wales and his brother, the Duke of 
Gloucester, in October 1928. This promotional work was continued by Hollywood 
film production companies who between 1928 and 1930 used Murchison Falls and 
the surrounding area as a location.457 
Preserving wild Africa: Bugungu and the national park threat, 
1930-1934 
The matter came to a head in the early 1930s. Tourism at this stage represented an 
extremely marginal, unproven value to the protectorate’s economy. It 
nevertheless boosted the Bunyoro-Gulu Game Reserve’s profile at the time when 
the national parks movement was taking off in the colonial metropoles. The 
Colonial Office was facing increasing external pressure for game reserves to be 
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converted into national parks. Game reserves could be created, altered or 
abolished by a colonial governor, by ‘simply’ gaining the approval of the Secretary 
of State for Colonies; any of these actions in relation to national parks, by contrast, 
required Acts of Parliament. The SPFE’s aristocratic core spearheaded the parks 
movement in British Africa. At the helm from 1926, stood the fifth Earl of Onslow, 
a politically active, and imperially connected Conservative member of the 
peerage. His zeal reflected aristocratic anxieties over the survival of their privilege 
in the changing British political landscape as much as it did the physical 
landscapes of empire.458  The SPFE had found even more powerful allies in the 
British Museum, the Zoological Society of London and the Prince of Wales, who 
had joined as a patron in April 1929; the Joint East African Board, a business 
pressure group representing and connecting metropolitan and settler interests; 
and conservationists from Belgium. Ostensibly in an effort to protect the rare 
mountain gorilla, the Belgian monarch, Albert, had established Africa’s first 
national park in Congo (and named it after himself). 
The Belgian government was interested in British Uganda’s wildlife because the 
vast Albert National Park abutted much of the protectorate’s south-west. The 
alliance with the SPFE had been assured when the latter’s President, Lord 
Onslow, and Vice-President, Viscount Grey of Gallodon, had been appointed by 
the Belgians to the Albert National Park’s Administrative Commission. The 
Belgian conservationists and the SPFE sought similar protections for the 
mountain gorilla on the Uganda side of the inter-territorial boundary under a 
similarly patrician management arrangement. It was in part to mollify the 
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Belgians that Governor Gowers had gazetted various protected areas adjacent to 
the Congo. He had declared a game reserve at Lake George in 1925, and another on 
Lake Edward in 1930, when he had also declared a ‘sanctuary’ specifically to 
protect the gorilla at Uganda’s mountainous south-westernmost extreme. 
But the feature of parks that made them so appealing to the SPFE made them 
rather less so to the colonial bureaucracy. The SPFE considered national parks 
essential to the ‘perpetual preservation of fauna’, owing to the ‘permanency and 
inviolability’ of their legal status. Parks were therefore insulated from the very 
political or economic expediency that often defined colonial rule. The Colonial 
Office received proposals for the creation of parks in East Africa, in particular, in 
1928.459 But under the Labour Government, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
Lord Passfield, in November 1929 in the House of Lords stated his belief that it was 
‘undesirable’ that the governments of East Africa ‘should tie their hands 
irrevocably’, he argued. ‘We cannot foresee the future sufficiently yet’.460  
The SPFE launched a thinly veiled public relations assault on the Colonial Office 
and British Africa’s colonial governments in 1930. As a result of an SPFE 
deputation to Lord Passfield in March 1930, the organisation was authorised to 
commission naturalist and former colonial medical officer, Richard Hingston, to 
visit five British colonies in East and Central Africa, ostensibly to examine the 
status of wildlife and the potential for national parks. Hingston’s mission was 
something of a charade as the status of wildlife preservation in these colonies was 
well known to the SPFE through its members. The real object of his ‘investigation’ 
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was to persuade white government officers and ‘representatives of public opinion’ 
among the settler community in the colonies, and to generate publicity for the 
movement at home.461  
For several years the SPFE and its allies had fixated on the gorilla area in the 
south-western mountains; now Hingston’s visit brought the question of Bunyoro-
Gulu Game Reserve’s future to the fore for the first time.462 Unlike the gorilla area, 
Bunyoro-Gulu was earmarked unequivocally for tourism development, akin to 
Kruger National Park, established in 1926. Certain officials and settlers interviewed 
by Hingston in Kampala and Entebbe in August 1930 were broadly supportive of 
this game reserve’s conversion. One of the protectorate’s main settler-oriented 
newspapers, whose proprietor was canvassed by Hingston, offered the opinion 
that ‘the public’ would ‘welcome’ such a development. ‘The pressure of Western 
Civilisation is a steady force making itself felt’, the Herald warned, ‘the day cannot 
be far distant when this Protectorate as a whole will be denuded of its wilder 
life’.463  Similarly, Game Ranger Roy J.D. ‘Samaki’ Salmon, deputising as Game 
Warden in Pitman’s absence, was reported to be ‘quite clear on the necessity for a 
National Park’, according to Hingston’s own unpublished interview notes. In 
Salmon’s opinion, currently the area was ‘singularly useless’ from an economic 
perspective.464  
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Drawing heavily on these and other comments by Salmon, Hingston’s report 
delivered to the Colonial Office in early 1931 identified Bunyoro-Gulu Game 
Reserve as ‘the most suitable area in Uganda for a national park’. It met Hingston’s 
requirements because it contained a variety of wildlife and terrain, contained a 
‘remarkable’ centrepiece, and was accessible owing to its location near both the 
Nile route, and a proposed possible railway. No other economic uses were 
conceivable, he asserted, owing to the absence of either any indications of 
‘anything of mineral value’, and or any potential in terms of cultivation. One of 
Bunyoro-Gulu’s further merits, from Hingston’s perspective, was its relative lack 
of inhabitants; his report relayed Salmon’s assertion that the game reserve 
contained just a ‘small fishing community’.465  
Hingston did not offer any specific recommendations for the future of the 
Bugungu settlement; however, he made an indirect, threateningly ambiguous 
reference. In his opinion, certain peoples – such as the Twa hunter-gatherers in 
the Albert National Park and the Maasai pastoralists in Tanganyika’s Serengeti at 
this time – exhibited the picturesque ‘primitive’ behaviour and livelihoods that 
lent charm to the primal environment. But it was unclear where the people of 
Bugungu fitted in these hierarchies of civilisation. At the very least, it appeared 
Hingston was arguing that the Exempted Area become permanently 
circumscribed and subject to an independent national park organisation he slated 
for creation. But there appeared to be even greater trouble ahead if Bugungu’s 
inhabitants were deemed to be something other than a purely ‘fishing community’ 
(emphasis added). ‘If natives are allowed to cultivate inside a park there are certain 
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to be continual complaints’, Hingston reasoned. ‘The only real solution is to 
arrange for their removal to suitable land outside park limits’.466  
Within the Uganda administrative service Hingston’s report had in reality been 
rather counterproductive. At a variance with the situation prevailing in Kenya and 
Tanganyika, most senior officials in Uganda in fact vociferously opposed his 
proposals. Even Pitman, a member of the SPFE, objected to the parks idea, 
resenting the ‘unwarranted interference’ of this metropolitan dilettante’s one-size-
fits-all prescription.467 Officials knew that Uganda’s wildlife – particular elephants 
– was in no way threatened. Recreational parks akin to South Africa’s Kruger were 
inappropriate in the particular colonial context of Uganda, whose small European 
population took ‘no interest in wild game preservation’.468 Governor Gowers had 
for some time encouraged the proposal for the gorilla park, on the grounds that 
the inaccessible mountainous country was ‘of no conceivable economic value’. But 
he considered Bunyoro-Gulu at this stage ‘quite unsuitable’ for a national park.469  
Gowers’ official response to Hingston in mid-May 1931 in certain respects reflected 
other developments regarding Bunyoro. The public politics of territorial 
dispossession had been intensifying for a few years owing in no small part to the 
efforts of upland educated elites of the ‘Young Banyoro Association’.470 In 
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addition, ahead of appearing as one of Uganda’s three delegates before a Joint 
Parliamentary Commission on closer union in East Africa,471 one young Nyoro 
activist – Ruyonga’s grandson, Kosia Labwoni – had publicised the Lost Counties 
dispute through an official memorandum.472 Miti’s successor as Bujenje county 
chief, Kosiya Labwoni, was a long-term mentee of the CMS’s Bowers, who had 
appointed him as one of the co-editors of a Runyoro periodical printed in Masindi 
titled Kanisa mu Bunyoro (or ‘Bunyoro Church Magazine’).473 
Gowers systematically scrutinised SPFE’s contentions regarding Bunyoro-Gulu.  ‘I 
cannot agree that the area offers no possibility of human settlement’, he claimed, 
citing the existence of a ‘fairly large population’ only twenty years earlier. The 
people ‘will undoubtedly require room for expansion in the course of time’, he 
advised. Gowers also urged the Colonial Office to recognise the potential offered 
by research into the eradication of the tsetse fly, a threat which in his view was 
already diminishing. Gowers also provided other grounds to dispute Hingston’s 
claims about the area’s lack of economic potential. With regards to minerals, the 
area had ‘by no means been exhaustively prospected’, he argued. In addition, the 
area’s accessibility was, if anything, ‘a strong argument against’ a ‘hasty decision’ 
for its appropriation for game preservation; furthermore, proposals for a dam on 
the upper Albert Nile, and the railway on the Gulu side could have ‘far-reaching 
effects’ on Bunyoro-Gulu reserve’s ‘economic importance. 474   
But Gowers had not entirely dismissed the SPFE’s overtures. They proposals were 
simply ‘premature’ – not entirely out of place. A few months later, to the 
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frustration of Passfield’s Conservative Party successor in the Colonial Office, Sir 
Phillip Cunliffe-Lister, Gowers’ sanguine statements on the prospects of a national 
park for the gorilla area had been aired in public.475 Those concerned by the plight 
of Bugungu had not been given great cause for optimism. Gowers had reassured 
the Colonial Office and SPFE that neither he nor his successors would ‘lightly 
recommend the abolition of the Reserve or the reduction of its area’.476 Signs that 
the metropole’s stance on national parks was softening became apparent amid the 
political and financial crisis that consumed the UK in 1931. Britain’s official 
delegates to the International Congress for the Protection of Nature, held in Paris 
in June 1931, had been the SPFE’s Onslow and Charles Hobley, who conveyed the 
government’s proposal for a major international conference on wildlife 
preservation. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald who infamously led the UK’s 
first National Government from August 1931, became an honorary member of the 
SPFE the next year.477 
The national park threat galvanised the constellation of officials who found 
themselves in Bunyoro by this time.  The spiralling losses of cotton, ground-nuts, 
cassava and human lives to marauding elephants in Bugungu had already become 
a grave source of concern to Masindi-based PC for Northern Province, 
Cambridge-educated administrative veteran, John Gilbert Rubie who had spent 
almost two decades among less centralised societies in Northern Province, and the 
new DC E. Dauncey-Tongue, who arrived in post in October 1931.478 Rubie was at 
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the time ushering in a new chapter in the district’s history. He had led a committee 
of enquiry into land matters in Bunyoro in August 1931. Though the committee 
was to reject the demands of the Mukama and his chiefs for freehold estates akin 
to those their counterparts in Buganda had long enjoyed, Rubie’s experience of 
these men persuaded him that Bunyoro’s loyalty deserved to be rewarded, given 
its status and ‘past misfortunes’.479 Discussions began for a ‘Bunyoro Agreement’ 
to define the respective rights and obligations of the Protectorate and Bunyoro 
Native Government.   
With the departure of Gowers in April 1932, an opening presented itself in regard 
to Bugungu. Rubie tested the positions of the Acting Governor Major Eustace L. 
Scott and Acting Chief Secretary Lancelot E. Knollys, both veterans of Uganda 
service. The opening gambit in the official resistance to the park proposal was 
made in August 1932. Dauncey-Tongue with the support of the Bunyoro Game 
Ranger Jock Jardine convinced Rubie to present the Chief Secretary with a 
proposal. These officials recommended an extension of the Bugungu Exempted 
Area to the south and south-west, between the Waiga River and Butiaba, to permit 
the return of more of the exiles, who had been excised from the Game Reserve ‘to 
enable effective elephant control to be exercised therein’.480 But this initiative was 
to be one of the final official acts in the protectorate by both Rubie, who retired on 
health grounds in September, and by Jardine, whose post was abolished in August 
owing to cutbacks. The initial reception of this proposal in Entebbe did not augur 
well. Knollys warned Rubie that the prospects for such an alteration receiving 
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authorisation from London were not good ‘in view of the proposal that this 
reserve should be retained in perpetuity as a National Park’.481  
The interests of the tourism industry were invoked by the Acting Game Warden 
Salmon to rebuff Rubie’s proposal. Salmon claimed that if elephant control were 
to be exercised on behalf of the settled area, the KUR&H trip would ‘lose lots of its 
attractions’, because ‘the greater animals’ would ‘suffer considerable 
disturbance’.482 In these years, white-owned tourism businesses such as Drysdale’s 
Auto Tours of Kampala and Biiso-based Lake Albert Hotel were capitalising on 
the KUR&H investments and multiplying their efforts to convince the government 
to invest in publicity for the protectorate. The proprietor of the former, K.J. 
Drysdale, sat on a publicity sub-committee within the Uganda Chamber of 
Commerce (UCC) by mid-1932.483 He conveyed the Acting Governor Scott to 
Murchison Falls a few months later; and returned him to Entebbe ‘full of 
enthusiasm for this eighth wonder of the world’, the Herald reported.484  The 
tourism industry was now increasingly promoted as serious commercial 
proposition, to which the game reserve in Bugungu was essential.485  
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Figure 24: 'Hydro-electric investigation of the Victoria Nile' (1935).486 
Rubie’s proposal seems to have stalled somewhat after his departure, and the new 
governor Bernard Bourdillon’s arrival, around the turn of 1933.  But discussions 
were renewed between Rubie’s replacement, Broderick Ashton-Warner, and the 
Bunyoro DC Dauncey-Tongue, who visited Bugungu together in June 1933. 487 
Signs that Bourdillon might be convinced to push back against the 
conservationists were encouraging.  His administration had assented to the 
preliminary examination of Murchison Falls’ hydro-electric power potential, and 
was considering approaches by various firms seeking oil exploration licences. 488 
Officials began to take a relaxed approach to sleeping sickness rules. By mid-1933 
he had permitted at least one small fishing village to be officially gazetted within 
the boundaries of the Lake Edward Game Reserve in recognition of the value of 
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economic fisheries.489  European commercial developments on Lake Albert 
followed: in the second half of 1933 a British venture called Lake Albert Resources 
(LAR) Ltd obtained an exclusive fishing licence and established themselves on the 
lakeshore in Bugungu at Wankende.490  LAR Ltd anticipated being able to dispose 
of large quantities of fish in the Belgian Congo on a regular basis owing to demand 
for rations for the considerable workforce at Kilo-Moto. The early 1930s saw an 
expansion of activity at the mines, responding to a dramatic increase in the annual 
average of the London market price at which Sokimo sold its gold.  Investments 
were made in new mines, which were due to come into production in 1934. With 
assistance in recruitment from a colonial government that still held a majority 
stake, Sokimo began to rapidly expand Kilo-Moto’s force of cheap unskilled 
labour.491 
The matter of the Bugungu settlement had become even more urgent in 1933 for 
various reasons. In mid-October 1933 the inter-war amelioration in Anglo-Nyoro 
relations was to culminate in the signing of the Bunyoro Agreement. Territory and 
game preservation had emerged as a point of contention during negotiations.492 
British officials were to be forced to address these concerns by including a clause 
that the governor would give ‘full consideration to the agricultural needs of the 
people’, and would make no alteration to the boundaries of game reserves without 
giving ‘full consideration’ to the mukama’s wishes.493 A matter of weeks later, 
SPFE’s efforts to pin the British government down on a commitment to National 
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Parks were to culminate in the Onslow-chaired International Conference for the 
Protection of the Fauna and Flora of Africa at the House of Lords, bringing 
together delegates from all of Africa’s imperial overlords.494 
In late September 1933, Ashton-Warner went further than his predecessor in a 
long and strongly worded memorandum to the Chief Secretary on the subject of 
Bugungu. ‘I should view with the utmost concern any proposal having as its object 
the preservation in perpetuity [of a National Park] (…) to the exclusion of the 
claims of the indigenous population’, he stated. In his view, only a game reserve of 
a far more limited extent ‘in the vicinity of the Victoria Nile and Murchison Falls’ 
would not risk ‘prejudicing the future needs of the local’. Reminding the 
Secretariat that people had been ‘forcibly’ removed, he emphasised that ‘the 
reason for their eviction no longer exists’, and claimed that those who had already 
resettled in the Bugungu Exempted Area were ‘cramped’.  In the long-term, in line 
with likely increases in the population he envisaged the people being permitted to 
extend their settlements east of the track, and to ‘take up such country as they can 
occupy effectively’. But in the short-term, in the name of maintaining surveillance 
and control, he recommended excising the current settlement area from both the 
Sleeping Sickness Area and game reserve, while extending the cultivated area east 
of the Bukumi-Ndandamire track, and, in accordance with his predecessor’s 
recommendations, extending the settlement zone southwards from the Waiga 
River to the Sonso River. These measures would enable the return of a few 
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thousand people, and the protection of their crops through shooting by elephant 
control game rangers and hunters on licences.495 
Preserving wild Africans: scales of justice and civilisation in 
Bugungu, c. 1930-1935 
Economic arguments of eco-tourist capital and their collaborators in the Game 
Department were met with those of Bunyoro-based administrators concerning 
peasant-focused lacustrine and agrarian development. Administrators came to 
appreciate Bugungu owing to direct experience, made possible by slightly better 
access than had previously been the case. In order to ease administration and the 
transport of cash crops, in the late 1920s the government had begun to upgrade 
and extend the rudimentary network of roads established in the early colonial 
period to connect the district’s core with many of its peripheries.496 Below the 
escarpment a rough path through the bush to the Bugungu Exempted Area was 
improved, especially from 1933. 
European observers, demonstrating the same concern for African production that 
had spurred the overhaul of game policy, were increasingly aware of the relative 
wealthiness and healthiness of Bugungu by the early 1930s. The pattern of long-
distance labour migration by young men in pursuit of wages, common among the 
populace above the escarpment, never obtained in Bugungu. In 1928, when 
elsewhere in Bunyoro the difficulty of acquiring livestock and cash for 
bridewealth payments was proving an obstacle to marriage, missionaries noted 
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that ‘each self-respecting Mugungu has at least two women’.497 Livestock numbers 
in Bugungu bounced back after being devasted by an outbreak of rinderpest 
(caused by buffalo in the reserve) and a bad batch of vaccines.498 Already by the 
end of 1931 there were about 550 cattle (along with 4,400 goats and 1,700 sheep).499 
Partly the result of purchases from Lango District, partly down to natural 
increase,500 the number of cattle had increased from about 670 in early 1933 to 
roughly 1,130 in late 1934.501  Bugungu was deemed to be a healthy place for cattle 
by Bunyoro’s standards; even the mukama kept a herd there.502 
Officials wrote admiringly about the ‘industrious’ ways of Bugungu’s 
inhabitants.503  There were two main sources of income. Within a British 
administration taking active steps to increase African agrarian production in order 
to address the collapse of export prices, certain figures now deemed Bugungu 
suitable for ‘economic development’ – ‘excellent’ for the cultivation of cotton.504  
But Bugungu’s wealth derived increasingly from fishing for both local 
consumption and trading for foodstuffs and other goods.505 The Uganda 
authorities commissioned a brief survey of Lake Albert in 1928 by a British 
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ecologist. He stayed briefly in Bugungu in April of that year. 506  New technologies 
were being adopted, particularly beach seine nets (or drag nets) known locally as 
makokota (sg. kokota), for which the Bugungu shoreline was better suited than 
most.507 This ‘considerable’ African industry deserved ‘every encouragement’.508 
Fish were caught using basket traps and fences, as well as hooks made from nails 
and other metals.  Attracted by growing opportunities, the first traders from South 
Asia and Somaliland blazed a trail into Bugungu from about 1933.509  
But it was not industriousness alone that appealed to men like Ashton Warner and 
Dauncey Tongue. The period was characterised by official concerns regarding the 
speed of social change and the problem of the‘detribalized native’, ‘with the 
consequent growth of indiscipline’. Dauncey Tongue had written about these 
problems in a psychology journal, bemoaning the ‘imposition of a twentieth-
century civilisation of a highly individualistic type upon an eighth or ninth-
century communal organization of society’. The missions were ‘the most potent 
influences in the destruction of communal life’; the schools produced ‘a 
discontented intelligentsia of no practical value’; and the ‘profitable crops’ and the 
desire for new ‘luxuries’ undermined the ‘old communal obligations’. 510 The 
Gungu community in Bugungu – the ‘Ultima Thule of the south’ – held a 
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particular attraction for such administrators.511 Chapels and schools had only been 
established by the Catholics at Ndandamire and by the Anglican lay readers at 
Kisansya and Kisiabi from the late 1920s, and had yet to generate social prestige.512 
The impact of cash-cropping was still relatively light. The backing Bugungu 
received from certain quarters was also a reflection of the special place it came to 
hold for a time in the imaginations of a few influential officials. Putative Gungu 
primitivism had legitimised both the expulsion from Bugungu in 1909, and the 
relocation to a game reserve in 1922, now it made the people of Bugungu a 
compelling cause for colonial administrators. 
A certain boorish, wildness in relation to authority also proved to be edifying for 
colonial officials.  The disputatiousness and masculine energy that were part of 
external and self-images of the Gungu carried less perjorative valences in this era. 
‘Bagungu are an interesting, cheerful, industrious, argumentative people!’, 
exclaimed one quite enthusiastic administrator.513  ‘I can quite imagine that their 
own Rukurato is a good old shouting match’ where ‘the one with the brass lungs 
gets the ear of the court, as in other primitive communities in Uganda several 
years ago’, commented another.514 Administrators believed that Africans 
elsewhere in Bunyoro were struggling to shake off the supposed condition of 
amaani gaha – meaning literally ‘no strength’. No similar lack of vitality or virility 
was identified in Bugungu, by contrast.515   
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Ideas of ethnic difference and civilisational hierarchy were frequently invoked by 
Europeans to explain this perceived propensity. In support of further reclamation 
and degazettement in Bugungu, Ashton-Warner had explained that the return of 
1922 had been required because they were ‘not Banyoro’. His forbears had 
permitted return ‘in deference to the demands of the people’, he had told Entebbe, 
as the exiles had ‘never settled happily’ in Kitana, for it meant living ‘amongst 
people and in surroundings which are totally foreign to them’. Bugungu was 
where they belonged because the Gungu were primarily ‘lake-shore dwellers and 
fisherman’.516 Europeans interpreted this as a consequence of their connections 
with ‘the far more primitive’ ‘Nilotic areas’. In contrast to the ‘subservient Bantu’, 
‘the absence of any tradition of loyalty to a supreme ruler render the Nilotic 
anything but (…) averse from voicing discontent’.517 Such ideas were shared by a 
CMS missionary, who posited that the Gungu ‘were a rather different type from 
the Banyoro proper’ because of ‘a mixture of Nilotic blood’.518 
Their alterity and wildness needed to be marked and checked, however. The 
limits were imposed through collectivising violence by the Bugungu sub-county 
chief Mukukuusa. This coercive, punitive force was itself to some degree limited 
by positions of him and his sub-chiefs as neighbours and in some cases kinsmen of 
the local population. But the ‘harsh’ and ‘certainly heavy’ nature of his court 
sentences was widely recognised; it was calibrated for the wild Gungu. It was 
deemed by himself and British officials to be ‘suited to this somewhat unusual 
area’, which was ‘sometimes truculent’ by comparison with the inhabitants of the 
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rest of the district. The colonial authorities believed that Mukukuusa ‘commands 
respect’, and enjoys ‘exceptional control’ of this ‘primitive’ people because ‘he 
deals heavily with them’.519 Dauncey Tongue regretted that ‘communal 
punishment’ had been ‘practically abolished’ when for many offences ‘it would be 
entirely in keeping with native ideas, as it was with our own in Europe for many 
centuries. But the community and its position in the hierarchy of civilisation 
continued to be inscribed through individual punishments – often through the 
‘effective and expeditious’ means of corporal punishment.520  
That high-handed approach spoke of the way Mukukuusa saw the Gungu, and 
saw himself in relation to them. He was a munyoro in the oldest, political sense of 
the term: he held authority derived from the Nyoro state in the form of his 
chiefship.521  But Mukukuusa was also seen as one of the men from Bugungu who 
‘tried to be like the Bagahya’.522 Driven by the internalisation of the plateau’s 
prejudices,  and the pursuit of opportunities, he had sought cultural assimilation. 
Remembered locally as a most ostentatious exponent of the Runyoro, Mukukuusa 
was teased by one district administrator for his tendency to read ostentatiously in 
this language from a notebook ‘at great length’ in meetings.523 In a putative scale of 
civilisation, Mukukuusa positioned his Cwa patrilineage, the ‘Bacwaa 
Banyabyaara’, as distinct and elevated from the Gungu. Mukukuusa encouraged 
the rather spurious notion that this patrilineage represented the ‘traditional’ 
                                                        
519 19.2.33, 15.6.33, 6/1133, 23/11/34,22.5.35, 23.1.36, 31.5.36, 18/12/37, BTB2, HDA.  
520 Dauncey Tongue, ‘The contact’, pp. 359-360. 
521 At some point he was also anointed by the mukama as a member of the Nyoro 
honorific order of the Bajwara Kondo, entailing substantial onerous obligations but 
increasingly few rights DC Bunyoro to PCWP, 8 October 1953, HDA, C.NAF.12. 
522 Int. Gungu 7a. 
523 Ints. Gungu 3a1, 3b1, 3c1; 19.12.37, BTB2, HDA. 
 169 
ruling dynasty of Bugungu.524 This idea met little official scrutiny. ‘As one touring 
official put it, Mukukuusa was ‘certainly suitable – being the hereditary chief’.  
‘The Bagungu’, he added, ‘are ruled by a chief chosen from one family’.525 
Increasingly comforting themselves in ideas of tradition and heredity in this 
period, the British were quite taken by what they viewed as a curious, spatially 
circumscribed ethnic institution, sub-ordinate to the Nyoro bukama. 
Wilderness saved: reincorporation and dehumanisation, 1934-
1938 
The full realisation of even Ashton Warner’s short-term ambitions for the 
protection and advancement of Bunyoro’s ‘most virile portion’ were precluded by 
an obstructive Game Warden. Pitman seems to have believed that forced 
depopulation of the Exempted Area was the best solution to human-wildlife 
conflict in the area. He remained circumspect in regard to Bugungu, but in regards 
to a similar case in different colony he spoke more frankly about settlements 
within the reserve as ‘absurd’ and ‘astonishing’, and ventured that removal would 
involve but ‘little hardship’.526 The Game Warden reluctantly assented to the 
Bugungu settlement’s slight extension eastward, and - though refusing to afford 
protection from game if people chose to settle in this area - between the rivers 
Waiga and Waisoke.  Pitman would agree to the excision of both the new and old 
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reclaimed areas from the game reserve, but ‘emphatically’ not the south bank of 
the Victoria Nile from Ndandamire to approximately one third of the distance up 
to Murchison Falls. As justification, he cited concerns regarding the threat to the 
‘spectacle of wildlife’ for tourists which he had described in detail in his first book, 
published a couple of years earlier.527  
Ashton-Warner was in March 1934 forced to accept the compromise offered by a 
determined Pitman.528 Under pressure to arrange for resettlement during a 
window of time after crop harvesting season. Moreover, Bourdillon made 
increasingly clear his sympathies were not quite the same as Ashton-Warner’s. 
Despite rhetoric concerning ‘justice to the natives’, ‘the tourist’s point of view’ 
increasingly prevailed.529 As a result of the UCC’s intensifying lobbying efforts, the 
governor allocated publication funds, provided photographs, and wrote an 
introduction for a guidebook for visitors. 530  The ‘Fauna Protectionists’ – whose 
‘anxiety’ apparently needed to be considered – was a category that very much 
included the governor, who became a member of the SPFE, penning pieces for its 
journal. 531 He developed a passionate interest in Uganda’s wildlife, increasingly 
swapping his rifle for his camera on visits to renowned wildlife spots like 
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Murchison Falls and the Belgian Congo’s Albert National Park, and sharing his 
stories and photographs with The Field magazine.532   
After receiving approvals from London for the boundary changes, the secretariat 
gave permission for the 1,700 exiles in Kitana-Kigorobya to return to the expanded 
Bugungu Exempted Area at around the turn of 1935. 533 But both local inhabitants 
and Bunyoro-based British officials continued to view the new Game Reserve 
boundary, especially vis-à-vis the Victoria Nile, as ‘unsatisfactory’. Dauncey 
Tongue took this matter up with the Game Warden, but to no avail.534 It was not so 
much the undesirable boundary, as it was lack of protection outside of it, that 
perturbed Bugungu most, however. Pitman remained largely unsympathetic to 
the imperilment of Bugungu’s residents, rejecting their demands for a full-time 
game guard. ‘It is not an easy locality to protect economically’, he complained, ‘for 
it is so remote’.535 
Little support for the district administration’s demands could be mustered. 
Dauncey Tongue was to depart from Bunyoro in early 1937, and the flurry of 
outside interest in Bugungu’s potential began to subside from about 1936. The 
British-owned LAR Ltd’s operations had collapsed in 1935 due to a combination of 
freak ‘accidental’ fires, one death, marketing obstacles, and a fundamental lack of 
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ecological knowledge.536  The firm had also learnt the hard way that fishing nets 
had to be made of certain materials to be effective, though the company’s sale of 
its nets of smaller-mesh and other gear to local people meant that they briefly 
‘reaped a rich harvest’. New technologies – involving particular seine and set nets 
(gill nets) and methods were quickly domesticated. But the people of Bugungu 
faced challenges in the form of high initial costs, and the risk crocodiles and 
hippopotamus posed to set nets. 537 The main constraint was marketing. Selling 
directly to the Congo’s Mahagi Port was prohibited; fish needed to be dispatched 
under licence to Mahagi Port via customs at Butiaba.  Those who broke these rules 
were exposed to the sharp vicissitudes of both the lake crossing in dangerous dug-
outs, and fluctuations in price, which at any rate remained too low to be worth 
accepting the manifold risks. Fishers continued to make sporadic demands for an 
official market in Bugungu, where buyers could come.538 Coutinho, the Goan 
fisherman-buyer from Kasenyi, also began a small, seine net operation on the 
north-western shore at Wankende.539 But he too was gone in 1936.  The industry 
was reported to be ‘static’.540 
Over the next couple of years, an increasingly neglected Bugungu was under 
threat from various directions. In 1936, the lowlands endured severe drought and 
famine. In their wake, a deluge threatened as the Egyptian Government had 
reached a preliminary agreement with Belgium regarding the Albert Nile dam.541 
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The state of the road only intensified the area’s marginality. A serviceable track 
had not lasted long, and officials had soon decided that constructing an all-
weather road to connect Bugungu with the escarpment was ‘impossible’, at least 
not without ‘colossal expenditure’ due to the distance involved, and the absence of 
suitable materials in the lowlands.542 A heavy toll was taken on incipient 
missionary and educational endeavours by these combined conditions.543 
Even the lowlanders’ limited gains against the wildlife preservationists were soon 
reversed under Philip Mitchell, whose stint as governor began in October 1935. 
The mid-1930s witnessed an outpouring of news coverage, accounts, films and 
photographs of the Falls and the riverine lowlands from the promoters and 
consumers of this tourist experience.544 To visit Uganda without seeing ‘one of the 
wonders of the world’ was ‘almost sacrilege’, as the Herald put it in 1935.545 Mitchell 
was quickly carried away on this wave of boosterism. Less than three months after 
arriving in Uganda, Mitchell had flown the editors of Uganda Herald and the 
Uganda Guardian to Murchison Falls in an effort to encourage more coverage of 
tourism.546  It was the beginning of an enduring personal attachment, which saw 
Mitchell visit with increasing frequency.547 
The fragility of the tourist trade had been temporarily exposed at the end of 
Bourdillon’s tenure, amid the delayed fallout of the Wall Street Crash, when there 
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was a sharp drop in visitor numbers, especially from the US.548 But in 1937 the 
industry had bounced back, boosted by exposure from Bourdillon’s earlier 
investments in publicity, the 1936 Johannesburg Empire Exhibition, and the 
establishment of promotional organisations such as the East Africa Publicity 
Association. Numbers of passengers on the Murchison Falls excursion rose from 
389 to 622 between 1936 and 1938.549 The increase encouraged and was encouraged 
by further investments by the Lake Albert Hotel (now located at Bukumi) and 
KUR&H.550 Visits by British royals, members of the nobility, politicians, and 
Hollywood film crews brought the falls to public attention around the world.551 
This tourism and, by extension, the game reserve, were growing in importance. 
 
Figure 25: ‘S.W.S. “Lugard” anchored below the falls’ (c.1936). 552 
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Visitors were invited to escape to a landscape of romance and adventure, where 
they could follow in the footsteps not only of the celebrities of the day, but also 
white imperial heroes. Vestiges of the period of Turco-Egyptian occupation were 
appropriated and repurposed by the colonial state, at considerable expense. 
KUR&H’s promotional material provided short biographies of the Bakers, and 
Gordon and Emin, ‘who blazed the African trail’ along the waterways.553 As per an 
earlier request from the Deputy Director of Surveys H. B. Thomas concerning 
sites of ‘historical and archaeological interest’, the DC Bunyoro had in 1935 
identified ‘Gordon’s [Fort] Magungu’ for ‘commemoration’.554  Such discourses 
and practices evoked a historical genealogy of European encounters, as a means of 
both promoting the attraction, and justifying its appropriation.  
At the same time writers recast this landscape as a timeless, pristine wilderness; 
but one that was threatened by the sort of ‘civilisation’ that had already corrupted 
other celebrated locales like Victoria Falls. The riverine lowlands were ‘nature’s 
zoo’, or brought to mind ‘the garden of Eden’.555  ‘Set in the most remarkable frame 
of wild Africa’, the falls were ‘unspoiled by man’s intrusion’ and ‘belong to Mother 
Africa’. Murchison Falls remained ‘one spot (…) that Adam might recognize could 
he return to earth’.  Such accounts erased or at the very least obscured the 
historical reality of the landscape as one shaped by African agency, and of the falls 
as a place of local and regional religious significance and pilgrimage. ‘Human 
beings cannot spoil their fascination’, noted one KUR&H writer – in strikingly 
obfuscatory fashion – since ‘past circumstances’ had ‘compelled the population to 
                                                        
553 KUR&H, The travellers' guide to Kenya and Uganda (Nairobi, 1936), p. 35. 
554 A.H. Cox, Acting CS to DC Bunyoro, 24 August 1931, HDA, LAND/105; DC 
Bunyoro to PCNP, 11 April 1935, HDA, LAND/105. 
555 J.O. Buckler, ‘Lake Albert and its Nile’, in East African Annual 1933-1934 (Nairobi, 
1934), pp. 40-49; ‘A trip to the Murchison Falls’, Uganda Herald, 18 March 1932. 
 176 
move’.556 Africans were often only permitted into the historical frame selectively – 
in tales that served to augment the romance of the setting. Written accounts of the 
falls often referred to a legend of a time in the remote past when two suitors of a 
‘dusky maiden’ on one side of the gorge fell to their doom after being dared to leap 
across the falls to win her hand.557  
These discourses exercised a powerful hold over Mitchell. Large-scale 
development projects fell by – or were pushed into – the wayside. Contrary to the 
recommendations of consultant engineers hired by Bourdillon, Mitchell objected 
to hydro-electric proposals for Murchison Falls. 558  Mitchell had assented to 
including much of the area within the oil exploration licence granted to African & 
European Investment Co. Ltd of Johannesburg. But the test holes the company 
started drilling in November 1937, and Uganda’s first deep wells, drilled in 1938-
1939 were all around Butiaba and Kibiro – well beyond either the old or new 
boundaries or the game reserve.559 It was of some relief to Mitchell when AEIC 
relinquished its oil prospecting licence in early 1940, after failing to discover 
commercial oil reserves.560 The governor later admitted that he feared that if 
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‘some busy-body’ discovered oil or minerals near the falls, this ‘lovely, wild place’ 
would be despoiled by commerce and industrial development.561  
 
Figure 26: The Kenyan and Uganda Railways and Harbours, ‘The Murchison Falls Uganda’ 
(1938).562  
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The governor and the Game Department clawed back Bugungu for the elephants, 
wildlife tourists, and imperial nostalgics. Mitchell’s administration – Pitman 
included – continued to fend off pressure for national parks at this time. The 
London Convention of 1933 was ratified in mid-January 1936 but did not constitute 
a binding obligation.563 Game reserves were a different matter entirely, however. 
In July 1938, the governor wrote to the Colonial Office seeking approval for a 
Game Reserve boundary alteration that would reverse the excision of 1934. In his 
letter he made reference to the Game Department’s concerns that harassment by 
licensed hunters had caused elephants in Bugungu to menace tourists in the 
reserve on the KUR&H trip.564 But Mitchell had the audacity to frame this request 
primarily as a response to local demands relayed by the PC for Northern Province. 
Mitchell claimed that the Bugungu settlement had become ‘the headquarters of 
holders of game licences, some of them of an undesirable type, of whose 
misbehaviour the Bagungu Chief has complained’.565  The Bugungu settlement 
area was reincorporated into the game reserve in September 1938. Mitchell had 
informed the Colonial Office that he had received assurances from the Game 
Department that increased protection would be afforded to the Bugungu 
settlement against marauding elephants. Yet Pitman, by now the Chairman of the 
Uganda Publicity Committee, had little intention to make good on these promises, 
as he believed ‘adequate protection’ of the settlement to be inimical to tourism.566 
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Mukukuusa’s complaints clearly did not constitute local support for the Exempted 
Area’s reincorporation into the Bunyoro Game Reserve. Even the mukama had 
not been consulted beforehand; the boundary alteration was ‘therefore contrary to 
the Bunyoro Agreement’, as one disapproving touring district official noted.567 
This lack of consultation was not entirely surprising: Mitchell had come to view 
the Mukama – and the 1933 Agreement – in a less-than-favourable light.568 The 
Mukama had in British eyes increasingly become dictatorial and impecunious, 
sacking his most capable and independent-minded chiefs, since the signing of the 
Bunyoro Agreement in 1933.569  He distributed these roles as a form of patronage 
largely to his sycophantic former servants and, in an effort to support some of the 
dozens of acknowledged children he sired, men wealthy enough to buy their 
positions.570 This tendency had served to steadily erode the authority of the 
Mukama and that of his chiefs – known as ‘the Mukama’s ‘spears’ (macumu 
g’Omukama). 
Reflecting diminishing prospects for expansion of the Bugungu Exempted Area 
eastward, later in 1938 the colonial government invested in ‘Gordon’s Magungu’. 
Insulated from African interference by its location some distance inside the 
Sleeping Sickness Area, a bronze tablet detailing the nature of the site was finally 
fixed on the memorial cairn in 1939.571 The same year a District Officer G.V. Vane, 
accompanied by the CMS’s P.B. Ridsdale, gathered artefacts from the site, 
inspiring Thomas, now as outgoing Director of Surveys, to write about this 
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outpost as one of the several ‘little oases’ of a project of ‘civilization and discipline’ 
that prefigured the wonders of British rule.572 
 
Figure 27: Untitled map of boundary change (1938).573 
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Conclusion 
Different actors within Uganda’s inter-war administrations were locked in 
disagreement over Bugungu, as they sought to contend with the difficult legacy of 
the circumstances of the 1922 return. Amid a wider resignification of ‘unspoilt’ 
communities and environments, the government found itself caught in a bind 
over whether to permanently remove the people, or, the protected area status 
from Bugungu. For a time it appeared that certain administrators had secured an 
expansion of settlement at the expense of the game reserve for a community that 
had emerged as ‘primitive’ ethnological favourites through the revalorisation 
elements of ethno-civilisational stereotyping. But the the increasingly powerful 
wildlife preservationist movement had eroded these gains almost instantly,  
A less spectacular mode of classificatory violence took hold, however. After being 
wrenched and insulated from their wider cosmopolitan Albertine connections for 
more than a decade in one perverse and peculiar social experiment in ethnic 
exclusivity at the Bagungu Location, the exiles had returned to another such 
experiment in Bugungu.574 Ideas of ethno-civilisational hierarchy had been 
violently inscribed among the people of the Exempted Area. They were punished 
harshly by their own chief for their membership of the ‘primitive’ Gungu 
collective. They were also, and increasingly, collectively punished by neglect from 
the newly formed Game Department for the apparent impertinence of distancing 
themselves from colonial power by deciding to return.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: Domination, difference and 
deflection on the capitalist frontier, c.1938-c.1952 
‘He who is above you hits you with your own club’.575 
Between the late 1930s and the early 1950s Bugungu was to be transformed – or 
retransformed – in the official mind into a hotbed of illegality and disorder as the 
intrusion of racialised capitalist production saw the fishing industry develop 
beyond recognition and supervision. In the post-war years Bugungu became a 
target of heavy-handed collectivising punishments at the hands of upland chiefs 
and militaristic game and fisheries officials who adopted attitudes and approaches 
that in some ways represented continuity, but in others marked a return to the 
punitive ‘pacification’ phase of the early colonial encounter. Part of the local 
response constituted a project of reputational reinvention in order to reclaim or 
maintain control of lucrative littoral resources. Chiefs and wildly wealthy men of 
an emergent capitalist class attempted to reconfigure established and internalised 
ethno-civilisational stereotypes and redirect classificatory violence. These men 
cast outsiders as the degraded agents of disorder and disobedience in order to 
deflect and appropriate the bureacratic and ill-tempered conservationist energies 
of the overbearing post-war activist state.  
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Accumulation, infiltration, and degradation, 1938-c.1946 
Held back by renewed colonial discrimination and a reactionary ruler, Bunyoro as 
a whole fell into a state of decline in the late 1930s and 1940s. But Bugungu 
experienced dramatic economic transformation. Previous fish marketing 
constraints were overcome by new traders. Fishers were to continue to 
intermittently demand permission to sell at Mahagi Port, which was often 
rumoured to be offering higher prices.576 But a compromise with the authorities 
was reached in 1938 in the form of an arrangement with a European businessman, 
Odin Ernst Sunde, the son of Norwegian settlers. Soon known as Lake Albert 
Fisheries (LAF) Ltd, his firm provided salt and drying sheds at Kitara and 
Ndandamire, as part of a large-scale, regular systematic marketing operation for 
the catches of African fishers.577  Like LAR Ltd before him, Sunde had seen 
potential to profit from exporting to the Congo via Butiaba. The managers of the 
Belgian Congo’s Kilo-Moto mining complex and other labour-intensive settler 
enterprises required more and more fish for the rations of their expanding African 
workforce at this time. Per unit of fine gold produced, Kilo-Moto in 1938 employed 
more than six times as many Africans as did the mines of the Witwatersrand in 
South Africa.578 As a result of securing contracts with Congo buyers, each year 
Sunde was able to set a fixed price. The amount of dried fish exported to Mahagi 
Port via Butiaba in 1939, up from just over 4 tons in 1938, to 65 tons in 1939, of which 
Bugungu’s fisheries contributed the majority.  
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The war provided a further fillip to the fishing industry. Increased investment and 
production at the Kilo-Moto played a significant but largely overlooked role in 
maintaining gold supplies to meet a wartime surge in demand. The labour force at 
these mines reached 40,000 in 1940 – 5,000 more workers than even Union 
Minière du Haut-Katanga’s world-renowned copper-mining concern.579 Amid 
constant high demand, in 1940 the total weight of fish exported to Congo’s Mahagi 
Port via reached 214 tons, made up almost entirely of catches from Bugungu. In 
two years, these exports had increased by a factor of 50.580 The war also spared the 
shoreline fishing villages the anticipated dam deluge, as that project was 
indefinitely postponed, and from 1942-1948 introduced further new demand in the 
form of a camp of 3,000 Polish refugees at Nyabeya on the road between Butiaba 
and Masindi. 581 
Sunde’s arrangement constituted a rather discreet, complex quid pro quo. Pitman 
publicly asserted from the late 1930s that the inshore fishery was a ‘strictly limited’ 
resource ‘best left in African hands’ as it was unable to ‘support organised 
commercial fishing on a large scale’.582  Counter to this professed policy, the Game 
Department had quietly granted Sunde not only a virtual monopsony in Bugungu, 
but also the right to operate a fishing camp himself. The Game Department had 
been willing to accept this arrangement because of the stability Sunde brought to 
the market.  
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Figure 28: B.G. Kinloch, 'Hauling a seine net at Buliisa' (n.d. but c. 1950).583 
The boom had involved various largely uncontrolled influxes. The rise of the 
fishing industry was only possible owing to migrant labour. In the late 1930s, the 
local labour market in fishing was known for its ‘capriciousness’, and employers 
‘suffered’ ‘despite the paucity of economic competition’.584 To avoid expenses, 
fishers usually adopted the non-economic means of exploiting labour by 
employing their own children. But the labour requirements for setting and 
hauling gill nets and seine nets were significant. A lot of African fishing was 
conducted from dugouts, with a crew of three or four men required to set and haul 
gill nets, which were left overnight to catch mpoi. The seine net fisheries which 
were responsible for the biggest catches had even larger labour requirements; 
some nets required dozens of men. But even poorer young Gungu men living 
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inland would not demean themselves performing the despised, arduous task of 
manual labour for wages under the direction of someone beyond the family. The 
answer increasingly came in the form of labourers from the increasingly land-
scarce Alur highlands to work as hired porters, laboring at a rate of Shs. 6 or 7 per 
month, plus food, or taking a share of the catch.585 
Economic transformation occurred largely in the absence of regulation. As was 
the case across much of the British empire’s inland fisheries, Lake Albert until 
after the war was characterised by a relative lack of colonial intervention in the 
form of marketing and production controls. Attempts had been made since at least 
as early as the mid-1930s to indirectly control the exploitation of the lake by 
restricting permits required for the cutting of trees, as it was feared that if all 
applications were granted ‘the lake would be dark with canoes’ involved in gill net 
fisheries. 586 But there had been no fishing regulations besides restrictions in the 
sleeping sickness rules regarding the type of vessels and mesh of the nets used. 
Several years before the war, the Game Department had been charged with 
responsibility for the fisheries but had not been given funds.587  
The wartime colonial state rested relatively lightly on Bugungu. Almost nobody 
from Bugungu was recruited into the army. While ‘the Banyoro’ were ‘considered 
unsuitable’ for the King’s African Rifles, one official soon after the beginning of 
the war ventured that ‘the Bagungu might well make good soldiers’, as they were 
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‘good water-men’ and ‘all have spears’.588 But old stereotypes concerning indocility 
and incorrigibility put paid to such enquiries. At the same time, wartime 
conditions precluded any serious official reconsideration of local expressions – 
often led by the redoubtable Yubu Kyamukatuka Katongole – of the ‘old desire’ to 
access ‘forbidden country’ by expanding the Exempted Area.589 But re-
incorporation within the Bunyoro-Gulu Game Reserve was not deeply felt as the 
Game Department demonstrated more willingness to send game guards. Tourism 
was no longer a priority; visitor numbers on the KUR&H excursions had 
plummeted during the war.590  Taxation increased as did demands for labour for 
the rubber estate above the escarpment in Budongo.591 But owing to ‘difficulty of 
marketing’  it was deemed ‘pointless’ to press cotton cultivation which diminished 
to ‘negligible’ proportions.592 Logistics hampered supervisorial capacities. With 
the shoreline road ‘impassable’ for more than a year at a time, Bugungu was 
rendered ‘impossible to reach’ by road, and government water transport rarely 
readily available.593  
An awful lot fell on a sub-county chief. But in the late 1930s, Yowaasi Mukukuusa 
was not up to the task; he retired at the end of 1940 after 18 years as sub-county 
chief. His departure constituted a watershed in the history of Bugungu; it marked 
the end of not only hereditary chiefly rule by the Bacwa Banyabyaara line, but 
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also the end of lowlanders’ hold on the office. A man from the plateau called 
Tomasi Tibeita who was seen and saw himself as non-Gungu was appointed as the 
new chief.  But he was not subjected to much protest. Like his predecessor, Tibeita 
adopted ‘heavy’ sentences he believed the people of Bugungu required; a strong 
hand was ‘needed’, as one district office put it,  ‘in primitive areas such as this’.594 
But he lacked Mukukuusa’s familiarity with the lowlands and struggled to 
navigate and control the ‘fish rush’.  
The special fishing privileges the administration accorded Sunde in Bugungu was 
at least partly a manifestation of an expedient exchange which saw him perform 
certain security and regulatory functions of the state. As had the case in the mid-
1930s with LAR Ltd, the nearest Pitman had to a fisheries officer in Bugungu was a 
private businessman, who gathered catch data and intelligence. Tellingly – 
although also unsurprisingly given Bugungu’s dearth of literacy – he was aided in 
his business by sometime employees, the retired chief Mukukusa, and former 
government clerk, Yosiya K. Wairindi. Bugungu was of course never a formal 
concession; but the pragmatic arrangement of partial, informal outsourcing 
represented clearly the alliances that were possible between capital and colonial 
policy at the periphery. 
Bugungu became a byword for illegality and disorder during the war. Some of the 
activities represented continuity. Local residents, particularly the young and the 
marginal, consumed and traded meat from game.595  The state had limited 
capacity to enforce game and sleeping sickness regulations. Cases taken against 
illegal hunting by Africans in Bugungu were not unheard of, but they were rare 
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during the war.596 Much the same as the chiefs’ attitudes to illegal alcohol-
brewing, a blind eye had long been turned as long as their ‘traditional’ ‘take-off’ 
was provided.597 
 But Bugungu also enticed a motley bunch of European white settlers from the 
Congo who sought to take advantage of this lack of fishing regulation, as well as 
better fishing grounds and more suitable landing sites. Some encouraged the 
smuggling direct to Mahagi, where it was exchanged for contraband. In 1940, the 
authorities had permitted the entry of competition to break Sunde’s monopsony. 
At least one businessman, a Greek from Bunia called Nico Jeronimidis, was able to 
operate on the same terms as Sunde. He was fishing and trading at Kitara Point 
until about 1942, when he, along with various other European encroachers, were 
given notice to quit. 598  The Game Department was perturbed by the ‘exploiters’ 
who had, to government officials, ‘openly admitted that they are not interested in 
the welfare of the fisheries’ as they regarded ‘fish solely from a profit making point 
of view’ – their object being ‘maximum immediate benefit’.599    
These rapacious capitalists were not to easily dissuaded. An ‘outstanding feature’ 
of Lake Albert fishery during the war had been the ‘numerous attempts’ of such 
men to gain a footing on Ugandan lakeshores; their scheming had to be 
‘consistently resisted’ by the authorities.600 European ownership of fishing camps, 
equipment, and Congo-built timber vessels was easily concealed, especially when 
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Sunde’s monitoring efforts temporarily ceased owing to wartime service. Officials 
noted with some satisfaction that African trader-fishermen were ‘ousting non-
native concerns’ in mid-1943; leading the charge was one Wandera Kalogiro, who 
had roots elsewhere in Bunyoro. He employed some 40 men, and paid fishers a 
price that meant LAF, while managed by Sunde’s deputies, had ‘almost closed 
down’. But it soon emerged that Africans like Kalogiro were being used as fronts 
for European – largely Greek – trading and fishing interests. The authorities 
clamped down on smuggling and illegal European buying in about 1944-1945. 601 
Around the end of the war began a ‘time of boom’. Fish prices rose remarkably. 
1945 prices stood at double that of 1940, and by the end of 1946 triple – somewhere 
in the region of £65 per ton.602 Seine nets and flax cord for making eight-inch mpoi 
gill-nets were ‘virtually unprocurable’, so fishers increasingly fashioned gear from 
the durable cord from salvaged motor tyres, even though the one South Asian 
duka that stocked them charged ‘ridiculously high’ prices. 603 Producing fish to the 
value of ‘nearly £20,000’, Bugungu was widely considered to contain the ‘most 
important’ villages among the several flourishing ones on the Ugandan shore of 
Lake Albert. 604  The lowlands were flush with ‘profits from fish’; ‘[t]he Bagungu’ 
were ‘enjoying previously unknown prosperity’.605  
But not many were reinvesting heavily in fishing operations. They were investing 
a lot elsewhere. Colonial visitors referred to some of the leading Gungu gill-net 
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fishers as ‘wealthy cattle-capitalists’.606  Livestock acted as a means to acquire 
prestige and to build funds both for retirement and to meet bridewealth. A 
trypanosomiasis outbreak in the late 1930s had virtually wiped out Bunyoro’s 
12,500 or so cattle. It was only in Bugungu that large numbers of cattle had 
survived. Already in 1940 there were about 3,300 cattle (in addition to roughly 
6,800 goats and 5,700 sheep ).607 As livestock was frequently sold, numbers were 
highly variable, but there were often as many cattle, or sheep, or goats as there 
were people; Bugungu’s population was about 5,000 in 1945. 608 
It was those recently arrived from outside who owned the largest fishing 
operations in Bugungu.  Incursions had increased along with the possibilities of 
accumulation. More was being reinvested in these operations by outsiders. 
Attracted by the ‘news of good fishing’ migrants from West Nile and Congo 
descended on the ‘temporary’ fishing camps.609 Africans were flocking to Bugungu 
from outside, and not only as porters. Some of these were the  ‘wealthy capitalist 
fishermen’ from Panyimur who had started to dominate competition for the 
primary product at the north end of lake. One such man ‘had become so 
prosperous that he had opened a bank account’.610611 The boat-owning African 
bosses also included men from Congo – including those fronting for ‘non-native’ 
capital, as Kalogiro had done. The regulatory regime on the Uganda side had 
become even more preferable. On the Belgian Congo side of the lake, the years 
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immediately after the war witnessed the imposition of fish guards and highly 
limited and prohibitively expensive fishing licences.612  
As sub-county chief Tibeita was replaced in late 1945 by Yosamu Rwakaikara from 
Masindi – another outsider unfamiliar with Bugungu’s quite special 
circumstances. Efforts had been made to find ‘a Mugungu’ for each position 
within the sub-county– ‘[t]he idea being to appoint local people whenever [the] 
right man appears’, as one administrator later put it.613 But the ‘right man’ was 
difficult to find – in part because of the area’s very low level of engagement with 
colonial institutions of literacy, in part because the ‘right man’ also needed to have 
impressed the Mukama through obsequiousness or bribes.  
Developmental images, ironies, and interventions in post-war 
Fishing had made Bugungu ‘the best gombolola [sub-county] in the district for tax 
collection’ – ‘far better than elsewhere’.614 Exceptional contributions prompted 
demands for at least slightly more equitable assistance and investment. 
Administrators received complaints mostly about the state of the road, the 
tendency for game guards to let elephants ‘roam’ ‘unmolested’ in the settled 
Exempted Area, and the cramped conditions of that area. As had been the case 
before the war, some officials expressed a certain sympathy and support.615 
Bugungu had ‘legitimate grouse’.616 But not a great deal of official action was 
taken. ‘The Bagungu are vigorous and prosperous people’, a touring official 
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remarked in 1946, ‘it is unfortunate that, through lack of communications, they do 
not get more attention’.617   
Less primitivist colonial officials took a dimmer view of the ironies of Bugungu. 
The district’s most isolated and insalubrious area had the temerity to have become 
the richest, healthiest, and most fertile sub-county for hundreds of miles around.  
Though prone to reject dispensaries and ante-natal treatment, and ignored by 
European District Medical Officer, their ‘healthy appearance and good physique’ 
stood ‘in marked contrast to their fellows who live inland’.618 While officials hoped 
the market would educate them in them habits of frugality, there was ‘little 
attempt visible at investing money’ either in schooling or housing. They were 
‘spending much money’.  Maize meal from outside was being bought from traders 
rather than grown in gardens; famine reserves were neglected. The small local 
duka sometimes turned over Shs 10,000 per month619 Thousands of cattle roamed 
the road, trampled crops, and spread diseases. Churches and schools struggled to 
hold on to people, partly because the lake and the bush offered relatively easy 
routes to accumulation.620 
Colonial views continued to inform, and be informed by, the prejudices of the 
plateau chiefs, who were now ruling Bugungu as sub-county chiefs. Oriented 
towards Congo economically, and away from Nyoro-Gahya cultural institutions, 
Bugungu had remained largely beyond the infrastructures that had opened up 
social capital to broader configurations of solidarity since the late 1920s, by 
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facilitating movement and connection through trade, intermarriage, education, 
and Christianity. Localised socio-cultural categories on the plateau – such as Sindi 
– had not entirely lost all meaning, but they began to fall out of use.621 The 
persistence of the internal othering of Bugungu was inherently structured by a 
language of evolutionism and exoticism that owed as much to the encounter with 
colonial modernity as pre-colonial ethnic thought. Reported Gungu misdeeds 
defined proper ‘Nyoro’ behaviour in contradistinction. Stereotypically Bugungu 
was a place of backwardness, danger, perversion, and ill-discipline. Paganism 
there was ‘common and strong’, and one would ‘fear’ physical assault. 622 Whereas 
on the plateau one would ‘marry properly’, in Bugungu it involved a ‘fight’, the 
men would ‘carry her to their home’ where she would be ‘forced into sex’.623 
Lowlanders spoke of uplanders ‘abusing’ them with various labels: ‘baly’ebikere’ 
(frog-eaters) owing to resilient culinary taboos; ‘Bigungu’ , involving 
dehumanisation by modification of their ethnonymic prefix; and ‘baruuru’ (Alur) 
or ‘badugudugu’,  a label meaning ‘the people one cannot understand’, which was 
normally reserved for speakers of the Sudanic and Nilotic Lwo languages. 624  The 
writings of Nyoro court historian John Nyakatura frequently refer to ‘Banyoro and 
Bagungu’ as separate categories in his work in these years.625 For many post-war 
uplanders, particularly Christians, Bugungu remained a repository of all that was 
undesirable in the making of a modern, civilised Nyoro nation. 
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These ideas influenced colonial and Nyoro-Gahya thinking about the sort of 
attention Bugungu required. Deeply embedded and highly particular practices 
and discourses of governance were fully resuscitated as administrative routine 
resumed. District officials continued to use the language of difference to justify the 
sub-county chief’s meting out of ‘heavy’ punishments; it was ‘needed in this area’, 
they argued.626  Post-war higher chiefs in Bunyoro were infamous for their 
superciliousness and ineffectiveness.627 These men believed that the ‘right man’ 
for chief could not be found in Bugungu, in part because of the nature of the local 
population. The local parish chiefs spent most of their time ‘attending parties’, 
according to the Bujenje county chief.628 Unconcerned with cultivating the loyalty 
required to be succcessful, the sub-county chief Rwakaikara targeted multiple 
village chiefs with fines ‘without any case’629 and increasingly pressured ordinary 
peasants to cultivate more food and cash crops, to send their children to school, 
and to stop ‘illegal hunting’.630 
In agriculturally marginal spaces such as Bugungu in the 1940s, the European 
embodiments of post-war colonial authoritarianism were the same figures as 
before the war.  The colonial officials whose decisions most impacted Bugungu 
continued to be the Game Department. The Department was still attentive 
primarily to the interests of tourists on the KUR&H tourist excursion to 
Murchison Falls which had just resumed. 631   Game Department officials 
increasingly emphasised the impact on of the residents of Bugungu on the 
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wildlife, not the reverse. Culturally shot through with militarism, the Game 
Department announced its return in mid-1945 forcefully. A visit from a Fort 
Portal-based British planter functioning as an Honorary Game Ranger resulted in 
heavy fines for 12 people caught hunting hippopotamus; further legal cases were 
taken against others caught ‘refusing to take food to him’. 632  But the approach 
shifted back to a more familiar form as a matter of punitive economy after Pitman 
returned from a wartime secondment in 1946. The department exerted pressure 
on the local population through an extortive disciplinary policy of purposeful 
neglect, requiring certain behaviour of Africans in Bugungu in return for 
assistance. The department  representatives now explicitly presented the 
withdrawing of protection as a means of ‘penalising’ the whole community 
whenever snares were found in the vicinity of the Nile in 1947.633  
Such practices were soon to be absorbed as part of the new, reformist, 
interventionist agenda, directed by the Fabian strain of British post-war 
colonialism. The 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act was to be 
implemented by the new Labour government in an effort to both reassert the 
legitimacy of the colonial project, and rebuild the post-war British economy. A 
better-resourced and more ambitious colonial state set out to ‘modernise’ African 
social and economic practices in order to increase production, regulate use of 
natural resources and improve the welfare of Africans as a means of consolidating 
colonial rule.634 In Uganda, Governor John Hathorn Hall appointed a natural 
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scientist, E.B. Worthington, to articulate his development vision, which were 
spelled out in his December 1946 ten-year plan 
The work of the Game Department was reconceived as that of preparing the way 
for national parks. The tide in official policy began to turn after October 1946 
when the Labour Party’s Arthur Creech Jones, previously acting as ‘SPFE’s 
conduit’ while serving as colonial undersecretary, was appointed Colonial 
Secretary in a cabinet reshuffle.  Creech was gripped by the crisis narratives about 
British Africa and excited by wildlife conservation’s potential to serve the interests 
of economic and social development.635 A similar stance was adopted in the 
Worthington Plan which made financial provision – albeit rather meagre – for the 
parks.636  
The colonial state also identified problems and promise in the fisheries. In 
Worthington’s plan he asserted that the rivers and lakes constituted ‘large 
potential resources’, which the Protectorate could ‘no longer afford to neglect’.637 
Part of the response was to take the form of direct intervention into the regulation 
and development of Lake Albert’s fisheries. After years of being informally 
outsourced to private companies, the duties and responsibilities were soon to be 
taken in-house by the colonial state, extending its direct control over western 
lacustrine peripheries. Hall’s administration introduced new Fishing Rules in 
early 1947 and a dedicated fisheries service was created as part of the Game 
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Department later that year. Plans were made to recruit a Fisheries Officer for Lake 
Albert. 
But there were other problems beyond the purview of such a department. The 
Fishing Rules of 1947 forced non-Africans, but not Africans, to acquire licences to 
engage in the fishing industry on the western lakes. These new restrictions 
reflected growing government concern about the disruptive political and social 
consequences that often accompanied the unrestrained private enterprise, 
particularly of the European hunter-gatherer-trader ilk that had long 
predominated on the western lacustrine frontiers. Even the partly informal 
arrangements such as that with Sunde risked African resentment. The 
administration needed these discreet arrangements to be discreetly dropped. 
Pitman reasserted a policy that Lake Albert’s inshore fishery remained ‘an African 
conducted industry’ in so far as the primary product was concerned.638 Still shaken 
by the anti-colonial sentiment that had manifested in the crisis that had consumed 
Buganda during his first few weeks in post in January 1945, Hall’s administration 
aimed to reduce politically risky inter-racial competition over profits. 
The Congo-exclusive market orientation of the Bugungu fisheries was also 
identified as a problem by the administration. Nutrition of colonial subjects and 
its connection to productivity had become a topic of concern for officialdom 
before the war.639  The Africans of Uganda were, ‘by European standards’, 
‘indolent, ignorant, irresponsible and not infrequently suspicious of foreign 
intervention’, Hall claimed; but this was ‘in large measure attributable to 
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malnutrition and disease’, he conceded.640 Pitman bemoaned that dried fish with 
its ‘enriching’ dietary potential had been ‘sacrificed’ to ‘non-native enterprises’ 
across the border.641 Out of all the protectorate’s districts, malnutrition was 
‘probably most obvious and prevalent’ in Bunyoro, an administrator ventured.642 
But the aversion to fish endured on the plateau, much to the frustration of 
officials. Hall’s administration believed it might be able to slowly change this 
situation, while partly reorienting Bugungu’s fishing industry away from the 
Congo. While many post-war colonial schemes to increase production were 
oriented towards export, the protectorate’s plans for Bugungu’s fish involved 
redirection of the product for domestic consumption. 
As was characteristic of his private capital-friendly plan, Worthington offered 
vague validation of the extant fish marketing system of ‘commercial organisations’ 
operating at ‘no expense to Government’.643 But Hall’s administration began to 
consider bringing this responsibility within the activist purview of the post-war 
colonial state. During the war, the colonial authorities’ successful assumption of 
certain economic functions and controls had included monopoly responsibility for 
marketing of certain commodities such as cotton and rubber. Underpinned by the 
assumption that the vagaries of the market could not be relied upon to develop the 
colonies, colonial states were to shut out private capital from many industries and 
to intervene through new institutions. Co-operative societies were to incorporate 
Africans in a manner that would serve to preserve ‘community’ from the sharper 
                                                        
640 J.H. Hall, ‘Foreword: Some Notes on the Economic Development of Uganda’, in 
E.B. Worthington, A development plan for Uganda: December 1946 (London, 1947), pp. 
iii-xii (iv). 
641 UP, ARGD Part II—Fisheries 1940-1946 (Entebbe, 1948), pp. 23-24. 
642 UP, ARPC 1939-1946 (Entebbe, 1949), p. 103.  
643 Worthington, A development plan, pp. 5, 39. 
 200 
edges of capital accumulation.644 Other types of entities, such as marketing 
corporations, would also feature in this restructured interface. In regard to fish 
marketing, the PC expressed support for giving these responsibilities to a new 
public utility given monopoly rights to undertake the purchase, processing and 
marketing of fish across the protectorate, excepting Lake Victoria. 645 
In April 1947 Hall’s administration appointed a committee to go into details and 
prepare recommendations for establishing a public utility company.646 But its 
progress to launch was slowed by private interests such as Uganda Lakes (UL) Ltd, 
owned by white settler business panjandrum Cyril Handley Bird, which had 
acquired Sunde’s Lake Albert business at around the turn of the year. Cognisant 
of - and disapproving of  - the diminishing room for private capital, Bird’s UL Ltd 
and various Asian and Ganda firms operating in Toro District, had conveniently 
insinuated themselves into the fish marketing sector just before the influx of state 
funds.647 As talks began they had further tried their luck by proposing an elaborate 
series of ‘interim ventures’ that would also need to be absorbed. Entebbe resisted 
the creation of ‘further vested interests’ by these non-African entrepreneurs. Hall 
was desirous ‘not to prejudice African opinion’, or ‘to create suspicion’ in the 
Native Governments concerned, whose ‘good-will’ he also intended to obtain 
through shareholdings. But the value of these private firms’ assets, and 
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corresponding degree of share participation still became subject to debate and 
attempted manipulation which delayed the parastatal company’s formation.648   
While the bureaucratic wheels slowly turned in 1947, tensions were building in 
Bugungu. The often-precarious zero-sum competition over fish and labour 
intensified as high water levels inundated landing sites, reducing inshore catches. 
The year witnessed a thirty per cent decrease in the quantity of exports from 
Butiaba, while the price at Mahagi Port rose over the course of the year to reach an 
all-time high. The porousness of this lacustrine border was increasingly exploited. 
More ‘non-native aliens’ attempted to ‘secure a footing on the Uganda shores’. 649  
Their African ‘fronts’ came with the unfair advantage of lengthier seine nets, 
made of better materials. Seine nets of 250 yards were observed.650  
The drop in exports in 1947 was only partly the result of reduced catches. 
Administrators enthused about the large sums fishermen were receiving from this 
hard currency area across the water.651 But a lot of the currency was not coming 
back into the country, and the duties on the dried fish were being evaded. The 
African ‘fronts’ were thought to be among the worst offenders; but there was ‘no 
doubt that the majority of the population indulge in it and find it lucrative’, 
admitted one official.652 As the price had continued to grow, so had the incentive 
to circumvent the fixed prices of the licensed European fisher-buyer-exporter UL 
Ltd. Fishers risked the perilous lake crossing to take dried fish to the fortnightly 
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market at Mahagi Port, where there were at least ten independent buyers, whose 
prices always found a way to reach Bugungu. As the illegally-acquired proceeds of 
these fish were in Congolese francs, they had to be spent in situ on goods, like 
cigarettes, which came back to Uganda as contraband.653  
Determining who had rights of access had grown more complex as the boom had 
continued. Identifying ‘Alur’ who arrived in Bugungu  from Congo as opposed to 
West Nile was difficult enough. But increasingly the fishing rush had also brought 
men to Bugungu who saw themselves as Gungu: men not only from the upland 
settlement at Kitana-Kigorobya, but also from Congo and West Nile District.654 
Across the water such men had been born and grown up in Alur Lwo-speaking 
households with Alur mothers, amid a wider Alur context since 1909. When they 
departed for Bugungu, they left behind many others who were undergoing, or had 
already undergone, the time-honoured process of assimilating into littoral society 
across the water, or maintaining only certain practices that could be invoked as 
markers of distinction, like ‘the exclusive form of dancing of the Mugongo [sic]’.655 
The younger interlopers found it difficult to pass as Gungu, not least because they 
had difficulties speaking Lugungu.656 They had never been to Bugungu before. 
In the absence of fisheries licensing rules and personnel, the office of the sub-
county chief - coercively supported by police and court messengers - had ever-
more significance in defining access rights and limiting infiltration. On the 
landing sites there were complaints about ‘troublesome characters’ among the 
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new arrivals. Two such men were ‘beaten’ by a parish chief.657  In Bugungu ‘many 
people’ began to agitate against Rwakaikara, leveling charges of chiefly misrule.658 
Different factions and lineages put forward different Gungu candidates. 
Mukukuusa was campaigning to revive the Bacwa Banyabyaara dynasty’s control 
over Bugungu through the appointment of his son George, who was a parish chief 
at The Bagungu Location in Kitana-Kigorobya.659   
But George had not convinced the colonial administration of his abilities.660 With 
approval from the Mukama, the county chief in March 1948 appointed Erifaazi 
Gahwera Katongole as sub-county chief in Bugungu. It was a decision that found 
some favour in Bugungu. Born in Bugungu in about 1897, Erifaazi was the son of 
ex-parish chief and veteran campaigner Yubu ‘Kyamkatuka’ Katongole. He was 
‘popular with his people’, partly by virtue of being the son of such an influential 
individual. He enjoyed being back in a place where ‘he was known’ officials 
reported.661 After being sent away for schooling during the lowlanders’ period in 
exile, Erifazi had gone on to work in various positions as a colonial auxiliary, 
acquiring considerable experience at the rank of sub-county chief elsewhere in 
Bunyoro.662  
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Reforming subjects: discipline and deflection, 1948-1949 
Katongole’s intimacy and identification with the people of Bugungu was a cause 
for discontentment among people from elsewhere. ‘The clerk at Bugungu is not a 
Mugungu and asks for transfer to Bugahya as he does not agree with his master’, 
noted one touring official.663 But Katongole was unable to control the movement 
of fish or people in and out of Bugungu. Sunde had in 1948 left Lake Albert to 
invest in fishing nets manufacture in Kampala, but had been replaced by UL Ltd 
with a Cypriot trio. Working together as a firm called ‘Kefreru’, they operated a 
buying station located in Bugungu. Officially, exports reached a new high of 521 
tons in 1948 – worth somewhere in the region of £32,649. But the real total was 
thought to be ‘double’ that amount. 664  In early 1949 there was evidence of a recent 
‘large influx’ of people from the Congo into the shoreline, particularly in and 
around Ndandamire.665 
But Katongole did seek to influence officials’ opinions concerning this influx. He 
had in his sights the lake’s first Fisheries Officer, Louis St. Clair Bartholomew, 
newly arrived in January 1949. In keeping with the departmental recruitment 
practice, Bartholomew was a military man – a Highland Light Infantry veteran of 
two world wars. Contrary to the Worthington plan’s personnel specifications, he 
had no scientific training. But Bartholomew was not new to Bugungu. Given the 
state’s erstwhile relationship with private fishing companies in Bugungu, it made 
perfect sense to hire the man who had led LAR Ltd’s short-lived venture in the 
                                                        
663 ‘Report of the A.D.C.’s tour in Bujenje- 12/1/49 – 22/1/49’, MDA, BOX 627. 
664 UP, ARGD 1949 (Entebbe, 1950), p. 41; UP, ARPC 1949 (Entebbe, 1950), p. 93; UP, 
ARGD 1948 (Entebbe, 1950), p. 41. 
665 21/1/49, BTB2. 
 205 
mid-1930s. 666 He arrived with ample preconceived concerns about the state of the 
fisheries, still believing that the catching of ‘absurdly immature’ fish in seine nets 
was wreaking ‘havoc’ with stocks.667   
 
Figure 29: B.G. Kinloch, ‘The late Mr. L. St. C. Bartholomew, Fisheries Officer, Lake Albert’ (n.d. but 
c. 1950).668 
But Bartholomew had not immediately castigated the Congo and West Nile Alur. 
They made ‘good fishermen’, he argued, as they were ‘on the whole of better 
physique and harder working’.669  His first major activity on Lake Albert’s 
shoreline in early 1949 was to count the numbers of fishermen and fishing camps, 
and the types of fishing gear. Breaking down these numbers by territorial or 
‘tribal’ categories, Bartholomew's data revealed that of the 68 seine-net fishing 
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camps in Bugungu, 40 were owned by Alur from Congo, and two by Alur/Jonam 
from West Nile District. Of 657 labourers employed across these 68 camps, there 
were 404 Congo Alur and 64 West Nile Alur. Only in the less labour-intensive gill 
net fisheries, which were much fewer in number, did the Gungu fishermen 
dominate.670   
In their representations to Bartholomew and his colleagues, Katongole and other 
Gungu spokesmen sought to subvert the ethno-civilisational hierarchies that 
denigrated the people of Bugungu, by appropriating exactly the same language of 
‘wildness’ used by colonial officials with reference to themselves. Katongole 
blamed the Alur for everything that the colonial state sought to curtail: smuggling; 
acting as proxies for non-African capital; evading tax; disobeying chiefs; and 
hunting wildlife. Officials came away assured that it was the outsiders, not the 
Gungu, who were ‘generally making a nuisance of themselves’. ‘These people 
seem to think that they are a law unto themselves’, reported one officer, . 
‘Obviously these people must behave as law abiding citizens or go’.671 
Katongole also adopted the violent tactics of the colonial state. Officials had been 
rather non-committal about how to bring the Alur population under control. 
District administrators even floated the idea of appointing an ‘Aluru Mutongole 
Chief’ as a ‘separate ruler for these people’ in the parish of Ndandamire where the 
‘immigrant Aluru’ made up a large proportion of the 500-strong population. But 
Katongole treated the Alur as the colonial state had treated the Gungu. Katongole 
had ‘already burnt several homes of the culprits concerned’, when a touring 
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officer investigated the situation at the end of January 1949.672 But official support 
for Katongole’s general approach was rather shaky. Administrators were disgusted 
by one particularly gruesome episode in the lowlands that occurred later that 
year, when seven Gungu men had tied a woman accused of burogo, or sorcery, to a 
tree and beaten her, causing ‘severe bodily harm’; Katongole had let them off with 
‘only small fines’, to the disappointment of British officials who had been alerted 
to this ‘bad affair’.673 
Gungu sought to deflect blame for the breakdown of fish marketing 
arrangements. The public utility Uganda Fish Marketing Corporation (Tufmac) 
established itself indirectly in Bugungu at around the turn of 1949.674 Kefreru 
reached a concession agreement with Tufmac in order to continue to operate on 
Lake Albert. Though the Tufmac concession permitted Kefreru only to trade, the 
latter were to benefit from legal restrictions designed to compel the African fishers 
to sell to them exclusively. To further encourage compliance the administration 
stopped offering the currency exchange service in Butiaba. But the Tufmac-
Kefreru arrangement soon ran into trouble. No longer at liberty to anchor their 
trade in their own catches, Kefreru foundered. Following a ‘somewhat chequered’ 
record when it came price disputes with local fishers, Kefreru stopped buying fish 
altogether in June. In September 1949 the final remaining member of Kefreru left 
Bugungu, leaving a trail of unpaid bills to labourers and fishers. With no large-
scale licenced fish traders active, the embarrassed administration was forced to 
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permit fishermen to export their fish directly to Mahagi Port and to exchange 
francs at Butiaba, while Tufmac resolved to engage directly with fish marketing.675  
Certain people in Bugungu made clear the source of the problem. Katongole’s 
superior, the Bujenje county chief, wrote to Katikiro about the situation. The 
letter, as was reported elsewhere, suggested ‘that Congo natives are fishing in the 
Uganda waters to the detriment of the local fishermen’.676 Gungu fishers were 
suffering as a result of the increased competition for fish, and the possibility of 
attracting fish buyers was reduced by the fact that European-backed seine net 
camps were taking their fish, caught in Uganda waters, to their masters at Mahagi 
Port.   
The authorities’ acts of collective punishment by means of withholding services 
intensified in 1948-1949. District officials recognised the road to be ‘the exception’ 
among the Native Administration’s otherwise ‘good’ roads, but long-overdue 
essential investment continued to be withheld unless ‘they start the work 
themselves’.677 The Game Department increasingly withdrew the game guards 
who were protecting people against the rapidly proliferating elephant population 
as a blanket punishment for hunting.678  Newly appointed Game Ranger John 
Mills, a former captain in the Welsh Fusiliers, increasingly saw his role as laying 
the groundwork for ‘Murchison Falls National Park’, as Bunyoro and Gulu Game 
Reserve looked likely to be reconstituted. Governor Hall had in late 1948 
appointed a committee to consider and make recommendations on national parks, 
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at the Colonial Secretary’s suggestion.679 As officials heaped pressure on the 
Mukama to end the hunting, in a meeting in October 1949 at the Sub-County 
Headquarters in Buliisa he made statements in which he threatened to go even 
further than simply continuing to withhold protection. With ‘very many people’ in 
attendance the Mukama had summoned the deeply unsettling spectre of 1909, by 
stating that ‘they might be shifted and taken elsewhere’. These words had made 
people ‘very worried’, reported the county chief.680 
The people of Bugungu sought to represent themselves as reformed subjects in 
contrast to the interlopers in order to deflect this collectivising violence. In an 
effort to convince the Game Department to send a Game Scout to shoot crop-
raiders, eight men from the riverside areas of Ndandamire and Bukindwa  
‘promised to guard’ the routes used by canoes to access the Sleeping Sickness Area 
for hunting.681 At least in the short-term, this had a salutary impact on levels of 
hunting in Bugungu.682 A fresh start was promised in regard to the fishing 
industry, as Tufmac had arrived around the turn of the year, intending to 
intervene between the fishers and Mahagi Port’s ‘unreliable Greeks’ by buying 
fish from Bugungu.683  
But Bugungu was also coming under close scrutiny. Soon the Tufmac general 
manager complained that the fishers did not understand the function of the 
company; he was being brought bad fish, and Bugungu was ‘the only place where 
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he is experiencing this trouble’.684 The new Game Warden Bruce Kinloch, 
obsessed with the ‘evils’ of snares made of wire cable, heard reports of renewed 
poaching at this time.685 Katongole increasing disappointed British officials at this 
time. He admitted to a touring district official in March 1950 that neither he nor 
the county chief were ‘aware of what actually constitutes an offence against the 
[Game] [O]rdinance’.686 Unable or unwilling to get to grips with the situation. 
Katongole was transferred away from Bugungu in April 1950. British officials 
report signs of improvement under his replacement, Yoronimu Rugongeza from 
the plateau who took a ‘sterner’ approach to poaching; yet Kinloch still refused to 
post a Game Guard to Bugungu. 687 
Licensing violence: Congo kidemu, 1950-1951 
As an outsider himself, Rugongeza did not share his predecessor’s acute concern 
over the presence of non-Gungu fishers. But Fisheries Officer Bartholomew had 
come to combine these preoccupations with his more deep-rooted views 
regarding ecological crisis over the course of 1949, though only from the middle of 
1950 did he feel compelled to act. By this time it became clear that Tufmac had 
failed. The government had been forced to revoke Tufmac’s exclusive buying 
licence, leaving the fishers ‘anxious’ for a local market. The reasons for this 
collapse were many. Disagreements between Tufmac and the fishers in Bugungu 
reflected fundamental tensions within the corporation.  Bartholomew had urged 
the company to bear with Bugungu’s fishers, but the general manager was more 
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concerned by the requirement ‘to make money for the shareholders’.688  Their 
dividends had priority over any wider public mission under the corporation’s 
rules.689  The story of Tufmac was also ‘a sad one of mismanagement and 
extravagance’.690 When rains rendered the Bugungu road impassable, relations 
rapidly deteriorated as Tufmac was forced to suspend marketing operations while 
awaiting a launch for water transportation which the company had not ordered in 
time. Bartholomew rued the fact that the government had ‘so closely identified’ 
with the company, and had ‘lost face’ as a result. 691  
But Bartholomew believed that Congo Africans had also played a part in this 
ignominious collapse and the wider, worsening crisis. Efforts to keep up with the 
demands from settler-owned enterprises in the Congo were increasingly 
propelling foreign interests into Uganda’s waters. He accepted that some of the 
Africans had come to Uganda of their own accord, but maintained that ‘their 
success does not bring any prosperity to this country’ as they smuggled their 
catches to back to Congo. Several of the seine nets used by those from Congo were 
about 600 metres long – much longer and therefore much more ‘destructive’ than 
those owned locally. The catches had ‘fallen off badly’; and the area was left ‘badly 
overfished’. Fishing with increasing intensity, these operations were ‘taking the 
fish from the local fishermen’. They were serving to ‘squeeze out’ even the seine-
owning Gungu fishermen with nets of 60-100 yards, who found their operations 
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‘no longer an economic proposition’. Incontrovertible evidence of European 
involvement was difficult to obtain. But Bartholomew deemed it ‘impossible’ for 
capital to have been provided by ‘the local African’ – even a rich one – as such nets 
cost an estimated £500 or more each.692 The situation was also generating 
‘considerable feeling against’ the South Asian-owned dukas whose opening hours 
for sale of maize meal were allegedly geared towards ‘nocturnal trade with 
foreigners’ while ‘frequently refusing to sell to Bagungu in the daytime’.693   
At Bartholomew’s request in July 1950, the Game Warden Kinloch launched 
efforts to set the legislative wheels in motion for canoe licensing through the 
application of the Fishing Rules of 1948 to Lake Albert.694 Keen to mend relations 
between the government and the fishers, Bartholomew had revised his proposals 
in a manner that rendered the sub-county chief even more powerful. He initially 
suggested that three consecutive Poll Tax payments would render Congo Africans 
eligible for registration.695 But he had learnt that some camps working at the 
bidding of European interests had been established for longer than three years. 
Convinced that the Greeks would ‘try to find some way round the regulations’ by 
offering inducements, Bartholomew determined that in order ‘to weed out’ the 
Euro-Congolese operations it was best not to be tied to a fixed qualifying period, 
and to insist that canoe licences stipulated a 250 yard limit on seine nets. Under 
these proposals, the sub-county chief’s power to determine fishers’ access to the 
riches of Bugungu was to be formalised and reinforced. This chief would sift 
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through applications, creating ‘lists of those who are, and those who are not, bona 
fide local residents’.696  
British officials’ interventions in the Lake Albert fisheries had the effect of 
defining fishing rights along ethnic lines. Bugungu’s fishers were told that ‘the 
Bagungu’ were only permitted to lend their canoes to fishermen ‘of their own 
tribe’. Canoes lent ‘to Congo or other outsider fishermen’ would be confiscated, 
and their owners punished. The explicit rationale behind these legal changes was 
the need ‘to protect the interests of the Banyoro and Bagungu fishermen’, as the 
DC Bunyoro put it.697 Licences to fish off the Bunyoro coastline, the PC Western 
Province recommended, would only be granted to ‘natives of Bunyoro’ and the 
‘number of Baganda’ who were already established there. Upland men showed 
almost no interest in Bugungu’s fisheries. The very small number of Ganda fishers 
active there were the principal casualties of the imposition of limits on the 
number of gill nets per licence-holder.698 
‘The whole object is to assist and protect the local native’, claimed Bartholomew in 
regard to the ordinance.699 But the ordinance was just one part of a disciplinary 
pincer movement from Kinloch’s department. As the Game Warden saw it, the 
ordinance would ‘assist in the control of game poaching up the Victoria Nile’.700 
The delta area and riverbanks within the Sleeping Sickness Area were home to 
fishing and hunting camps, supplied with maize meal by the ‘many plots of 
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cultivation’, which had sprung up in the fertile soils.701 The chiefs hounded the 
poor fishers out of their camps on the lakeward side of the Victoria Nile delta in 
July 1950. But all those who remained were publicly warned by the Mukama in 
August that they were ‘to move out’ by the end of the year – before the January 
1951 licensing process – on pain of having their houses and gardens burnt, and 
their canoes and grain confiscated.702 As the game officials believed that ‘good 
progress’ had  been made to this end later in the year, they provided the area with 
a  guard.703 But demands for another, in the hinterland cotton-growing area of 
Bugana, were met with the timeworn transactional offering; a game guard would 
be provided only ‘if they stop poaching’ and not in ‘outlying’ areas where ‘they 
must protect themselves’.704 
With people beginning to move away from the forbidden littoral zones that had 
become the ‘chief source of food’ for labourers, ‘a serious shortage of food’ 
threatened. But the district administration quickly tried to turn anticipated 
hardship to further disciplinary advantage. Aside from the illegal maize gardens, 
Bugungu’s residents had largely rejected directions to become ‘self-supporting’. 
Despite the general unsuitability of the soil, and the threat posed by crop-raiding 
elephants, the government deprecated the importation of Congo maize flour used 
by the fishermen. But administrators believed that the shortages that this would 
create would ‘make the Bagungu cultivate more’ in permitted zones, and planned 
to press for an Agricultural Instructor to be sent to assist.705 
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The licensing of 223 canoes in Bugungu in the January forced the departure of 
most of the Congo Alur not content to remain as mere seine-net porters. Gungu 
fishers continued their project of reputational reinvention and ethno-civilisational 
contestation. These men greeted the announcing of licensing with ‘cheers and 
expressions of thanks’, and offered to serve voluntarily in an informal policing 
capacity, by forming themselves into what Bartholomew termed ‘a sort of "Watch 
Committee"’ to provide him with information about any ‘undesirable’ foreigners 
seeking to encroach on their fishing grounds.706 To be civilised was to appropriate 
the discourses and practices of the civilisers. 
The Congo fishermen ‘naturally did not like the proceeding so well’, remarked 
Bartholomew on the registration process, with some understatement. The 
antagonism generated between the Protectorate’s subjects was also quick to 
manifest itself. Bartholomew received reports that departing Congo Alur took 
revenge against the triumphalist Gungu fishermen: leaving Bugungu without 
paying their debts, taking their hosts’ canoes with them, and threatening violence 
if the Gungu came to Mahagi. The Alur/Jonam of Panyamur locality attempted ‘to 
keep Bagungu out’ by resurrecting a moribund sleeping sickness regulation 
prohibiting movement between Bunyoro and West Nile.707  
But a more violent collectivising punishment from Bartholomew was forthcoming. 
The new regulations failed to deter all of the Congo Alur. Several ‘Bacongo’ 
fishermen were reported to still remained in Bugungu, or to have returned there, 
in order to fish ‘surreptitiously’. Others had returned, and were now ‘hanging 
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about the shore’, and waiting for ‘the good time coming in the form of licences for 
all’; they had even ‘won’ the sub-county and county chiefs ‘to their way of 
thinking’. With responsibility for issuing fishing licences due to handed over from 
the ADC to the sub-county chief, Bartholomew declared in his April 1951 report 
that ‘the time has now come to take a strong line with the Congo men here’. 
Bartholomew resorted to sudden violent coercion: in May 1951, he attempted to 
ensure that the shoreline was ‘cleaned up’, by launching a ‘raid’ on the ‘badhats’ in 
a departmental Land Rover. Bartholomew even considering expelling all 
Congolese porters as a precaution, until he realised that not only could he not 
prevent porters from assisting in landing seine net hauls, he could not even keep 
them out of the canoes of Gungu gill-net fishermen without ‘doing serious damage 
to the fishing industry’. But he remained alert to the risk of ‘Congo opportunism’ 
through ‘undercover arrangements’ between ‘Congo “porters”’ and ‘genuine local 
inhabitants’. 708 
This ‘raid’ was to be one of Bartholomew’s final official acts as fisheries officer; he 
fell seriously ill soon afterwards, spending April to October 1951 on leave before 
being sent back to Scotland where he passed away a year later.709 His violent 
intervention sent shockwaves through the Northern Albertine Rift, exacerbating 
inter-communal strains. Congo Alur in the Mahagi market refused to sell Gungu 
fishermen the cassava flour they required to feed their porters.710 Tensions 
between Congo Alurs and West Nile’s Alur/Jonam were reported soon after near 
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the Uganda-Congo frontier.711 But licensing measures to keep out the ‘hordes’, as 
Kinloch termed them, were to be maintained.712 
Disorder resumes, c.1951-c.1952 
The departure of the Congo bosses left nobody for the colonial authorities to 
blame, stigmatise, and punish but the Gungu themselves. Problems mounted 
about the game reserve status, the lack of accessible land that it appeared to entail, 
and the need for protection from elephants, which were responsible for a series of 
deaths, and buffalo, which transmitted cattle diseases.713  For outbreaks of 
trympanosomiasis and anthrax cattle disease, officials pointed the finger at the 
lowlanders for keeping their cattle on the road, and using the meat and hides of 
animals found dead.714  
Bugungu could not be trusted when it came to game, according to officials. 
Bugungu’s poaching proclivities were in 1951 less evident, it seemed, as no cases 
were brought before the court. But district officials maintained that ‘the 
pathological need’ for meat and the ‘considerable profit’ it offered—remained 
‘very strong’. Administrators assumed that the ‘malefactors’, particularly buffalo-
hunters, had a ‘collusive’ relationship with chiefs and other inhabitants who had 
‘a personal interest in shielding them’.715 Game policy in Bugungu was 
increasingly tied to Kinloch’s unrelenting crusade to force the Protectorate 
government to immediately establish the national parks. Following the 
completion of the report by the Parks Committee in 1951, the government had 
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decided on further investigations into the matter by Ken Beaton, the Senior 
Warden of the Royal National Parks of Kenya.  
The road remained a big problem, for fish marketing problems did not end with 
the departure of the Congo smugglers. No replacement for Tufmac was quickly 
forthcoming. The fish market at Mahagi Port could still be reached using the 
barges or the steamer from Butiaba, but the pressure of priority cargoes and the 
corrosive effect of salt on the interior of the barges increasingly meant the fishers 
were ‘more or less compelled’ to carry fish in their individual canoes.716  From 
about September 1951, a slightly better alternative had briefly emerged on the 
Uganda side of north-western shore of Lake Albert, at a buying station at 
Panyimur in West Nile District run by a Greco-Belgian firm called Société du Haut-
Uélé et du Nil (SHUN), under an agreement with Tufmac. 717  Fishers had for a 
while benefited from a ‘price war’ that broke out between SHUN and the Greek 
buyers at Mahagi Port.718 But Panyimur still involved a treacherous journey by 
canoe. The high prices from 1951 did make buyers consider coming to Bugungu, 
but they were repelled by the ‘flooded and impassable’ road.719 District officials 
claimed they were only willing to improve the road if SHUN committed to making 
regular visits to Bugungu. In reality, the district administration knew this to be an 
empty offer; the buyers would be unwilling to commit long-term due to 
fluctuations in the prices.720  Officials readily blamed the lowlanders. Problems 
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over fish marketing were owing to fishers ‘independent nature’ which mean they 
tended ‘to flit from place to place in search of the highest prices’.721  
The authorities meted out the customary collectivising punishments.  Kinloch’s 
suspicions made him attempt to blunt the efficaciousness of Game Guards. Chiefs 
had been further deterred from instructing Game Guards to shoot crop-raiding 
elephants, as Kinloch insisted they be made ‘to justify in writing’ these requests.722  
Instead of investing in the road and helping to connect fishers with buyers, 
officials continued to demand local self-help.723 The new sub-county chief who 
arrived in 1952 was Masindi’s Yosiya Baligonzaki, a former policeman who was 
‘fond of having his people lashed’.724  
When CMS Kisansya Primary School was rebuilt in 1952, one touring officer 
marvelled: ‘now a joy to behold. Best thing that the Bagungu have ever done’.725 It 
was a rather backhanded compliment. The population were still far from the ideal 
subjects the late colonial state was seeking to mould. Officials found Bugungu 
rather too self-willed to conform to growing expectations for Africans to 
demonstrate ‘self-help’.726 ‘These people simply are not improving their living 
conditions despite their wealth’.727   
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Conclusion 
A dozen or so years of highly localised and largely unsupervised accumulation 
and infiltration had retransformed Bugungu into a site of unsettling ironies and 
dangerous wildness in Nyoro-Gahya and colonial eyes, catalysing disciplinary 
initiatives of an intensity not seen since 1909. Techniques of governance in this 
period involved less cajolement, more open compulsion through collectivising 
punishments. But a coalition of lowland chiefs and emerging capitalists 
increasingly sought to inscribe difference and hierarchy amid the confusion, 
enlisting classificatory violence in their struggles over accumulation and 
autonomy.As such, these figures aimed to deflect and appropriate the insulting 
ethno-civilisationalist images and increasingly overbearing practices of Nyoro-
Gahya sub-colonials and militarist colonial officials in order to relegate others as 
barbarians. The demonstration of instrumental, coercive power in a series of 
interventions by the state at the turn of the 1950s served as a reminder that violent 
spectacle remained essential to the constitution and projection of state authority 
in Bugungu, even if its victims had changed. 
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CHAPTER SIX: Between ‘darkness’ and ‘light’: 
extinction, extortion and excess in late colonial 
Bugungu, c.1952-1961 
‘previous policy appears possibly unjust & excessively obstructive to a fairly 
progressive people’. 728 
A new, self-conscious social group of young literate men used the burgeoning 
vernacular press and written petitions to the government to engage with the 
discourses and practices of ethno-civilisationalism in the 1950s. In a time of rapidly 
developing political opportunities associated with the democratisation of local 
government in Bunyoro, these figures laid claim to political and moral leadership. 
Some burnished their reputations by leading a backlash against the harsh 
differential and differentiating culture of punishment and the degrading 
stereotypes ideas that provided its discursive underpinnings; others, by contrast, 
turned the ethno-civilisationalist gaze and corresponding disciplinary impulses 
inward on a society strained by unprecedented social change. The ‘hordes’ from 
outside Bugungu had been disciplined and degraded through law and coercive 
force at the bidding of an older generation of chiefs and fisher-entrepreneurs at 
the turn of the decade; but, in the eyes of both officials and Gungu readers, 
barbarians remained within.  
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‘[T]he consequences of their misbehaviour’: c.1952-1954 
Bugungu experienced further powerful social and economic shifts in 1952-1954. 
After a year of ‘violently fluctuating’ prices in 1952, Mahagi Port market prices 
began a secular decline in 1953.729 At Mahagi fishermen endured an increasingly 
severe system of inspection and condemnation. Poorly dried catches were 
vulnerable to being rejected or offered lower prices.730 Several of these men had in 
1954 organised themselves into a co-operative Fishing Society called Katuhikeyo – 
from kuhikaniza, meaning ‘to concur with each other’ – to buy salt and nets in bulk 
at better prices. But no buyers visited Bugungu owing to the state of the road.731 
Domestic demand for Bugungu’s salted fish remained very low as the ‘traditional 
taboo on the eating of fish’ on the plateau in Bunyoro was ‘only just beginning to 
disappear’.732 But it remained impossible to stimulate such demand through 
supply, as the state of the road rendered the cost of transport ‘absurdly high’.733 
Bartholomew’s successor as Fisheries Officer believed they had ‘little to fear from 
overfishing’.734  
Alternative livelihoods, particularly among poorer inland lowlanders, were being 
attempted. Production of cotton was expanded by farmers who formed co-
operative societies such as the Byamani Cotton Society based around the growing 
cotton hub at Bugana in the south-eastern hinterland of the sub-county, to market 
this cash crop to buyers from the plateau at a time of favourable prices. Officials 
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noted a ‘big increase’ in cotton cultivation at the start of the decade, with prices on 
the rise.735 Transport of their crop by water was rendered costly due to the labour 
required for repeated off-loading and loading, and the limited cargo-loading 
capacity of the landing pier. But the road presented formidable obstacle to 
efficient transportation of their crop to ginneries.736 It had become necessary to 
construct temporary bridges from wooden poles during the dry season to enable 
lorries to transport the cotton crop out of the district.737   
People increasingly began to look above the escarpment for other, new 
opportunities. By this time, the sub-county’s two primary schools were 
oversubscribed for the first time owing to concerted propaganda from authorities, 
the successes of the few who had gone to school, and the passing or mellowing of 
some of the churches' staunchest opponents.738 Kisansya and Ndandamire became 
full primary schools, and over the next few years a few Anglican ‘bush schools’ 
began to receive government assistance. New sources of financial support for 
education in the junior and senior secondary schools on the plateau appeared in 
the form of bursaries or scholarships from the church, Bunyoro Local 
Government, and the British American Tobacco corporation, which students from 
Bugungu received following top performances in district-wide examinations. 
Getting students to higher schools, and fish and cotton to market required 
investment in, among other things, the road.739 But the Native Government instead 
adopted a tough fiscal policy in regard to Bugungu. In mid-1953, the Bunyoro 
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District Council had voted to introduce graduated taxation in Bunyoro with a top 
rate higher than any other district.740 Although this tax was haphazardly 
implemented elsewhere in Bunyoro, the Katikiro in 1954 insisted that all canoe-
owners automatically paid the top rate.741 As the Fisheries Officer argued, the tax 
hit the more ‘industrious’ fishers hardest, and failed to take into account the 
difficulty of assessing the income earned in Mahagi market, owing to its 
volatility.742  
Such an approach from the Nyoro ruling elite was mirrored in the intensification 
of the culture of extortive, collective punishment. Officials had given up helping 
the fishers, claiming to have arranged with fishermen to sell to buyers coming 
from Kampala, only for the men from Bugungu to instead opt to take their catches 
to Congo to take advantage of temporarily high prices.743 The road at any rate 
‘more or less cut Bugungu off from regular administration and supervision by 
departments’.744 But this infrastructure was increasingly the object and subject of a 
disciplinary project. Efforts to induce the residents to provide labour for road 
maintenance were unsuccessful: ‘it is immaterial to them whether or not they 
receive their pay (…) as they are so wealthy’, bemoaned the DC Bunyoro. Instead 
of advocating for funds to improve the road, however, district administrators took 
to ‘raising hell with the Bagungu’. In an effort to ‘goad the Bagungu into putting 
the road to rights’, officials requested cotton buyers not to visit Bugungu by boat, 
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and threatened to withhold investment in boreholes for the hinterland.745  
Realising there were limits to what the lowlanders could or were willing to achieve 
in this regard, the Bunyoro Local Government in early 1953 installed a pontoon 
bridge over the most troublesome river, the Waiga. But the road was closed to 
motor traffic within a few months as the pontoon was looted of all its materials.746 
When the lowlanders failed to identify the culprits, the DC petulantly refused to 
devote any more resources to the road, leaving it impassable.747 
The Game and Fisheries Department continued to try to compel obedience in 
1953-1954. Under pressure from Game Warden Kinloch, the white settler press, 
and the SPFE’s successor organisation, the Fauna Preservation Society, the new 
Governor Andrew Cohen’s administration in March 1952 put forward a National 
Parks Bill for converting the Bunyoro-Gulu and Toro game reserves into 
Murchison Falls National Park and Kazinga National Park respectively.748  But the 
acquiescence of Bunyoro District Council – dominated by chiefs and the Mukama 
-- was largely secured through the offer of ten per cent share of all park entrance 
fees for the Bunyoro Government. 749 But another concession had been obtained. 
The Protectorate promised to abolish Bugungu’s encompassing game reserve and 
enclosing Sleeping Sickness Area, with the park boundary’s location declared in 
July 1952 serving to increase the area open to settlement by a third. The 
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boundary’s significance had been impressed upon the population by 
disagreements during visits from officials, councillors, and surveyors.750  What had 
not been publicised greatly was the government’s intention to replace the loathed 
game reserve status with another, albeit newly contrived, protected status: 
‘Elephant and Hippopotamus Sanctuary’. Its implications from the colonial 
perspective were minimal: it meant that elephant and hippopotamus could be 
killed in defence of life and crops, but not hunted on a licence.751  
 
Figure 30: The south-western boundary between Murchison Falls National Park and the Bugungu 
Elephant and Hippopotamus Sanctuary (1952). 
But Game Reserve abolition and Sanctuary creation were left in abeyance by the 
newly constituted parastatal Uganda National Parks (UNP) organisation. The park 
boundary required physical demarcation, which was to be costly and time-
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consuming, especially owing to its deviation from physical features such as rivers. 
Further uncertainty had been produced by UNP’s interest in amending this 
boundary in a way that took back more land for the park. The riverside territory 
coveted by UNP contained Fort Magungu. Former parks advisor Beaton, in his 
new role as Chief Warden, had in late 1952 earmarked this former Turco-Egyptian 
landing and outpost as an ideal base for the park headquarters. Imagining UNP’s 
British personnel as legatees of celebrated imperial adventurers, Beaton 
considered this site of ‘historical interest’ to be ‘a strategic position [from which] to 
control the south-western boundary [of the park]’. He also imagined it a perfect 
location from which to convey tourists to the Falls. These increasingly popular 
trips had hitherto run from Butiaba but were often suspended or interrupted by 
low water levels and storms on the lake.752   
By mid-1954, the organisation had opted instead to develop a riverbank spot to the 
east of the fort at a location newly named by Lwo-speaking park staff as ‘Paraa’, 
meaning ‘Place of the hippo’. But Fort Magungu still formed part of UNP’s plans, 
which were pursued after Beaton’s sudden death in October 1954. UNP argued 
that the boundary should still be adjusted to protect not only this ‘historic site’, 
but also crocodiles, which had been threatened by an upsurge in poaching in 
response to growing demand for their skins.753 The DC Bunyoro approached the 
Mukama to consult the District Council over this ‘small alteration’ to the 
boundary, offering, in exchange, to excise from the park a piece of land of equal 
area in Bunyoro’s north-east. The official maintained that there was no cultivation 
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in the vicinity of Fort Magungu, and the nearest house was approximately three 
miles from this new proposed boundary.754  
The Mukama delayed on making a decision. In the meantime, game officials 
maintained a policy of withholding protection by game guards from the Game 
Reserve until poaching – carried out ‘almost with impunity’ – was brought under 
control. The Game Ranger argued that Bugungu’s inhabitants needed to ‘accept, 
with good grace’ the ‘consequences of their misbehaviour’.755 The consequences 
were severe. Incursions by a herd of 600 elephants over the course of several 
months in 1954 left a trail of destruction: human fatalities, mature cassava crops 
‘devastated’ and cotton ‘badly trampled’, and the closing of Bugana Primary 
School in central-eastern Bugungu.756   
Reformers, readers, and rumours, 1954-1955 
But reactions against impositions, neglect, and stigmatisation were growing 
among the wider population. They made known their discontent initially by 
means of an old strategy – destroying government property, such as the cattle 
innoculation crushes, and the highly flammable grass-thatched buildings of the 
chief Baligonzaki and medical dresser's house.757 But new approaches and 
opportunities for protest arose in Bunyoro’s much changed politics. In late 1953 
Uganda experienced shockwaves when Cohen deported the intransigent Kabaka 
of Buganda and the Legislative Council accepted the Wallis enquiry’s 
recommendations for the adoption of a system of elected district councils that 
                                                        
754 Gower to the Mukama, 6 July 1954, HDA, GAM.11. 
755 Game Ranger to Agricultural Officer (Hoima), 3 March 1954, HDA, GAM.3. 
756 12.7.54, & 29.9.54, BTB3. 
757 19.11.52, 22.11.52, BTB3; UP, PCAR 1953 (Entebbe, 1954), p. 95. 
 229 
would assume responsibility for local government. Few men from Bunyoro had 
joined the first semi-effective nationalist party, the Uganda National Congress, 
owing to its origins in Buganda, but now, among ‘the more educated class’, 
‘political thought and discussion’ had been stimulated by developments there. 
Over the course of 1954,  public discontent was growing. The cost of maintaining 
the Mukama, the ‘unfettered’ nature of the power he exercised, and the 
unsuitability, incompetence and corruption of chiefs he selected had emboldened 
the Council’s committees to resist his will for the first time.758  
The Mukama’s fate was sealed in the August 1954 due to the outcomes of meetings 
between a Council-appointed committee and a British advisor on constitutional 
affairs, Keith Hancock, who had come to Uganda primarily to address Buganda’s 
relationship with the Protectorate Government. The 14-man ‘Bunyoro Hancock 
Committee’ was dominated by ‘new men’ with the equivalent of at least senior 
secondary education. Expressing, in Hancock’s words, ‘very strong opinions’, the 
Committee came out ‘unanimously in favour of very radical constitutional 
change’.759 A new Bunyoro Agreement was to aid a planned District 
Administration Ordinance. The Mukama was to be relegated to the position of 
constitutional ruler; and, in the Council, the number of ‘representatives of the 
people’ – to be indirectly elected by sub-county councils – would more than 
double, giving them clear majority over unelected members. These developments 
heralded a new era that would be directed by educated younger men whose 
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authority was derived from their conversance with the esoteric ways of the 
colonial state and the world of paper. 
A vibrant new Runyoro-language newspaper both reflected and stimulated these 
political convulsions. In 1953, under the editorship of Hoima schoolteacher Peter 
R.M. Mijumbi, Mwebingwa was launched with backing from the Catholic White 
Fathers Mission. Covering church and general news in both Bunyoro and Tooro, 
the title had print runs of 2,000 to 3,000 for most of the 1950s, and went from a 
monthly to a bi-weekly after its first year. Mwebingwa took a politically ‘moderate’ 
stance according to a colonial report in 1956.760 Though this newspaper borrowed 
its name from one of the mukama’s honorific titles meaning ‘the one I come to 
when in need’, it self-consciously provided alternative, subversive recourse. As the 
sole Runyoro-language newspaper beyond the dry newssheet produced by the 
government, Mwebingwa quickly gained readers and contributors among lettered 
men of all faiths. But its primary - and privately acknowledged - aim was to 
criticise the Protestant chiefs who in Bunyoro held virtually all the positions in the 
top two ranks of the chiefly hierarchy.761 Frustration felt by Catholics in these 
years was to lead to the creation of the Democratic Party in Buganda. Locally the 
newspaper was soon considered to pose a threat to the chiefs' entrenched power 
and privilege because it ‘points out bad behaviour and sheds light, its voice goes 
far and it helps the poor a lot’, explained Mijumbi.762 In 1954-1955 Mwebingwa was 
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to cause serious ructions by giving space for letters from Bugungu besides the dry 
reports of the Catholic Nyoro-Gahya headmaster who acted as correspondent. 
In this period of increasingly public politics and emerging revolt from educated 
modernisers on the plateau, ‘new men’ also came to the fore in Bugungu. The first 
generation of men who had completed primary education and, in select cases, 
further training on the plateau and beyond returned to Bugungu in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. Their number included clerks like junior secondary-educated 
Hosea K. Muhigwa, and a man called Daniel K. Wairindi, who had trained as a 
tailor at a Junior Secondary Technical College in the early 1950s in Tooro District. 
Many were primary teachers, such Kisansya Anglican’s headmaster Abimereki 
Kwolekya and Bugana Anglican’s Yosamu Nyamazabo, and Ndandamire 
Catholics Sebastiano Kagoro and Francisco Rwamukaaga. They joined a 
typewriter-owning Catholic ex-teacher called Yakobo Kiiza, who survived off a 
pension earnt through wartime service which had left him paraplegic.763 One of 
the first of the lowland literate intelligentsia to turn to Mwebingwa was Muhigwa, 
who urged his fellows to do the same. ‘[Y]ou have many complaints which you 
have not written down (…)’, he lamented, ‘(…) we should make efforts to advocate 
(…) to see that we are considered!’.764  
The lettered lowlanders constituted themselves as a social group but claimed the 
civility and authority to speak for a particular place and people. Cognisant that 
transformed district and national political milieus offered new opportunities for 
advancement, political aspirants identified the District Council as a new location 
of authority and power. By the very act of writing, and writing in Runyoro, these 
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men used Mwebingwa to make known Bugungu’s civilised, ‘progressive’ 
credentials to colonial and African audiences beyond the lowlands. The ‘new men’ 
took a different approach in order to persuade the authorities that Bugungu was 
itself worthy of a different approach from the authorities. Defining themselves in 
opposition to the erstwhile sub-colonial civilisers, the chiefs, these men were the 
basomu/banyaakusoma (‘the readers’) or beegesibweho (‘those who had been learned’ 
or ‘those who had been civilised’).  
These individuals had partly internalised the old Nyoro-Gahya idea that ‘to be 
learned’ or ‘to be civilised’ meant to have adopted Nyoro-Gahya ways. These 
cultural expressions had been elevated as markers of status more recently through 
their association with the structures of colonial modernity that these men 
experienced. Runyoro was the official, written language of the local government, 
school, church, and print media, and had been validated further by post-war 
orthographic initiatives sponsored by the colonial Department for Education.765 A 
sense of Nyoro-Gahya cultural chauvinism on the plateau was heightened by 
Ganda efforts to stamp it out in the Lost Counties. 
One Catholic missionary was not wholly mistaken in 1953 when he noted, rather 
vaguely, that ‘the Bagungu’ had been ‘more or less absorbed by the Banyoro’.766 
Among the few educated elites from Bugungu with whom missionaries had 
closest contact, some ‘tried to hide’, one informant recalled – they ‘tried to be like 
the Bagahya’.767 But the tendency for people of Bugungu to ‘regard themselves as a 
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separate people’, was a more powerful phenomenon.768  In reciprocation of the 
plateau society’s derision and denigration of Bugungu, they excluded themselves 
from plateau society. It was one thing to write privately claiming to be a ‘Munyoro 
by tribe’ in letters applying for support from a Local Government that made clear 
that ‘Applicants must be Banyoro’ in its adverts.769 It was quite another to accept 
the claims of Nyoro-Gahya ethno-civilisationalism. 
People from Bugungu who made it up the escarpment for education often found it 
difficult to reconcile the notion of Nyoro-Gahya superiority with the state of 
plateau they encountered. They tended to deride and denigrate Nyoro-Gahya 
men. Though the term Gahya was still much in use at the northern peripheries, it 
only tended to be used in oral communication, owing to its derogatory 
connotations of slavishness.770  Gahya was also gendered: in Bugungu ‘it was 
unheard of for a mature boy to carry water on his head’ or ‘to dig [in the garden]’; 
in Masindi and Hoima ‘it was normal’.771 Many lowlanders tended to  deprecate 
even more the palpable poverty and despair of the plateau population who 
themselves called Bunyoro ensi y’enaku, or ‘the country of poverty’.772 By the 1950s 
in the lowlands, more than a decade of localised economic boom brought new 
social status and communal confidence; it was the ‘only place in Bunyoro where 
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they had any cattle’.773 Bugungu’s 4,000 or so cattle in 1951 represented the vast 
majority of the district’s stock.774 Brideprice payment demonstrated a sensitivity to 
per capita cattle ownership, and related rates of polygyny. In Bugungu the typical 
total value of the payment – in cash, cattle or goats, or, more commonly, a 
combination thereof – went up from a few hundred shillings in the mid-1940s to 
about a thousand by the early 1950s. Social distance between Bugungu and the 
uplands was maintained.775  It was ‘almost unthinkable’ for a Nyoro-Gahya man to 
make the payment required for a bride from Bugungu.776  This manifestation of 
economic disparity itself came to be naturalised and ethnicised: ‘[t]he Abagungu 
have different ways in marriage’, one upland informant told a researcher; ‘for us 
we used to marry by delivering a he-goat and local beer (…) But for them they use 
cattle and many goats’.777  
Yet the new men of Bugungu tended to deprecate even more the jealousy, 
resentment, and ostracisation they imputed to the plateau. The lowland scribes 
composed letters that both reflected and intensified collective anxiety, indignation 
and opposition to Bugungu’s upland and colonial overlords. In Mwebingwa 
Muhigwa began to rail against both the colonial and local governments’ tendency 
of ‘pressing the Bagungu hard’ without providing anything in return.778 ‘You 
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quickly decide that the people of Bugungu should pay 112/- or 62/- in form of taxes 
because they are rich, because they have cows’, argued Kwolekya.779 
With their individual letters to Mwebingwa making little impact on the plight of 
Bugungu, the lettered lowlanders decided to write collectively and directly to the 
government. Such an approach had shown some potential. After a letter from ‘all 
the Bagungu’ about their chief’s misconduct reached the DC, Baligonzaki was 
replaced by Fesito Magambo, who hailed from Bugungu.780 Literate men in their 
late twenties and thirties wrote into existence a new advocacy group, the Bugungu 
(or Bagungu) Poll Tax Payers Assembly (BPTPA). They composed a memorandum 
in English signed by 29 men, and on 20 September sent it to officials at every level 
from the County Chief to the Chief Secretary in Entebbe. Among the members of 
this inter-denominational, inter-clan advocacy organisation were lightly educated 
‘progressive’ fishermen, like Koosya Bahoire, but the BPTPA association’s moving 
spirits were clerks and teachers. The BPTPA provided, in Muhigwa’s estimation, 
both a ‘loud voice’ and ‘capacity’ to ‘present to the protectorate government the 
petitions of the people of Bugungu’.781   
District administrators were inclined towards a sympathetic view of the 
lowlanders’ plight.782 The district administration were assailed by complaints 
regarding game policy during their tours of Bugungu, but the DC’s efforts to 
convince Kinloch to reconsider his department’s approach came to nothing. 
Kinloch had dismissed their petition as ‘nonsense’ in his correspondence with the 
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Secretary for Agriculture and Natural Resources in Entebbe. Accusing a ‘large 
number of the inhabitants of the Bugungu area’ of wanting to ‘run with the fox 
and hunt with the hounds’, Kinloch asserted that Bugungu would not receive 
assistance from game guards until the people showed willingness to ‘mend their 
ways’.783 Cognisant of Kinloch’s views, the Secretary had apparently written a 
reply to the BPTPA on behalf of the whole administration in late November. 
Their petition did not have the impact for which they hoped. The Secretary’s late 
November reply did not reach the BPTPA.784 The silence caused imaginations to 
run wild. Alongside the usual complaints about letting his ‘fellow Bagungu’ get 
‘left behind’ in terms of ‘development’, speculation regarding the government’s 
silence began to develop, surfacing in increasingly seditious missives to the 
authorities and Mwebingwa. Muhigwa accused the Bunyoro Government of acting 
to ‘suppress the petitions of the people of Bugungu’.785  As time went on, its 
members took growing umbrage at the perceived slight. ‘I would like to request 
both Governments to always reply the petitions we write down such as these, we 
don’t write to entertain readers, we write to show our problems and ideas’. 
Evoking a revival of deeply rooted mechanisms of political accountability, 
Muhigwa even threatened a protest migration to areas across the water: ‘If it is 
Government’s plan to chase us from our native land; the people of Bugungu have 
plans of crossing to Congo and West Nile! Very few will come up [to the 
plateau]!’.786  
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At the same time, irritated by the Mukama’s dilatory approach to the Fort 
Magungu deal, the colonial conservationists considered a novel means of 
extortion. With the park boundary finally demarcated at the end of 1954, the stage 
was set for the conversion of the Game Reserve into a Sanctuary, if the territory 
swap involving the Fort could only be concluded.787  The district administration 
planned to resort to creating what they termed ‘a lever’.788 The Sanctuary was to 
come with an additional stricture: the Game Warden Kinloch planned to amend 
the proclamation to declare a sanctuary for elephant, hippopotamus and crocodile, 
supposedly to protect the population of the latter at Fort Magungu. But he offered 
to remove this protection for crocodiles ‘if and when negotiations (…) for inclusion 
of the Fort Magungu area in the National Park are successful’.789 But the time-
honoured local administrative strategies vis-à-vis Bugungu were poorly received 
by Cohen’s Secretariat in Entebbe. The Secretary of African Affairs warned the 
DC that ‘there would be no moral justification’ for applying such a lever ‘to force a 
concession’.790   
Though the territory exchange offer was to remain on the table, officials decided 
to press on with the extant park boundary demarcation, and the concomitant 
conversion of Bugungu from Game Reserve to Sanctuary. Around the start of 
March, news that these changes were scheduled to come into effect on 1 April 1955 
caused significant ructions. The DC reported hearing claims from members of the 
Bunyoro Hancock Committee that the Governor had ‘pulled a fast one on them’ 
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by pushing the Sanctuary through while he still has power to do so without the 
need for the District Council’s approval. After meeting with this committee’s 
members to see how the latest draft of the new Bunyoro Agreement had been 
received, the DC reported having been ‘immediately assailed (...) in connection 
with that most regrettable proclamation’ which had ‘aroused very considerable 
mistrust and doubt as to the Government’s good faith’.791 Negotiations over the 
Bunyoro Agreement were almost derailed. The District Council’s Standing 
Committee in the middle of March made clear that they were implacably opposed 
to the Sanctuary, and also refused to countenance the proposed boundary 
amendment at Fort Magungu. 792  The Council committee that visited Bugungu on 
10 March 1955 to examine the area in question, reported back unfavourably on 
UNP’s plan ‘to make a memorial for the coming of the Europeans’, noting that ‘in 
fact there exist already memorials in Bunyoro’. 793   
The hue and cry in Hoima was nothing compared to the groundswell of antipathy 
and a proliferation of threats and rumours the Sanctuary proclamation had 
triggered in Bugungu on 11 March 1955. 794 The usual acrimonious attitude towards 
the authorities had already intensified. BPTPA members had stepped up their 
activities partly in the self-interested knowledge that in the form of the District 
Administration Ordinance, legislative progress had been made towards the 
democratisation of the District Council; but also partly owing to the assumption 
that the colonial government had decided that it would ‘not bother to respond’ to 
BPTPA’s September letter. ‘Should we stop paying tax?’, Muhigwa asked. ‘[T]hey 
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forget that the prevailing peace depends upon we the subjects!’, he added, 
menacingly. He chided member of the Hancock Committee and Legislative 
Council, George Magezi, for having never visited Bugungu. ‘We don’t know how 
such people make their reports on this area’, he explained.’ ‘Do they put in facts, 
or they leave BLANK spaces?’ he asked.795 
At first, the BPTPA for its part responded on 23 March in more measured fashion. 
Writing ‘humbly’ to the authorities and Mwebingwa as ‘obedient servants’, they 
reinforced the Standing Committee’s arguments, begging to change its decision to 
gazette Bugungu as a ‘land of animals’, not of people. ‘We the people of Bugungu’ 
were ‘born here long time ago even before the coming of whites’; now, because of 
the change, ‘animals will defeat man and kill him, and eat his food crops’.  Anyone 
‘who survives will have to run away’ and ‘some will die because of stress, suffering, 
and malaria and all that will result from change of environment’. 796  The BPTPA’s 
members maintained that it offered no substantive change to the punitive status 
quo under which they were suffering. All forms of restrictive conservationist 
zoning were the same – they fell under the rubric of ‘karantini’. Differences in 
conservation status had correlated with extreme neglect from game guards in the 
past in the case of the game reserve. The indignation was compounded by a sense 
that the plans for the Sanctuary had been concealed by the authorities. This 
impression was produced at least in part by apparent miscommunication in 1952, 
and lengthy subsequent delay in implementation. 
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Believing the Council had consented to the Sanctuary in mid-1952, colonial 
officials were at a loss as to the reasons for this ‘considerable stir’.797 The DC 
Bunyoro offered the Mukama assurances that within the Sanctuary protection 
would be afforded to Bugungu by the Game Department, ‘provided that the 
Bagungu co-operate’.798 The DC complained to Entebbe that the Mukama and his 
katikiro ‘will not understand, and do not wish to understand’; but he saw ‘no 
alternative but to tell them that (…) they must lump it’. The matter of Fort 
Magungu seemed ‘more difficult still’.799 The DC proceeded to threaten the 
Mukama with imposing a crocodile sanctuary along the river, in order to force his 
agreement on the Fort.800  Entebbe was ‘at a loss to understand’ the fuss, as the 
sanctuary had been part of the ‘original undertaking’ in 1952, but directed the DC 
not to pursue his crocodile sanctuary plans.801   
But the colonial government proceeded to gazette the Sanctuary on 1 April 1955. 
Any semblance of the courtesy and submissiveness rapidly disappeared. Muhigwa 
and other BPTPA members speculated and peddled scurrilous rumours of 
dastardly schemes of forced displacement. Poaching was surely a ‘mere excuse’ for 
the withdrawal of game guards, Muhigwa declared; it was nonsensical to make the 
misdeeds of a ‘few bad people’ produce ‘suffering for the entire people’. The 
authorities must have ‘something hidden in their mind’, he concluded. The 
dastardly aim of colonial game policies was for ‘the Bagungu to be attacked by the 
wild animals, so that they run away (…) which would then let the government 
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attach [Bugungu] to karantini’.802 ‘[F]oreigners are coming with the intention of 
closing Bugungu’, declared one ‘anonymous’ Mwebingwa letter, which Wairindi 
claimed to have ‘found’.803  In another broadside in the same inflammatory vein, 
another BPTPA man claimed to have even been told by kingdom officials that 
‘you will migrate (…) so that Bugungu remains for animals!’.804 
Bugungu’s inhabitants had impeccable reasons for believing the incendiary 
theories. These rumours resonated with lowlanders’ historical subjection to 
collectivising punishment at the hands of the authorities. The Sanctuary in 
particular raised the hackles because the spectre of displacement still stalked the 
lowland residents, having been stirred most recently in 1949. Like the host of other 
rumours that circulated across broad swathes of colonial Africa, conspiracy 
theories relating to conservation areas gained traction because they rendered 
familiar and rational the exotic, iniquitous, and indecipherable; but also 
imaginatively elevated particular oft-disregarded peoples to the centre of the 
colonial state’s attentions and machinations.805  In Tooro, when Wairindi was 
there for college a year or two previously, the UNC had stirred up support for 
itself by capitalising on similar popular rumours about the National Parks 
Ordinance.806 
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Lowlanders defied Nyoro practices of submission by increasingly adopting less 
veiled, antagonistic rhetoric; people in the lowlands saw the district government 
as complicit – driven by vindictiveness and envy.807  One anonymous letter 
sarcastically declared that ‘We would like to inform the government of 
Rukirabasaija [i.e. the Mukama] that (…) we cannot befriend lions and elephants 
(…) [as] we do not know the language of animals’.808 When news came that the 
Standing Committee had assented to a boundary delineation to which many 
lowlanders objected, another BPTPA man cast aspersions about the motives and 
conduct of the District Council in general, and the Katikiro in particular; it had 
been an attempt ‘to disorganise our area without our knowledge’. ‘We have 
rejected the National Park completely and with all our energy, it will not be 
established in our country!’, he warned, rather belatedly.809 An increasingly 
belligerent Wairindi declared that ‘Bugungu does not belong to Europe, and the 
whites just came to colonise us (…) [W]hy are they deceiving us (…)?’. ‘A bad name 
brings sorrow - SANCTUARY!!,’ Wairindi protested, requesting that the DC ‘erase 
that bad name’.810  
In this period Nyoro-Gahya leaders were attempting to divert attentions to 
Bunyoro’s cause célèbre, the so-called ‘Lost Counties’ claim.811 While Nyoro 
‘homespun historians’ invoked a glorious history of their kingdom, Gungu 
political entrepreneurs focused the attentions of the lowlanders and the 
authorities on a different narrative: 
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our country Bugungu (…) in the past (…) was full of people, stretching from Lake 
Albert to Pajao hill, but a disease called sleeping sickness attacked the area and 
killed people, and Government took us to Kitana, and time came when the 
diseases ceased(…) we tried to plead with Government until they heard our plea 
and allowed us to go back in our area. 812  
Through this history of suffering and heroic struggle, a moral right over Bugungu 
was asserted. The spectre of separatism was mischievously evoked by one BPTPA 
member when he impiously described the Gungu people as Bugungu’s ‘bakama’ – 
an ambiguous term, meaning both ‘kings’ and ‘owners’. Lowland partisans were 
turning the Nyoro irredentist petitioners’ tactics and essentialist language against 
them.  
Reconciliation, revolution and reversion, mid-1955 to c.1957 
These raucous protests did not achieve the erasure of Sanctuary status from 
Bugungu. But the second half of 1955 nevertheless, represented a major turning 
point in the history of colonial Bugungu. Ahead of the September signing of the 
Bunyoro Agreement, much of the furore in Bugungu died down as the authorities 
addressed the most brazen collectivising punishments which had most fuelled 
rumours and distrust. Game guards were sent to Bugungu for the first time in two 
years. In that time only nine elephants had been shot; in the second half of 1955, 
more than 50 were shot by these guards over the course of four or five months. 813 
The administrators assuaged certain fears about the Sanctuary; ‘[d]on’t get 
worried that we shall leave Bugungu, that will not happen’, Muhigwa assured 
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Mwebingwa’s lowland readership. Muhigwa learnt from officials that Entebbe had 
in fact sent them a reply to their September 1954 letter; the BPTPA’s missives had 
been misplaced at the sub-county headquarters by ‘uneducated chiefs’, he 
explained.814  Funds for the road had been allocated; and was work was to start in 
the dry season expected around the end of the year. Fishers in mid-1955 benefited 
from the removal of restrictions on gill net mesh sizes.815 Relations concerning the 
cattle trade improved as a Veterinary Assistant and a Veterinary Scout showed 
themselves able to help control the spread of disease and resist the depletion of 
herds.816   
A sense of reconciliation between the lowland literati and both governments 
became apparent. Bunyoro’s representative Magezi had taken the matter of the 
road to the Legislative Council in August 1955.817 Muhigwa strikingly took to the 
national English-language press to urge ‘his fellow countrymen’ – the ‘people of 
Bunyoro’ – to elect as Katikiro, ‘one who has a deep love of his country’.818 
Muhigwa publicly offered Bugungu’s petitioning power to the Lost Counties, but 
he expected in return ‘other areas of Bunyoro’ ‘to join hands’ with Bugungu. 
Corporeal metaphors emerged to enjoin the plateau to devote governmental 
resources to Bugungu: ‘A healthy person is someone whose entire body has no 
pain (…). What ate hair did not spare the brain’.819   
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But the nature of the relationship between Bugungu and the authorities in some 
way remained unchanged. The imperative civilisational statements by status-
conscious literates remained strong. It was no coincidence that at this time – in 
August 1955 – a group of younger men from Bugungu with higher qualifications 
than the BPTPA members constituted itself on a more formal basis. These men 
were on their way to becoming the first to go on to senior secondary schools and 
Primary Teacher Training Colleges above the escarpment across Western 
Uganda. With encouragement from an Anglican missionary, and advised by a 
newly qualified Catholic teacher called Joseph Gabondi Tundulu from Bugungu, 
they convened themselves as a self-consciously elite and ‘progressive’ Bugungu 
Outside Student Association (BOSA) – a ‘club for educated young men’.820  
The BPTPA’s members for their part seized upon another chance to burnish the 
reputations of both Bugungu and themselves. In November 1955 renewed BPTPA 
co-ordination was occasioned by a short visit of Governor Cohen in the course of 
his routine twelve-day tour of Western Province, as Bunyoro neared the last 
session of the district council before its reconstitution.821 Cohen’s meeting with the 
lowland leaders was an opportunity to level claims to resources. But it was also a 
chance to publicly impress upon a gathered mass of inhabitants of Bugungu that 
the BPTPA leaders were essential brokers between them and the colonial state. 
The BPTPA schoolteacher members orchestrated an impressive display. Cohen 
was received by Ndandamire’s school band, entertained with a ‘Kigungu dance’ by 
men and women at Buliisa, serenaded with ‘3 songs in English and 1 in Rugungu’ 
by schoolchildren wearing new uniforms made especially for the occasion, and 
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confronted by the sight of a huge crowd of people, and upwards of 1,500 cattle, 
which had been mustered near Kisansya Primary.822 
The Governor’s very appearance was taken as a powerful sign of Bugungu’s 
official rehabilitation. Many were to celebrate his vague promise to ‘re-examine’ 
the question of the Sanctuary and ‘whether it was in fact necessary’. But his 
administration remained intransigently cloth-eared. ‘The Bagungu should not be 
punished for the theft of the pontoon bridge, which was stolen by an enemy of the 
Bagungu’, the BPTPA told the Governor. 823 But the latter responded with threats 
of these same sort of collectivising punishments.  He claimed that the people ‘must 
be ready to work on the road’, or the plans ‘cannot be put into effect’. ‘The 
Bagungu should co-operate with Government by leaving off poaching’, he also 
warned, ‘or the present policy of protection might be reconsidered’.824 The 
administration observed that Bugungu was ‘at the best of times mistrustful of 
government’.825 Colonial officials were steadfast in their determination to deny 
that they had given Bugungu reasons to distrust.  
The colonial government did make the same mistakes again straight away, 
however. The fragile rapprochement between the lowlands and the authorities in 
the mid-1950s indirectly benefited from a significant increase in the size of fish 
catches. Prices never quite reached their early 1950s levels again. But many of the 
main obstacles to the commercialisation of the fishing industry were removed.  
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Use of more durable yet affordable nylon nets increased appreciably.826 Crocodile 
populations that threatened the fishers and damaged nets dramatically reduced in 
these years. Though hunters were not licensed to trap crocodiles in Bugungu until 
1958, the lowland littoral benefited from these efforts elsewhere on Lake Albert. 
Licensing restrictions and supervision were relaxed by officials now convinced 
that, if anything, the lake was ‘generally under-fished’.827 The government 
provided loans to fund the development of a new class of ‘progressive’ fishermen 
who had demonstrated that they were ‘prepared to re-invest some of their profits 
in improving equipment’. 828 Planked boats and motor-powered canoes, often 
bought by these means, dramatically improved both fishing in deeper waters and 
marketing. 829  Fisherman ‘rejoiced’ when the authorities in West Nile District 
licensed Belgian and Greek buyers from Congo to operate at Panyimur; a 
‘miniature Grimsby’ was developing with some colonial infrastructural 
investment.830 ‘Plenty of money and plenty of trade here’, officials reported in 
early 1957.831 
But marketing still remained a point of contention. Officials viewed the continued 
reliance – directly or indirectly – on the Congo market as dangerous and 
unsatisfactory owing to losses in protein and hard currency, and the vulnerability 
to cessation or price volatility or collapse. After the rehabilitation of the road in 
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1956, the Fisheries officers began to attempt to force its use in order to develop 
Uganda’s internal markets and reorient the fish trade away from Congo. There 
were now no excuses; it was to be ‘up to the fishermen to make the effort 
themselves’.832 The DC, urged caution, however, about these ‘possibly over 
optimistic’ plans.833  Bugungu made little effort to comply. A few months later 
fishers came asking for assistance after a drop in the prices at Panyimur. Fishers 
renewed demands for regular buying – and perhaps even a fish market – in 
Bugungu.834 
The Regional Fisheries Officer responded petulantly. He scolded them for being 
‘too lazy’ to stimulate alternatives to the Congo markets in Uganda; his assistance 
was withheld until they ‘do something for yourselves.835 This approach intensified 
in mid-1957 even after the road deteriorated after a matter of mere months. 
Despite the expectation of ‘cases of hardship amongst the smaller operators’, the 
Fisheries Officer convinced the DC to refuse licences to Congo buyers in 
Bugungu. Pinning fresh hopes on ‘progressive fishermen’, he believed his policy 
would ‘teach’ lessons that had ‘to be learnt sooner or later’.836 He pointed to 
another attempt to remedy the road, as well as a new track linking Wanseko to the 
markets of northern Uganda via the park.837 But most fishers, out of desperation, 
continued to dispose of their fish at Mahagi Port and Panyimur in 1957. Officials 
were soon forced to resign themselves to this situation. Late 1957 inspections 
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indicated that it was most unlikely to become a reliable all-weather road in this 
very low-lying country ‘for many years to come’.838 
More glaring still were colonial attempts to leverage concessions regarding the 
national park little more than a year after the Sanctuary controversy. UNP had not 
given up on its designs on Fort Magungu; the colonial administration in mid-1956 
returned to its old transactional tricks by offering to degazette the Sanctuary if the 
Bunyoro local government agreed to relinquish the area around Fort Magungu. 
The outraged Council rejected and admonished these advances, while demanding 
the Sanctuary’s revocation, and the provision of more Game Guards – or even a 
fence or ditch – on the boundary with the park.839   
But there was a strong sense in the lowlands that their treatment by the district 
government’s representative in the district, the sub-county chief, was 
discriminatory. Magambo took an unusually energetic approach to the matter of 
poaching, which was estimated by UNP to be worse in Bugungu than anywhere 
else along the park boundary.840 After Magambo’s house was torched on 24 
August 1955, one of his supporters complained that the culprits were ‘the same 
people who (…) have been demanding for another Mugungu to come’ – the ones 
who complained ‘that the Bagungu do not have any right to choose [sub-county 
and parish] chiefs who are born within’.841 ‘As I am one born of this country, I 
should like to know the reason why people keep on burning the government 
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buildings’, Magambo demanded.842 The writers of an anonymous complaint 
against him had already explained to the County chief  ‘we want the gombolola 
[sub-county] chief to be burnt therein’.843 This sustained ‘nuisance’ campaign led 
to the 1955 incarceration of the ringleader, BPTPA member and poacher-trader-
fishmonger Safulensi Lukumu Kaheeru.844 But it continued as Magambo was 
increasingly at loggerheads with general population and his own chiefs, over the 
hunting of game, particularly hippo.845 There was no great warmth between 
Magambo and the new lettered elites either. ‘You should know that he hates the 
educated people’, one of them told Mwebingwa.846 But others feared that upland 
alternatives to Magambo were worse. ‘Isn’t the chief we have now a Mugungu? 
Isn’t he born here and don’t you very well know his clan?’, one man asked after 
Magambo’s house had again been burnt in December 1956. ‘[I]f we continue being 
cruel like that, where will the chiefs be drawn from to come and work here?’.847 
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Figure 31: B.G. Kinloch, ‘The “new look” in fishing canoes – Kabalega-built boat specially designed 
for use with an outboard motor’.848 
 
‘We Bagungu are eating each other like grasshoppers’:849 
moral ethnicity in Bugungu in the mid-to-late 1950s  
People in Bugungu internalised the denigrating discourses that colonial and 
Nyoro-Gahya officials deployed in relation to them. The ethno-civilisational gaze 
was always directed within as well as without. In a time of rapid socio-economic 
change, ethnicity was powerfully produced as a community of argument about 
virtuous Gungu moral order. Intra-communal debates about civilised behaviour 
had a deeper history in Bugungu but were offered a new forum in Mwebingwa and 
another weekly, Mugambizi (‘the speaker’) in the mid-1950s. Typewriter-owning 
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Catholic conservative crusader Kiiza and his fellows made their highly partisan 
interventions as claims for moral authority, if not political office. The first 
civilising contributions upbraided those who continued to use older modes of 
political expression – burning down government buildings. ‘Is this something that 
will develop us Bagungu?’, asked Catholic schoolteacher Sebastiano Kagoro.850 It 
was a ‘bad habit’, village chief Yosam Ukumu bemoaned. ‘[T]he Bagungu are the 
people who are destroying our area’.851 
But reformers soon turned their attentions to other topics. Perhaps the biggest 
social transformations since the late 1930s were produced by the fishing industry. 
The massively increased catches since 1956 had brought in a particularly dramatic 
influx of cash to the ‘progressive’ fishermen who formed a group called ‘Basohi ba 
Bugungu’, or ‘Fishermen of Bugungu’, in around 1957. Bugungu was home to 
‘individually perhaps the richest people in Bunyoro’, noted one veteran 
missionary.852 Most of these were part of the new class of ‘progressive’ fishermen. 
The latter included some teacher-politicians who were investing their salaries in 
the capitalist sphere, but was mainly comprised of men with very little formal 
education. Some of this money was being reinvested in the transportation 
business. One man, Nabosi Wandera, owned a fishing camp which provided the 
funds for him to purchase not only a motor boat launch but also a five-tonne 
truck.853 Other men invested in small shops in African trading centres on the road 
from Buliisa Township to Wanseko; such enterprises were ‘springing up 
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everywhere’, observed touring officials.854 But a lot of profits also went into 
livestock. The population of Bugungu in 1957 was pushing 7,000 cattle; the 
wealthiest individuals owned 200 or more, and derived income from them by 
selling some at bi-annual or tri-annual markets, in response to growing demand 
for meat in upland Bunyoro.855  At Bugungu’s Christmas market of 1958, outsiders 
bought 327 heads of slaughter cattle, fetching ‘Shs. 114, 656 [about £5,700] ]to the 
pockets of Bagungu cattle owners’.856 
Not all men in Bugungu accumulated such wealth. Economic disparities were 
exceptionally severe. Many men made a relatively comfortable living from the 
lake and cotton, but both were precarious. Some fishers remained in canoes which 
became ‘floating coffins’ in extreme.857 ‘[W]e are about to be finished’, warned one 
writer, after six men had been lost to the lake in one month.858 Others were 
reduced to a pure agricultural existence as they had no fishing gear or canoes, and 
lived inland in scattered villages, like Bugana, connected to the road by footpaths. 
Crops were menaced by marauding game, and the people imperilled by famine.859 
While most of the populace grew some cotton, and were organised into growing 
societies, the prices it commanded were relatively low by the mid-to-late 1950s, 
and its marketing continued to present ‘extreme difficulties’ owing to the 
infrastructure.860   
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The disruptive and unequal opportunities of economic change generated conflict. 
When one educated man was found guilty of assaulting his brother, the sub-
county chief’s decision to spare him the corporal punishment reportedly provoked 
one man to ask, ‘So you only cane us, the poor?’.861 Progressive fishermen offering 
transportation in their motor-powered canoes were accused of ‘profiteering’; the 
‘heavy fees’ forced many to risk paddling to Mahagi Port.862 The agricultural poor 
found themselves living among the lowly Alur who grew their own crops but also 
sold their labour on a casual basis to other farmers, having  left the shoreline 
around 1950 for areas like Bugana before spreading northward, around a new 
settlement called Ngwedo, located on the new road that UNP constructed to the 
park in about 1956.863 Some immiserated young men banded together to engage in 
violent entrepreneurialism. A gang self-styled as ‘Kampuni-Kumyoro’, or ‘the 
Company of Stranglers’, attacked and robbed people at night, striking fear into the 
new men.864 
For the first time members of the growing contingent of proponents of the ‘new 
world’ of Christianity felt emboldened to speak out. One young man who 
completed Junior Secondary was sent for training in the Anglican church in the late 
1950s. But local Christian observance remained very restricted in the 1950s.  ‘The 
majority of the Bagungu say that “religion is for the whites [abajungu]”’, Kiiza 
lamented in late 1956.865 A British missionary complained that ‘at least half the 
Bagungu are pagans, not even baptised’ and served by ‘absolutely inadequate 
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Church Teachers’.866 ‘They don’t got to Church very much, and they do not support 
the Church Teachers they have had, in fact most of them have fled sooner or 
later’.867  Criticisms were often levelled in the language of Christianity; in a 
discussion about religious observance, Kiiza wrote that ‘the Bagungu prefer 
Mammon’.868 
Different categories of littoral liturgists were locked in struggles over claims to 
special knowledge about individual and collective well-being in the 1950s. More 
numerous and more popular were balegezi and balaamansi – exponents of the ‘old 
practices’ of the world of ‘phantoms’ (amahembe) and kihala.869  These men made 
waterside sacrifices to the deities such as Bolwa or Biswa rwa Nyambogo on behalf 
of the whole of Bugungu, involving vast sums of money as well as extensive co-
ordination between lowland clans each performing their part, in series, along the 
shoreline.870 In the first half of 1957, Shs. 800/- had been collected along with ‘a very 
big sheep, dressed with branches of muramura tree and so many other things’, 
which was taken deep into the waters of the lake ‘to invoke [the god] Rubanga’ ‘so 
that rain can come’.871 
The reproduction of gender relations and control of female sexuality were key 
points of contention. Certain older women exercised some political authority; but 
the lowlanders had acquired an ignominious reputation among the colonial and 
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Nyoro authorities with regard to treating women as ‘servants’.872 Commodity 
production by absentee males at the lakeshore threw much of the household 
labour onto women, reinforcing the growing separation of male and female spaces 
as livestock expansion near the lakeside homesteads forced women to cultivate 
several miles to the east, where leopards eyed their babies, tied to their backs 
during digging.873 Young men enjoyed a comparatively easy existence, herding 
cattle or helping on the shoreline; ‘boys were kings’, as one informant put it.874  
Men engaged with particular Christian ideas of patriarchal authority in their 
attempts to control female sexuality.875 Dances – both local and foreign – were 
occasions for acts ‘which cannot be mentioned’ and risked ‘ruining the children’, 
as they were difficult to ‘control’.876 Women were being left to ‘loiter around’ as 
‘prostitutes’.877Attitudes towards the role of women were changing in certain ways 
among some small sections of lowland society. In the mid-to-late 1950s, among 
Bugungu’s small number of devoted Christians, the first female student went on to 
junior secondary school, and a women’s group was founded by the wife of the 
sub-county chief Magambo.878 One Protestant urged Bugungu not to treat women 
like animals: ‘let her be in the noun class of MU-BA [i.e. that of humans].’ It was 
necessary for a girl to go to school to learn ‘modern behaviours’, he opined; 
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otherwise they would ‘not be admired by an educated boy’.879   
But there were nowhere near enough god-fearing ‘educated boys’, some believed. 
Generational tensions were also exposed in the letters by older conservative 
Christians in pages of Mwebingwa.  In a piece titled ‘Mau mau is coming to 
Bugungu’, Kiiza chastened the uncivilised behaviour of young men. The ‘short 
tempered’ , ‘energetic’, and ‘uneducated’ boys ‘cannot distinguish between good 
and bad’. ‘[C]ontrol your anger’, he commanded, ‘a human being should not react 
like an animal’880 The newspaper reported on the use of the court system by older 
women to discipline youths.881 In order to ‘escape authority’, young men 
increasingly sought to established fishing grounds in remote locations such as the 
small islands at Kabira and on the shoreline at Bugoigo near the Waiga River on 
the southern periphery of Bugungu.882   
The meeting point of these various axes of contention was the institution of 
bridewealth. Moderately wealthy men in their thirties and forties often had six to 
eight wives. One such man famously had 30 surviving sons, and no idea how many 
daughters.883 Cases of prolific polygny and an overall abundance of livestock, led 
to a shortage of wives, and therefore extremely high bridewealth expectations. In 
the late 1950s, the latter often consisted of 12 to 13 goats, 3 to 5 cows, one bull plus 
                                                        
879 Bimbona, ‘Emikaaga enyakuhinguraine omu Bugungu’, Mwebingwa, 9 August 
1958. 
880 J.B. Kiiza, ‘Maumau n’omu Bugungu eraija’, Mwebingwa, 7 June 1958. 
881 Int. Gungu 4c; Bimbona, ‘Abanyoro okutakora amananu omu Bunyoro’, 
Mwebingwa, 22 March 1958.  
882 County Chief to Omuketo 23 June 1957, HDA, FIN.19/Vol.2; ‘Aga Bugungu’, 
Mwebingwa, 19 April 1958. 
883 ‘General Purposes Committee’, Mugambizi, 21 February 1958.  
 258 
1,100/- to 1,500/- in cash.884 Large bridewealth had many repercussions. Some 
young men, especially those with poor fathers, were unable to marry women from 
Bugungu; the practice of marrying Alur women dated back to pre-colonial era, but 
it greatly increased in the post-war period. A man could kuswera kuwaaakaswera, 
literally ‘marry how you can marry’, meaning that you could pay nothing or very 
little in the way of brideprice.885  
When large bridewealth was on offer, there were socially destabilising 
consequences. Parents in Bugungu often could not resist taking their daughters 
out of school – if they had been there to start with – and giving them away as 
brides. It meant that husbands placed more onerous demands  on their wives’ 
labour, generating strains. Some husbands decided to end marriages. Some wives 
– especially those physically abused – ran away. Abductions were common.886 
Others bought their freedom by turning to licit or illicit entrepreneurship to 
refund their in-laws. At remote landing sites in southern Bugungu, women 
entered into relationships with fishermen beyond some of the demands of 
traditional marriage.887 Many lowlanders were scandalised by these developments 
lamenting that broken marriages made women ‘turn to prostitution’.888 
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It was a time of growing itima, or ‘ill-feeling’, in Bugungu, regretted Kiiza.889 This 
feeling found expression in a spate of murders related to witchcraft accusations.890 
Many of the jeremiads and invectives composed by lowlanders were pervaded by 
a sense of impending calamity – kiihe. This catastrophist tendency was particularly 
strong among the Christian campaigners for whom bad behaviour also explained 
the previous disasters Bugungu had suffered.891 Deaths on the lake and lightning 
strikes were ‘punishments’ resulting from a ‘lack of fear of God’, explained Kiiza. 
Failure to learn from them could provoke ‘a curse on our area like what happened 
to Sodom and Gomora’.892 ‘Are you waiting for god to raise his machete?’, asked 
another man, concerned by widespread drunkenness.893 The country that does not 
have faith in God will ‘perish’, another warned.894  
Ethno-civilisational competition and rank, 1958-c.1961 
These internal tensions found expression in anxieties over ethno-civilisational 
reputation, which took on increasing significance as the timetable for 
independence from British rule began to accelerate in the late 1950s. Uncivilised 
behaviour threatened ‘to spoil the name of the people of Bugungu’.895 ‘[W]e have a 
lot of cash, and yet the upland people say we are in darkness’, noted Kiiza.896  
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BPTPA members demanded that the government pay attention: ‘you need to 
know that the old Bugungu has ceased to exist, therefore you need to respond to 
us not to do as you used to do in the past’, but in a manner appropriate to ‘the 
Bugungu of today’.897 This anxiety was also expressed by literate elites through 
institutional, associational forms. The student organisation BOSA had graduated 
in late 1958 into an organisation exclusively for ‘educated’ ‘Bagungu’. The new 
organisation was sometimes rendered ‘Bagungu United Association’ (BUA), other 
times ‘Bugungu United Association’. Among the other names considered were the 
‘Educated Bagungu Association’, and the ‘Bugungu Progressive Association’. 
BUA’s constitution allowed members to use ‘Lunyoro’ and ‘Lugungu’ in meetings, 
but tellingly adopted English as BUA’s ‘official language’. BUA aimed ‘to unite 
Bagungu’ but also to guide in them in this ‘world of competition and progress’.  ‘It 
is we and we only who can relieve Bugungu from those conquerable obstacles 
which have kept her lagging behind other parts of the country for ages’, one of its 
leaders reminded members.898  
Ample cause for such anxiety was given by the way outsiders talked about Bugungu. 
Some of those more intimately acquainted with Bugungu, such as CMS’s Ridsdale, 
were relatively complimentary. ‘[A]ll Makerere [College] Nyoro are Bagungu’, he 
reportedly told one anthropologist, before explaining their intelligence and 
initiative with reference to the consumption of fish.899  But the same man also 
described it as  ‘backward and insular’.900 The Anglican parson placed there in 1959 
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would be withdrawn in 1961, with Bugungu was identified for remedial measures, 
owing to ‘lack of support from the Bagungu’ who were ‘reverting to the worship of 
money [and] beer’.901 ‘In spite of the vast sums of money earned by the fishermen 
they live in the most primitive huts without any sanitation’, the District Medical 
Officer complained.902 Fisheries Officers bemoaned ‘the difficulty we have had in 
getting the Bagungu to produce a reasonable quality of salt fish’.903  The catches 
were ‘ laid out to dry in the sun everywhere’, amid ‘goats, fowls, ducks, dogs & cows’ 
reported an unimpressed district administrator.904 ‘ The County Chief told the 
BPTPA that Bugungu ‘very backwards in all respects’.905 
The weight of such ideas was reinforced by what Bugungu considered to be 
discriminatory punishment and the withholding of services by the authorities. 
Lowlanders frequently offered their moral and financial support for the district 
government’s campaign for the return of the Lost Counties.906 Relations with the 
local government had to some extent improved since the indirect election saw 
about five BPTPA members join District Council, voting in 1959 to secure the path 
to direct elections in 1960.907  But they did not feel their support was repaid 
through the chiefs imposed on them.908  Even one visitor to Bugungu was 
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surprised to see a man physically ‘beaten’ at Magambo’s bidding on the spot over 
a tax dispute. ‘I had not seen this anywhere else, I only saw it in Bugungu, 
Wanseko’, he reported.909  But a fate little better than Magambo came Bugungu’s 
way after the mutual torment ended around the turn of 1959, when he was 
dismissed and convicted for handling stolen goods – a demise rumoured to have 
been engineered by his arch-nemesis Kaheeru.910 Bugungu faced the imposition of 
successive upland chiefs. In a mid-1961 there was a Kaheeru-spearheaded BPTPA 
complaint against the heavy-handedness of sub-county chief, Yowana Kwebiha, 
claiming he was ‘treating us people of Bugungu (…) quite different from the way 
people are administered in other sub counties in Bunyoro’.911 Less than two weeks 
later, Kwebiiha faced anonymous death threats from ‘the people of Bugungu’ - 
addressed to ‘Mr Bloody Gombolola’, as noted wryly by touring officials.912  
Certain resources were still being withheld or ineffectively applied. Late 1950s 
developmentalism had expanded the range of services that the government could 
reasonably be expected to provide. Tundulu wondered why no midwife was 
provided for ‘the Bagungu’, who were ‘very fertile’, especially when ‘compared to 
other tribes in Bunyoro’.913 The rains of mid-1958 confirmed the road’s destruction. 
The DC Bunyoro declared in September 1958 that a ‘truly all-weather road’ 
needed to be completed ‘once and for all’ and ‘at all costs’, as Bugungu constituted 
‘by far the most productive area that has no proper road access’.914 But the 
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Bugungu road remained ‘the most difficult road in the whole district’, and its 
improvement project ‘one of the most expensive ones in the Province’.915 Every 
single costly intervention by the colonial government over the next year or two 
only served confirm that even more outlay was required.916 The continuing 
unreliability of access owing to the road undermined a great deal besides; for one 
thing, it made it ‘most difficult to undertake any specific production development 
plans’.917 The road was the most difficult collective affront to Bugungu owing to 
the struggles of previous years. Tundulu threatened in August 1958 that ‘the 
Bagungu’ would themselves ‘collect our tax of 1959 for purposes of working on this 
road’.918 
The local and colonial government made some investments in 1958-1959 in an 
effort to ‘modernise’ Wanseko.919  But marketing challenges remained 
fundamentally unaddressed. Market volatility immediately before and after 
Congolese independence in July 1960 preceded the total collapse of fish demand 
amid civil strife, forcing Bugungu to develop the northern Uganda markets to 
which they had already begun to turn. In this context, legislation from Entebbe 
imposing a countrywide canoe licence fee in early 1961 was taken as a targeted 
assault on Bugungu; members of the, fishers’ lobby group, Basohi ba Bugungu, 
argued that if canoes could be taxed, then why not hoes?920  
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A growing sense of British panic in regard to wildlife conservation in the twilight 
of the protectorate rule, meant that collectivising punishments continued to form 
part of game policy, and continued to inspire agitation. In early 1958, residents 
again demanded the abolition of the sanctuary, but the authorities refused to give 
up this source of leverage, especially while the park continued to come under 
attack from illegal hunting from Bugungu;  the protectorate government 
responded by trying again to force a deal on Fort Magungu.921 Demands for a 
second game guard for Bugungu were made: ‘we the Bagungu are not ready to 
cultivate [crops] for animals’, Tundulu complained; ‘we pay taxes like other 
people’.922 Over the next few years the anti-Sanctuary mission was to be 
championed by the BUA, who claimed that the destructiveness of game meant 
that ‘the word Sanctuary’ was the ‘root of restlessness among the inhabitants’.923  
In the late 1950s, UNP began to make its presence felt in Bugungu. This new, 
armed antagonist had familiar proclivities and priorities. Charles Donald ‘Bombo’ 
Trimmer, the colonial military veteran who became warden of Murchison Falls 
National Park in 1957, had initially taken a relatively gentle approach in Bugungu, 
permitting canoes in some of the best fishing grounds – just inside the park’s 
riverine boundary.924 But Trimmer quickly withdrew this privilege as South Asian 
capitalists’ investments in crocodile expeditions drove hunters further and further 
up the Victoria Nile to Murchison Falls itself where an extraordinary number of 
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crocodiles were to be found.925 Trimmer relaxed the rules again on a ‘good 
neighbour basis’ in early 1959 owing to signs that crocodile poaching had stopped. 
But the fishing ban was reinstituted after many an ‘example of non-cooperation by 
the Bagungu’ in relation to hippo snaring, and a ‘serious outbreak’ of crocodile 
poaching in late 1959. 926  ‘[T]he Bagungu’ were ‘no longer the Warden’s white 
haired boys’.927 Lack of rain in early 1961 triggered demands for ‘the Bagungu’ – 
who were ‘about to die’ – to be allowed to grow crops on the immediate fertile 
banks of the Nile. But UNP rebuffed these requests.928 
Anxieties about the civilisational meanings of continued punishment began to be 
expressed by Gungu writers in the language of political tribalism. ‘I ask Bagungu 
to (…) be aware that people have started encroaching on our area,’ one Mwebingwa 
contributor warned, ‘and the lake might be taken away from us’. ‘[R]ich people 
will (…) come, people who have money like beans’ and they will ‘pay for expensive 
licences, which a Mugungu fisherman cannot afford to pay’.929 One touring 
colonial official in 1959 noted that during meetings held in Bugungu the ‘Bagungu 
appeared suspicious about everything done or introduced by non-Bagungu’’.930   
The ‘non-Bagungu’ that tended to constitute a threat in the eyes of lowland 
literate elites were not the  ‘Abaruru’ (Alur). The latter continued to be seen as 
lowly ‘badly off’; subject to a mixture of pity and disregard.931 The women served 
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as cheap brides, and the men lived in appalling conditions in around the fishing 
village at Wanseko, selling their labour to boat-owners.932 Their presence was 
essential to the economy, and became even more so after the Congo crisis of 1960 
which had forced some to take refuge in Bugungu. The Congo crisis also provided 
an obstacle, and an indirect solution, in regard to agricultural production, as it cut 
off supplies of cassava from Mahagi Port, but provided the labour to cultivate it in 
Bugungu. Ardently agriculturalist Congo Alur joined the established settlements – 
that served as a buffer against park – around the eastern hinterland village of 
Ngwedo.933 These settlers grew cotton for cash and cassava to trade on the 
lakeshore, or sold their labour in gardens or landing sites.934 They were welcomed 
by the Bunyoro local government keen to increase taxpayers and nostalgically 
fixated on the idea of multi-ethnic imperial past; the katikiro averred that ‘the 
Banyoro feel a special responsibility to some of the tribes bordering Lake Albert 
who belonged to Bunyoro in times before British rule’.935  
But other arrivals were not viewed in such an innocuous light. An anonymous 
writer took to the newspaper to beg his ‘fellow Bagungu’ to become awake to the 
threat – to ‘open up your eyes and look at your port, Wanseko’. ‘Bahindi started 
their trade in Bugungu [when] we were not aware about trade(…)’, he lamented’, 
‘[t]hey surrounded and exploited us!’936 Bugungu ‘was always being oppressed by 
foreigners’, claimed Kiiza, ‘a Muhindi (…) look[s] down upon us and exploits us’.937 
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Quotidian wrangles between South Asian shopkeepers and their customers 
ending in ‘costly litigation’ fed into tensions over race and control of urban 
space.938 The booming fishing village of Wanseko increasingly represented the 
epicentre of this struggle in Bugungu. 
Conclusion 
The project of ethno-civilisational reassessment, reformation and reinvention that 
had begun to gather momentum a few years earlier, was increasing and clearly 
powerfully articulated by a new educated elite among the Gungu from the early 
1950s. Figures conversant in the language of ‘tribe’ and eager to make themselves 
known took to the pages of the vibrant new Runyoro press in order to conjure 
both a political community worthy of civilisational esteem and a moral 
community demanding urgent civilisational attention. For many both within and 
without, Bugungu remained barbarous – an assessment only reinforced by the 
types and degrees of consumption that the fishing industry supported. Putative 
ethno-civilisational inferiority still demanded, and was demarcated through, 
classificatory violence.  As British rule drew to a close, collectivising punishment 
remained a differential and differentiating tool of governance that sharpening 
collective loyalties and experiences of degradation even if the resources and 
ambitions of late colonial developmentalism promised to consign these impulses 
to the past. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Corporate hierarchy: the 
business of ethno-civilisationalism in Bugungu, c. 
1961-1970 
‘Bugungu is far ahead in terms of money (…). I ask the Bagungu to form an 
association based on our business (…) to take our area Bugungu to a higher 
level’.939 
The 1960s witnessed a new type of ethno-civilisational work led by Bugungu’s 
most highly credentialed men. While political activists in other parts of the 
country continued to channel their entrepreneurial energies into the cerebral 
tasks of writing ethno-histories, codifying customs and language, Bugungu’s 
educated elites and their associations conspicuously refrained. Instead, they 
sought to reorder putative ethno-civilisational hierarchies and transform 
stereotypes through a different collective undertaking. While individual 
entrepreneurialism had made Bugungu far richer than anywhere else in Bunyoro, 
now educated elites promoted an ethnically-flavoured brand of corporate 
capitalism as a means by which to not only dominate and control the lowlands, 
but also to elevate their collective reputational standing, and to civilise their 
Gungu fellows. While the African nationalist policy of nurturing a class of African 
traders in the 1960s was met with much contemporaneous analysis, the 
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relationship between ethnicity, ideas of civilisational hierarchy, and corporate 
capitalism in Uganda’s politics has tended to be overlooked.940 
The road to a higher level, 1962-1965 
As Bugungu approached its final twelve months of British rule, it was hit with 
disastrous weather. 941 In the second half of 1961, fishing was brought to a standstill 
in some areas as the heaviest rains for 45 years was followed, from October 
onwards, by the ensuing rise in lake level – an exceptional fifteen feet – which 
submerged the beaches suitable for seining. Wanseko was like a ‘deserted place’, 
as it was ‘ten years ago’, noted one complainant seeking assistance. ‘[W]e have lost 
all our business, live-stock and houses. We have no money since we have nowhere 
to sell our meagre catch of fish.’942 The rain also compounded marketing issues for 
any products. Bugungu as a whole was only reachable by water in November 
1961.943 As Uganda entered 1962, the Lake Albert fishing industry faced ‘unusual 
difficulties’.  Catches were down, and the Congo market remained low or non-
existent.944  
But Bugungu had grown in political stature in the District Council. Bugungu’s 
councillors were divided along religious-political party lines, particularly initially. 
In the 1960 District Council election, some councillors had won on Democratic 
Party tickets, others on that of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) – the party 
that had grown out of the UNC. But in the highly factional politics of Bunyoro’s 
plateau, one upland bloc associated with Masindi and another with Hoima had 
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long fought each other over Bunyoro’s development resources, political and 
administrative offices, and other forms of patronage. Bugungu had emerged as a 
decisive third force.945 
This growing political influence began to show fruit in the form of game policy. In 
a move that was largely symbolic, but highly meaningful in Bugungu, in late 1961 
Game officials were convinced by the district government to drop the Sanctuary 
status. Facing difficulties controlling licensed hunting between the Sonso and 
Waiga rivers at the southermost extreme of Bugungu, the Game Department 
agreed to an exchange for another status – ‘Controlled Hunting Area’ (CHA), 
covering the entirety of Bugungu. The council’s General Purposes Committee 
‘unanimously agreed’ to this change as the CHA offered a less overt type of 
protection for wildlife and promised to generate considerable local government 
revenues. The CHA represented an exclusive hunting zone where a carefully 
monitored annual quota of game was available to be shot under special permits 
for which the fees were ‘relatively high’. Bukumi-Bugungu Controlled Hunting 
Area, as it was to be known, was proclaimed in February 1962.946 
While it was a time of rebuilding for a devastated fishing industry, the years 
immediately following independence in October 1962 was a time of growing 
optimism, pride, and self-confidence in terms of educational, professional, and 
political attainments. Political rewards started to materialise even more clearly in 
the second half of 1963. DP and independent councillors from Bugungu formed 
part of a larger wave of defections to the UPC, which had come to power at the 
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centre. As was the case across the country, Bunyoro’s  Kingdom Government was 
controlled by the party that controlled central government. Under the terms of the 
1962 Independence Constitution, four ministries were devolved to the semi-federal 
Bunyoro Kingdom Government. Though Bugungu lay on the Masindi-side of the 
district in geographical terms, its bloc’s councillors alliance with Metusera T. 
Katuramu’s Hoima UPC faction enabled the latter to control the district 
government.947  
There were rewards for this support. In August 1963, the newly-elected Katikiro 
Katuramu selected lowlander Yowasi Bijoro Bigirwa as Minister of Social Services 
and Education while four other lowland councillors succeeded in gaining places 
across the Education Committee and the Trade Development Committee. The 
Uganda Argus reported on a party organised by the ‘Bagungu tribe’ in Bigirwa’s 
honour.948 With UPC in the ascendancy in the district, the Ndandamire 
headteacher joined the party from the DP in August 1964, Amid manipulation and 
irregularities, every part of Bugungu returned UPC councillors in October 1964, 
and Tundulu received the Deputy Speakership, as a sop to the Catholics.949  
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Figure 32: Y.B. Bigirwa (far left, sitting), Y.G. Tundulu (left, standing), (1964).950 
Bugungu’s councillors increasing carried away on a wave of what one researcher 
called ‘district nationalism’, which intensified in 1963-1964 owing to the campaign 
for the return of the Lost Counties from Buganda. No lowlanders seem to have 
featured heavily in this campaign before independence; among the 93 memoranda 
the Privy Councillors in London received on the matter of the Lost Counties 
during a commisison of inquiry, not one came from the lowlands.951 The matter 
was rendered largely irrelevant by its remoteness from Bugungu. ‘[T]hose things 
were very far from us’, recalled one informant.952 But after independence, 
councillors from Bugungu made frequent public statements emphasising support 
for this campaign; and for Nyoro unity.953 Even while the Lost Counties ‘siphoned 
off’ finances and time, it served as a unifying cause right up until victory in the 
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referendum on the matter in late 1964.954  The sense of unity in Bunyoro was 
powerfully expressed through Bigirwa’s social ties; he later acted as best man at 
the wedding of a member of the Hoima’s educated elite.  955 
 
Figure 33: Y.B. Bigirwa (sitting, second from left) as best man for a Hoima groom (1965). 956 
These businesses continued to be undergirded by production in Bugungu itself. In 
1964, with fishermen availing of government fishing boat subsidy scheme, the 
fishing industry was beginning to reach levels of activity that had last been seen 
before the flood.957 The Congo market again collapsed that year owing to the 
outbreak of the Simba Rebellion, led by Pierre Mulele, who had been education 
minister in the government of murdered premier Patrice Lumumba.  But demand 
in Uganda continued to rise considerably. ‘Thriving’ Wanseko served as a 
distribution centre for fish from other landing sites, like Butiaba and those even 
further south, to various growing markets in West Nile and Acholi.958  In 1965 the 
                                                        
954 Fred G. Burke, Local government and politics in Uganda (Syracuse, 1964),  p. 108. 
955 ‘People in Uganda’, Uganda Argus, 24 September 1965. 
956 Photograph from ‘People in Uganda’, Uganda Argus, 24 September 1965. 
957 Ochwo, ‘Bunyoro Kingdom Annual Report 1964’, HDA, ADM.14/64. 
958 Kyomya, ‘Fisheries Annual Report – 1964’, 1965, HDA, ADM.14/64. 
 274 
fishing industry had almost recovered to the pre-flood intensity; as a fall in the 
water level enabled the use of more seine nets, the Congo market reopened.959 The 
‘focal point’ for the fishing industry at the north end of Lake Albert, Wanseko was 
one of the most important fishing villages in Uganda, if not the whole of East 
Africa. Luo fisherman from western Kenya’s fishing grounds on Lake Victoria had 
shipped their modern style boats by rail to Pakwach, and then by water to 
Wanseko, where they caught, grilled and smoked fish – mainly Alestes – before  
sending it to their home district in Kenya.960  
The fishing industry was supported in terms of food and labour largely by 
Congolese sources, as had often been the case in the past. The ‘Mulele War’, as it 
was known locally, sent growing numbers of refugees to Bugungu in the final four 
months of 1964.961 Efforts to introduce mandatory encampment in late 1964 were 
even less successful than they were elsewhere in the country at this time. 962  In 
early 1965 there were claims of one hundred unreported new arrivals daily, at 
Wanseko, with some going on to join their relatives elsewhere in the country, but 
some not.963 But the Bunyoro Local Government, generally concerned by ‘the 
smallness of its declining population’ took a lax attitude to immigration at this 
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time.964 As had so often been the case going as far back as the pre-colonial era, the 
self-settled refugees continued to be welcomed. The new arrivals continued to 
provide much-needed casual labour – for fishing, farming, and construction – but 
also took up land which enabled them to provide food, which otherwise the 
fishing camps had to obtain from across the water, sometimes at great expense, as 
even there it was in short supply. Many refugees had joined earlier Alur pioneers 
who had settled on Bugungu’s agricultural frontier around Ngwedo near the park 
boundary under a village chief called Kezeroni Wanzala, who was the son of an 
Alur woman.965 Although wont to occasionally complain of their ‘subjugation’ on 
the shoreline, they generally constituted a politically docile part of Bugungu.966 
Though the vast majority of this community were Catholics, few aligned 
themselves with the DP; they were devoted to Obote.967 
There were still ‘attitudes of cultural superiority’ directed from the core to the 
periphery, according to anthropologist Simon Charlsey. 968  This was increasingly 
less the case in regard to Bugungu than it was the north-east where Charlsey 
conducted his fieldwork. Bunyoro Kingdom celebrated and even appropriated 
certain Gungu markers of cultural difference – such as the kikwele hunting dance – 
were celebrated, admired and even appropriated as Nyoro cultural 
performances.969 At any rate, any Nyoro hauteur was met with manifestations of 
Bugungu’s growing confidence. Swaggering young lowland men in the early-to-
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mid 1960s adopted a jokey ethnic slogan bintu biloho, meaning that ‘[in Bugungu] 
things are there’, i.e. ‘we have riches’, defining themselves in contradistinction to 
the impoverished people of the plateau. The phrase was popularised by Eriya 
Byenkya, who became Permanent Secretary in Bunyoro’s Ministry of Finance in 
1964. He reportedly derided his upland colleagues: “You people, you Bagahya! The 
poorest man in Bugungu has at least a goat at home; you don’t have even a 
hen!”’.970  
A government publication shortly after independence drew special attention to 
‘the Bagungu fishermen’ for making their sub-county the ‘wealthiest’ in 
Bunyoro.971 But officials largely tended to disparage the state of the lowlands. 
Bunyoro’s katikiro warned the people of Bugungu to stop importing goods bought 
from Congo without permission.972 Health officials condemned the ‘awful state’ of 
sanitation in Wanseko, declaring it a ‘losing battle’.973  Taking an increasingly hard 
line in terms of canoe confiscations, UNP’s new chief warden, a former colonial 
policeman called Roger Wheater, increased the pressure on the crocodile hunting 
expeditions demanded by skin buyers of South Asian origin. Wheater condemned 
the local attitude towards poaching: ‘it is obvious that the Chiefs in the Bugungu 
area have no interest whatsoever in the maintenance of Law and Order in respect 
of offences related to the National Park.’974 Outgoing British officials demanded 
for an ‘improvement’ in the ‘administrative machinery’ which allowed people to 
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settle in Ngwedo ‘for the sole purpose of poaching’. The Briton’s African 
replacements condemned Wanseko as a ‘haphazard’ ‘hide-out for criminals and 
vagrants’.975  
 
Figure 34: Dugout canoes seized by UNP (c. 1961). 976 
But it was ethno-civilisational esteem that mattered more to the people of 
Bugungu in these years. Several former members of BOSA-BUA had secured 
prestigious white collar jobs. Among these associations’ former office-holders 
were Yosaamu Hannington, Mugenyi Kaseegu, a civil servant in Uganda’s 
Ministry of Mines who had studied at Budo and the UK; Stefano Kizige, the 
headmaster of Catholic Nyamigisa Junior Secondary School in Masindi; the 
latter’s brother, Cosmas Matongo Kato who was a sub-county chief; and Daniel 
Wanzala, a Standard Bank worker who had graduated from St Mary’s College 
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Kisubi near Entebbe. Other young men had secured scholarships for higher 
education at Kampala’s Makerere, Tanganyika’s Dar-es-Salaam, and even further 
afield.977 Bugungu’s educated women also raised eyebrows near and far in this 
period by forming ‘the Banyoro Bagungu Ladies Committee’ in Hoima Town. The 
Committee worked towards the ‘abolition of bridewealth’ and the establishment 
of ‘recognised status for women’, a British anthropologist heard while conducting 
fieldwork in Kampala.978 
Civilisational credentials were demonstrated by the way one made money. Rich 
lowlanders increasingly invested in businesses away from fish. Sole 
proprietorships owned by rich, unlettered individuals mushroomed particularly 
after independence.979 These years provided a particularly propitious 
environment for Bugungu’s indigenous capitalists. The government’s first five-
year economic development plan, heavily influenced by the World Bank, stressed 
the need for the diversification of the country’s economy and the reduction of 
dependence on its main cash crops, but also the creation of a cadre of African 
professional managers. The government promised to replace the South Asians 
with ‘African tycoons’.980 The parastatal Uganda Development Corporation in 
mid-1963 created a subsidiary called African Business Promotion Ltd (ABP Ltd) in 
co-operation with the government’s Trade Development Section to supply credit 
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and other facilities to aid the foundation of trading companies unable to access 
these services through normal channels.981  
The person tasked with nurturing these capitalist enterprises in Bunyoro was the 
Assistant Trade Development Officer – a role that the ex-BOSA-BUA leader 
Wanzala took up in 1963. With support from his office, Bugungu was in 1964 home 
to the best performing of the district’s five active traders associations. Every 
fortnight they were buying goods valued at between Shs. 10,000/= and Shs. 
20,000/= and purchased a seven-ton lorry.982  A business called Tubyokiri, 
meaning ‘we are waking up’, had been established under a partnership structure 
in 1964 by a couple of dozen educated elites from Bugungu from primary teachers, 
to private dispensers, to central government ministerial assistants, most of whom 
had been members of BOSA-BUA alongside Wanzala. Tubyokiri had acquired a 
maize meal mill and large shop, but also a hotel.983   
The catastrophic floods that had submerged Wanseko had provided openings in 
the transportation business. In late 1962, the Robert Coryndon service between 
Pakwach and Butiaba Port was terminated by EAR&H. But there was still huge 
demand from passengers wanting to cross the north end of the Lake. Owners of 
motor-powered boats in 1963-1964 competed almost to the point of physical 
violence over these passengers – most of whom were male labour migrants from 
West Nile and Congo. In an effort to ameliorate tensions between competing 
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parties, some three men proposed to pool some of their money in order to buy a 
larger boat which they could collectively operate.984 
With Wanzala’s advice and encouragement, ownership was opened up beyond 
boat owners to other men – mainly fishermen who could afford a share for 1,000/-. 
Operating with administrative assistance from educated young relatives, these 
men in September 1964 registered Bugungu Ltd with 50 Gungu men as 
shareholders. Educated young relatives and friends were enlisted to register the 
company and to keep its paperwork in order. The company purchased a couple of 
large, modern motorboats and were charging 50/- per Wanseko-Panyimur ferry 
journey. At the end of the first year, they made a net profit of Sh. 68,000/. ‘Money 
started pouring in like water’, recalled one of the founders. 985  
Corporate hierarchies and takeovers in ‘wild’ Bugungu, 1965-
1968 
As 1965 became 1966, concerns about Bugungu’s disorder intensified. The war 
escalated between UNP and lowland poachers. UNP organisation had acquired an 
aircraft for aerial reconnaissance,  and an amphicar to patrol the waters.986 Dozens 
of canoes and prisoners were caught in a series of combined air-water patrols, 
sometimes in co-ordination with the Uganda Police and the Special Force 
Police.987 But most official energies beyond UNP, were increasingly focused on the 
‘non-Ugandans’ among the African population.988  The newly appointed Game 
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Warden of the Lake Albert Range, J.K. Mawanda, took an intense dislike to the 
state of affairs in Bunyoro in general, but he very quickly reserved particular 
contempt for the Congolese settlers on the park boundary.989 By the end of 1965 
the Bunyoro Local Game Committee – comprising of central government officials 
as well as district councillors – had recommended turning the Bugungu 
Controlled Hunting Area into a Game Reserve so as ‘to keep people away who had 
started settling’.990  
In the last few months of 1966 the Game Warden stirred officialdom in Bunyoro 
into action on this matter with detailed descriptions that cast Bugungu’s 
hinterland as a scene of total disorder owing to these ‘quite uncontrollable’ 
settlers. ‘Poaching to these Congolese is (…) in-borne (sic) habit ‘, he warned the 
DC. ‘[T]hese people have settled themselves wherever and as they want.  I very 
much doubt whether they ever pay taxes’, he added.  ‘I have a feeling that if forced 
to settle in one place, given Chiefs of their own mentality and perhaps tribe, better 
control and less trouble would be achieved’.991  During an investigation into the 
matter at the start of September 1966, Mawanda led a tour of Kasenyi and Ngwedo 
villages by several central and local government officials, including Bunyoro’s 
Finance Minister, and his Permanent Secretary Byenkya, The party were soon 
convinced by Mawanda that ‘disastrous havoc’ had broken loose . Not only was 
their ample evidence in the forms of skins brazenly exhibited outside the house of 
the self-proclaimed leader of the settlers, the encroachment of these people had 
led to ‘the destruction of the famous Fort Magungu’, which was located in the 
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hunters’ ‘corridor’ to the park. 992 In preparation for action to be taken against 
these settlers,  Mawanda in co-ordination with local chiefs, mustered a list of 862 
people living near the park boundary, and recommended a meeting be held 
‘immediately’ to decide on measures to ‘rectify this deplorable situation’ and to 
rescue ‘this famous revenue producing area’.993  
Officials’ concerns about the Congolese were soon expressed with greater 
frequency in regard to Wanseko. The opening of the Congo market, saw a rush of 
Congolese fish buyers at the beginning of the year, and illegal buying by 
unlicensed dealers became evident to officials.994 Vsiting Wanseko, UPC 
government deputy Minister S.W. Uringi, who hailed from the Ugandan Alur 
highlands in West Nile, warned that immigrants ‘were allowed to stay on 
condition that they abided by the rules here, and followed this country’s motto of 
work for progress’.995 The central government took a harder line, instituting a 
discriminatory licensing regime through passing new fishing rules into law in 
1966. 996 Non-Ugandans had  to pay eleven times the fee that Ugandans paid from 
this point on.  Bunyoro Kingdom Government also took steps, to bring the 
‘uncontrollable’ Congolese to heel. In late 1966, it ordered chiefs to provide 
information on the number of foreigners in their areas.997 Aiding administrative 
control in Bugungu was a man who hailed from the sub-county, Perez Isingoma. 
He became the first to hold the Bugungu sub-county chieftainship since Festo 
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Magambo’s exit almost a decade previously. The following year the central 
government decided that all refugees living outside gazetted settlements needed 
to be registered, and to have their origins recorded.998 UNP only encouraged the 
xenophobia, with Wheater complaining that it was ‘paradoxical’ that ‘local chiefs 
are allowing numbers of Congolese to take over Bunyoro land in the Bugungu 
area’.999 These people had settled near or in several cases within, the park  yards, 
carrying illegal firearms.  
Complaints against Congolese were made by a new generation of BOSA elites to 
the central government in late 1966.1000 But as tensions grew concerning 
‘foreigners’, the exclusivist ethnic association life in Bugungu took on a 
commercial guise. After resigning from his Assistant Trade Development Officer 
post in 1965 to become the Managing Director of Bugungu Ltd, Wanzala embarked 
on folding the elite trading partnership Tubyokiri into Bugungu Ltd. This 
amalgamation constitued a commercial but also a political endeavour: it was a 
means to wrest the lowlands from the hands of the South Asians and other 
Africans. Bugungu Ltd diverged from extant models for corporate activity. A 
decade before had seen the rise of the co-operative movement in the sphere of the 
district’s marketing societies.  With substantial redistributive objectives, the 
Bunyoro Growers Co-operative Union (BGCU) had been founded by the local 
government as powerful, central union for all of the district’s local crop marketing 
societies. But the ethnic character of these entities was undercut by their 
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inclusivity. Co-operatives like BGCU were democratic organisations with open 
membership, even if some of its constituent parts, like Byamani cotton group in 
Bugungu, and the ‘Palwo-caa Growers Co-operative Society Ltd’ reflected ethnic 
differences.1001 Even stakes in the plateau’s manifestations of corporate capitalism 
were available to anyone, at a price; the wholesale trading firm, Bunyoro 
Agahikaine Ltd led by the BGCU’s President, Yona B. Majara, was registered in 
1964 as a public company. But Bugungu Limited was made exclusively for Gungu 
investors.1002 
But the outward-oriented ethno-civilisational impulses were mirrored internally. 
It was seen by Wanzala as a means to ameliorate certain kinds of intra-comunal 
tensions between different social groups in Gungu society. It was of course only 
open to the wealthy – those who could afford to buy a stake. But like BOSA-BUA, 
Bugungu Ltd sought to ‘unite the Bagungu’, as one of its founders recalled.1003 It 
sought to transcend locality, and Christian denomination, which continued to be a 
source of political division even if ex-DP Catholics were now publicly UPC 
supporters. But the educated elites also saw Bugungu Ltd as a means to surmount 
differences in educational status, which to a certain extent corresponded with 
different generations of lowland men. As Wanzala and some of his fellow 
educated men saw it, the new Bugungu Ltd represented a means by which to 
civilise – and allowing the market to civilise – the ways of the less educated men.  
From 1967, at Wanzala’s request, Bugungu Ltd’s received tutelary assistance from 
Kampala’s Management Training and Advisory Centre (MTAC), which had been 
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created a year earlier by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the United 
Nations International Labour Organisation (ILO). Though the ILO’s mandate is 
the protection of working people and the promotion of their human and labour 
rights, its Ugandan ‘modernisation’ initiative was a clear example of its liberal 
anti-communist agenda in the decolonising world. The MTAC aimed to provide 
entrepreneurs with advisory services – such as feasibility studies – and technical 
training, as well as preparing Ugandans for managerial positions.1004  
 
Figure 35: Wanzala with a UN ILO advisor outside the Bugungu Ltd’s headquarters in Wanseko 
(1967)..1005 
Bugungu Ltd expanded at an incredible rate. For a short time in the mid-to-late 
1960s, it was the major commercial force in Bunyoro. As well as continuing to 
provide transport on Lake Albert, the company had acquired a lorry and branched 
out into trade, selling fishing and boat equipment such as nets and anchors. 
Bugungu Ltd also acquired another hotel, more boats, shops (including premises 
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in Masindi and Hoima towns), a petrol station, and a cattle ranch. With about 
three dozen employees on its books, the company soon dominated wholesale and 
retail trade across much of Bunyoro District. NTC granted the company coveted 
sub-distributorships for consumer products such as sugar, cement, salt, and sauce-
pans.  It was also appointed wholesale distribution agent over Agahikaine for Bell 
beer.1006   This rapid expansion and diversification owed much to outside support 
aimed to increase the share of commerce in African hands. In terms of the advice, 
loans, and credit facilities available to capitalist enterprise from state and 
transnational sources, Bugungu Ltd received the help of credit guarantee facilities 
provided by African Business Promotions Ltd (ABPL) – which was in 1966-1967 to 
merge with the Trade Development Section, forming into the National Trading 
Corporation (NTC).  
The years 1967-1968 witnessed the height of the lowlanders’ efforts to destablise 
ethno-civilisational hierarchies. A degree of normalisation had occurred in regard 
to the sphere of local and central government policy which went some way to 
addressing some of the legacies of older practices of collectivising punishment. 
Though the powers of the sub-county chief had been very much curtailed under 
constitutional reforms, it was of enormous symbolic value if nothing else that the 
government had appointed a man from Bugungu to this office. Furthermore, the 
all-weather road was completed around the end of 1967.  These years also 
witnessed a shift in Bugungu’s legal status. Disputes over the park and demands 
for fencing to prevent animals disturbing human settlements were to continue; 
but the Control Hunting Area (CHA) was abolished by the government in 1968. 
                                                        
1006 ‘Banyoro get advice on trade’, Uganda Argus, 3 November 1966; UPC Bunyoro, 
‘Briefings to His Excellency’, n.d. (but 1968), UNA, OPC, BOX 21/PML/C.59. 
 287 
Settlement closer and closer to the park boundary – largely by Congolese farmers 
– meant that the CHA was ‘no longer of value’, complained Wheater.1007 It had 
become full of agriculture and livestock. In an effort to save the feeding grounds of 
wildlife in the swamps of the south-eastern hinterland of Bugungu, the 
government converted 518 square kilometres between the escarpment and Waiga 
River to a Game Reserve. But this area remained largely peripheral and free of 
settlement at this time.1008  In the same year, a new maternity hospital was opened 
in Bugungu.1009 Home to fanatical UPC-supporters, Bugungu granted Obote a 
rapturous reception when he arrived during his April 1968 visit.1010 
These years witnessed the peak of Bugungu’s ethno-civilisational standing in the 
eyes of the upland population.  A self-identifying Munyoro from Hoima noted 
admiringly in his Makerere undergraduate dissertation that the ‘Bagungu are 
extremely progressive’ and ‘hard working people’ who were advanced ‘in every 
walk of life imaginable’, particularly ‘in education and trade’.1011 Within Bunyoro, 
Bugungu’s reputation had been burnished by Bugungu Ltd; the renowned 
company hosted the Mukama, and it gained further fame at the district fair. 1012 
Nationally, Bugungu’s fame had also spread. One of the lowlands’ sons, Joseph 
Robert Bikobbo, was winning awards for his performance in university degrees 
abroad on scholarships in Leeds and Zagreb.1013 He was about to join a small but 
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growing group from Bugungu who had returned from education abroad to 
coveted jobs in central government ministries and inter-territorial agencies. 
Wanzala for his part had secured a seat on the board of the NTC and was talked 
about by members of the National Assembly as one of ‘big people’ with ‘big 
monies’.1014 The People newspaper interviewed him for a profile piece in 1968; he 
was even approvingly identified as ‘a genuine Ugandan capitalist’ – a ‘fascinating 
example of what can be done’, in a feature article on African managers in 
London’s Management Today.1015   
Downturn, disorder, and division, 1968-1970 
But Bugungu’s incorporation and status was a precarious business. The lowlands’ 
political significance greatly diminished after about 1967. The district’s factions’ 
shared, overriding political focus evaporated, and a new faction arrived, after the 
Lost Counties of Bugangaizi and Buyaga in late 1964 voted to be rejoin Bunyoro 
instead of remaining in Buganda. The fallout had been delayed by the local 
government’s decision to hold Council elections just before the referendum. But 
in 1968 twenty new Gangaizi members from these largely Catholic – albeit largely 
UPC-supporting – districts entered Bunyoro’s District Council. Positions and 
resources over which these factions could compete were increasingly limited. 
After violently crushing the Buganda Kingdom in 1966, Obote’s UPC government 
centralised power, emasculating the local governments, relegated semi-federal 
Bunyoro to mere district status under the 1967 Constitution. This move reduced 
the number of ministries from four to two and prevented the Secretary General – 
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as the Katikiro was renamed – from uniting different political factions behind him 
by awarding a ministry to each. Bigirwa was one of those who lost a ministry. The 
abolition of the Nyoro traditional monarchy served to lower the civilisational 
status of plateau, it also served to undermine the alliance that had developed 
between the latter and Bugungu.1016 
Connections were also put under strain by Uganda’s troubled economy. Bugungu 
experienced severe downturns starting from 1967, as trade slowed when the price 
of consumer goods shot up from the day of the national budget, and there were 
substantial falls in the prices of cash crops. Officials reported that ‘no fish was 
caught for sale’, and fishermen had started to leave for other fishing villages. The 
average monthly sales for both retailers and wholesalers considerably went down, 
with traders selling on credit more than ever, owing to its customers’ lack of 
cash.1017 ‘There is no money these days’, one government official was told.1018  
Bugungu Ltd itself had long strained under its own internal and fundamental 
tensions. Perhaps for good reason, of the dozens of other firms who were granted 
sub-distributorships by the NTC, only a small minority were private limited 
companies, and those, without exception, were owned by individuals and families 
– like J.W.B. Kasigwa & Sons in Masindi, Bwambale & Co. in Tooro, and Sabiti 
Lubega Ltd in Masaka – not collections of the wealthiest members of an ethnic 
communities.1019 Bugungu Ltd had expanded extremely quickly. Problems over 
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personnel and working capital meant they increasingly struggled to compete with 
South Asian wholesalers.1020  But even more serious was the considerable mutual 
distrust that existed between the firm’s educated people – referred to pejoratively 
as bajungu bairaguru, ‘black Europeans’ – and those with little or no formal 
education. Many of the members believed giving responsibility to the educated 
was ‘like throwing a rat to a cat’, Wanzala told The People. Much to the chagrin of 
some of the older, and less lettered members, Wanzala insisted on speaking 
English in meetings. The older boat-owners who had founded the company 
resented and resisted attempts of Wanzala and his educated allies to reinvest their 
money in fixed assets, and to extend the distribution of fish caught by Bugungu 
fishermen. Soon one of the older fishermen-transporters in the company began to 
run a competing business, and broke away to form his own company, Bijampora 
Ltd, and somehow managed to take Bugungu Ltd’s transport licence with him. 
Legal wrangles ensued. Around the turn of 1969, a beleaguered Wanzala resigned 
and went alone. With the support of his fans at the UN ILO, he obtained capital 
for his own private business, focusing on Butiaba and Masindi. 1021  
Even during its period of success, Bugungu Ltd had only brought into sharper 
relief the ethno-civilisational fault lines in lowland society. At the pinnacle of the 
local economic structure were extremely wealthy men who owned modern motor-
powered boats (bought with government subsidies) and put out about 15 nets 
daily, which earned them about 2,500/- per month. Porters working for boat-
owners were paid a paltry monthly wage of about 60/- plus food and lodging. 1022  
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Inequality had been exacerbated by UNP’s confiscation and destruction of 
hundreds of canoes as anti-poaching measure. It had forced ‘quite a number’ of 
‘Bagungu fishermen’ into the same economic position as the vast majority of the 
Alur. Some of them relied on cultivating cotton, but it had fallen heavily in price. 
1023 Others went fishing for other men, being paid a shilling a day, or one shilling 
for each ten shillings’ worth of fish sold; this was ten times less than the man with 
a dugout canoe and three nets could obtain.1024 As the aims of the ‘Banyoro 
Bagungu Ladies Committee’ suggested, strains relating to high bridewealth 
expectations only grew worse in the mid-1960s. Even men who made a 
comfortable living from fishing believed it necessary to keep a woman busy to 
prevent sexual adventures on her part, and, simply ‘because we paid brideprice’, 
as one man explained it.1025 At the same time, husbands demanded a certain 
portion of any private incomes was generated by married women by making 
alcohol, cultivating cotton, or rearing small stock.1026  
At this time, a rather unhealthy assessment of lowland society from a Western 
perspective was offered by American anthropologist called Mary-Jean Aerni. 
Aerni spent a few weeks visiting Wanseko in 1968, working under the auspices of 
UNP on a report on the inhabitants’ attitudes towards the park, supported by the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Inexperienced in Africa, and working closely with 
UNP’s wardens, Aerni indulged in the same damning discourses that colonial 
officials had deployed in relation to Bugungu since the 1940s. She condemned ‘the 
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Bagungu’, as a ‘disorganised community’ who lacked the ‘education or disciplined 
effort’ to take advantage of ‘the proceeds’ of fishing. The profits had ‘disappeared’ 
‘without ameliorating the conditions of the women, adding perceptibly to the 
enlightenment of men, or the better care and homelife of the children’. Though 
admiring the Alur as the ‘hardest workers’, Aerni asserted that Wanseko provided 
‘ample illustration of the human desire for indulgence during a time of 
unexpected and unearned prosperity’.1027  
In her relentlessly bleak account of Wanseko, Aerni made one recommendation 
that prefigured one that was to be made in a far more notorious ethnographic text 
from this period.1028 Unbeknownst to the people of Bugungu, in one provocative 
recommendation that did not make it into her final report, she suggested that 
residents of Bugungu be relocated above the escarpment to the south, away from 
the park and the lakeshore to make way for reclamation by UNP. In a rather 
absurd reversal of the usual roles, the British chief warden – a former colonial 
policeman – maintains that he dissuaded her from voicing this proposal, pointing 
to the political ramifications of governmental abduction.1029  
Officials increasingly cast Bugungu as a place of rife criminality. In late 1968, ‘38 
fishermen were rounded up’ by the administration in one operation targeting tax 
defaulters, ‘fishing net robbers’, and other criminals on the islands known as 
‘Kampala’, ‘Lubiri’, ‘Karamoja’, ‘Entebbe’, and ‘Luzira’.1030  But the government 
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took a particularly authoritarian approach to outsiders. Obote warned Bugungu of 
the dangers posed by immigrants ‘who wanted to bring trouble to Uganda’.1031  
District officials increasingly discussed the Congo Alur as a ‘quite uncontrollable’ 
people. Administrators identified the ‘undesirable elements’ fundraising for 
Congolese Lumumbist rebel movements as a ‘very big security risk’. Officials were 
concerned that it was ‘difficult to differentiate’ between Ugandan and Congolese 
Alur.1032 A crackdown on unlicensed fish buyers from the Congo, preceded an 
announcement that Obote’s regime had announced that it intended to stop issuing 
licences to non-Ugandan fishermen and fishmongers. 1033  The 1969 Trade 
Licensing Act allowed the government to prohibit non-citizens from trading in 
specified areas and in specified items.1034 
While the early part of the decade had seen Bugungu open out in order to prove 
its ethno-civilisational credentials, the end of the decade showed internal strains 
within the community manifesting in ‘latent tension’ between the community and 
those it considered to be outsiders.1035  A touring ADC noted that ‘[m]any shop 
keepers were very grateful to the Government of Uganda for having introduced 
the Trade Licensing Act’.  ‘These people of Wanseko do not want to see “Asians” 
in shops’.1036 A familiar, older ‘parochialism’ in relation to the plateau was also 
increasingly on show. Condemning their ‘parochialism’, the ADC Bunyoro noted 
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that the people in Bugungu ‘argue that Geography cut them off from the rest of 
the District and as such they should be treated a bit differently’. ‘They even argue 
that their area (Bugungu) has no Secondary School whereas Bunyoro (as if they 
are not in Bunyoro) has got all the three Schools’.1037  
Conclusion 
In the first decade of independence, Bugungu attempted to cast off colonial 
discourses and practices of degradation. The meteoric rise of Bugungu Ltd marked 
the pinnacle of this long-running project of reinvention and repudiation. But 
Bugungu was heavily freighted with meanings accreted over a long history of its 
relationship with the escarpment and outside authorities. Intra-communal 
tensions over the nature of ethno-civilisationalism were brought into sharp relief 
in the fall of what reformer-entrepreneurs had hoped would function as a 
corporate vehicle of reputational and moral improvement. Certain images, deeply 
internalised and inscribed through classificatory violence, proved difficult to fully 
shed, as old ideas of inferiority transmuted into new putative barbarisms. The 
nervous, authoritarian post-colonial state also found it difficult to relinquish the 
practices and discourses that had been so central to colonial statecraft at the 
margins. By the late 1960s it legitimised the  xenophobic identification of new 
targets of classificatory violence outside the Ugandan citizenry.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Colonial spectres: decline and 
crisis, c.1971 to c.1991 
Political, social and economic horizons had temporarily widened in the 1960s for a 
small but growing section of the lowland Gungu community, who actively 
contested and shaped putative inter-ethnic hierarchies of civilisationalism in 
Bunyoro. But this always-precarious project of reinvention was thrown into 
fundamental doubt as the disconnection and degradation of the 1970s eroded its 
material underpinnings. Institutional, infrastructural, economic and regulatory 
collapse produced a bewildering period political openings, closures and 
realignments and inculcated a profound localism. Evoking the 1940s and 1950s, 
this chapter traces the shocking re-emergence of the classificatory violence of 
collectivising punishment as internalised by bereft local actors reacting, like 
colonial officials before them, to perceived political insubordination. Such 
violence reinscribed difference and hierarchies of ethno-civilisationalism, only 
now tied explicitly to a politics of indigeneity, as shaped by donor-induced state 
retreat, economic liberalisation, and the return of electoral politics. 
Localisation and destabilisation, 1971-1974 
The two or three months immediately following Idi Amin’s January 1971 military 
coup in certain respects witnessed the end of politics as it had been known in 
independent Uganda. Through a series of decrees, the military regime banned 
political parties, postponed elections for up to five years, and dissolved 
parliament, district, municipal and town councils, along with the offices of Mayor, 
and Deputy Mayor, and the District Council’s Secretary-General and Assistant 
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Secretary-General. Amin appointed a cabinet of ministers at the centre consisting 
mainly of career civil servants and he treated them as such. All legislative, 
executive and military powers were vested in General Amin as head of 
government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Amin ruled by 
decree.1038 
In the largely pro-UPC Bunyoro, which had historically contributed few men to 
the armed forces, the reception of the coup had been decidedly ‘lukewarm’, as one 
Nyoro petitioner admitted.1039 UPC politicians found themselves stifled or worse. 
Newly re-empowered DCs were tasked with upholding strict residence and travel 
restrictions on all former members of parliament, mayors, district councillors, and 
other public figures.1040 Certain Bunyoro District UPC notables suffered the 
brutality of Amin’s state security apparatus. To avoid the same fate, the former 
District Council Speaker Kassim Rubenda from Bugungu fled to Zaire – as Congo 
was renamed by President Mobutu in 1971.1041 
Much of the literature concerning 1970s’ Uganda emphasises that ethnic hostilities 
rose to unprecedented levels. But scholars have offered little sense of how these 
rivalries manifested themselves beyond the military’s violently diminishing circles 
of inclusion. 10421043 The scholarship gives the impression that the struggles of the 
1970s are the struggles of individuals, such as local government bureaucrats, urban 
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women, or Ugandan Asians.1044 This politics of survival apparently ‘diverted and 
sidetracked’ ‘ethnic ambitions’.1045 It is as if the energetic ethnic 
entrepreneurialism of previous decades was for a time frozen, ‘unresolved’. 
Amin’s Uganda was in some ways a ‘command economy’.1046 But ethnically-
framed demands did not stop. Ugandan citizens claiming to speak for certain, 
often very localised constituencies sought to capitalise on the political rupture. 
Lacking in formal, political representatives, Ugandan citizens relied even more 
heavily on the culture of petitioning than they had before Amin, and the 
provincial archives abound with evidence of this epistolary culture. Amin’s 
ostentatious efforts to solicit opinions from ‘elders’ and other special interest 
groups encouraged subterranean supporters of the DP, like the Catholic 
businessman Daniel Wanzala who had pioneered Bugungu Ltd, to emerge from 
the political wilderness.1047  
In the lowlands, a very localist mode of political claim-making was animated by 
growing intra- and inter-ethnic competition for lacustrine and terrestrial 
resources. Gungu petitioners made demands for alterations to the game reserve 
and national parks in order to open up both land for animal husbandry and the 
Victoria Nile for fishing.1048 Though cast in the language of nationality and 
citizenship – of ‘foreigners’ and ‘Zaireans’ – central to petitioners’ concerns was 
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the continuing intrusion of Alur fishermen.1049 Embittered UPC men from in and 
around the protestant node of Kisansya near Buliisa Town viewed the 
Ndandamire-Wanseko’s largely Catholic Alur presence – and the Catholic DP 
Gungu who associated with them and very often married their women –with 
particular apprehension.1050 
Gungu claims represented a nervous reaction to the changing ways the Alur 
community saw the lowlands and themselves. In the 1970s, Alur had continued to 
gravitate towards the fisheries and supposedly ‘free land’ in Buliisa Sub-County 
leading to a shift in the lowlands’ demographic makeup. In the face of growing 
Gungu hostility, the Alur increasingly imagined themselves a collective. 
Transcending divisions between and within the Alur of Zaire and those of Uganda 
was made easier by the fact that in Buliisa these people were ‘all mixed up’.1051 The 
idea of the lowlands as a place of temporary political and economic sanctuary 
began to be supplanted. When Alur had settled in a certain village in Ngwedo 
Parish near the park boundary in the 1960s they had named this open land 
‘Avogira’, meaning ‘I have taken temporary refuge’, in their language.1052 But many 
did return to their areas of birth, cognisant of intensifying hunger in the highlands 
on both sides of the West Nile-Zaire border. Through their toponymic acts, these 
settlers began to conceive of ‘Alur areas’, located along particular stretches of the 
shoreline, and in the eastern hinterland of the district. 1053 Some Alur took the view 
– one seemingly shared by some Nyoro highlanders – that northern Bunyoro had 
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become – or was always – ‘an extension of Alurland’, as anthropologist Aidan 
Southall maintained.1054  
There were multiple elements to these claims to belonging. Some Zairean Alur 
claimed that they now held ‘citizenship’ as they had stayed in Uganda for a long 
time.1055 Others drew on narratives of historical interaction to stake autochthonous 
claims on the lowland landscape, or specific parts of it. Some cultivators in the 
eastern lowlands, claimed that they had made this area their own through sweat 
and courage as pioneers. Alur informants maintained that owing to the presence 
of dangerous animals, ‘no one would even dare to come around here’ until the 
Alur pioneers arrived in the 1950s, and ‘cleared it of bushes’.1056  Some Alur claims 
took in the whole of the lowlands, undercutting Gungu autochthonous narratives 
by referring to a deeper past. Alur had long asserted through oral traditions of 
Lwo migration centuries earlier that they had been ‘the first’ to stay in northern 
Bunyoro and to worship spirits at Mount Gisi just above the escarpment to the 
south-east of the lowlands.1057 But other claims were connected to specific 
localities outside the park that some Alur had inhabited on the eve of the sleeping 
sickness displacements of 1909. Though rendered faint by intervening spatial and 
temporal disconnection, a special significance was accorded to a place called 
Kakora, located in the interior of the sub-county, between Ngwedo and Bugana. 
Some informants recounted their grandparents’ stories of being born in 
Kakora.1058 They pointed to physical evidence at this place – acacia trees and 
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pieces of pots unearthed while digging – dating back to ‘before the whites 
came’.1059 
And there was little chance that Amin’s regime would undermine the Alur 
position. Although the Alur in the lowlands had shown enthusiasm for Obote, 
they were from Uganda’s north-western borderlands, like Amin. 1060 They were 
also largely Catholic – the denomination more typically associated with the DP 
than the UPC. The Alur enjoyed unprecedented connection to power under the 
military government. Though several Alur appointed to high office by Amin were 
purged as the Kakwa and Nubi closed ranks, the Alur remained prominent at the 
‘outer core’ of the regime, as historian Holger Hansen has put it. They were 
numerous in the lower ranks of military, in part because of Amin’s recruitment of 
one-time Mulelist/Lumumbist rebels from Zaire.1061 More generally, and in 
keeping with his ostentatiously anti-imperialist stance, Amin tended to extend a 
warm welcome to peoples purporting to have been pro-Lumumba.1062  
The moves for internal political legitimation that Amin made specifically in 
Bunyoro were directed largely at the plateau, and mostly symbolic in nature. He 
initiated a large-scale sugar project near Masindi, and an attempt to ingratiate 
himself with royalist Nyoro ethnic patriots included symbolic gestures such as the 
renaming of Murchison Falls in honour of the elderly ex-Mukama Tito Winyi’s 
late father, the late-nineteenth-century Nyoro potentate Kabalega. But not one 
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person from Bunyoro served as a cabinet minister under Amin. Extreme 
disconnection – for better and for worse – characterised Bunyoro’s experience of 
Amin’s rule.1063 The symbolic and developmental goods that Amin delivered to 
Bunyoro were distant from and irrelevant to many Gungu lowlanders.1064 
Measures that materially benefited Bugungu were short-lived and limited. Any 
hopes raised by the few patron-client linkages Amin forged with the lowlands 
through appointments in the civilian bureaucracy proved to be misplaced. The 
high politics of Kampala came with high risk for local ethnic patrons. Before the 
coup, Bugungu’s  Bikobbo had moved from a position in the Ministry of 
Information, Broadcasting and Tourism to work in the murky world of the Office 
of the President. When the coup occurred, he had been away for postgraduate 
study at the US’ Vanderbilt University, but returned to work for Amin. However, 
Bikobbo’s connections to both Obote and American academia made him 
particularly vulnerable amid the paranoid spiral of violence that came to 
characterise Amin’s regime. Bikobbo fled to Nairobi in late 1973. He seems to have 
returned later to Uganda only to meet his end in helicopter ‘crash’, near Mbale in 
April 1976, according to a report in the Voice of Uganda – the mouthpiece of the 
military government.1065  
Similarly, Amin’s headline economic policy won him little popularity in the 
lowlands. Under pressure from African traders, in late August 1972 Amin 
announced his infamous ‘Economic War’, under which non-citizen Asians were to 
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be expelled.1066 Though roundly praised by the African population as it reduced 
competition, few traders in the lowlands benefited directly.1067 There was little in 
the way of foreign assets in Buliisa Sub-County as South Asian businessmen had 
already all but disappeared from Buliisa Town. The Economic War offered 
limited, short-lived sources of patronage. Gungu traders quickly grew aggrieved at 
the lack of supplies and requirements to sell their goods at prices dictated by the 
State Trading Corporation.1068 
Rather than bolstering Gungu control of the lowlands, the policies of the Amin 
regime began to erode it – both directly and indirectly. In his efforts to ‘establish 
love’ – his regime provided means by which to vent pent-up political energies.1069 
Resurrecting one of Obote’s plans, the military government in March 1973 held 
‘elections’ for chiefs from the village to the county level. In certain parts of 
Uganda, the elections turned out to be more ‘consultations’. In some areas, the 
chiefs who were elected were soon replaced en masse by the military regime. 1070  
But this seems to have been less the case in the lowlands – and in Bunyoro in 
general – than it was elsewhere. As Alur made up a growing percentage of the 
lowland population, they were able to obtain a few positions slightly higher up in 
the sub-county’s chiefly hierarchy – at the level of parish and sub-parish chiefs. 1071 
This was the period when ‘Alur also started leading’, as one informant recalled.1072 
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Emboldened by their purchase on political authority, representatives of the Alur 
community also began demanding social expenditure in the areas they 
dominated.1073  
Amin also altered the Lake Albert fishing regulations that had long structured 
local ethnic hierarchies after talks with his Zairean counterpart Mobutu in July 
1973. The outcome of these talks that grabbed most headlines was the lake’s 
renaming as ‘Lake Mobutu Sese Seko’. But this symbolism only compounded 
ideas encouraged by more tangible measures introduced simultaneously to 
‘strengthen ties’. Amin lessened restrictions that had attempted to stop Zaireans 
from fishing in Uganda’s waters.1074  At the canoe regatta held as part of the public 
renaming ceremony, ‘Uganda fishermen displayed their undisputed mastery’, but 
Gungu domination over the waters near the lowland shoreline was more difficult 
to maintain owing to an immediate ‘influx’ of Zairean fishermen into ‘the much 
coveted and more productive’ Ugandan waters.1075 
Redefining Bugungu, 1974-1979 
The wider economic and political trends within Amin’s Uganda intensified 
localism. The ‘economic war’ wrought lasting damage; rampant inflation and 
severe shortages were only exacerbated from 1973 as a result of the international 
oil crisis. The parallel cash economy, referred to as magendo, which had long been 
a feature in the lowlands, increasingly replaced the officially organised economy. 
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In the lowlands, certain people were ‘running Magendo on a great scale’. 1076 The 
magendo economy had a long history in the lowlands. The smuggling of salted fish 
across the lake had been pervasive for several decades.1077  But in the 1970s a 
variety of other goods increasingly found their way to Zaire along with the fish. 
There were huge returns to be made on smuggling petrol, paraffin and, especially 
in the middle of the decade, coffee brought in from the plateau. Other 
commodities such as soap and sugar, which were hard to come by in Uganda, 
were smuggled in from Zaire. 1078 Away from the lake, rampant poaching occurred 
in the national park and game reserve.1079 While the Alur near the park boundary 
were poaching meat, largely for subsistence, the chief park warden noted, the 
‘Wagungus’ (sic) were ‘mainly interested in crocodile skins and ivories’ (sic).1080   
The rise of the magendo economy had multiple implications. For one, the plateau – 
once the source and target of elite aspirations – faded into irrelevance. But as well 
as re-orienting the lowland gaze, the practices and proceeds of the magendo 
economy engendered a profound sense of social disorder and distrust. Under-
resourced government employees lacked the means to counter the magendo 
economy.1081 But they also lacked the will. Amin’s over-extended state let inflation 
erode real value of officials’ wages, with predictable consequences for their 
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diligence and integrity.1082 Park rangers, if they were not collaborating in poaching 
operations, ‘would just shoot you’, one informant explained.1083 
A culture of cheating and greed flourished, producing a sense of moral crisis in the 
lowlands. The ‘chief magendoists’ were certain traders and fishermen from the 
Gungu community who grew ‘wild with money’, noted one chief, who was himself 
a ‘prominent trader’.1084 ‘Although money is hated by nobody’, he conceded, 
magendo was a ‘threatening disease’ that was ‘spoiling the good name of Bugungu’. 
Rival Gungu trading and transportation companies scrapped it out over transport 
and smuggling routes,1085 ‘always bribing their way in and out’, as one informant 
put it.1086 The wealthy accessed commodities and equipment ‘from dubious 
sources’ ‘usually at 5-8 times the normal prices’, fisheries officers reported.1087 
Those who had the means plundered the lake using illegal nets; it was as if there 
were ‘no rules’, regretted one informant.1088 The lucrative magendo trade – and a 
general anti-intellectualism that pervaded the country under Amin –  reduced the 
interest people took in education.1089 ‘It seems that these people do not care about 
books if they do they care but a little’, remarked one seller of Christian 
literature.1090 Chiefs reported that some Gungu men ignored their cotton 
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production directives on the grounds ‘they were cattle keepers and fishermen 
only’.1091  
Relations between these wealthier men and those unconnected to, or at the 
bottom of, the magendo networks were placed under significant strain. For poorer 
men fishing was a far more difficult business than ever before owing to cholera, 
dysentery, shortages and theft, all of which reached huge proportions in the 
1970s.1092 Those who relied on cotton for cash suffered as prices plummeted and 
the government failed to supply them with hoes and pay growers, while 
simultaneously attempting to compel them to grow the crop. 1093 Petitioners 
complained about certain families going ‘almost half-naked’ due to the cost of 
cloth, and ‘consuming unsalted food’, for want of that commodity.1094 Some 
women were forced into brewing alcohol, and even, in one ‘abnormal’ case, 
actually fishing, provoking further moral outrage.1095 Many ‘unruly’ young men 
descended into alcoholism, and turned to stealing fishing nets and even cotton.1096  
While tensions increased over fishing rights, another front opened up inland as 
desperate Gungu families were increasingly looked to agriculture as a means of 
subsistence. This generated conflict as there was little suitable land available in 
Buliisa. The lowlands’ growing population was hemmed in at its north, east and 
south by the park and game reserve – a situation they protested against.1097 The 
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shortage of land was also a product of the form that richer lowlanders’ wealth had 
long taken. When they were not acquiring wives or ‘merry-making’, or reinvesting 
in illegal or legal trade, Gungu men with money bought cattle.1098 Cultivators and 
administrators complained about the ‘loitering’ and ‘gallivanting’ cattle advancing 
eastwards.1099 
When Gungu lowlanders turned their attentions to cultivable land, it brought 
them into conflict with the Alur. It was mainly in the eastern hinterland – the 
location of Buliisa’s most fertile soils – that over previous two decades the Alur 
had settled, regardless of their citizenship. In return for fish and cash, they had 
provided the Gungu community with crops and labour. Gungu who sought 
agricultural land in Buliisa were increasingly forced to buy it from the Alur 
farmers.1100 This situation proved rather galling for some. Gungu ‘think that 
foreigners are not entitled to land’, as one university student from Buliisa 
remarked in her 1973 undergraduate thesis.1101 Gungu claims on this land were 
based on a rather tendentious reading of the history of wider settlement within 
lowlands prior to the sleeping sickness evictions.  ‘They said they are “returning to 
their land” [and that] we “should go back to our land” [in Zaire or West Nile]’, one 
Alur informant bemoaned.1102 The Alur were increasingly no longer seen as non-
threatening presence. 
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Verbal confrontations rarely developed much further under Amin, however.1103 
Alur-Gungu social and political connections in certain parts of Buliisa – 
particularly around the Catholic hub at Ndandamire in the north-west – acted as a 
deterrent.1104 People also thought it wise to keep a ‘low profile’ – to stay off the 
radar of the security organs of Amin’s state.1105 Violent clashes were not an option; 
the military regime ‘would not to hear [of] those sort of things’, one informant 
explained.1106  
But ‘Amin cooled it down’ – at least temporarily – in other ways.1107  Gungu ethnic 
patriots anxious to restore control over local political and economic resources had 
by 1974 started to pay closer attention to the opportunities presented by the 
military government’s re-organisation of the country’s administration, and its 
receptivity to further changes. Implemented in March 1974, the administrative 
overhaul involved the country’s 20 districts increasing to 38, spread across ten 
provinces – a new bureaucratic tier – each under a provincial governor. This 
scheme amounted to ‘the most extensive reorganisation of local government 
Uganda had ever seen’, as historian Tony Low put it at the time.1108 But the August 
1972 announcement of moves towards this administrative revolution was largely 
overshadowed by the international outcry, and local jubilation that attended 
Amin’s declaration of ‘economic war’, which had been made in the same speech. 
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The military regime rhetorically justified these administrative reforms in terms of 
‘convenience and efficiency’; Amin claimed that these had ‘nothing whatsoever to 
do with political or tribal considerations’.1109 But it was pre-eminently a matter of 
both. Amin claimed that the ‘division of this country into administrative units by 
the colonists was haphazard’ and ‘not based on any rational criteria’.1110 But 
Amin’s rationale for this overhaul was in some ways identical to the ethnological 
approach of the early colonial state which had created and carved up Uganda.  
To a certain extent, Amin’s administrative revolution had the effect of 
popularising his regime among certain local ethnic patriots at Uganda’s internal 
peripheries who felt marginalised under the extant administrative setup. Amin’s 
ascent to power had stirred claims of a separatist nature which had been slowly 
evolving at Uganda’s internal peripheries. Within a few months of the 1971 
military coup Amin relented to creating two new districts by dividing Acholi and 
Karamoja, bringing the total to 20. These moves elicited a deluge of claims from 
political entrepreneurs from elsewhere in the country. Ugandan citizens pursued 
the creation of administrative positions because these offices represented sources 
of patronage – providing opportunities for rent-seeking, embezzlement, and the 
exercise of local political control.  
The earliest advocates for change in Bunyoro were the people of the southern 
counties who felt marginalised in terms of the distribution of resources and had 
begun to envisage alternative political futures following the rupture of 1967. Many 
of those who began in 1971 to press demands for a separate ‘South Bunyoro’ 
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district were associated with the Mubende Banyoro Committee. In their petitions 
to Amin the Gangaizi attempted to propagate and leverage perceptions of Old 
Bunyoro as a hotbed of UPC loyalism, where chiefs oppressed the predominantly 
Catholic Gangaizi ‘as a defeated tribe’.1111 Writing before the announcement of 
plans for administrative overhaul, political scientist Roger Southall was right to 
express his doubt that ‘the severe divisions in the body politic of Bunyoro’ would 
be ‘excised by military tutelage’.1112 
Concerned about the proliferating claims and the costs of implementing and 
sustaining such changes, Amin had momentarily backtracked after months of 
stalling. In March 1972 he declared that demands for separate districts were futile 
as he planned to implement ‘county-level administration’ – without elaborating 
what this would mean in practice.1113 In Amin’s August 1972 speech, new districts 
were firmly back on the agenda. But the 33 districts – spread across nine provinces 
– slated at that time did not include a new district for southern Bunyoro. 1114  
But claims from the south of the district began to be echoed by Masindi’s political 
elites, long aggrieved by the location of Bunyoro’s district headquarters being in 
Hoima.1115 In May 1973 new iteration of the list was produced, consisting of 39 new 
districts, including ‘North Bunyoro’ and ‘South Bunyoro.1116 While requests from 
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the Lost Counties for a separate district solely for the Gangaizi had not been met; 
they would be forced to share a district with the Hoima faction’s North Bugahya 
and South Bugahya counties. North Bunyoro was to consist of Bujenje – including 
Buliisa Sub-County – Kibanda and Buruli counties. 
The chaotic character of the process of multi-layered balkanisation reflected the 
degree to which the process of reorganisation had become subject to, and fuelled 
further, instances of localist claim-making. But unit proliferation aided the 
government’s political control in various ways beyond simply placating 
dissatisfied political entrepreneurs. Petitioners’ demands for new administrative 
units also chimed with the anxieties of the government regime with regards to 
threats from within and without Uganda’s borders. 1117 Though the September 1972 
invasion of Uganda from Tanzania by about one thousand armed guerrillas loyal 
to Obote had ultimately failed, it had profoundly shaken the regime’s confidence. 
As well as entailing the creation of new posts in which to insert those loyal or 
potentially troublesome to the regime, administrative disaggregation served to 
disarticulate frames for political action. 1118 It produced the illusion of 
decentralisation but, in reality, served to curb the power of certain groups, thereby 
centralising power within an overarching logic of divide et impera. The implications 
of the administrative rearrangements implemented in 22 March 1974 were 
complex for the people of the lowlands. There is little evidence of widespread 
political mobilisation in the lowlands concerning North Bunyoro District. But 
once implemented, its implications were multiple and complex. As Bikobbo 
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posited in his 1972 postgraduate thesis, though his people wanted ‘always to be 
referred to as the Bagungu and not as the Banyoro’, they needed ‘to be identified 
as Banyoro’ ‘politically’ because alone they were ‘not numerically strong [enough] 
to exert effective pressure on authorities in Kampala’.1119 Now, the political weight 
of the Gungu community was further attenuated by the division of Bunyoro as it 
separated the Gungu lowlanders from the what had been The Bagungu Location 
in Kitana-Kigorobya in South Bunyoro, thereby attenuating the disproportionate 
power they had previously enjoyed by straddling the Masindi-Hoima 
factionalism. The creation of North Bunyoro District provided little cause for 
celebration. Its headquarters were 120 kilometres away in Masindi, and it provided 
limited positions for Gungu elites. 
It took another administrative device to stir the Gungu separatist imagination in 
the lowlands. In the wake of an attempted coup in late March, and facing diffuse 
disgruntlement on the peripheries (of the peripheries) regarding the new 
administration setup, the regime floated the idea of introducing the status of ‘sub-
district’ in certain geographically peripheral areas.11201121 Sub-districts entailed the 
establishment of secondary district headquarters headed by a resident Assistant 
District Commissioner in charge of a team of officers from the government 
departments (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, veterinary etc). 38 localities, including 
Buliisa Sub-County’s eponymous town, were each chosen to host a sub-district. 
North Bunyoro’s secondary node was established in October 1974. It was named 
‘Bugungu Sub-District’. This ethno-toponymic term for the lowlands had 
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continued to be much used in unofficial parlance; but it had not been used to refer 
to an official entity since the colonial period.1122 The introduction of Bugungu Sub-
District validated and encouraged the notion that the lowlands were deserving of 
special administrative treatment. Gungu ethnic patriots’ hopes for the sub-district 
were to prove misplaced, however. Its patronage posts were by no means limited 
to Gungu. Some of the departmental staff posted to work as officers in the sub-
district team were Gungu, but not the office of ADC. Amin’s fretful state inserted 
people loyal or beholden to his regime in the most powerful local position in the 
lowlands irrespective of their origins. Much to the chagrin of many Gungu, even 
an Alur highlander served in the position for about two years in the mid-to-late 
1970s.1123 
As had been the case during the planning and establishment of full district, the 
introduction of the sub-districts provoked fresh claims. Petitioners were 
encouraged to believe that further boundary changes were within reach,1124 and 
even in the last year of Amin’s rule the regime was soliciting requests through a 
system of regulated, even-more-localised claim-making. Ahead of county tours by 
the provincial governor, each parish was required to ‘prepare a memorandum 
which will cover the successes of the Military Government in their parish, failures, 
problems and a comprehensive report on the developmental projects’.1125 The 
regime was ill-disposed towards the language of ‘tribe’ and exclusive political 
entitlements; collective claims were accordingly framed by local petitioners as 
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being ‘in line with the Government policy of taking services nearer to the 
people’,1126 as extant units were ‘too large’ for one official ‘to administer 
effectively’. 1127  
Uganda would have to wait until January 1979 for Amin to allow another couple of 
districts to be created; but political entrepreneurs seeking more modest 
adjustments found a still receptive audience.1128  While demands for construction 
or rehabilitation of boreholes or classrooms, for example, fell on deaf ears, the 
regime was amenable to local calls for upgraded administrative status as the costs 
of new posts did not entail high capital investment in terms of infrastructure. 
Communities had come to expect that in return for new administrative units, they 
would have to collectively construct new headquarters on a ‘self-help’ basis.1129  
It appears that over the couple of years following the introduction of Bugungu 
Sub-District, lowland political entrepreneurs began to petition for a separate 
county – carving out of Bujenje, a new smaller county containing the two sub-
counties of Buliisa and Biiso. Straddling the escarpment, Biiso was home to a 
cosmopolitan – but predominantly Alur – population centred on the eponymous 
sub-county headquarters overlooking the lowlands, in addition to Butiaba and 
Bugoigo. The latter fishing centres had drawn increasing numbers of fishers– 
including many Gungu men – over the 1970s.1130 The section above the escarpment 
increasing became an alternative focus of land acquisition by Gungu families in 
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search of food security. The county campaign proved successful. In April 1977, the 
provincial administration assented to the creation of what would now be known 
as Buliisa County. The Gungu preference for ‘Bugungu’ was overruled;1131 but a 
Gungu man, a sub-county chief above the escarpment called Herizoni Bujunde 
Kintu, was appointed as county chief in Buliisa.  
Once achieved, this change, in turn, immediately encouraged further claims, some 
more ambitious than others. Gungu ethnic patriots began to petition for the 
addition of the upland Kigorobya Sub-County which, though contiguous to Biiso, 
remained in South Bunyoro. This represented a project of both ethnic 
reconsolidation, and ethno-territorial aggrandisement, as Kigorobya had been 
inhabited by an outcrop of the Gungu population since the sleeping sickness 
epidemic of 1909. But the petitioners were always careful to avoid making 
explicitly ethnic arguments. They explained only that Kigorobya ‘in the past had 
been with Bugungu’.1132 However, with Amin’s regime soon embroiled in a war 
with Tanzania, various subsequent petitioners set their sights lower, demanding 
new sub-parish units in different parts of the county.1133 
Amin’s shadow, 1979-1985 
But the security apparatus and administrative instruments that respectively 
repressed and rechannelled Gungu ethnic ambitions disappeared with Amin, 
when he was ousted in April 1979. And the disruption wrought by a succession of 
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transient armed visitors in the month or two after Amin had been deposed only 
intensified competition for resources in the lowlands.  
Compared to many places, the impact of the ‘Liberation War’ on Buliisa ‘had not 
been all that bloody and damageful’, the county chief Kintu reported in June 1979. 
But the one man reportedly so ‘full of joy’ that he died ‘due to over-drinking’ was 
not the only person to suffer.1134 As Amin’s fleeing soldiers sought transport or 
went ‘on the rampage’, ‘fishermen scattered’– many ‘crossed to Zaire’, fisheries 
officers reported.1135 In the park, soldiers gunned down a lot of the few remaining 
animals for meat and ivory.1136  The Tanzanian armed forces preparing to continue 
their pursuit of these men only compounded the disruption. These soldiers 
consumed more game and ‘liberated’ a lot of property from its lowland owners. As 
one fisher recalled, ‘they ate my 28 goats. They left the small ones, [and] those 
died… [and] our canoes were being used [for firewood] to cook’.1137  Some 
magendoists capitalised on the chaos.1138 But it took two or three months for normal 
activities to resume on the lake.1139 
The invasion and the UNLF’s assumption of power was a period of loss and 
narrowing political possibility in the lowlands. During the seventy-or-so days he 
was in power, the new president, Yusuf Lule embarked on a conscious effort to 
undo some of the administrative atomisation of the Amin years. North and South 
Bunyoro districts – renamed Masindi and Hoima respectively – escaped 
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amalgamation under the administrative reforms that reduced the 39 districts to 23 
as part of rather inconsistent wider project to erase their ‘tribal’ associations. But 
the lowlands – like every other sub-district in the country – lost its sub-district 
status. Reflecting its lack of active participation in Amin’s removal regime, there 
was no representation from Bunyoro in first UNLF government.  
In these straitened circumstances, barely supressed local antagonisms over 
entitlements and belonging re-emerged. The county chief reported ‘much more 
misunderstanding’ and ‘disunity’ in mid-1979. The fall of Amin’s regime witnessed 
a backlash against Alur. Rumours circulated that Amin’s Alur soldiers were 
making clandestine trips to ‘their relatives in Ngwedo parish’ and had been 
involved in violent incidents. In a June 1979 meeting, the county chief opined that 
those known to be harbouring such men ‘should be expelled from Bugungu’.1140 
Administrative reports elliptically referred to a ‘serious situation’ having occurred 
in Buliisa in this regard.1141 A fisheries officer noted the departure in July 1979 of ‘a 
number of fishermen of Zairois origin’.1142  
These tensions were only exacerbated by the interim government’s introduction 
of elections at various levels for UNLF committees.  Under the government of 
Godfrey Binaisa, who had been chosen, unexpectedly, to replace Lule in June 1979, 
indirect elections took place for the enlarged National Consultative Council – the 
interim parliament – and at different levels within the districts. 1143  As was the case 
elsewhere in Masindi and Hoima districts, elections to UNLF ad hoc branch 
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committees led to threats of physical violence in ‘tribal conflicts’ between the 
‘indigenous’ people and ‘migrants’ or ‘foreigners’. 1144 
But changing prospects at the national level changed the complexion of lowland 
politics in mid-1980. The old political cleavages between DP and UPC had been an 
implicit aspect of the UNLF from its outset. But the return of multi-party politics 
only seemed inevitable after Binaisa had been was deposed by the Military 
Commission chaired by Paulo Muwanga, an ally of Obote.1145 The developments – 
pointing towards an election in December 1980 – had complex ramifications for 
Buliisa. The ex-Bunyoro districts were still UPC strongholds.1146 Obote’s return 
was met with great enthusiasm among the Gungu of Buliisa County in particular, 
owing to the large (nominally) protestant majority and their cherished memories 
of prosperity and unquestioned control in the 1960s. This situation was reflected 
by the UPC’s selection of Yosam Mugenyi as candidate for MP for the Masindi 
North constituency, which included the lowlands. Mugenyi was a Gungu man 
from Kisansya. He had been a leading figure in BOSA-BUA at the turn of the 1960s 
before studying in the UK and beginning a civil service career that had seen him 
rise to head of the Department of Geological Survey and Mines.  
But Obote’s return also necessitated a rather uneasy inter-ethnic, inter-
denominational political realignment and rapprochement. The UPC’s ascendancy 
in the election in Buliisa would only be assured through a Gungu alliance with the 
Alur population in the lowlands which had swelled in the previous two decades. 
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Though largely Catholic, the Alur population were expected to vote UPC out of 
enduring pan-Lwo solidarity with Obote –combined, in the case of the Zairean 
contingent, with gratitude towards his first government for having permitted their 
settlement.1147 Recognising this Alur political preference, Gungu DP supporters 
attempted to raise the issue of their eligibility to vote by questioning their 
citizenship. This threat forced an Alur-Gungu UPC marriage of convenience 
which ‘quelled’ the citizenship question, one DP activist recalled.1148 
The coalition held firm in the election. In many parts of the country during the 
campaign the DP had enjoyed great success in broadening its appeal beyond its 
original confessional and Ganda base. But in the ex-Bunyoro districts, this pattern 
did not hold. A ‘sizeable majority’ backed the UPC out of enduring loyalty and 
aversion to DP’s leadership, which remained in the hands of a Catholic Ganda 
politician. In Buliisa County, in particular, the DP was ‘totally overwhelmed by the 
strong UPC’, recalled one DP devotee.1149 The UPC controversially emerged 
victorious nationally.1150 But Mugenyi would have probably emerged victorious 
even if no malpractice had taken place. According to the official results, Mugenyi 
received more than twice as many votes as the DP candidate who hailed from 
above the escarpment.  
Violence severely affected other parts of Uganda after the 1980 election prompted 
the leaders of certain disgruntled parties to initiate armed struggle against the 
UNLA. But distance continued to insulate Bugungu from much of the conflict. 
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The ‘bush war’ between the UNLA and Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance 
Army (NRA) guerrillas most heavily afflicted the area north of Kampala that 
became known as the Luweero Triangle.  Before late 1985, Masindi and Hoima 
only featured in these military campaigns for brief moments in March and June 
1984, when the NRA launched successful raids of barracks and armouries in the 
respective headquarters of these districts.1151 The conflict between the UNLA and 
Amin’s former soldiers was largely restricted to the borderlands between Sudan 
and what had previously been West Nile District, and directly impacted even less 
on Masindi District than the ‘bush war’. 
The war’s indirect affects did not leave Buliisa untouched, however. While some 
people prospered through the usual channels, others experienced violence, 
sickness and immiseration. Fisheries officers noted that fish net theft by armed 
men was on the rise.1152 This insecurity, coupled with a breakdown of trust 
between the owners of fishing businesses and their labourers, prompted the 
departure of many young Gungu men to lakes Kyoga and Victoria. Subsistence 
and illicit accumulation drove both the Gungu and Alur communities even 
further into ‘poaching and encroaching’, taking advantage of the financial 
constraints under which UNP continued to operate.1153 A cholera outbreak led to 
several deaths at the turn of 1984, and the failure of rains for two years greatly 
affected small stock and necessitated famine relief. 1154  
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DP supporters perhaps suffered the most under UPC rule. It began during the 
1980 election campaign in violence and intimidation of the DP by UPC Youth 
Wingers which evoked the 1964 struggle for the district council. Among the 
primary targets in 1980 was a young man called Fred Lukumu, a Catholic former 
employee of the Bank of Uganda who had campaigned unsuccessfully in the DP 
primaries in the same constituency as Mugenyi. Harassment continued after the 
election. ‘It was even worse than Amin’s time’, one DP activist recalled of the 
Obote II years. ‘It was a crime not to be affiliated to UPC’. 1155  DP supporters seen 
to be doing well in terms of business were labelled ‘bandits’, and faced extortion, 
intimidation, or worse. One trader, who had built his business under Amin, was 
murdered in 1985 at his commercial premises in Buliisa; his wife was abducted, her 
body never found. The perpetrators were never identified. 1156  
Buliisa’s administrative status did not improve under Obote II, which refused to 
entertain such requests.1157 Nevertheless, the regime enjoyed considerable 
legitimacy in the lowlands. UPC Gungu lowlanders found themselves rewarded 
for their loyalty to Obote. For the first time, Buliisa acquired a connection to the 
national political centre when Mugenyi was appointed Minister for Transport in 
early 1981. In textbook patrimonial fashion, Mugenyi directed some of the 
positions in his ministry and in the state-owned Uganda Transport Company to 
Gungu UPC loyalists.1158 And although in this period the North Bunyoro District 
government remained toothless, chronically under-resourced, and therefore 
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rather irrelevant in terms of patronage, one of Mugenyi’s fellow ex-BOSA-BUA 
members, UPC man Blasio Mugasa, served as chairman of District Council.  
During the ‘bush war’, the NRA recruited hundreds of young men from the 
plateau, especially the southern counties of Hoima District. But there were 
apparently only about three Gungu recruits, including one DP activist.1159 This 
difference was partly the result of Buliisa’s remoteness from what had long been 
the main theatres of action, but it also reflected contrasting politico-religious 
affiliations and economic differentials.  
The political realignment of 1980 averted direct inter-ethnic confrontation despite 
the DP’s best efforts. Inter-ethnic tensions were still perceptible. In response to a 
Gungu manager’s misappropriation of funds from one cotton growers’ society in 
the eastern hinterlands, a new organisation called ‘Alur Ujai’ – meaning ‘the Alur 
have refused’ – was founded, evoking memories of the early colonial Nyoro 
protest movement Nyangire.1160  But even this bold Alur move spoke of the 
community’s growing sense of security. The fact that the Alur in Buliisa could all 
claim to be Ugandan Alur rather than Zairean Alur, and were, at least in the 
regime’s eyes, ‘mainly supporters of UPC’ meant that they were not persecuted 
like the Banyaruanda in the south and south-west of the country. The question of 
Alur citizenship seems to have been largely silenced. Senior party officials kept 
close tabs on the accusations that they were being ‘victimised’ in Bunyoro 
region.’1161  
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Classificatory violence, 1985-1991 
But the ousting of Obote II in mid-1985 ushered in an extended period of dramatic, 
seemingly relentless change in the lowlands. On 26 July 1985 the UPC lost power 
to Acholi officers, General Tito Okello Lutwa and Brigadier Bazilio Okello, who 
established another military council. Lowland figures strongly associated with the 
UPC, such as Mugenyi, fled to Zaire, some not to return for years.  The old UPC 
order – both the Gungu political leaders and Alur clients – were bereft.1162  
But there were further consequences which were catastrophic for all the 
inhabitants of the lowlands. The newly installed Lutwa regime was itself 
immediately threatened. Facing a mounting challenge in the form of the NRA, 
Lutwa attempted to bolster the UNLA through a deal with the leaders of the 
‘Anyanya’ – southern Sudanese and West Nile rebel groups once associated with 
Amin. He also attempted to reach a peace agreement with the NRA at peace talks 
in Nairobi which began in late August. Both the NRA and the UNLA fought to 
control territory – and to create the illusion thereof through propaganda – in 
order to strengthen their relative positions in these negotiations. Confusion 
reigned. In September 1985, the NRA’s Central Brigade under Major General 
David Tinyefuza launched an attempt to capture Hoima and Masindi districts.  
The bush war finally hit Buliisa County in the first half of November 1985.  After 
taking Hoima Town, NRA guerrilla units had infiltrated the rural areas around 
Masindi, which continued to be held by the UNLA. NRA guerrillas had made their 
way north towards the lowlands, reaching Butiaba at the foot of the escarpment by 
the middle of the month. UNLA/Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) Anyanya 
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reinforcements were airlifted in to a base near the Victoria Nile in the northern 
Albertine Rift at Ndandamire Primary School and at the park headquarters Paraa. 
The UNLA’s Anyanya quickly alienated the residents of the lowlands owing to 
their acquisitive, ‘merciless’ behaviour.  
Around 15 November, the vast majority of the Gungu community left the lowlands 
to escape. At a time of great uncertainty, some crossed to Zaire, but the majority 
went south on foot and by water either to Butiaba, where some stayed to monitor 
the situation, or to Gungu friends and relatives in NRA-held Kigorobya-Kitana, 
above the escarpment, and there readied themselves to jump in boats at Kibiro 
and travel to Zaire if necessary. Their cattle, in many cases left unattended, 
wandered towards the park boundary. The lowlands had witnessed another 
kidemu, as circumstances forced residents to seek refuge in many of the same 
places that the sleeping sickness epidemic had send them almost three quarters of 
a century earlier. ‘As people say, history repeats itself’, one informant reflected. 1163 
But unlike the evictions of 1909, it was Alur rather than Gungu who were in the 
majority among those who took to hiding in the bush to avoid displacement in 
1985.1164 And there were other inversions afoot once the NRA assumed control of 
the lowlands in February 1986. The years following the advent of the NRM era in 
Uganda further upended the Obote II political order. Burnt by the UPC’s 
resurgence in the 1980 election, Museveni promoted a ‘no-party’ system of ‘broad-
based government’. The NRM’s earlier approach to the politics of difference and 
belonging owed much to the leadership’s experiences during the ‘bush war’ from 
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1980 to 1986. The NRA had gained traction in the diverse area known as the 
Luweero Triangle, particularly among the numerically preponderant Nyarwanda 
who had arrived in Uganda from Rwanda at different points over several decades, 
but had faced brutal persecution from the Obote regime on account of their 
alleged disloyalty. In areas the NRA controlled it instituted local resistance 
councils that defined citizenship on the basis of residence rather than 
‘indigeneity’.1165   
But the regime discarded principles and promises with little hesitation. 
Commitments like ‘no-party’ or ‘broad-based government’ had little meaning in 
Uganda in this period. The National Resistance Council (NRC) that had replaced 
Lutwa’s Military Council was initially only comprised of so-called ‘historicals’ – 
NRM soldiers and political cadres. Beyond the NRC, the DP-UPC duopoly 
persisted under the NRM banner. Inclusivity in the national government was 
initially largely limited to the embrace of DP men who had been downtrodden 
under the UPC regime. Museveni’s decision to appoint the President-General of 
the DP, the Catholic Paul Ssemogerere, as Minister of Internal Affairs profoundly 
shaped perceptions of the new regime’s preferences.1166  
The DP’s revived fortunes were replicated at the local level of governance in 
Buliisa, where the new political dispensation had compelled realignment. On its 
seizure of power, the NRM instituted a five-level system of elected ‘Resistance 
Councils’ (RCs) and corresponding executive committees, functioning in parallel 
with the hierarchy of appointed chiefs. The RCI represented the village, RCII the 
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parish, RCIII the sub-county, RCIV the county, and RCV the district (but the 
county level – RC4 – did not function in these years). Encouraged by the new 
political dispensation at Uganda’s centre, Gungu DP men who had been terrorised 
under the Obote II regime came to the fore in local elections to the sub-county 
RCs in Buliisa County, drawing on the erstwhile tactics of their political 
opponents.  
The enduring party loyalty demonstrated by the majority of Gungu lowlanders 
won certain UPC votaries’ positions as chairmen on committees. But the most 
powerful RC positions were won by DP men – mainly Catholic long-term political 
aspirants from Ndandamire with relatively strong ties with the Alur community. It 
was the support of that community that secured these DP politicians the Biiso and 
Buliisa sub-county councils. For the Alur, the NRM’s RC system had both opened 
up further space for their participation in local politics, and the departure of 
Obote had necessitated a search for new political patrons, producing this 
rapprochement. Now widely recognized as the ‘kingmakers’ in lowland politics, as 
one informant put it, the Alur had condemned the UPC to the political margins by 
realigning in accordance with the new national political order.1167    
Confronted by the antipathy of a large section of the Gungu population, the 
ascendant DPs of Buliisa spearheaded various efforts to ameliorate tensions. Amid 
growing inter-ethnic competitition for state resources and linguistic recognition at 
the national level, educated Gunguin the diaspora in Kampala late 1986 came 
together to form a new generation of self-consciously elite ethnic association 
called the Bagungu Community Association (BaCA), with the same old hopes of 
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transcending politico-religious divisions.  One of the moving spirits of BOSA-
BUA, a Catholic Ndandamire old boy called Cosmas M. Kato initiated and 
patronised this revival. Instituted on a ‘non-political’ basis and purported to bring 
‘development’ to ‘our homeland’, it had re-emerged with a more overtly ethnic 
function. One of the various tasks it set itself in 1987 was getting Lugungu language 
programming on Radio Uganda. 1168   
The same year witnessed a unifying Gungu effort to expand patronage, resources 
and local control.  DP-dominated sub-county councils evoked the practices and 
discourses of the Amin years when a review of local administration was conducted 
by the Museveni-appointed (Mamdani) Commission of Inquiry into the Local 
Government in 1987. Buliisa’s councillors pushed for the restoration of sub-district 
status on the grounds of the county’s remoteness. This claim represented the first 
step to resuscitate Amin-era efforts by Gungu elites to combine Buliisa County 
with Hoima District’s Kigorobya Sub-County – jointly called ‘our region’ by the 
Gungu authors of BaCA’s 1987 Constitution.1169  
Lugungu language was granted a slot by Radio Uganda a few years later. But other 
Gungu initiatives failed. The preoccupation of BaCA’s wealthier members was 
increasingly the organisation’s commercial arm, Mwitanzige Ltd. Moreover, both 
BaCA and Mwitanzige were ultimately hamstrung by the very divisions they 
sought to transcend. 1170 Contrary to its original intentions, the Mamdani 
Commission’s June 1987 report encouraged Museveni to demonstrate Aminesque 
receptivity to localist claim-making – he assented to recommendations for the 
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creation of four new districts elsewhere in the country. But the more modest 
demands advanced by Buliisa’s RCIII councillors were denied by the 
Commissioners on the grounds that the Bukumi-Wanseko road was due to be 
rehabilitated.1171  
A sense of ethno-civilisational crisis increasingly took hold in Buliisa. BaCA’s 
Chairman wrote to the RCIIIs of the three sub-counties of Gungu ‘region’, 
complaining of the ‘bad habits’ of ‘our people’. These worse offences included 
‘over-drinking’, using ‘bad language’,  and demonstrating a ‘lack of good attention 
to families affairs and education’ (sic)’.1172  These narratives were tied to 
perceptions of ecological disorder. Famine and both familiar and unfamiliar 
deadly diseases stalked the land, and hyena and lion increasingly looked beyond 
the (contested) park boundary for prey.1173 Gungu petitioners claimed that the lake 
had been ‘spoiled’, provoking an increased focus on cultivation and cattle-rearing 
which was in turn transforming the county into a ‘desert’.1174  
Economic conditions, combined with collectivising punishments by the NRM, 
threatened Gungu conceptions of ethno-civilisational status. Underlying concerns 
about the fisheries was falling demand and prices for fish in Zaire, the high cost of 
both fuel for engine boats and salt, thefts of fishing nets, and NRM attempt’s to 
crackdown on both the thriving illegal cross-border barter trade and, ironically, 
destructive fishing practices.1175 These state interventions foundered on lack of 
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both resources to police the lake and co-operation from ‘local authorities’ 
implicated in illegal fishing practices and trade. But the June 1987 ban on both 
fishing times and certain types of gear had generated fears for ‘very survival’ of the 
‘indigenous fishermen’, according to one impassioned petition signed by political 
leaders and representatives of the fishermen.1176 
Certain Gungu elites attempted to exploit this situation, to reinscribe ethno-
civilisational hierarchy and difference.  Bereft UPC devotees among them often 
blamed ‘Zaireans’/’foreigners’, in often unmistakably coded reference to their 
erstwhile political partners, the county’s Alur inhabitants – regardless of their 
nationality. Perceived political insubordination was recast as barbarism  stood 
accused of net-theft, witchcraft, ‘land-grabbing’, and cannibalism; but it was the 
Zaireans’ putative contraventions of fishing regulations that drew most of Gungu 
political focus entrepreneurs focused on in their petitions. They cast themselves as 
civilised custodians of the fish breeding grounds that others abused. ‘What 
humiliates us most is the fact that (…) these foreigners are operating so freely with 
their destructive nets (…) and (…) can afford to quieten anybody who may wish to 
challenge their work’. They warned – with menacing ambiguity – that ‘an exodus 
is in sight’.1177   
Intimidation of the Alur at the landing sites had not stopped the DP-Alur alliance 
emerging victorious in the RC elections of February 1989.  For the first time, 
Buliisa’s two sub-counties’ RCs, from the village and parish level, gathered as an 
electoral college to elect the county’s one representative to the expanded 
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parliament – the National Resistance Council – and three District RC members. In 
the battle for NRC representative, DP man Fred Lukumu, Buliisa’s RCIII 
Secretary, defeated a member of BaCA’s executive committee, urban officer 
Naftali Bigirwenkya by 52 votes to 24. Amid this febrile political atmosphere, BaCA 
collapsed. 1178  
Contestations over citizenship lay at the heart of certain violent local struggles 
over local control, recognition, and access to resources. Self-declared Gungu 
spokesmen were urged by the government to redirect their political focus to the 
Uganda Constitutional (‘Odoki’) Commission, which was established in 1989 to 
review the constitution and to draft a new one on the basis of consultations with 
the populace.1179 The only qualification for citizenship made in the independence 
Constitution of 1962 had been a residency requirement of five years. The interim 
report by the Odoki Commission submitted in December 1990 revealed a 
widespread and intense sense of ‘resentment’ ‘tainted with prejudice and 
ignorance’ about this arrangement. As Ugandans tended ‘to confuse national 
citizenship with tribal identity’, exclusionary practices of more established and 
secure groups of self-styled ‘indigenes’ were sometimes directed towards those 
widely considered to have a more tenuous right to belong in Uganda.1180  
For a time, the NRM regime attempted to canalise such political energies. Having 
caved in to Western economic policy prescriptions in the form of structural 
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adjustment programmes in 1987, the regime waged revolutionary rhetorical war 
on Western cultural imperialism.1181 An ethnological impulse was increasingly 
perceptible and instrumentalised. A few months after Museveni’s apparent 
ideological conversion, the NRM set up its National Culture Committee, the aim 
was to ‘ensure that the different cultures are organised and used in the 
implementation of the ten-point programme of the NRM’.1182 Against the backdrop 
of UNESCO’s World Decade for Cultural Development, the NRM created its 
Directorate of Cultural Affairs in 1990, and declared plans to formulate a national 
policy on culture.1183 The regime hoped to turn activism into economic activity and 
cultural production for display in cultural museums and at events such as the 
Uganda Cultural Festival, planned for 1991, on the theme of ‘Culture for Unity in 
Development’.1184 
The ethnological vision quickly insinuated itself into  the national debate over 
citizenship.   The Odoki Commission had received various possible solutions to 
this issue from members of the public . But the recommendation that began to 
prevail envisaged the transformation of citizenship eligibility into a matter of 
ethnic categories. Rather than a right determined solely by geographic residence, 
the possibility of citizenship from birth was slated to be restricted to those born in 
Uganda who had a parent or grandparent from a Ugandan ethnic group—
whatever that was to mean in practice.1185 This path disregarded the very same 
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1990 report’s fears on the subject of possible consequences of such a criteria. The 
regime had ‘backed off from the political promise of Luwero’.1186 Redefining 
citizenship in this way necessitated the creation of an ethnological inventory. Just 
weeks after the interim report of the Odoki Commission had been submitted, the 
directorate of the National Population and Housing Census (NPHC) had, for the 
first time since the last colonial census of 1959, included a question about ethnicity 
in a population census.1187  It marked the beginning of a process that was to lead to 
an unusual innovation in the 1995 Constitution: an ethnonymic inventory: a 56-
strong list of ‘Uganda’s indigenous communities’.1188 This document came to 
include Gungu category thanks to the efforts of Buliisa’s representative to the 
Constituent Assembly who contested a shorter, 48-strong list that had appeared in 
the Odoki Commission’s 1993 draft constitution.  But it was also to included the 
Alur category. The NRM’s politically expedient formalisation of the politics of 
indigeneity offered little to the Gungu UPC faction, owing to the ambiguous 
national provenance of many of the Alur in Builiisa.  
Matters began to come to a head in 1991. Net thefts by gunmen, and net 
confiscations the Zairean authorities, led to the loss of not only nets worth 
millions of shillings, and therefore livelihoods, but also some lives in the first few 
months of 1991.1189  The situation was compounded by Uganda authorities 
increasing efforts to eliminate undersize gill nets, and all beach seine nets in 
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August 1991.1190  Alur had been ‘encouraged’ to leave in the face of  an increasingly 
‘negative attitude towards their presence on the part of the Bagungu’, leading to a 
50 per cent reduction in the size of the Wanseko fishing fleet, according to UN 
FAO researchers who visited the area that same month.1191 
In September 1991, affronted UPC Gungu RCII and RCI in their party’s lowland 
stronghold of Kisiabi Parish took matters into their own hands through the 
appropriation of classificatory violence.  Apparently against the advice of Masindi 
District Administrator, elected officials issued ‘all non-Bagungu’ in the fishing 
villages between Wanseko and Butiaba with an ‘eviction order’, giving them two 
days to leave. After the deadline passed without response, in the middle of the 
month the same men who had issued the ultimatum took drastic, violent action 
which was to earn Buliisa an unusual and ignominious place in the national 
spotlight. For about three days the Alur in several landing sites close to Buliisa 
Town in Kisiabi Parish were attacked by a Gungu mob wielding ‘pangas, clubs, 
bows and arrows’, according to reports by journalists and fisheries officers.  Before 
district authorities and the NRA were able to intervene and halt the expulsion, 
great destruction was carried out, sending shockwaves throughout the county. 
Several Alur were murdered and over 400 of their houses were razed or knocked 
down as they were ‘herded’ in their hundreds to the lake, and forced into boats to 
Zaire and the shorelines of Nebbi District. These evictees were quickly joined by 
other Alur, fleeing the villages on the northern and southern shorelines of the 
county owing to fears of receiving the same treatment. Even Alur living in the 
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hinterland of the county in Bugana and Ngwedo parishes began to uproot their 
recently planted cotton crop in preparation to take flight. Officials across the 
water in Nebbi District’s Panyimur estimated that about 12 boatloads of people 
escaped the violence. 1192  
Conclusion 
Once political circumstance extinguished hopes of contestation or inversion by 
other means, hierarchies of ethno-civilisationalism were reinscribed through the 
collectivising punishment against the Alur in Bugungu in 1991 by a disgruntled 
political faction among the increasingly insecure Gungu community. The 
previous two decades had strained state-society relations, attenuating links 
between intra-district centres and peripheries on multiple levels, sharpening local 
inequality and competition between and within communities, and engendering a 
strong sense of political, ecological and moral crisis. These processes had 
destabilised images of ethno-civilisational hierarchy, exhibiting the the ramifying, 
cascading legacies of colonial intra-African racialisation. ‘[E]xterminatory 
violence’, as Jonathan Glassman puts it, ‘tend[s] to be accompanied by rhetoric in 
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which ethnic categories are imagined as hierarchical strata, linked to one another 
in relationships that structure the entire society’.1193  
Classificatory violence on this scale did not repeat itself for some time. Activists 
found new stratagems for the pursuit of local control and historical grievance 
involved the paired invocations of of ‘indigeneity’ and ‘ethnic minority’ status.1194 
Smaller, less-known communities on the margins who found themselves re-
subsumed in 1993-1994 by the government-sanctioned restoration of old kingdoms 
in the form of ‘cultural institutions’. In a bid to secure former’s electoral support 
and recentralise power, particularly in response to the return of multi-partyism in 
2006, the regime distributed patronage by creating new administrative districts 
and electoral constituencies.1195 The government transformed the Gungu district 
minority into an apparent ‘majority’, as Buliisa was granted district status in July 
2006 by way of reward for NRM electoral loyalty, in response to sustained local 
lobbying from BaCA and the local council. Museveni audaciously cast such 
fragmentation as a part of radical project of liberation from ‘sub-colonialism’ and 
‘cultural chauvinism’.1196 
                                                        
1193 J. Glassman, ‘Slower than a massacre: The Multiple Sources of Racial Thought 
in Colonial Africa’, The American Historical Review 109, no. 3 (2004 ), pp. 720-754 
(730). 
1194 Minority status was not unproblematic or unambiguous in a country where no 
one ethnic group constituted more than 17 per cent of the population. Museveni’s 
government was resistant in terms of legal frameworks and international 
instruments related to this aspect of international human rights discourse; 
Uganda failed to ratify the Declaration of the Rights of Persons belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in December 1992.  
1195 The number of districts went up from 33 in 1990 to 80 in 2006, and were to 
reach about 130 in 2017. The number of MPs went up from 319 in 2006 to 426 in 
2016. 
1196 Yoweri Museveni, ‘Address To The Nation’, New Vision, 13 September 2004. 
The knowledge produced by Museveni’s state took on an increasingly 
ethnological character, undergirded by the constitutional oddity that was the 
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District status proved scarcely any better as weapon with which to  confront 
profound, multiplying, inter-connected challenges. Intensifying environmental 
crisis took the form of ever more extreme periods of drought and floods. The 
discovery of world-class oil reserves at sites across Buliisa by an Anglo-Irish 
exploration company in the mid-to-late 2000s involved and triggered 
militarisation and capitalist encroachment, enclosures, and land speculation. 
Struggles over shares in the proceeds of commercial exploitation pitted parties 
within Buliisa against both central government and Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom. 
Certain political interests were further threatened a demographic shift successive 
influxes of Alur refugees from the wartorn Democratic Republic of Congo since 
the late 1990s, and Nyarwanda transhumant cattle herders hailing from far to the 
south-west in the Uganda-Rwanda borderlands but present in a more 
subordinate, marginal fashion since at least as far back as the 1960s.  
Those in power in the lowlands held on through the deflection and infliction of 
ethno-civilisationalism’s discourses and practices on ethnic others. Perceived 
political insubordination in regard to elections continued to be met with renewed 
Gungu accusations of essential barbarity and criminality of ‘marauding’ 
interlopers.1197  Gungu political entrepreneurs attempted the mass expulsion of the 
Alur in 2004 and the Nyarwanda in 2007. After several years of courtroom 
struggles and flashpoints of inter-communal violence, an increasingly 
authoritarian, militarist state took matters into their own hands in early December 
                                                        
Third Schedule, to which the government agreed to augment by nine ethnic 
categories. Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Uganda Population and Housing Census: 
Analytical Report: Population Composition (Kampala, 2006), pp. 21–26; Republic of 
Uganda, ‘The Uganda National Cultural Policy: A culturally vibrant, cohesive and 
progressive nation’, December 2006. 
1197 Abel Kagoro, ‘The refugees have abused our kindness’, New Vision, 26 October 
2004 
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2010, as state security agencies carried out the extrajudicial ‘Operation Restore 
Justice’: a mass eviction of thousands of Nyarwanda and 10,000-20,000 heads of 
their cattle. Gungu discourses now promulgated a self-image as part of the 
national developmental mainstream of sedentary farmers in order to appealed to 
the NRM state ’s ethno-civilisational imperatives concerning the ‘indisciplined 




                                                        
1198 Yoweri Museveni, ‘President’s statement on Buliisa conflict’, New Vision, 19 
July 2007.  
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CONCLUSION 
‘Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?’.1199 
Africans in Uganda have not experienced a singular regime of violent punishment 
during their encounter with the modern bureaucratic state. The violence of 
punishment manifested colonialism’s defining ambivalence. Colonial rule could 
be conceived as ‘civilising’, ‘improving’,  and ‘tutelary’ in holding out the promise 
of merging the Other with the Self – the ‘uncivilised’ with the ‘civiliser’. But it also 
worked to preserve fundamental, unbridgeable alterity, marking and maintaining 
the ‘colonial rule of difference’ between colonised and coloniser – between  
‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’.1200  Races are, as Paul Gilroy puts it, ‘assembled, 
conjured into being, by the – usually violent – workings of racism’.1201 This 
inscription ramified throughout African society; in a society structured by such 
racial domination, it is through the ‘modality’ of race that ethnicity – and all other 
axes of difference – are refracted, structured, and experienced, as it is put by 
Jemima Pierre, following Stuart Hall. 1202 As ideas and practices of violent 
punishment cascaded, they racialised inter-ethnic relations. 
                                                        
1199 C.P. Cavafy, ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’, in George Savidis (ed.), Collected 
Poems (Princeton, NJ, 1975), p. 33. 
1200 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories (Oxford, 1994), p. 10.  
1201 Paul Gilroy, ‘Never Again: Refusing race and salvaging the human’, New Frame, 
20 June 2019, <https://www.newframe.com/long-read-refusing-race-and-salvaging-
the-human/> (accessed 10 August 2020). 
1202 Jemima Pierre, The predicament of blackness : postcolonial Ghana and the politics of 
race (Chicago, 2013), 5. Following, Stuart Hall, ‘Race, articulation and societies 
structured in dominance’, in UNESCO (ed.) Sociological Theories: Race and 
Colonialism (Paris, 1980), pp. 305-345 (341) 
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Colonial officials were wont to conceive of such punishment as ‘civilising’; the 
violent dispossession faced by forest peoples was understood as a means of 
forcible assimilation of ‘dying races’ into other ‘more civilised’ collectivities.1203 But 
in effect, the violence of punishment was profoundly classificatory. The 
classificatory violence of collectivising punishment produced and reproduced 
ethnic difference and hierarchy. This form of violence drew on and inscribed 
ideas of ethno-civilisational superiority and inferiority, reflecting the colonial 
encounter’s instrumental assimilation and reworking of a complex bundle of 
interrelated local taxonomies and stereotypes concerning livelihoods, gender, 
demography, environments, and positions in the economic structure and in 
relation to centralising units of socio-political organisation.  
At the margins where such ideas were practised they were felt more sharply and 
meaningfully than what one scholar has considered the ‘suggestive outlines’ 
provided by other identificatory technologies of colonial governance and 
knowledge production.1204 The colonial state brought to bear unprecedented – if 
still rather limited, inconsistent, and incoherent– coercive, intellectual, and 
bureaucratic resources in inculcating this way of ordering communities. It did so 
most powerfully through African ‘outsiders’ placed in the role of sub-coloniser 
among the sub-colonised. Such arrangements were unusual in most parts of the 
country. As Connor Cavanagh puts it, ‘diverse populations have been unevenly 
affected by these now often forgotten processes of intra-African racialisation’. 1205 
                                                        
1203 Connor Joseph Cavanagh, ‘Dying races, deforestation and drought: the 
political ecology of social Darwinism in Kenya Colony’s western highlands’, 
Journal of Historical Geography 66 (2019), pp. 93-103 (94). 
1204 James R. Brennan, Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania (Athens, 
OH, 2012), p. 12. 
1205 Cavanagh, ‘Dying races’, p. 102 
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This differential and differentiating punitive mode emerged in the wars of 
colonial conquest in interaction with local substrates of chauvinism. ‘In small wars 
against uncivilized nations’, advised one British military thinker of the time, ‘the 
form of warfare to be adopted must tone with the shade of culture existing in the 
land, by which I mean that, against peoples possessing a low civilization, war must 
be more brutal in type’.1206 But these ideas and practices were sustained by the 
colony – ‘a site in which “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without 
end”’.1207 Reactions and counter-reactions to early violence generated cycles of 
distrust, and sporadic efforts to more powerfully assert state authority that in turn 
made it more, not less difficult to shape ‘more civilised’ (i.e. more compliant) 
colonial subjects by other means – through the criminalisation and punishment of 
political contestation and insubordination.1208 Classificatory violence persisted 
endured through colonial administrative structures and cultures in post-colonial 
Uganda.   
But this thesis does not assign a determining, unilateral role to the colonial state 
and its agents.  Africans frequently challenged, resisted, and appropriated 
classificatory violence, and the ethno-civilisational stereotypes and markers that 
underpinned it. As discriminating and discriminatory state violence ramified, it 
was internalised, and deflected, sometimes with shocking consequences. The 
dizzying reversals, inversions and ironies of Buliisa’s past has left the Gungu 
category uneasily poised between subject and object of degradation; between 
victim and perpetrator of domination, displacement, dispossession, and 
                                                        
1206 J.F.C. Fuller, The reformation of war (London, 1923), 103. 
1207 Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003), pp. 11-40 (23).  
1208 Paul Nugent, Boundaries, communities, and state-making in West Africa: the 
centrality of the margins (Cambridge, 2019), p. 20. 
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exploitation; and between resistance and embrace of the logics and rubrics of 
colonialism. So-called ‘ethnic conflict’ of the sort Buliisa has so often witnessed, 
has developed ‘against and through’ Africa’s ‘relation to global racialized 
hierarchies’.1209  
This thesis works against the Ugandanist historiography’s headline rivalries and 
underlying civilisational narratives. It encourages the redirection of attention to 
elusive events and processes at the interstices, in an effort to disrupt the 
dichotomies – Bantu and non-Bantu, centralised and less centralised – that 
continue to powerfully shape the way Uganda is viewed and studied. 1210 These 
labels have often obscured the trajectories of particular political cultures – 
evolving in the encounter with the modern bureaucratic state – over the past 150 
years or more, revealing an ambiguous marginality at the nexus between language 
groups, forms of political organisation, and environmental niches that structure 
conventional views of Uganda. These places ‘betwixt and between’ in Uganda’s 
history has often been ignored as scholars uncritically accepted and reproduced 
an underlying ethno-spatial ordering that tended to reflect and reinforce power 
relations between and within communities. This ordering was long ago described 
by anthropologist Aidan Southall as the ‘convenient myth of Uganda as composed 
of Buganda and twelve other district tribes’.1211 Without puncturing this myth, and 
understanding the ethno-civilisational ideas and practices that it shaped, and by 
which it was itself shaped, the task of understand the animating forces behind the 
politics of identity in today’s Uganda is rendered extremely difficult. To this end, it 
                                                        
1209 Pierre, The Predicament, p. 5. 
1210 For a recent addition to this historiography, see Reid, A history. 
1211 Aidan W. Southall, ‘The current state of national integration in Uganda’, in D. 
R. Smock and K. Bentsi-Enchill (eds.), The search for national integration in Africa 
(New York, 1976), pp. 307-331 (pp. 311-312). 
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is necessary to probe the shadows and interstices of the tribal categories of the 
Andersonian census, map, and museum.1212 
The enduring marks of classificatory violence are subjected to fresh public 
inspections through new frames of discourse and action in the dim light of 
contemporary Uganda. One such framing arrived attached to the word 
‘indigenous’ – a term that had been in wide domestic usage, with different 
significance, for some time. The worldwide ‘indigenous peoples’ movement that 
emerged  in the 1970s was led by aboriginal communities largely from white settler 
colonies in the Americas and Australasia in reaction against the assimilationist 
tendencies of a human rights law hitherto in thrall to the ‘nation state’ model. 
Activists around the world sought domestic constitutional and legal provisions for 
definition and recognition of this political category,  and African judicial discourse 
came to assimilate this term in the mid-2000s owing largely to the Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations/Communities, established in 2003 by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and support from a 
handful of international NGOs, including Copenhagen-based International 
Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). In Uganda activism first focused 
on no more than half a dozen ethnic communities conventionally seen as hunter-
gatherers (e.g. Twa, Benet, and Ik) or transhumant pastoralists (e.g. Tepeth, and 
Ngikaramajong). 1213  But a larger movement coalesced with assistance from 
                                                        
1212 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (New York, 1991), pp. 163-185. 
1213 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Working Group of Experts 
on Indigenous Populations/Communities, Research and Information Visit to the 
Republic of Uganda 2006 (Banjul, 2008).  
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various international and national civil society actors of ‘NGO-ised’ Ugandan 
society.1214   
The analytical emphasis of the scholarship on African involvement in this 
movement has tended to be strongly instrumentalist. The dominance of this 
perspective is perhaps unsurprising. While the decades of neoliberal capitalism 
since the 1980s have ravaged Africa, these years saw the development of generous 
and well-resourced international NGOs, and an international jurisprudence that 
conferred an unusual range of privileges on ‘indigenous peoples’: from the right to 
the protection of identity and, even in the face of development projects, their 
collective cultural property –  including state-controlled resources – to the rights 
to education, employment, health, religion, language and more. Scholars have 
tended to see invocations of indigenous rights largely in terms of extraversion – as 
a strategy for accessing resources from states and civil society organisations, 
frequently to the detriment of ethnic ‘others’.1215   
But there is a need to understand the historical dimensions of communities’ 
articulations of conceptions of indigeneity. The literature has seen little 
elaboration of references to ‘real and remembered histories cultural experiences 
and pasts’ and ‘historically sedimented practices, landscapes and repertoires of 
                                                        
1214 Frederic Musisi, ‘Minority tribes meet’, The Monitor, 14 December 2012; and 
Equal Opportunities Commission, ‘Press release for International Day of the 
World’s Indigenous People’, 10 August 2017 <https://www.eoc.go.ug/media-
updates/2017/08/press-release-international-day-world’s-indigenous-people> 
(accessed 10 August 2020). NGOs such Kampala-based Cross-Cultural Foundation 
of Uganda and London-based Minority Rights Group featured prominently in this 
movement. 
1215 For example, see Jim Igoe ‘Becoming indigenous peoples: difference inequality 
and the globalization of East African identity politics’, African Affairs 105, no. 420 
(2006), pp.  399-430; Gabrielle Lynch, ‘Becoming indigenous in the pursuit of 
justice: the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Endorois’, 
African Affairs 111, no. 442 (2011), pp. 24-45. 
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meaning’.1216 In order to ‘more fully or empathetically understand the motivations, 
grievances and aspirations’, Cavanagh argues, it is necessary to adopt a ‘post-
colonial vantage point’, examining ‘the continuities between colonial discourses 
and contemporary arguments’.1217  Such a perspective is possible by using the 
transformation of the category of indigenous peoples as a lens. The legal category 
had at first been synonymous with ‘first peoples’; but this definition had 
increasingly been complicated by the presence of African and Asian activists in 
the movement. It needed new definitions that would accommodate those people 
in the post-colonial countries who claimed to experience the same structural role 
as ‘first peoples’; the outcome was though heavily contested and contestable. The 
new definition came to be associated with the notion of vulnerable ‘culturally 
distinct’ non-Western societies who had experience of marginalisation, 
dispossession, and internal colonialism linked to particular stigmatised 
livelihoods, and related custodial connections to environments and territories.   
The indigenous peoples movement became a key discursive medium through 
which ideas of ethno-civilisationalism and the enduring marks of classificatory 
violence could be debated, appropriated, reworked, and inverted. Anthropologist 
Adam Kuper put it simply, but quite provocatively: ‘the term ‘indigenous’ became 
a euphemism ‘for what used to be termed “primitive”’.1218 It can be seen to 
represent a means by which claims of having experienced the sharper edge of 
                                                        
1216 Tania Murray Li, ‘Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource 
Politics and the Tribal Slot’, CSSH 42, no . 1 (2000), pp. 149-179 (152); Gabrielle 
Lynch, ‘Kenya’s New Indigenes: Negotiating Local Identities in a Global Context’, 
Nations and Nationalism 17, no. 1 (2011), pp. 148–167. 
1217 Connor Joseph Cavanagh, ‘Dying races, deforestation and drought: the political 
ecology of social Darwinism in Kenya Colony’s western highlands’, Journal of 
Historical Geography 66 (2019), pp. 93-103 (102). 
1218 Adam Kuper, ‘Return of the native’, Current Anthropology 44, no. 3 (2003), pp. 
389-402. 
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differentiated colonial subjection can be parlayed for the privileges of 
differentiated citizenship. As the ACHPR Working Group put it, ‘[t]erms such as 
“underdeveloped”, “backward”, “primitive” and worse are regularly applied to 
some people and not others’.1219  
The movement shaped a new generation of Gungu activism. Activists had started 
to question the legitimacy and monopoly of the intermittently functioning BaCA – 
made up of Kampala elites, including a Gungu rentier tycoon and electoral 
financier who had obtained land titles in strategic locations across Buliisa’s oil 
fields. An educated but economically struggling cohort in their thirties, based 
largely in Buliisa, took action through bold new initiatives, while French, Chinese, 
and Anglo-Irish international oil companies and the government found 
themselves locked in disputes over taxes and refinery and export plans – 
especially after the price crash of 2014. Indigenous rights discourses inflected the 
promotional material of the Bugungu Heritage Information Centre (BHIC) formed 
in 2013 by activist Kiiza Patrick Wilson, and the launching of a related – but as  yet 
unsuccessful – bid for an official, state-supported ‘cultural institution’ by means of 
‘cultural secession’ from the Bunyoro Kingdom. The indigenous rights agenda 
(along with Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in 
the Niger Delta) was explicitly invoked in the Lake Albert Indigenous People 
Survival Movement (LAIPSUM), formed by a teacher-activist in 2014. 1220 
                                                        
1219 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Report of the African 
Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (New 
Jersey, 2005), p. 14  
1220 Munyomo Robert, ‘Open letter’, Facebook, 29 May 2014,  
<https://www.facebook.com/notes/kiiza-patrick-wilson/open-letter-to-unesco-by-
munyomo-robert/706548242740133> (Accessed 10 August 2020);Herbert Munyomo, 
‘Tilenga project could extinguish native Bagungu’, New Vision 21 November 2018 
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Gungu activists – like many others have – have experienced marginalisation 
within this movement of the marginal, however. To a certain extent this situation 
reflects activists’ lack of both clear grasp of the movement’s framing and the right 
connections with the government, UN agencies, and organisations such as the 
ACHPR’s Working Group and the IWGIA. But it also reflects the uneven 
distribution of wider legitimacy of claims to this exceptional status – just like 
claims of superior ethno-civilisational status among certain Africans under 
colonial rule. There are even apparent different tiers between and among even 
those conventionally seen the hunter-gatherers  and transhumant pastoralists 
atop the hierarchy of dehumanisation. 
Today’s unformalised hierarchy of ethno-civilisationalism has been shaped by 
various institutions. The NRM government has played a role, even while failing to 
grant the category constitutional recognition, to ratify UN ILO’s 1989 Convention 
169, or to vote on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. 
Indigenous rights remain, by definition,  a marginal issue, with politically 
unpalatable entailments, which the government has found little difficulty in 
resisting.1221 But broad support for, and rhetorical use of, the category in relation to 
‘top-tier’ claimant communities has issued from the Ministry of Gender, Labour & 
Social Development and the Equal Opportunities Commission, established in the 
late 2000s. This limited form of recognition from the government has influenced 
and been influenced by not only self-identified indigenous peoples themselves, 
but also outside specialists and advisers at the UN agencies, the ACHPR’s 
                                                        
1221 Rane Willerslev and Lotte Meinert, ‘Understanding Hunger with Ik Elders and 
Turnbull's The Mountain People’, Ethnos, 82, no. 5 (2017), 820–845 (p. 840–841). 
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Working Group and NGOs such as the IWGIA, who publish annual reports that 
validate the claims of a select few communities.1222  
Even de facto categorisations have had consequences. A deficit in the wider 
legitimacy of Gungu claims came to light in mid-2018 in heated discussions over 
the $3-4 billion Tilenga Project – an Industrial Area and a Central Processing 
Facility backed by a consortium led by Paris-based multinational oil corporation 
Total SA – planned for Buliisa’s inland north-east.1223 As well as impacting many 
people less directly, it required displacement of dozens of families and the 
compulsory acquisition – at a government-specified rate of compensation – of 
some 800 acres of relatively fertile land. But the project’s developers claimed that 
they were not obliged to conduct an extended community engagement and 
consultation process that would have been required in regard to ‘indigenous 
people’ under the rules of the World Bank’s International Financial 
Corporation.1224 In support of these claims, the project consultants had invoked 
the absence of the Gungu category from the IWGIA’s reports.  
The indigenous peoples movement has appeared in more than one guise in 
contemporary Uganda, however. One newer movement has emerged in 
connection with indigenous peoples’ claims to specialised knowledges and 
                                                        
1222 For details of an important Twa legal challenge to the government’s position, 
see Jeŕeḿie Gilbert & Kanyinke Sena, ‘Litigating indigenous peoples’ cultural 
rights: Comparative analysis of Kenya and Uganda’, African Studies 77, no. 2 (2018), 
pp. 204-222. 
1223 About 190,000 barrels of oil per day, collected from dozens of wells, will be 
processed by this intensely exploited and secured extractive enclave. 
1224 AECOM/Eco & Partner Consult, EA-1/EA-1A & EA-2 North Project ESIA Scoping 
Report (2015) 
<https://ug.total.com/sites/g/files/wompnd1236/f/atoms/files/ea1_1a_ea2_north_proj
ect_esia_scoping_report.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2020); Herbert Munyomo, 
‘Tilenga project could extinguish native Bagungu’, New Vision 21 November 2018 
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proclivities vis-à-vis the natural world. These ‘conservationist’ practices drew the 
attention of part of the global environmental movement that one scholar termed 
the ‘dark green religion’.1225 A key organisation of this variety is the relatively small 
but highly influential Gaia Foundation, established in the mid-1980s in 
Hampstead, north London, by a white activist in exile from apartheid-era South 
Africa, and her British businessman husband. Named after the ancient Greek 
mother earth goddess  – and, in turn, James Lovelock’s famous 1970 ‘hypothesis’  – 
the Gaia Foundation takes inspiration from many sources. But at the centre of the 
mission of such organisations is the re-spiritualisation of human relations with the 
natural world in order to rediscover a ‘lost harmony’. 
The philosophy and approach promoted by such organisations involves particular 
conceptions about indigenous peoples. Gaia is closely connected to indigenous 
peoples movement activists and organisations, counting among its longstanding 
associates and advisors a white Canadian sociolinguist called Nigel Crawhall, who 
for many years was the Director of the Secretariat for the Indigenous Peoples of 
Africa Coordinating Committee.1226 Among Gaia’s first patrons was Laurens van 
der Post, Afrikaner conservationist (in)famous for his obsessive quest for ‘unspoilt 
Edens’ and ‘unspoilt Africans’ in central and southern Africa.1227 Gaia presents a 
similarly romanticised, essentialised, and ethnicised view of indigenous peoples, 
particularly nature shrine custodians it casts as the embodiment of Rousseau’s 
                                                        
1225 Bron Taylor, Dark Green Religion:	Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future 
(Berkeley, 2009).  
1226 An informal network of African indigenous peoples activists founded by a 
Moroccan lawyer in 1997. 
1227 For more on this individual, who deeply influenced both Prince Charles and 
Margaret Thatcher, see John McCracken, ‘Imagining Nyika Plateau: Laurens van 
der Post, the Phoka and the Making of a Natural Park’, JSAS 32, no. 4 (2006), pp. 
807-821. 
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concept of the ecologically ‘noble savage’. The villains of the piece, according to 
Gaia, are colonialism and Christianity; capitalism rears its head only in the for of 
multinational resource extraction companies –  not as a system that has 
profoundly shaped relationships between and among peoples and their 
environment.1228   
Gaia’s approach involves combining these ideas about the nature of ‘indigenous 
people’ with the legalism of Western environmentalism. A key legal and political 
philosophy for Gaia is ‘Earth Jurisprudence’ developed its one-time patron, the 
late American theologian and cultural historian Thomas Berry. Constituting a 
rejection of anthropocentric legal systems – and a self-conscious response to 
deeply reactionary corporate legal activism – this approach involves conferring 
juristic personhood on ‘sacred natural sites and territories, and their customary 
governance systems’. Since the 1990s, Gaia has worked in the Amazon basin to 
refine a way to revive what it calls ‘community ecological governance’. This 
concept entails identifying ‘indigenous knowledge practices’ through ‘eco-
cultural’ documenting and mapping the ‘Rights of Nature’ as embodied by 
‘customary laws’ and ‘customary governance systems’, connected to sacred natural 
sites and their custodians. A tree or a lake, through its custodian, can thereby sue 
individuals or companies. 
The international campaign for ‘Rights of Nature’, in which Gaia played a key 
role, took off in the 2000s. The movement has made legal, judicial, and 
constitutional progress, particularly in central America; articles on the Rights of 
                                                        
1228 This perspective is unsurprising given that Gaia’s funding is partly sourced 
from the private philanthropic arms of capital, such as the Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund. 
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Nature were adopted in Ecuador’s Constitution in 2008, under the country’s first 
‘indigenous’ president Rafael Correa. Gaia was one of 18 organisations from 
around the world, who came together to form the Global Alliance for the Rights of 
Nature in order to capitalise on this momentum. But Gaia was also steadily 
developing connections in Africa, largely through the African Biodiversity 
Network in Kenya. In Uganda, Gaia cultivated a local partner in the form of the 
Kampala-based NGO, the National Association of Professional Environmentalists 
(NAPE). These organisations’ collaboration began with a European Commission-
funded 2007 project on indigenous knowledge systems pertaining to ‘cultural 
forests’. 
Gaia soon entered the NGO scramble for Buliisa that petroleum had triggered.  
The organisation was attracted, in particular, to the district’s largely forgotten and 
long-stigmatised complex of sacred clan shrines (the mpuluma) and their 
custodians (the balegezi or balamaansi) which had been identified during a survey 
of endangered ‘cultural resources’ conducted in 2011-2012 by the Bunyoro 
Kingdom, with co-ordination from NAPE.1229 In an effort to bring the Rights of 
Nature to Uganda, from about 2014 Gaia and its local NGO allies increasingly 
worked with Gungu ritualists like Kagole Margret Byarufu, of Wandyeka sacred 
natural site in Kisansya.1230 Together they developed proposals for legal 
                                                        
1229 Rose Nakayi and Annika Witte, ‘Making Cultural Heritage Claims on 
Profitable Land: The Case of the Ngassa Wells in Uganda’s Oil Region’, Africa 
Spectrum 54, no. 3 (2019), pp. 222–243. 
1230 National Association of Professional Environmentalists & Gaia Foundation, 
Advocating for Recognition and Protection of Water, Food Sovereignty and Sacred 
Natural Sites and Territories in Uganda`s Oil Region (Kampala, 2014). The other 
Ugandan NGOs included African Institute for Culture and Ecology (AFRICE) and 
Advocates for Natural Resources and Development (ANARDE).  
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recognition of Gungu right, as ‘local custodian community’ ‘to govern and protect 
Lake Albert as a sacred lake’ – the first in Africa.1231 
Environmental activism has paid greater legal dividends in Uganda than the 
indigenous peoples movement that it seeks to galvanise. A 2017 ACHPR resolution 
resulted from Gaia and its allies’ efforts to secure ‘Legal Recognition of Sacred 
Natural Sites and Territories, and their Customary Governance Systems'.1232 With 
this momentum, the process of documenting and eco-cultural mapping the Rights 
of Nature began in Buliisa in November 2018 , ahead of the recognition of the 
Rights of Nature by Uganda’s Parliament in its National Environment Act on 7 
March 2019.1233 November that year witnessed the passing of new ordinances in the 
Buliisa District Council, formally recognising and protecting sacred natural sites 
and ‘customary laws’ of 26 Gungu ‘custodial clans’, now organised within the new 
‘custodian clans association’.  
                                                        
1231 Kagole Margret Byarufu, ‘African rural women, custodians of seed and 
traditional knowledge’, Langscape Magazine 5, no. 2 (Winter 2016), pp. 43-45; ‘A Call 
for  
1232 Dennis Tabaro, ‘The relevance of respecting sacred natural sites’, New Vision, 
23 June 2017. 
1233 Article 4 provides that ‘nature has the right to exist, persist, maintain and 
regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution’, and 
that ‘a person has a right to bring an action before a competent court for any 
infringement of rights of Nature under this Act’ 
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Figure 36: NAPE, 'Map showing Mpuluma and territories on Lake Mwitanzige' (2019). 
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It is difficult to predict the consequences of the introduction of these new legal 
tools in the hands custodians long derided and denigrated, and often lacking 
formal education. But Gaia’s efforts to revalidate the notion of ‘indigenous people’ 
in Uganda by this indirect route has had certain immediate effects, and not just in 
terms of ‘naturali[sing] the colonial history of legal personhood’.1234 The 
organisation has rendered the lowlands a space of experimentation once more. 
The laws for which Gaia campaigned have for one thing established intra-ethnic 
hierarchies, placing the ecological and ritual authority of the 26 ‘custodial clans’, 
over that of the 56 or so other clans. Perhaps more consequentially, it also 
officialises and formalises ethno-territorialism by means redolent of colonial-era 
codification of ‘tribal’ customary law and ethno-cartography, limiting 
custodianship of natural sites and, by extension, the encompassing district to 
people of Gungu ethnicity. As such, the new laws implicitly construct non-Gungu 
as the primary sources of contamination and corruption.1235  Activists have used 
the ideas that structured ethno-civilisational hierarchies to legitimise their ethnic 
primacy in a hierarchy of claims to belonging and ownership.  
Nowhere do the frozen images of such framings do justice to history; but they are 
rendered a conspicuous mockery by the story of the lowlands. While Buliisa today 
remains remote – in late 2019 it still lacked an all-weather road – the romanticised, 
essentialist images deployed in ethnic ‘branding’ are difficult to square with 
nostalgic local narratives of ‘wild’ capitalist extractivism and accumulation by 
                                                        
1234 Ariel Rawson & Becky Mansfield, ‘Producing juridical knowledge: ‘‘Rights of 
Nature’’ or the naturalization of rights?’, Environment and Planning E 1, no. 1-2 
(2018), pp. 99-119 (100).  
1235 They are not alone in this, among Western conservationists. For example, see 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Migration and conservation in 
the Lake Albert Ecosystem (Winnipeg, 2015). 
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Gungu individuals and ethnically-demarcated corporations enticing and 
exploiting ‘migrant’ workers.1236 But in keeping with Ugandan politics, class is 
erased from analysis and narrative by discourses on the rights of indigenous 
peoples and the Rights of Nature. These movements are silent on the political 
economy of the crisis that produced them. 
  
                                                        
1236 For more on ethnic branding, see John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity, 
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Gilbert, Jeŕeḿie, and Kanyinke Sena, ‘Litigating indigenous peoples’ cultural 
rights: Comparative analysis of Kenya and Uganda’, African Studies 77, no. 2 
(2018), pp. 204-222 
Girling, Frank Knowles, The Acholi of Uganda (London, 1960) 
Glassman, Jonathon, ‘Slower Than a Massacre: The Multiple Sources of Racial 
Thought in Colonial Africa’,	The American Historical Review 109, no. 3, 
(2004) pp. 720–754  
---, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2011)  
---, ‘Ethnicity and Race in African Thought’, in William H. Worger, Charles 
Ambler, and Nwando Achebe (eds.), A Companion to African History 
(Hoboken, NJ, 2018), pp. 200-223  
Gordon, Charles E., ‘The Khedive's Expedition to the Lake Districts’, PRGS 21, no. 1 
(1876), pp. 56-63 
---, ‘Unpublished letters of Charles George Gordon’, SNR 10 (1927), pp. 1-59  
Gordon, David, ‘Growth without Capital: A Renascent Fishery in Zambia and 
Katanga, 1960s to Recent Times’, JSAS 31, no. 3 (2005), pp. 495-511 
Gorju,	J.,	Entre le Victoria, l'Albert et l'Edouard (Rennes, 1920) 
Grant, James Augustus, A Walk Across Africa (London, 1864) 
---, ‘Summary of Observations’, The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of 
London 42 (1872) 
Gray, John Milner, ‘The Diaries of Emin Pasha- Extracts XI’, UJ 30, no. 2 (1966), pp. 
191-200  
Green, Elliott, ‘Explaining African ethnic diversity’, International Political Science 
Review 34, no. 3 (2013), pp. 235-253 
 365 
Grogan, Edward S., From the Cape to Cairo (London, 1900) 
Grosfoguel, Ramón, ‘Race and ethnicity or racialized ethnicities?: Identities within 
global coloniality’, Ethnicities 4 (2004), pp. 315-336 
Hall, Bruce, A History of Race in Muslim West Africa, 1600–1960 (Cambridge, 2011) 
Hall, J.H., ‘Foreword: Some Notes on the Economic Development of Uganda’, in 
E.B. Worthington, A development plan for Uganda: December 1946 (London, 
1947), pp. iii-xii  
Hall, Stuart, ‘Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance’, in 
UNESCO (ed.) Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism (Paris, 1980), pp. 
305-345 
Hamilton, Carolyn and John Wright, ‘The Making of the AmaLala: Ethnicity, 
Ideology and Relations of Subordination in a Precolonial Context’, South 
African Historical Journal 22, no 1 (1990), pp. 3-23 
Hansen, Holger Bernt, Ethnicity and military rule in Uganda (Scandinavian Institute 
of African Studies, 1977) 
---, ‘Uganda in the 1970s: A Decade of Paradoxes and Ambiguities’, JEAS 7, no. 1 
(2003), 83-103 
Harrison, A., ‘Louis St Clair Bartholomew’, Scottish Mountaineering Club Journal 25 
(1953), pp. 170-172 
Hassan, Vita, Die Wahrheit über Emin Pascha (Berlin, 1893) 
Hastings, Adrian, The construction of nationhood: ethnicity, religion and nationalism 
(Cambridge, 1997)  
Heasty, J. A., English-Shilluk, Shilluk-English Dictionary (Dolieb Hill, 1974 [1937]) 
Higiro-Semajege, F., The role of National Trading Corporations in stimulating African 
entrepreneurship ( Kampala, 1968) 
Hingston, R.W.G., ‘The Only Way of Saving African Fauna’, Illustrated London 
News, 13 December 1930 
---, ‘Proposed British National Parks for Africa’, The Geographical Journal 77, no. 5 
(1931), pp. 401-422  
Hodges, A.D.P., ‘Report on Sleeping sickness in Unyoro and Nile valley’, RSSCRS, 
no. 8 (1907), pp. 86-99 
---, ‘Report on Sleeping Sickness in Uganda from January 1st to June 30th, 1906’, 
RSSCRS 9 (1908), pp. 3-62 
Hopkins, A.G., ‘Big business in African Studies’, JAH 28 (1987) pp. 119-140  
Hopkins, Benjamin D., ‘The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Frontier 
Governmentality’, The Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 2 (2015), 369-389 
Hoppe, Kirk Arden, Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 
1900-1960 (London, 2003) 
Hynd, Stacey, ‘Law, Violence and Penal Reform: State Responses to Crime and 
Disorder in Colonial Malawi, c.1900–1959’, JSAS 37, no. 3 (2011), pp. 431-447 
Igbafe, Philip A., ‘Western Igbo Society and Its Resistance to British Rule: The 
Ekumeku Movement,	1898-1911’, JAH 12, no. 3 (1971), pp. 441-459 
Igoe, Jim, ‘Becoming indigenous peoples: difference inequality and the 
globalization of East African identity politics’, African Affairs 105, no. 420 
(2006), pp.  399-430 
Iliffe, John, A modern history of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979) 
Ingham, Kenneth, ‘The	Amagasani	of the Abakama of Bunyoro’, UJ 17, no. 2 (1953), 
pp. 138-145  
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Migration and conservation in 
the Lake Albert Ecosystem (Winnipeg, 2015) 
Isaac, Benjamin, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton, NJ, 2004) 
 366 
Jacobs, Nancy J., ‘Environment, Production and Social Difference in the Kalahari 
Thornveld, c1750-1830’, JSAS 25, no. 3 (1999), pp. 347-373 
Johnston, Harry H., The Uganda Protectorate, 2 vols. (2; London, 1902)   
---,  A comparative study of the Bantu and Semi-Bantu languages (Oxford, 1919) 
Jørgensen, Jan Jelmert, Uganda: A Modern History (London, 1981) 
Junker, Wilhelm, Travels in Africa during the Years 1882-1886 (London, 1892) 
Kamuhangire, Efuraimu Rwumva, ‘The Pre-Colonial History of the Salt Lakes 
Region of South Western Uganda, c. 1000-1900 AD’, (Makerere University, 
1993)  
Karubanga, H.K., Bukya nibwira (Nairobi, 1949) 
Kenny, Michael G., ‘Mirror in the Forest: The Dorobo Hunter-Gatherers as an 
Image of the Other’, Africa 51, no. 1 (1981), pp. 477-495 
Kirk-Greene, Anthony H. M., ‘‘Damnosa Hereditas’: Ethnic ranking and the 
martial races imperative in Africa’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 3, no. 4 (1980), 
pp. 393-414  
Kitching, A. L., On the backwaters of the Nile (London, 1912)  
Knapp, Steven, ‘Collective Memory and the Actual Past’, Representations 26 (1989), 
pp. 123-149 
Kolsky, Elizabeth, ‘The Colonial Rule of Law and the Legal Regime of 
Exception:	Frontier “Fanaticism” and State Violence in British India’, 
American Historical Review 120, no. 4 (2015), pp. 1218-1246 
Kopytoff, Igor, ‘The Internal	African Frontier: The Making of African Political 
Culture’, in Igor Kopytoff (ed.), The African frontier:	the reproduction of 
traditional African societies (Bloomington, IN, 1987), pp. 3-81 
Kuper, Adam, ‘Return of the native’, Current Anthropology 44, no. 3 (2003), pp. 389-
402 
KUR&H, The travellers' guide to Kenya and Uganda (Nairobi, 1936) 
Kwamya, Zakayo K., ‘Okufa kw'omwana wa Rev. H. Bowers, Emasindi’, Ebifa mu 
Buganda, no. 220 (1925), pp. 109-110   
Kyomuhendo, Goretti, Waiting (New York, 2007) 
Laclau, Ernest, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London, 1990) 
Lanning, E. C., ‘Kikukule: guardian of southeastern Bunyoro’, UJ 32, no. 2 (1968), 
pp. 119-147  
Leonardi, Cherry, Dealing with government in South Sudan: histories of chiefship, 
community & state (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2013) 
Levine, Hal B., ‘Reconstructing Ethnicity’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 5, no. 2 (1999), pp. 165-180. 
Li, Tania Murray, ‘Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics 
and the Tribal Slot’, CSSH 42, no . 1 (2000), pp. 149-179 
Lloyd, Albert B., Uganda to Khartoum (London, 1906) 
Lonsdale, John, ‘Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism’, in P. Kaarsholm and J. 
Hultin (eds.), Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological 
Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (Roskilde, 1994), pp. 131-
150 
---, ‘Soil, Work, Civilisation, and Citizenship in Kenya’, JEAS 2, no. 2 (2008), pp. 
305-314 
---, ‘Ethnic patriotism and markets in African history’, in Hiroyuki Hino, Arnim 
Langer, John Lonsdale, and Frances Stewart (eds.), Ethnic Diversity and 
Economic Instability in Africa: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge, 2012), 
pp. 19–55  
 367 
---, ‘Kenya’s four ages of ethnicity’, in Hino et al (eds.), From Divided Pasts to 
Cohesive Futures: Reflections on Africa (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 15-68 
Low, D.A., ‘Uganda Unhinged’, International Affairs 49, no. 2 (1973), pp. 219-228  
Low, D. A. and J. Lonsdale, ‘Towards the New Order, 1945-1963’, in D. A. Low and 
Alison Smith, History of East Africa, vol. III (Oxford, 1976), pp. 1-63 
---,	Fabrication	of Empire: The British and the	Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902 
(Cambridge, 2009)  
Lwanga, P.M.K, Obulamu bw'Omutaka: J.K. Miti Kabazzi (Kampala, 1954) 
Lynch, Gabrielle, ‘Becoming indigenous in the pursuit of justice: the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Endorois’, African 
Affairs 111, no. 442 (2011), pp. 24-45 
---,	 ‘Kenya’s New Indigenes: Negotiating Local Identities in a Global Context’, 
Nations and Nationalism 17, no. 1 (2011), pp. 148–167Lyons, Maryinez, The 
Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900-
1940 (Cambridge, 1992) 
MacArthur, Julie, ‘Decolonizing Sovereignty: States of Exception along the Kenya-
Somali Frontier’, American Historical Review 124, no. 1 (2019), pp. 108-143  
Maddox,	H. E.,	An Elementary	Lunyoro	Grammar (London, 1902) 
Major, Andrew J., ‘State and Criminal Tribes in Colonial Punjab: Surveillance, 
Control and Reclamation of the ‘Dangerous Classes’, Modern Asian Studies, 
Vol. 33, 3 (1999) 
Mamdani, Mahmood, Define and rule: native as political identity (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2012) 
Marjomaa, Risto, ‘The Martial Spirit: Yao Soldiers in British Service in Nyasaland 
(Malawi), 1895-1939’, JAH 44, no. 3 (2003), pp. 413-432  
Marston, Jay, ‘Uganda, land of something new’, National Geographic 71, no. 1 (1937), 
pp. 109-130 
Mazrui, Ali, ‘Ethnic Stratification and the Military-Agrarian Complex: The 
Uganda Case’, in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: 
Theory and Experience (Cambridge, Mass, 1975), pp. 420-452 
Mbembe, Achille, ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003), pp. 11-40 
McCracken, John, ‘Imagining Nyika Plateau: Laurens van der Post, the Phoka and 
the Making of a Natural Park’, JSAS 32, no. 4 (2006), pp. 807-821 
Middleton, Dorothy (ed.), The diary of A. J. Mounteney Jephson: Emin Pasha Relief 
Expedition, 1887-1889 (London, 1969) 
Mill, John Stuart, Considerations on Representative Government, 2nd ed. (London, 
1861) 
Mitchell, J.C., The Kalela Dance, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 27 (Manchester, 
1956), pp. 26-27 
Mitchell, Philip Euen, Native Administration (Entebbe, 1939) 
---, African Afterthoughts (London, 1954) 
Moses, Michael, ‘A history of Wadelai [26 October 1901]’, UJ 17, no. 1 (1953), pp. 78-
80 
Musisi, Nakanyike B., ‘Morality as Identity: the Missionary Moral Agenda in 
Buganda,1877–1945’, Journal of Religious History 23, no. 1 (1999), pp. 51-74 
Nakayi, Rose, and Annika Witte, ‘Making Cultural Heritage Claims on Profitable 
Land: The Case of the Ngassa Wells in Uganda’s Oil Region’, Africa 
Spectrum 54, no. 3 (2019), pp. 222–243 
Nakiwafu, Nuwa K., ‘Hoima, Bunyoro’, Ebifa mu Buganda, no. 58 (1911), pp. 1-3 
 368 
National Association of Professional Environmentalists & Gaia Foundation, 
Advocating for Recognition and Protection of Water, Food Sovereignty and Sacred 
Natural Sites and Territories in Uganda`s Oil Region (Kampala, 2014) 
Neumann, Roderick, ‘Ways of seeing Africa: colonial recasting of African society 
and landscape in Serengeti National Park’, Ecumene 2, no. 2 (1995), pp. 149-
69 
---, ‘Dukes, Earls, and Ersatz Edens: Aristocratic Nature Preservationists in 
Colonial Africa’, Environment and Planning D 14, no. 1 (1996), pp. 79-98 
---, ‘Africa’s ‘Last Wilderness’: Reordering Space for Political and Economic 
Control in Colonial Tanzania, Africa 71, no. 4 (2001), pp. 641-665 
---, ‘The Postwar Conservation Boom in British Colonial Africa’, Environmental 
History 7, no. 1 (2002), pp. 22-47 
Newbury, David, ‘Bunyabungo: The Western Frontier in Rwanda, c. 1750-1850’, in 
Igor Kopytoff (ed.), The African frontier (London, 1987), pp. 164-192 
---, ‘Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties’, IJAHS 
34, no. 2 (2001), pp. 255-314  
---, The land beyond the mists: essays on identity and authority in precolonial Congo and 
Rwanda (Athens, GA, 2009) 
Newbury, M. Catharine, ‘Colonialism, Ethnicity, and Rural Political Protest: 
Rwanda and Zanzibar in Comparative Perspective’, Comparative Politics 15, 
no. 3 (1983), pp. 253-280 
Northrup, David, Beyond the bend in the river : African labor in eastern Zaire, 1865-1940 
(Athens, OH, 1988) 
Nugent, P., Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: 
The Life of the Borderlands since 1914 (Oxford, 2002)  
---, ‘Putting the History Back into Ethnicity: Enslavement, Religion, and Cultural 
Brokerage in the Construction of Mandinka/Jola and Ewe/Agotime 
Identities in West Africa, c. 1650 – 1930’, CSSH 50, no. 4 (2008), pp. 920-948 
---, Boundaries, communities, and state-making in West Africa: the centrality of the 
margins (Cambridge, 2019) 
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